RLA Preclusion Is Accommodation-Specific: Odell Does Not Automatically Bar Vaccine-Mandate Accommodation Claims

1. Introduction

In Andrew DesOrmeaux v. Kalitta Air, LLC (6th Cir. July 6, 2026) (unpublished), pilot Andrew DesOrmeaux sued Kalitta Air after the company implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy and placed him on unpaid leave when he did not become “fully vaccinated.” DesOrmeaux alleged that Kalitta unlawfully refused to accommodate him and discriminated against him under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and violated parallel Michigan civil-rights statutes; he also asserted retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADA.

The central appellate question was not whether Kalitta’s vaccine policy was wise or medically justified, but whether DesOrmeaux’s statutory discrimination claims were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because resolving them would require interpreting the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Kalitta relied heavily on Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC, 107 F.4th 523 (6th Cir. 2024), where similar accommodation claims were held precluded because the requested accommodations would have required schedule changes affecting a seniority-based bidding system governed by the CBA.

A second issue concerned procedure: whether DesOrmeaux preserved arguments against dismissal of his retaliation counts, given the district court’s conclusion that his opposition was perfunctory and failed to engage Kalitta’s legal arguments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded:

  • Affirmed dismissal of Count I (Title VII retaliation) and Count III (ADA retaliation), largely on forfeiture/waiver grounds.
  • Affirmed summary judgment on Count IV (ADA “regarded as” disability discrimination) because DesOrmeaux waived meaningful appellate review by not developing arguments distinguishing Odell.
  • Reversed summary judgment on Count II (ADA failure to accommodate) and on Counts V and VI (Michigan disability and civil-rights claims), holding that the district court incorrectly treated Odell as automatically dispositive despite a potentially material factual distinction in the accommodation sought.
  • Remanded for further proceedings on the revived claims.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. RLA framework and “minor dispute” preclusion

  • Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67 (2009)
    The court used this decision for the basic distinction between “major” and “minor” disputes under the RLA, framing why disputes governed by an existing CBA are channeled into arbitral mechanisms.
  • Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994)
    This case anchored two key propositions: (i) RLA preclusion applies to both federal and state claims when the dispute turns on interpreting/applying a CBA; and (ii) “purely factual questions” about conduct and motive generally do not require CBA interpretation.
  • Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988)
    Cited through Norris to reinforce that factual disputes over conduct/motive typically are not preempted merely because a CBA exists.
  • Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 792 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986)
    Provided the Sixth Circuit’s oft-quoted formulation that an action is precluded where it is “based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance machinery of the [CBA] and of the R.L.A.”
  • DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994)
    Supplied the Sixth Circuit’s two-part test (as applied in later cases): RLA/CBA preclusion exists if the case requires interpretation of the CBA or if the CBA creates the right asserted.
  • Emswiler v. CSX Transp., Inc., 691 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2012)
    Used for both summary judgment standards and an important RLA point: the arbitration mandate is not jurisdictional but “merits-related,” citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
  • Stanley v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 808 F. App'x 351 (6th Cir. 2020)
    Reinforced that invoking a CBA as a defense is insufficient for preclusion; the CBA must “conclusively resolve” the dispute for it to be “inextricably intertwined.”
  • Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC, 107 F.4th 523 (6th Cir. 2024)
    The key comparator. Odell held that accommodation claims tied to scheduling modifications were precluded because deciding “reasonableness” and “undue hardship” would require interpreting seniority-based bidding provisions in the CBA. In DesOrmeaux, the Sixth Circuit treated Odell as controlling only where the requested accommodation truly implicates CBA scheduling/seniority mechanisms.

B. Standards of review and procedural preservation

  • Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149 (6th Cir. 2014))
    Provided the de novo standard for Rule 12(b)(6) and the requirement to construe allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.
  • Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2021))
    Used for the rule that perfunctory, undeveloped arguments are typically forfeited.
  • Puckett v. Lexington- Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Dye v. Off. of the Racing Comm'n, 702 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2012); Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004); Bolden v. City of Euclid, 595 F. App'x 464 (6th Cir. 2014))
    Supported the conclusion that failing to develop an issue in appellate briefing waives review.
  • Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004))
    Cited for the limited “miscarriage of justice” exception to considering forfeited arguments.
  • Guyan Int'l, Inc. v. Pro. Benefits Adm'rs, Inc., 689 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2006))
    Emphasized the appellate role: review the case actually presented below, not a new, improved version.

C. Pleading standards for retaliation dismissals

  • Sturgill v. Am. Red Cross, 114 F.4th 803 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))
    Provided the plausibility pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2014); Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2019))
    These cases framed what qualifies as “protected activity” (complaining/reporting discriminatory practices) and confirmed but-for causation in Title VII retaliation.
  • Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm'n, 999 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2021); Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc., 150 F.4th 751 (6th Cir. 2025)
    Reinforced the meaning and application of but-for causation in retaliation (Title VII and ADA, respectively).
  • Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC, 154 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025); Creusere v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati, 88 F. App'x 813 (6th Cir. 2003); Stanley v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 808 F. App'x 351 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2019))
    These authorities were invoked to show doctrinal uncertainty on whether a request for accommodation itself is protected “opposition” activity under Title VII—an uncertainty the panel did not resolve on the merits because DesOrmeaux forfeited key counterarguments.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The core holding: Odell is not a blanket rule—RLA preclusion turns on the specific accommodation and record

The district court treated Odell as dispositive: because DesOrmeaux (like the Odell plaintiffs) was a pilot under the same CBA and sought relief from the same vaccine policy, the court assumed any “reasonable accommodation” analysis would necessarily require interpreting seniority-based scheduling provisions—thus making the dispute “minor” and channeling it to RLA arbitration.

The Sixth Circuit rejected that automatic application at the summary judgment stage. The panel emphasized:

  • Kalitta bore the burden (as the party asserting preclusion) to show the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA.
  • Not all accommodation theories implicate scheduling. The crucial distinction was DesOrmeaux’s assertion that he sought recognition that his immunity/recovery status allowed him to fly to all destinations without a second dose—i.e., an accommodation that (if factually true) would not require schedule changes and thus might not require CBA interpretation.
  • Factual development mattered. Whether he truly was eligible to enter all relevant countries—and whether Kalitta could schedule him without altering bid/seniority outcomes—were fact questions inadequately resolved by treating Odell as controlling “as a matter of law.”

Accordingly, the panel held the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the ADA failure-to-accommodate claim (Count II) and, because the same logic drove the state-law dismissals, on the Michigan claims (Counts V and VI) as well.

B. Limits of the reversal: scheduling accommodations still trigger Odell

The court also made clear what did not change: to the extent a plaintiff’s accommodation request entails scheduling modifications affecting seniority-bid processes, Odell remains controlling that adjudicating “reasonableness”/“undue hardship” will require interpreting the CBA. The panel explicitly rejected the argument that Kalitta’s alleged practice of bypassing seniority-bidding made the CBA irrelevant—because deciding whether the provision is mandatory is itself an interpretive exercise.

C. Why Count IV (regarded-as disability) stayed dismissed

The panel affirmed summary judgment on Count IV not because it necessarily disagreed with DesOrmeaux on the merits, but because he did not develop an appellate argument distinguishing his “regarded as” theory from the analogous claim in Odell. Under Puckett v. Lexington- Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't, undeveloped briefing results in waiver of appellate review.

D. Retaliation counts: dismissal affirmed due to forfeiture and lack of developed opposition

The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Counts I and III primarily on procedural grounds: DesOrmeaux did not respond in the district court to Kalitta’s key dismissal points (protected activity under Title VII; but-for causation under Title VII and the ADA), instead offering conclusory and largely misaligned arguments. On appeal, he attempted to add new theories (e.g., verbal opposition and investigative activity via company devices), but the court applied standard forfeiture principles (Heyward v. Cooper; Guyan Int'l, Inc. v. Pro. Benefits Adm'rs, Inc.), declining to consider arguments not presented below absent a miscarriage of justice.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical significance for RLA-governed employers and employees

Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion supplies a clear, litigation-shaping principle within the Sixth Circuit’s existing RLA framework:

  • Employers cannot win RLA-preclusion summary judgment by citation alone. Where the plaintiff plausibly frames an accommodation that might avoid CBA interpretation (here, an immunity-based eligibility theory), courts must examine the record rather than treating Odell as universally dispositive.
  • Plaintiffs can sometimes plead and prove around preclusion by articulating accommodations that do not require schedule reshuffling, seniority displacement, or other CBA-defined mechanisms—though the opinion also signals that factual accuracy will be tested on remand.
  • State-law civil-rights claims rise and fall with the same preclusion logic when they track the federal accommodation inquiry and would require the same CBA interpretation (Norris).

B. Procedural discipline in retaliation litigation

The opinion is also a cautionary procedural precedent: retaliation claims can be lost not only on the merits but through failure to meaningfully oppose a motion to dismiss. The panel’s approach underscores that plaintiffs must directly address “protected activity” and “but-for causation” in their district court briefing, or risk affirmance on forfeiture grounds.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RLA “major” vs. “minor” disputes: “Major” disputes concern forming or changing a CBA; “minor” disputes concern applying an existing CBA. Minor disputes generally must be resolved through the CBA/RLA grievance and arbitration system, not in court.
  • “Inextricably intertwined” with a CBA: A claim is precluded when deciding it would require the court to interpret CBA terms (not merely read or reference them). If the CBA would “conclusively resolve the dispute” (Stanley), the case belongs in arbitration.
  • Why accommodations can trigger CBA interpretation: If an employee’s proposed accommodation changes scheduling, seniority, bidding, or other negotiated workplace rules, the court may have to decide what the CBA permits or requires—an interpretive task the RLA channels to arbitration.
  • “But-for causation” in retaliation: The employee must plausibly allege (and later prove) that the adverse action would not have happened absent the protected activity. It is not enough that protected activity and adverse action occurred close in time.
  • Forfeiture/waiver: If a party does not develop an argument when it matters—especially in response to a dispositive motion—appellate courts usually will not consider later reformulations of the case.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision establishes an important limitation on broad readings of Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC: RLA preclusion is accommodation-specific and record-dependent. Where a plaintiff advances evidence-supported facts suggesting an accommodation could be provided without modifying CBA-governed scheduling or seniority mechanisms, a court may not grant summary judgment by assuming the CBA must be interpreted. At the same time, the opinion reinforces strict preservation rules—retaliation theories not squarely argued at the district court level are likely to be lost on appeal.