Right-of-Way Does Not Immunize the Preferred Driver: Comparative Fault Applies to Stop-Sign Yield Violations Under Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of appellate review after a bench trial

The Court framed its review through Clark Tr. of Lenore H. Clark Living Tr. Dated Sept. 24, 1992 v. Fuller (quoting Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC): factual findings are reviewed for clear error, with deference to credibility determinations; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. This mattered because Bunning’s challenge, though couched as “misapplication” of comparative fault, ultimately depended on the trial court’s fault allocation and proximate-cause findings—areas where the appellant faces a steep clear-error hurdle.

2) The breadth and purpose of Wyoming comparative fault

The Court relied on a line of cases explaining that Wyoming adopted comparative fault to soften contributory negligence’s harshness while still allowing defendants to reduce or defeat damages by proving plaintiff fault:

• Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co. (comparative fault’s role and legislative purpose; also used to underscore apportionment across negligence actions)
• Parrish v. Groathouse Const., Inc. (a plaintiff with fault >50% is not entitled to recovery under § 1-1-109(b))
• Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc. (comparative fault as a “fair system of apportionment” in negligence actions; special concurrence highlighting broad application)
• Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Teton Cnty. ex rel. Teton Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Bassett (supporting the statutory shift away from strict contributory negligence)
• Strong Const., Inc. v. City of Torrington (comparative fault applies to tort claims seeking personal injury or property damages caused by another’s fault)
• Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Min. Expls. Co., and Sherman v. Platte Cnty. (collectively reinforcing that modern negligence adjudication requires finding negligence and apportioning it among parties)
• Anderson Highway Signs & Supply, Inc. v. Close (explaining how various subsections of § 1-1-109 operate depending on whether a claimant is free of fault)

These authorities were used to reject Bunning’s effort to carve out a “right-of-way exception” to fault comparison. The Court treated § 1-1-109’s text (“all actions” seeking damages for injury to person or property) as the default rule, absent an express legislative carve-out.

3) When the Legislature limits comparative fault—and how courts identify such limits

The Court’s statutory harmonization analysis leaned heavily on the concept (and examples) that the Legislature can limit comparative fault in particular settings, but must do so clearly:

• Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp. of Wyoming (recognizing legislative power to limit or reject comparative negligence in defined circumstances)
• Huff v. Shumate (federal district court decision applying Greenwalt’s concept; explains that Wyoming did limit comparative fault via a statute barring seat-belt nonuse evidence, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f))
• Within Huff v. Shumate, examples of express legislative modifications: the Dram Shop statute (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301) and the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123), including § 1-1-123(a)-(c); and a reference to Halpern v. Wheeldon

By contrasting those explicit limits with the text of § 31-5-222(b), the Court reasoned that the absence of any language restricting fault comparison in stop-sign collisions was decisive: the Legislature “knows how” to restrict § 1-1-109 and did not do so here.

4) Textualism and the prohibition on “reading in” exceptions

The Court cited several recent Wyoming cases for the interpretive rule that courts may not insert words the Legislature omitted:

• Castaner v. State (impermissibility of reading additional language into a statute)
• Matter of Est. of Haack (omissions are treated as intentional; courts won’t supply missing terms)
• Alvarado v. State (supporting the same anti-insertion principle)
• Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (courts lack authority to modify statutes by judicial rewriting)

These authorities collectively grounded the Court’s refusal to transform the stop-sign statute into a strict-liability rule or a categorical bar on comparative fault.

5) Right-of-way is “relative,” not absolute—preferred drivers still owe ordinary care

A substantial portion of the opinion reaffirms that, even with a preferential right of way, a driver must act reasonably to avoid collisions. The Court anchored that rule in longstanding Wyoming negligence and traffic-law cases:

• Lovato v. Tim Case; Jones v. Schabron; Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner; DeJulio v. Foster; Cervelli v. Graves; Miller v. Hedderman (general duties of ordinary care and proper lookout)
• Christensen v. McCann (quoting Garner v. Brown) (rights in the roadway are “relative”; right-of-way does not eliminate the duty of reasonable care)
• Anderson v. Schulz (speed, control, and lookout are interrelated; higher speed raises the required vigilance and control)
• Pierce v. Bean (a preferred driver’s unreasonable speed may be a proximate cause; right-of-way does not excuse lack of due care)
• McVicker v. Kuronen (right-of-way rules do not relieve the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid collisions; endorses Langner v. Caviness on the “two-fold duty” to follow traffic regulations and act prudently)

These cases directly undermined Bunning’s central premise that Romero’s yield violation made Bunning’s speeding and lane-weaving legally irrelevant.

6) Multiple proximate causes and apportionment in collision cases

To support the finding that both drivers’ negligence could simultaneously be causal, the Court cited Wyoming’s repeated recognition that there can be more than one proximate cause:

• JTL Grp., Inc. v. Gray-Dockham (quoting Wood v. CRST Expedited, Inc.)
• Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull; Frazier v. Pokorny; Hester v. Coliseum Motor Co.

This doctrinal point matters because Bunning’s “strict yield violation” theory implicitly assumes a single dispositive cause (the failure to yield). The Court rejected that model as inconsistent with Wyoming causation principles.

7) Expectations about lawful speeds affect intersection causation analysis

The Court also relied on cases recognizing that a driver may assume other drivers will not approach at unlawful or excessive speed, which can affect fault allocation and causation:

• Ries v. Cheyenne Cab & Transfer Co. (a driver not entitled to priority may assume the other will obey speed limits; supports considering unlawful speed even where one party has priority)
• Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry (cited in connection with Ries)
• Robinson v. Shoumaker (a right-of-way holder is not excused from ordinary care; cannot imperil cautious drivers)

These authorities helped justify the trial court’s attribution of a majority share of fault to Bunning based on speed and aggressive lane changes near the intersection.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Court treated the issue as statutory: does § 31-5-222(b) override § 1-1-109?

Bunning’s appeal was framed as a “right-of-way” argument, but the Court resolved it as a matter of statutory structure and legislative intent. The Court began with the baseline rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b) applies to actions to recover damages for injury to person or property and bars recovery when the claimant’s contributory fault exceeds 50%.

2) No textual carve-out in § 31-5-222(b)

The stop-sign statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-222(b), imposes duties: stop, then yield to vehicles in the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. But it contains no civil-liability rule making yield violators strictly liable, and no language eliminating comparative fault in civil litigation. The Court refused to judicially add such terms, invoking the anti-insertion cases (Castaner v. State; Matter of Est. of Haack; Alvarado v. State; Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.).

3) “Legislature knows how” reasoning: explicit limits exist elsewhere

Using Huff v. Shumate and Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp. of Wyoming, the Court emphasized that when the Legislature intends to limit comparative fault, it does so expressly (seat belt evidence rule; Dram Shop; Recreation Safety Act). The absence of similar limiting text in § 31-5-222(b) meant comparative fault remained fully applicable.

4) Right-of-way is not “absolute immunity”

The Court reaffirmed a core Wyoming negligence principle: even preferred drivers must use ordinary care, maintain a proper lookout, and drive at a reasonable speed. It tied this to earlier right-of-way decisions (including Christensen v. McCann quoting Garner v. Brown, Pierce v. Bean, and McVicker v. Kuronen), rejecting the notion that right-of-way converts the non-preferred driver’s statutory violation into strict liability.

5) Application to the record: clear-error deference to fault allocation

Once the Court concluded comparative fault applies, the remaining question was whether the trial court clearly erred in finding Bunning >50% at fault. The Court held it did not. Evidence supported findings that Bunning drove about 15 mph over the limit, weaved through traffic, accelerated to pass near the intersection, and proceeded despite noticing Romero waiting at the stop sign. At the same time, Romero stopped fully but misjudged whether he could safely proceed, failing to yield. The trial court’s weighing of these competing breaches and its conclusion that Bunning’s driving predominated were not clearly erroneous.

6) No “forfeiture” of the right-of-way occurred

The Court made an important conceptual clarification: Bunning did not “lose” his statutory preference. The trial court found he had the right-of-way and that Romero violated § 31-5-222(b). The bar to recovery came solely from § 1-1-109(b) after fault apportionment—i.e., the legal consequence of being more than 50% at fault in a damages action—not from any forfeiture doctrine.

Impact

1) Doctrinal clarification: stop-sign yield violations do not create strict civil liability

The opinion cements that a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-222(b) is not a categorical trump card against comparative fault. Plaintiffs with the right-of-way remain subject to scrutiny for speeding, lookout failures, and unreasonable driving, and may be barred if their fault exceeds 50%.

2) Litigation consequences in intersection cases

• Evidence focus: Speed estimates, skid marks, passing maneuvers, traffic density, and driver observations become central even when one party failed to yield.
• Pleading and trial strategy: Plaintiffs should anticipate vigorous comparative-fault defenses; defendants should develop fact records showing the preferred driver’s unreasonable operation contributed to the crash.
• Bench/jury findings: The decision underscores the importance of special findings under § 1-1-109(c)(ii) (damages without regard to fault; percentage fault by actor), insulating judgments on appeal absent clear error.

3) Legislative signaling

By emphasizing that the Legislature expressly limits comparative fault when it intends to, the Court implicitly places the policy choice back with lawmakers. If Wyoming were to create a special civil-liability rule for stop-sign yield violations (or any other traffic statute), it would require explicit statutory language.