RICO Conspiracy May Rest on an Agreement to Participate in an Enterprise That “Existed or Would Exist” Without Constructively Amending the Indictment

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Court’s Rulings)

A. RICO enterprise and “association-in-fact” structure

• Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009): The court relied on Boyle for the proposition that an association-in-fact enterprise is “expansive,” may be “formal or informal,” and requires only purpose, relationships, and longevity. This underwrote the holding that the Clarksville group functioned as an enterprise in spring 2015 even before formal recognition by the Mongols’ national leadership.
• United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899 (6th Cir. 2022): Provided the circuit’s standard articulation of RICO conspiracy elements, including an agreement to participate in an enterprise affecting commerce through a pattern of racketeering with agreement to commit at least two racketeering acts.
• United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489 (6th Cir. 2021): Central to the opinion’s “future enterprise” instruction analysis; Rich recognizes that § 1962(d) criminalizes the agreement itself, so an agreement to participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise can be a completed offense. The panel used this to validate the “existed or would exist” instruction and to reject arguments that enterprise “formalization” was required.

B. Conspiracy participation and related doctrines

• United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986): Used to reject the notion that each conspirator must participate in every overt act; supported affirmance of RICO conspiracy even if an individual defendant’s activity emphasized violence rather than drug sales.
• United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1970)): Supported the rule that a late-joining conspirator “takes [the conspiracy] as he finds it,” undercutting arguments that joining later defeats enterprise membership.
• Walker v. United States, 134 F.4th 437 (6th Cir. 2025): Applied to hold Boylston waived an argument that he was not part of the enterprise because his trial counsel affirmatively conceded membership.

C. VICAR “purpose” element

• United States v. Woods, 14 F.4th 544 (6th Cir. 2021): The court used Woods to frame VICAR’s purpose requirement: it is satisfied if an “animating purpose” was to maintain or increase position in the enterprise (even if personal motives also exist). This supported affirmance for the Finley shooting-related accessory count and the Cole murder VICAR count.

D. Kidnapping “benefit” requirement

• United States v. Windham, 53 F.4th 1006 (6th Cir. 2022): Provided the governing interpretation of § 1201(a)(1)’s “or otherwise” language—any objective the kidnapper finds sufficiently beneficial.
• United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021): Reinforced that “any reason” that is “in any way of benefit” satisfies the element, enabling affirmance of the Priess kidnapping conviction (benefit: damage control with the Mother Chapter after Chavez’s death).

E. Drug conspiracy, buyer-seller, attempt, and aiding-and-abetting

• United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2006): Supplied the elements of § 846 drug conspiracy used to uphold convictions for Hern and Stanley.
• United States v. Wheat, 988 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2021): Framed the “buyer-seller” limitation; the court used it to distinguish mere purchase from conspiratorial participation, then upheld Stanley’s conviction based on broader coordination.
• United States v. Ferguson, 65 F.4th 806 (6th Cir. 2023): Supplied attempt doctrine (“intent” plus “substantial step”) used to uphold Santiago’s attempted possession conviction even though the planned drug deal became a robbery.
• United States v. Sadler, 24 F.4th 515 (6th Cir. 2022): Provided the aiding-and-abetting standard (“participated…as something he wished to bring about”) used to uphold Santiago’s liability for the attempted possession.

F. Inconsistent verdicts

• United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984); United States v. Lawrence, 555 F.3d 254 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Randolph, 794 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2015): These cases anchored the court’s refusal to review alleged inconsistencies in the jury’s predicate findings for firearm counts, emphasizing that sufficiency review (not logical consistency) protects against irrationality.
• Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981): Used to foreclose a fairness complaint premised on a codefendant’s greater “lenity.”
• United States v. Ruiz, 386 F. App’x 530 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stewart, No. 23-5691, 2024 WL 2974484 (6th Cir. June 13, 2024): Cited to narrow a suggested “two-guilty-verdicts” exception and to reinforce nonreviewability in this context.

G. Semi-anonymous jury

• United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lawson, 535 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009): These cases framed the standard: strong reason for protection plus precautions to minimize prejudice, including neutral explanation and voir dire adequacy. The panel found those safeguards satisfied.
• Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984): Cited for district courts’ inherent authority to manage trials, supporting the conclusion that the court could raise semi-anonymous jury measures sua sponte.
• Sister-circuit support: United States v. Shyrock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hall, 506 F. App’x 245 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995): Used to reinforce that sua sponte consideration is permissible.

H. Expert testimony on gangs

• United States v. Gray, 121 F.4th 578 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Reynolds, 86 F.4th 332 (6th Cir. 2023): Provided the Rule 702 framework (qualification, relevance, reliability).
• United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ledbetter, 929 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2019): Supported admission of expert “big picture” testimony about a national gang paired with fact witnesses linking the local set to that structure.

I. Confrontation Clause and delayed cross-examination

• Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004): Provided the core confrontation principles—face-to-face testimony and adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
• Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985): The court leaned heavily on Fensterer to emphasize that the Constitution guarantees an “opportunity for effective cross-examination,” not the defense’s preferred timing or maximal effectiveness.
• Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023): Supported the idea that wide latitude for cross and juror instruction-following ordinarily satisfies confrontation concerns.
• Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); United States v. Fox, 134 F.4th 348 (6th Cir. 2025): Used to reject an “absolute control” theory of cross-examination timing and content.

J. Constructive amendment/variance framework for indictment-instruction mismatch

• United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Davis, 970 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2020): Provided the taxonomy—actual amendment, constructive amendment, variance—and the constitutional stakes (grand jury right, notice, double jeopardy).
• Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1992): Key analogy supporting that adding an alternative “method” of satisfying an element often produces (at most) a variance rather than a new offense.
• United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2007): Cited regarding the overlap between prejudicial variances and notice-related constructive amendment concerns.

K. Mistrial and midtrial delay discretion

• United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1999): Provided the “greatest caution” standard for mistrials.
• United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1984): Used for the principle that scheduling decisions require a showing of “actual prejudice.”
• Comparative delay cases: United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 451 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2006); People v. Breceda, 290 Cal. Rptr. 3d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022); State v. Henderson, 309 A.3d 1208 (Conn. 2024); and notably United States v. McDonald, 166 F.4th 440 (4th Cir. 2026): These reinforced that lengthy health-related recesses do not automatically compel mistrial absent demonstrated prejudice.

L. Sentencing and harmlessness principles

• United States v. Booker, 994 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Shaw, 139 F.4th 548 (6th Cir. 2025): Controlled the “oral sentence controls” rule and the use of the written judgment to resolve ambiguity.
• United States v. Harrell, 180 F.4th 888 (6th Cir. 2026); United States v. Blake, 166 F.4th 611 (6th Cir. 2026): Framed the right-to-be-present at sentencing analysis and plain-error prejudice inquiry.
• United States v. Hayden, 102 F.4th 368 (6th Cir. 2024): Imposed the requirement that discretionary supervised release conditions be orally noticed or properly incorporated by reference; the panel found harmlessness here given the life sentence realities and lack of substantive challenge.
• United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2019): Supplied the harmless-error principle that guideline miscalculations not affecting the ultimate range/sentence do not require resentencing.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Richards, 164 F.4th 508 (6th Cir. 2026): Guided substantive-reasonableness review and the “even more demanding burden” for defendants challenging below-guidelines sentences.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Enterprise proof: “functioning as an enterprise” before formal recognition

The court treated the enterprise question as a practical inquiry under Boyle v. United States: whether the group operated as a continuing unit with a common purpose, relationships, and longevity. It emphasized evidence that by early 2015 the group held meetings, recruited, wore “soft colors,” undertook violence to build reputation, and coordinated drug activity—supporting the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise regardless of the Mother Chapter’s later “official” recognition.

B. RICO conspiracy can be complete even if the enterprise is prospective

Relying on United States v. Rich, the panel endorsed the government’s complementary theory: defendants could be guilty by agreeing to found and then operate a racketeering enterprise—meaning the conspiracy offense is satisfied by the agreement to participate in an enterprise that “would exist.” This becomes especially consequential in cases where defendants attempt to exploit pre-recognition or pre-formalization periods to deny enterprise status.

C. Indictment/instruction conformity: no constructive amendment from “existed or would exist”

The court applied the Combs/Kuehne framework and held there was no risk the jury convicted for a different offense than charged. The indictment charged a conspiracy; the instruction stated the elements of conspiracy (consistent with Rich). The future-tense phrase did not create a new offense; at most it clarified a legally permissible method of proving the charged conspiracy. The panel further read the indictment’s language (“prospective and/or founding members”) as providing notice that the conspiracy encompassed formation activity.

D. VICAR purpose: enterprise-related status motives can coexist with personal motives

The court treated VICAR’s purpose requirement as satisfied where an “animating purpose” is to maintain or increase position (United States v. Woods). In the Finley shooting episode, the evidence supported a gang-feud/status motive; in the Cole murder, the evidence supported status protection (avoid appearing weak; maintain good standing; retain “top rocker”), and the court also noted post-murder leadership changes as reinforcing an enterprise-related purpose inference.

E. Kidnapping “benefit”: reputational and organizational damage control qualifies

In affirming the Priess kidnapping conviction, the panel applied United States v. Windham and United States v. Small to conclude that forcing Priess to explain Chavez’s death to higher-ups provided a sufficient “benefit.” The benefit need not be monetary or ransom-based; organizational objectives—like averting Mother Chapter scorn—count.

F. Attempt and “deal turned robbery”: attempt completes before later disruption

Applying United States v. Ferguson, the panel held that substantial steps (money obtained, gun obtained for protection, travel to meeting with intent to obtain drugs) completed the attempt even though the seller planned a robbery. That doctrinal move also preserved the firearm predicate: the gun’s “relation to” drug trafficking is assessed at the time of the attempted transaction, not after the plot changes.

G. Confrontation Clause and COVID recess: opportunity, not optimal timing

The panel treated the three-week delay between direct and cross as constitutionally tolerable because the defendants ultimately had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine in open court and expose credibility infirmities (Delaware v. Fensterer; United States v. Owens). The court stressed practical realities (protecting the sick defendants’ right to be present; disease mitigation), the absence of gamesmanship, and the sufficiency of instructions and voir dire-like polling upon resumption.

H. Semi-anonymous jury: safety and integrity measures with neutral explanation

Under Warman/Talley/Deitz, the court approved semi-anonymity where counsel knew jurors’ names, voir dire was extensive (questionnaires plus three-day voir dire), and the jurors were given a neutral media-contact explanation. The court also recognized inherent authority to raise the measure sua sponte (Luce v. United States), rejecting any requirement of a government motion.

I. Sentencing: harmlessness and practical effect principles dominated

Many sentencing claims failed because any alleged guideline errors did not change the ultimate guideline range (often “life”) or were harmless given mandatory life terms (United States v. Faulkner). Even where the court recognized error (standard supervised release conditions not orally pronounced under United States v. Hayden), it found harmlessness due to lack of substantive challenge and the reality that supervised release is unlikely to occur.

3.3. Impact

• RICO conspiracy charging and instruction practice: The decision strengthens the Sixth Circuit’s acceptance (building on United States v. Rich) of jury instructions explicitly allowing enterprise existence to be found as “existed or would exist,” reducing defendants’ ability to litigate enterprise “formalization” gaps as an indictment-instruction mismatch.
• Enterprise formation window: Prosecutors can more confidently frame racketeering conspiracies around formation efforts—recruitment, symbolic affiliation, early violence, and operational routines—without waiting for national-level recognition or formal paperwork.
• Trial management in extended, multi-defendant cases: The opinion provides a detailed road map for handling COVID-era interruptions while preserving confrontation and fairness arguments, emphasizing “actual prejudice” requirements for mistrial and the sufficiency of cross-examination opportunity.
• Semi-anonymous juries in organized crime trials: The approval of a court-initiated semi-anonymous jury (with careful safeguards) signals continued receptivity to juror-protection measures in violent enterprise cases, especially where witness intimidation is alleged.
• Kidnapping “benefit” breadth: The holding reinforces that reputational/organizational objectives can satisfy § 1201(a)(1), potentially widening federal kidnapping exposure in enterprise contexts where abductions serve internal discipline or damage-control purposes.