Revocation Waiver-of-Counsel Is Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion and Assessed Under the Totality of Circumstances

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from a third revocation of supervised release. While on federal supervision, Deldrick Lamar Spence was arrested in Ballard County, Kentucky (May 2023) on state charges including trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of marijuana and paraphernalia, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. Due to a timing anomaly—his probation office did not discover the May 2023 arrest until November 2024—the alleged conduct was not addressed at an earlier revocation hearing and instead became the basis for the revocation proceeding at issue.

Three issues framed the appeal:

• Waiver of counsel: whether Spence’s decision to proceed pro se at the revocation hearing was knowing (and the associated standard of appellate review).
• Procedural reasonableness: whether the district court relied on impermissible sentencing factors barred by Esteras v. United States when imposing the statutory-maximum 24-month revocation sentence.
• Collateral attack: whether Spence could invalidate the revocation judgment by arguing that his underlying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1) The right to counsel (and self-representation) in criminal prosecutions

• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963): recognized the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as “fundamental and essential” in criminal prosecutions. The Sixth Circuit invoked Gideon to delineate the robust constitutional baseline—then explained why it does not govern revocation.
• Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): recognized the Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se and cautioned that a defendant who chooses self-representation cannot later complain about the “effective assistance of counsel.” The panel used Faretta to reject Spence’s argument that his later performance at the hearing proved his waiver was uninformed.
• Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004): emphasized that courts need not follow a prescribed “formula or script” when accepting a waiver of counsel. This supported the opinion’s broader point: even in Sixth Amendment settings there is no “script,” and in revocation settings (where Sixth Amendment protections do not apply) an even less rigid approach is appropriate.
• United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2016): Sixth Amendment waiver cases that apply de novo review and discuss substantial compliance with the Bench Book model colloquy. The panel distinguished these authorities because revocation is not a “criminal prosecution” for Sixth Amendment purposes.

2) Why the Sixth Amendment does not attach to revocation proceedings

• Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981): used to reinforce the idea that not every liberty-affecting proceeding triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): held the Sixth Amendment does not apply to parole revocation; emphasized revocation concerns “conditional liberty” and a “breach of trust” type proceeding rather than a new criminal prosecution. This is the foundation for the Sixth Circuit’s approach.
• United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005): Sixth Circuit precedent extending Morrissey to federal supervised release, quoted for the proposition that “the protections of the Sixth Amendment do not extend to revocation hearings.”
• Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973): recognized minimum due-process requirements for revocation and that counsel may be required only in limited, case-by-case circumstances. This provided the constitutional floor against which the court assessed the district court’s waiver inquiry.

3) The nature of revocation proceedings and procedural flexibility

• United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1995): cited for the proposition that revocation is traditionally understood as civil and centered on breach of trust.
• United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Owen, 854 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2017): used to highlight that revocation procedures are more flexible (e.g., hearsay may be considered) and must satisfy due process/fundamental fairness rather than the full panoply of trial rights.
• United States v. Givens, 786 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2015): cited for the proposition that district courts enjoy wide discretion in revocation context, supporting deferential review of waiver determinations.

4) Standard of review and the “totality of the circumstances” waiver test

• United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Walton, 145 F.4th 476 (4th Cir. 2025); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ivers, 44 F.4th 753 (8th Cir. 2022): These sister-circuit cases supplied the analytic template: review is for abuse of discretion, and waiver validity is assessed under the totality of the circumstances rather than the more exacting Sixth Amendment framework.
• United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025): cited to show Sixth Circuit practice of applying abuse-of-discretion review to waivers of supervised-release procedures.
• United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638 (6th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Kumar, 750 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2014): provided the Sixth Circuit’s definition of abuse of discretion (clear error of judgment, misapplication of law, etc.).

5) Revocation sentencing after Esteras

• Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): the central sentencing precedent. The panel treated Esteras as barring reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors (e.g., “seriousness of the offense,” “respect for the law,” “just punishment”) in revocation sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), while also emphasizing Esteras’s nuance: those concepts are forbidden only insofar as they reflect retribution for the underlying crime of conviction, not when connected to permissible aims like deterrence or enforcing compliance.
• United States v. Adams, 124 F.4th 432 (6th Cir. 2024): cited for the procedural reasonableness framework.
• United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2025): applied Esteras and clarified that “offense” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to the underlying crime of conviction, not the supervised-release violation conduct—supporting the panel’s conclusion that the district court permissibly discussed the seriousness of Spence’s Grade A violations.
• United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084 (6th Cir. 2024); Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): established the plain-error framework applied because Spence did not object below.
• United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) and United States v. Johnson, No. 24-3787, 2026 WL 50666 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026): supported the presumption that district courts know and apply governing law and that appellate courts should not manufacture error from ambiguous remarks when the record overall reflects reliance on permissible considerations.

6) No collateral attack on the underlying conviction in a revocation appeal

• United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007): the controlling Sixth Circuit rule that a defendant “may not attempt to invalidate his original conviction” in an appeal from revocation; challenges must be pursued via direct appeal or 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
• United States v. Flanory, 45 F. App'x 456 (6th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Hall, 735 F. App'x 188 (6th Cir. 2018): reinforced the Lewis principle.
• United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002): used to rebut Spence’s attempt to relabel his constitutional challenge as “jurisdictional.” Defects in the conviction go to the merits, not the court’s adjudicatory power.
• United States v. Terry, 234 F. App'x 82 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam): similarly rejected treating merits defects as jurisdictional in the revocation context.

7) The opinion’s alternative discussion of the underlying § 922(g)(1) issue

• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): discussed when § 922(g)(1) may be unconstitutional as applied to certain individuals and framed “dangerousness” categories; the panel indicated Spence’s drug-trafficking history falls into a category posing “a significant threat of danger.”
• Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 1999): cited to support enforcing a broad plea waiver that would likely foreclose Spence’s belated constitutional attack on his conviction.
• United States v. Oravets, No. 24-3817, 2025 WL 2682632 (6th Cir. Sep. 19, 2025): cited for the proposition that “drug trafficking often motivates violent crime,” bolstering the dangerousness analysis.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) A new, explicit Sixth Circuit holding on waiver-of-counsel review in revocation proceedings

The opinion’s core doctrinal move is to decouple revocation waiver-of-counsel analysis from Sixth Amendment waiver doctrine. Building from Morrissey v. Brewer and United States v. Kirby, the panel reasons that a revocation hearing is not a “criminal prosecution,” but a proceeding concerning “conditional liberty” and “breach of trust,” which carries different procedural expectations.

From that premise, the court announces two linked rules for this circuit:

• Standard of review: acceptance of a waiver of counsel in a revocation proceeding is reviewed for abuse of discretion (not de novo).
• Substantive test: the validity of a waiver is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, asking whether the record supports that the defendant made an informed choice to proceed without counsel.

Applying that framework, the panel found the district court’s nearly forty-minute colloquy—covering rights, evidentiary standards, penalties, and repeated reminders that counsel was available at no cost—more than adequate. Spence’s coherent responses and prior experience with multiple revocation proceedings reinforced that the decision was knowing.

2) Clarifying the operational boundaries of Esteras in revocation sentencing

On sentencing, the panel treated Esteras v. United States as prohibiting reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in revocation sentencing decisions under § 3583(e). But it emphasized two limiting principles:

• Merely hearing the government invoke “respect for the law” is not the same as the judge relying on that forbidden factor.
• References to “respect for the law” or “seriousness” are problematic only if they reflect retribution for the underlying offense of conviction; they may be permissible when tied to legitimate goals such as deterrence, protecting the public, and enforcing compliance with supervision.

The panel read the district court’s comments (“penalty,” “nature of the offense”) as directed to the supervised-release violations—particularly their classification as “Grade A violations”—and to permissible revocation purposes. Even the court’s mention that Spence’s violations resembled his original felon-in-possession conviction was framed as supporting a deterrence/compliance rationale rather than punishing the original offense anew.

3) Reinforcing the procedural channeling of constitutional challenges

The court reaffirmed that revocation appeals are not vehicles for attacking the underlying conviction. Under United States v. Lewis, challenges to the conviction must be brought by direct appeal or 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The panel then rejected Spence’s attempt to call his Second Amendment claim “jurisdictional,” explaining under United States v. Cotton that jurisdiction concerns adjudicatory power, not the merits validity of the conviction.

Although unnecessary to the holding (given the procedural bar), the panel added that Spence’s claim likely fails because of (i) his plea waiver and (ii) the Sixth Circuit’s dangerousness framework in United States v. Williams, given his drug-trafficking history and repeated association of drugs and firearms.

C. Impact

1) Practical consequences for revocation hearings in the Sixth Circuit

• Deferential appellate posture: By adopting abuse-of-discretion review, the decision makes it harder to overturn revocation waivers of counsel, particularly where a district judge conducts a reasonably thorough colloquy.
• No “Bench Book” mandate: The opinion signals that revocation colloquies need not approximate the detail expected in Sixth Amendment Faretta contexts, so long as the record supports an informed choice under the totality of circumstances.
• Record-building incentive: Even with a flexible standard, the opinion rewards district courts that create a clean record (a separate waiver hearing; clear explanation of violations, evidence, exposure; repeated availability of free appointed counsel).

2) Post-Esteras sentencing guidance

• How to speak about “seriousness” safely: Judges may discuss the seriousness of violation conduct (e.g., “Grade A violations”) and the need for deterrence/protection, but should avoid framing revocation time as “just punishment” for the original conviction.
• Appellate interpretation of ambiguous remarks: With Vonner and the presumption of regularity, defendants face a steep climb when the overall record reflects permissible considerations.

3) Channeling constitutional litigation

• The decision reiterates the structural separation between (a) revocation review and (b) conviction validity challenges, discouraging defendants from attempting to leverage revocation proceedings as an indirect constitutional attack forum.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release revocation: A post-prison supervision system. If a person violates conditions, the court can revoke and impose additional prison time. It is not treated as a new “criminal prosecution” for Sixth Amendment purposes.
• Conditional liberty: The idea from Morrissey v. Brewer that a supervisee’s freedom is contingent on compliance with conditions; revocation withdraws that conditional freedom.
• Waiver of counsel / proceeding pro se: Choosing to represent oneself instead of using a lawyer. The key question is whether the choice is informed. In this case, the Sixth Circuit adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test for revocation waivers.
• Abuse of discretion vs. de novo review:
  • De novo: the appellate court decides the issue fresh, without deference.
  • Abuse of discretion: the appellate court gives deference and reverses only for clear legal error, clearly erroneous facts, or a clear error of judgment.
• Plain error review: If a defendant did not object in the district court, the appellate court will correct an error only if it is clear, harmful, and undermines the fairness/integrity of proceedings (Greer v. United States; United States v. Olano).
• Impermissible § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in revocation (Esteras): In revocation sentencing, courts may not impose prison time to further “just punishment,” “seriousness of the offense,” or “respect for the law” insofar as those are retributive judgments about the original crime of conviction; but courts may impose prison for deterrence, public protection, and sanctioning breach-of-trust behavior.
• Collateral attack: An attempt to invalidate a conviction indirectly in a different proceeding. The Sixth Circuit reiterated that revocation appeals are not the proper place; direct appeal or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Deldrick Lamar Spence establishes a clear Sixth Circuit framework for self-representation at supervised-release revocation: acceptance of a waiver of counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the waiver’s validity is judged under the totality of the circumstances, not the Sixth Amendment’s more demanding waiver doctrines. The decision also provides concrete, post-Esteras guidance: revocation sentences must avoid retributive reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) concerning the underlying conviction, while remaining free to focus on deterrence, public protection, and the seriousness of the violation conduct. Finally, the opinion reinforces institutional channeling rules by rejecting attempts to use revocation proceedings to litigate the constitutional validity of the original conviction.