Revocation Sentencing After Esteras: No Plain Error Where the Court Disclaims § 3553(a)(2)(A) and Grounds the Sentence in Noncompliance

Introduction

In United States v. Joseph Elias Nehme (11th Cir. June 23, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 24-month revocation sentence imposed after the district court revoked Joseph Elias Nehme’s supervised release. Nehme—previously convicted federally for failing to update his sex-offender registration under 18 U.S.C. § 2550(a)—was found to have violated supervised release by committing a new state crime: failing to register as a sex offender under Fla. Stat. § 944.607(10).

The appeal raised two issues central to revocation sentencing law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025):

  • Procedural legality: whether the district court impermissibly considered the retributive factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for law, just punishment) when imposing a revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
  • Substantive reasonableness: whether the 24-month sentence was unreasonable because the court allegedly failed to consider the proper § 3553(a) factors and failed to give adequate weight to mitigation (including time served in state custody for the same conduct).

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • The district court did not plainly err under Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025) because it expressly excluded § 3553(a)(2)(A) from its considerations and grounded its remarks in Nehme’s noncompliance and breach of supervised release conditions.
  • The revocation sentence was substantively reasonable under abuse-of-discretion review, particularly because it was within the advisory guideline range (capped at the 24-month statutory maximum) and the district court sufficiently indicated it considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)

    This was the controlling authority on the core procedural claim. The Supreme Court held that, because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) lists certain § 3553(a) factors but omits § 3553(a)(2)(A), a revocation court cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release, relying on the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

    The Eleventh Circuit applied Esteras in a defendant-unfavorable way: even though Esteras forbids reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), the panel found no plain error because the district court said it was not relying on those factors and its rationale could be understood as focusing on the supervised-release violation (noncompliance), not retribution for the underlying offense.

    The opinion also tracked Esteras’s nuance: Esteras interpreted “offense” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) to mean the underlying conviction and expressly left open whether “retribution for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release” is permissible (not decided in Esteras). That open question implicitly helps explain why “serious violation” language here did not automatically translate into an Esteras violation.

  • United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)

    Cited via Esteras to frame plain error review. Under this standard, the defendant must show a clear or obvious error. The panel used Olano’s demanding threshold to reject Nehme’s claim because any reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) was neither express nor unmistakable.

  • United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016)

    Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for reviewing substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence: abuse of discretion, reversing only with a “definite and firm conviction” of a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. The panel also cited Trailer for the burden: the challenger must prove unreasonableness.

  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022)

    Used for two propositions central to rejecting the substantive reasonableness challenge: (1) the district court has broad discretion to assign weight to each factor, including giving one factor “great weight”; and (2) acknowledging consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is generally sufficient.

  • United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007)

    Cited to rebut the inference that failure to discuss mitigation equals failure to consider it. The panel used this to answer Nehme’s claim that his mitigation (including prior state time) was not properly weighed.

  • United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009)

    Cited (through Butler) for the proposition that a court’s general acknowledgment of having considered the § 3553(a) factors and arguments can suffice, supporting the panel’s conclusion that the district court adequately considered the proper factors.

  • United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)

    Cited for the common appellate presumption/expectation that a sentence within the Guidelines range is ordinarily reasonable—important here because Nehme’s 24-month term fell within the capped range.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 3553(a)(2)(A) Issue After Esteras: “Actual Reliance” Must Be Clear

The statutory structure is the foundation: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) authorizes revocation and reimprisonment but directs courts to consider only specified § 3553(a) factors—excluding § 3553(a)(2)(A). After Esteras, using § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation sentencing is forbidden.

But the panel’s key move was methodological: because Nehme did not specifically alert the district court that it might be relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), the appellate court applied plain error review as described in Esteras and Olano. Under that framework, reversal requires that it be “clear” or “obvious” the court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A), either “expressly” or “by unmistakable implication.”

The district court’s record insulated the sentence:

  • It expressly disclaimed any reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), stating it considered § 3553 “with the exclusion of [s]ection 3553(a)(2)(A).”
  • Its explanation emphasized that the supervised release conditions were “straightforward,” that Nehme “did not comply,” and that this was a “serious violation.” The panel treated this as compatible with permissible revocation rationales (sanctioning noncompliance/breach of trust), not as retribution for the underlying crime.

The opinion reinforced this framing by citing the Guidelines’ revocation policy statement: U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024), which characterizes revocation sentencing as sanctioning the “breach of trust.” That concept helps distinguish permissible sanctioning of supervised-release noncompliance from impermissible punishment for the “seriousness of the original offense.”

2) Substantive Reasonableness: Deference, Within-Range Sentence, and No Requirement to Discuss Every Mitigating Point

On substantive reasonableness, the panel applied abuse-of-discretion review under United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). It then relied on three recurring principles from Eleventh Circuit precedent:

  • Weighting is discretionary (United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022)): the court may emphasize one factor (here, Nehme’s history/characteristics and demonstrated noncompliance).
  • No obligation to discuss every mitigating item (United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007)): silence about mitigation does not equal ignoring it.
  • Within-Guidelines sentences are ordinarily reasonable (United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)): the 24-month sentence sat inside the guideline range as capped by the statutory maximum.

The panel also addressed Nehme’s “double punishment” theme (he had already served state time for the same conduct). It concluded the district court did consider that argument but was entitled to give it less weight than other considerations.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a practical illustration of how Esteras will operate in day-to-day revocation appeals in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Record-building matters: when defendants do not squarely object that § 3553(a)(2)(A) is being used, plain-error review will make reversal difficult.
  • “Breach of trust” language is safer than “just punishment” language: courts can describe violations as “serious” and focus on noncompliance without necessarily triggering an Esteras problem—especially when they explicitly exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A) on the record.
  • Within-range revocation sentences remain hard to overturn: the opinion reiterates the heavy deference given to district courts in weighting factors and assessing mitigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release revocation: after prison, defendants must follow court-imposed conditions. If they violate them (including by committing a new crime), the court can revoke supervised release and impose additional prison time under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
  • § 3553(a) factors: the sentencing “checklist” Congress provided. In revocation, § 3583(e) incorporates only some of them and excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A).
  • Retributive factors (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)): punishment-oriented considerations—seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for law, and just punishment. After Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), these cannot be used to justify a revocation prison term.
  • Plain error: a demanding appellate standard applied when an argument was not clearly presented below; reversal generally requires an obvious legal mistake that clearly affected the outcome.
  • Substantive reasonableness: whether the sentence length is within the broad range of reasonable outcomes given the allowed considerations.
  • Breach of trust (Guidelines concept): revocation is framed as sanctioning failure to comply with supervision conditions, not re-sentencing the defendant for the original crime.
  • Nolo contendere: a plea in which the defendant does not contest the charge; it commonly results in a conviction for sentencing purposes.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: the lower proof standard used in revocation proceedings (more likely than not), not “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Conclusion

United States v. Joseph Elias Nehme applies Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025) in a way that clarifies the appellate posture of § 3553(a)(2)(A) claims: absent a clear record showing the district court actually relied on retributive factors, especially where the court expressly disclaims them and focuses on noncompliance, reversal is unlikely—particularly under plain-error review. The decision also reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential approach to substantive reasonableness in revocation sentencing, especially for within-Guidelines terms and where the court acknowledges the relevant factors and arguments.