Date: Feb 8, 2026

Revocation Sentences Do Not Recalculate Criminal History or Apply Retroactive Amendment 821; § 3583(g) Mandatory Revocation Limits § 3553(a)(2)(A) Challenges

Introduction

United States v. Grant (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) addresses two recurring supervised-release questions: (1) whether a defendant may invoke a retroactive Guidelines amendment—here, Amendment 821—to reduce the criminal history category used to compute the advisory range for a revocation sentence; and (2) whether an above-guidelines revocation sentence is unreasonable where the district court references the defendant’s “lack of respect for the law.”

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Jawon Montray Grant (appellant), who had an earlier felon-in-possession conviction and, shortly after beginning supervised release, was found again with narcotics and a firearm. The appeal challenged only the revocation judgment (though Grant also appealed the new conviction and forfeited arguments on it).

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the revocation judgment. It held:

Amendment 821 cannot be used at a revocation hearing to lower the criminal history category or the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation, because the revocation criminal history category is the one “determined at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to the term of supervision,” and because the retroactivity mechanism in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 does not authorize reductions to revocation imprisonment terms.
The 24-month statutory-maximum revocation sentence was not erroneous. The panel treated the “lack of respect for the law” remark as a shorthand description of recidivism and breach of trust, and in any event emphasized that revocation was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) given narcotics/firearm possession, and that when § 3583(g) applies the court is “neither directed nor forbidden to consider any particular factors.”

The opinion is not designated for publication (5th Cir. R. 47.5), but it clearly restates and applies the circuit’s approach to Amendment 821 in the revocation setting and to § 3553(a)(2)(A) objections under § 3583(g).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Preservation, forfeiture, and standards of review

Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021): Used to deem forfeited any issues not adequately briefed—here, Grant’s separate appeal of the new firearm conviction. This framing narrowed the appellate inquiry to the revocation judgment.
United States v. Melendez, 57 F.4th 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2023): Supplied the standard of review for Guidelines questions—de novo for application, clear error for factfinding. This mattered because the Amendment 821 issue was a legal question about what the Guidelines and policy statements allow.
United States v. Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Bullard, 13 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1994)): Reinforced that a party must raise an issue so the district court can correct it. The panel used this to confirm Grant preserved the Amendment 821 objection, yielding de novo review on that issue.
United States v. Cano, 981 F.3d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Sanchez, 900 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2018): Provided the Fifth Circuit’s “two-step ‘plainly unreasonable inquiry’” for revocation sentences when objections are preserved (procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness).
Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 201–02 (2025): Was decisive on the standard of review for the “improper factor” claim. Because Grant did not alert the district court that it might be relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), the panel applied plain-error review.
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)): Supplied the familiar four-part plain-error framework, including the discretionary fourth prong.

Revocation authority, improper factors, and mandatory revocation

United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2014): Confirmed the district court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) to impose any revocation sentence up to the statutory maximum.
United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011): Cited for the rule that, when acting under § 3583(e), courts may not consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, including “promot[ing] respect for the law.”
United States v. Belmontes, 807 F. App'x 292, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) and United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550, 551–52 (5th Cir. 2020): These cases anchored the panel’s conclusion that when a defendant possesses narcotics or a firearm while on supervised release, revocation is mandatory under § 3583(g). Belmontes also supplied the key interpretive gloss: under § 3583(g), the district court is “neither directed nor forbidden to consider any particular factors,” which undercut Grant’s claim that the district court’s phrasing necessarily created reversible error.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why Amendment 821 did not apply at the revocation hearing

The panel’s analysis is fundamentally a scope-of-authority holding: even if Amendment 821 is retroactive for certain defendants, that does not mean it can be used to alter the revocation range or revocation sentence.

Revocation ranges use the original criminal history category. The court relied on the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.1 (2010), which states that the relevant criminal history category is the one “determined at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to the term of supervision” and “is not to be recalculated.” The stated reason is structural: revocation ranges were “designed to take into account that the defendant violated supervision.”
The retroactivity mechanism does not reach revocation imprisonment terms. The court then tied Amendment 821 to the statutory vehicle for retroactive relief, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and its implementing policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. While § 1B1.10 permits reductions for Amendment 821 in the qualifying context, the commentary is explicit: “[Section 1B1.10] does not authorize a reduction in the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.8(A)). That text foreclosed the remedy Grant requested “at the time of [his] revocation hearing.”

Putting these together, the court held the district court correctly treated criminal history category IV as fixed for revocation purposes and correctly declined to apply Amendment 821 to the revocation sentence.

2) Why the above-guidelines revocation sentence was not reversible error

Grant’s second argument targeted the district court’s justification for an upward variance to the statutory maximum (24 months), emphasizing the court’s phrase “lack of respect for the law.”

Plain-error posture mattered. Under Esteras v. United States, because Grant did not specifically object that the court was impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), the panel reviewed only for plain error—an intentionally difficult standard to satisfy.
Contextual reading of the district court’s remarks. The Fifth Circuit accepted the Government’s contextual explanation: the district court was describing recidivism and danger—Grant committed the “exact same conduct” shortly after release—rather than invoking § 3553(a)(2)(A) as a sentencing purpose. This is consistent with the revocation framework that treats the violation as a breach of the court’s trust.
Mandatory revocation under § 3583(g) reduces the force of § 3553(a)(2)(A) objections. The panel stressed that, because Grant possessed narcotics and a firearm, the district court “did as it was required” and revoked under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). Relying on Belmontes, it added that under § 3583(g) the court is “neither directed nor forbidden to consider any particular factors,” making it harder to reframe the district court’s comments as legal error warranting reversal.

Impact

Amendment 821’s “status points” change will not lower revocation exposure via recalculated criminal history. Defendants who qualify for retroactive relief from Amendment 821 must pursue it, if at all, through a § 3582(c)(2) process aimed at the original imprisonment term—not by attempting to reduce revocation ranges or revocation imprisonment.
The opinion reinforces the “fixed criminal history category” principle at revocation. By grounding the holding in the text of U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.1 (2010), the panel signals that revocation is a distinct sentencing event with its own design assumptions, not an occasion to “update” the defendant’s Guidelines profile.
§ 3583(g) cases will remain difficult vehicles for § 3553(a)(2)(A) appellate reversals. Where revocation is mandatory (narcotics/firearm possession), and especially where the defense did not preserve a specific “improper factor” objection, appellate courts are likely to treat “respect for the law” language as contextual recidivism/breach of trust commentary—unless the record clearly shows the court anchored its sentence in forbidden punishment rationales.
Practical litigation effect: defense counsel must separate (a) retroactivity motions from (b) revocation advocacy. Grant illustrates that the correct procedural pathway matters. Even a favorable retroactive amendment does not automatically become an argument at revocation, and counsel must preserve specific objections to the court’s sentencing-factor reasoning to avoid the steep plain-error standard.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release revocation: After prison, a defendant may be supervised under conditions. If the defendant violates conditions, the court can revoke supervision and impose additional prison time (up to a statutory cap).
Amendment 821 and “status points”: Before Amendment 821, the Guidelines typically added two criminal history points if the defendant committed the new offense while under a “criminal justice sentence” (including supervised release). Amendment 821 reduced that to one point in the relevant provision. Fewer points can mean a lower criminal history category and a lower advisory range—but this case holds that change does not carry into revocation-range calculations.
Criminal history category at revocation: The revocation table uses the criminal history category from the original sentencing (the sentence that first imposed supervised release). It is “not to be recalculated” at revocation, even if later amendments would have changed it.
§ 3582(c)(2) retroactivity: This statute is the usual vehicle for seeking a reduced original prison term when the Sentencing Commission later lowers a guideline range and makes the change retroactive. The key limitation applied here: policy statements say it does not authorize reducing prison time imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) “improper factors”: In many revocation contexts, courts may not sentence based on “seriousness of the offense,” “promot[ing] respect for the law,” or “just punishment.” But when revocation is mandatory under § 3583(g), Fifth Circuit precedent indicates the court is not strictly directed or forbidden to consider particular factors, weakening claims premised on those restrictions.
Plain-error review: If a defendant fails to make a specific objection in the district court, appellate review becomes much harder: the defendant must show a clear legal error that affected substantial rights and seriously harms the fairness/integrity of proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Grant reinforces two practical rules for supervised-release litigation in the Fifth Circuit: (1) revocation sentencing does not reopen criminal history calculations and cannot be used to apply retroactive Amendment 821 to reduce the revocation range or revocation imprisonment; and (2) where § 3583(g) mandates revocation for narcotics/firearm possession, appellate attacks on a revocation sentence based on alleged consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) are especially difficult—particularly absent a preserved objection and where the district court’s remarks can be understood as addressing recidivism and breach of trust.