Revocation Proof and Confrontation in the Eleventh Circuit: Custodian Affidavits May Suffice, but “Missed Treatment” Requires Competent Evidence

Introduction

In United States v. Amaury Rodriguez (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a revocation of supervised release imposed after Rodriguez—originally convicted in 2009 for distributing child pornography—was alleged to have absconded from Florida, traveled to Arkansas, failed to comply with sex-offender registration requirements (state and federal), failed to participate in treatment, and used internet-connected technology despite a computer/modem restriction.

The appeal raised three core issues:

  1. Due process / confrontation in revocation: whether the district court improperly relied on hearsay, including sex-offender registry “no-record” affidavits and treatment-provider statements, without properly applying the balancing framework of United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994).
  2. Sufficiency of the evidence: whether the court clearly erred in sustaining the alleged violations.
  3. First Amendment challenge: whether special conditions restricting computer/modem use (with prior court approval) were unconstitutional under Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017), especially given a life term of supervision.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit:

  • Affirmed the findings that Rodriguez violated supervised release by:
    • failing to register as a sex offender under Florida, Arkansas, and federal law (Violations 1, 2, 3, 10);
    • changing residence without notifying probation (Violation 5);
    • using an internet-connected computer/modem (Violation 9);
    • and noted he did not dispute leaving the district without informing probation (Violation 6).
  • Vacated the findings that Rodriguez failed to participate in:
    • mental-health treatment (Violation 7), and
    • sex-offender treatment (Violation 8),
    because the record lacked competent evidence to support those violations as found and justified.
  • Affirmed the computer/modem restriction as a supervised-release condition as foreclosed by circuit precedent.
  • Vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without consideration of Violations 7 and 8, invoking the “sentencing package” principle of United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

The decision is best understood as an application—sometimes in tension—of the Eleventh Circuit’s revocation due-process doctrine and its standards for evidentiary sufficiency and appellate review.

United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994)

Frazier supplies the revocation-hearing framework for hearsay: although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, revocation defendants are entitled to “minimal due process requirements,” and the court must balance the defendant’s confrontation interest against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness. The hearsay must also be reliable.

Here, Rodriguez argued the district court failed to properly perform the Frazier balancing regarding registry custodian affidavits and treatment-provider statements. The Eleventh Circuit largely rejected that claim as to the registry evidence, emphasizing reliability and practical burdens, and then vacated the treatment violations on a different evidentiary logic (not simply because of a defective Frazier analysis).

United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1983)

Penn provides an important justification for documentary substitutes in revocation: “difficulty and expense of procuring live witnesses” may justify affidavits and documentary evidence, which often carry “indicia of reliability.” The panel invoked Penn to validate the district court’s reliance on registry custodian affidavits—especially where Rodriguez did not identify concrete reasons why cross-examination would undermine the searches or the “no record” conclusions.

United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2020)

Hall reinforces that hearsay may be considered in revocation if the defendant can refute it and it bears “minimal indicia of reliability.” The panel used Hall to situate the registry affidavits within accepted revocation practice.

United States v. Reese, 775 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015)

Reese is cited for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment confrontation right does not apply in supervised-release revocation proceedings; the relevant protection is due process. This frames Rodriguez’s confrontation claim as a Frazier due-process issue, not a trial-right issue.

United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156 (11th Cir. 1984)

These cases do the crucial appellate work. Even if confrontation was improperly denied, Taylor places the burden on the defendant to show (1) the hearsay was materially false or unreliable, and (2) it actually served as the basis for the sentence. The panel used Taylor to reject Rodriguez’s effort to obtain reversal merely by pointing to an asserted defect in the Frazier process—because he “does not even attempt” to show the registry affidavits were unreliable.

Reme is cited for the due-process minimum: hearsay used in sentencing must bear minimal indicia of reliability.

United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008)

Vega-Castillo supplies the prior-precedent rule: older binding precedent controls unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. The panel invoked it to explain why, to the extent Rodriguez argued Frazier altered the harmlessness/burden allocation, Taylor (as earlier precedent) would govern.

Standards of review and proof: United States v. Diamond, 102 F.4th 1347 (11th Cir. 2024); United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc); United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2017)

Collectively, these citations define the appellate posture:

  • Abuse of discretion for revocation decisions and preserved evidentiary/sentencing challenges (Frazier, Diamond, Mazarky).
  • Clear error deference to factual findings (Almand; Rodriguez (2023)).
  • Preponderance of the evidence to prove violations (Cunningham), with the en banc definition in Watkins.
  • Fact-finders may choose among reasonable inferences (Williams), which mattered for inferring intent to reside out of state and personal computer use.

United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2013)

The panel relied on Washington when vacating the treatment violations: the government bears the burden of introducing “sufficient and reliable” evidence to prove necessary facts by a preponderance. That burden was not met for Violation 7 and, given the district court’s stated rationale, not met for Violation 8 either.

United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2015)

Rivera is used for a basic hearsay definition (offered for the truth of the matter asserted). That definition became outcome-determinative for Violation 8: if the provider’s statement was truly “not for its truth,” then there was no evidence Rodriguez actually missed the May 8 appointment—so the violation could not stand.

Computer/Internet conditions: United States v. Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2020); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017)

The panel treated the First Amendment challenge as foreclosed:

  • Coglianese stated the Eleventh Circuit has “uniformly” upheld computer restrictions for sex offenses involving a computer so long as the defendant may seek permission for specific uses; it affirmed a 30-year term with such a prior-authorization clause.
  • Bobal upheld a life term with a computer restriction (on plain-error review) and distinguished Packingham.
  • Packingham struck down a broadly applicable state law restricting social media access for registered sex offenders even after sentence completion; the Eleventh Circuit has distinguished supervised-release conditions that are individualized, time-tethered to a federal sentence, and contain a permission mechanism.

United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014)

Once the panel vacated two component violations, it applied Fowler to vacate the entire sentence and remand, allowing the district court to “reconstruct the sentencing package” to align with the Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors without those violations.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Registry custodian affidavits: confrontation, reliability, and the defendant’s appellate burden

The court’s treatment of the registry evidence proceeds in two steps:

  1. On the merits of Frazier balancing, the panel was “not persuaded” the district court failed to balance, emphasizing that the district court considered:
    • the affidavits’ specificity (database and manual searches),
    • their facial reliability, and
    • the burden/expense of producing custodians.
    This tracks Penn’s acceptance of documentary substitutes where procuring live witnesses is expensive and the documents are reliable.
  2. Even assuming error, the panel invoked Taylor: Rodriguez still had to show the affidavits were “materially false or unreliable,” and he did not. This makes reliability not merely a trial-level gatekeeping consideration under Frazier, but also an appellate prerequisite for reversal where the claim is essentially “the witness should have been produced.”

Practically, the opinion signals that in the Eleventh Circuit a revocation defendant challenging documentary registry evidence must do more than demand cross-examination; he must identify why the document is likely wrong (e.g., flawed search methods, mismatched identifiers, incomplete systems) to satisfy Taylor’s “materially false or unreliable” requirement.

B. The failure-to-register violations: inference-driven proof meets the preponderance standard

On the substantive elements, the panel held the district court did not clearly err in finding that Rodriguez’s conduct triggered Florida, Arkansas, and federal reporting duties and that he failed to comply.

  • Triggering conduct was inferred from:
    • his absence from home beginning May 4, 2023, without return,
    • his arrest in Arkansas on June 15, 2023,
    • emails sent on June 6 and 7 identifying “Amaury Luis Rodriguez,” and
    • a recorded jail call stating he was “here in Arkansas now” because he did not want “home” or “probation.”
    Under Williams, the factfinder may choose among reasonable inferences; under Watkins and Cunningham, the government need only show a preponderance.
  • Noncompliance was shown through custodian evidence that no registration forms were filed reflecting the change.

The opinion also briefly notes an error in the petition’s statutory citation to SORNA (listing “42 U.S.C. § 1690, et seq.” despite reclassification), but treats it as non-prejudicial because Rodriguez did not claim lack of notice or inability to defend.

C. Treatment violations: the court’s “not-for-truth” framing collapsed the proof

The most instructive portion of the opinion is the vacatur of Violations 7 and 8, which turns on what evidence actually proved: “Rodriguez missed treatment,” as opposed to “probation was investigating and couldn’t find him.”

  • Violation 7 (mental-health appointment) failed for lack of evidence; even the government conceded there was no competent proof that Rodriguez missed an appointment on the charged date. Under Washington, the government must present “sufficient and reliable” proof.
  • Violation 8 (sex-offender appointment) was supported only by a provider’s out-of-court statement that Rodriguez missed May 8. Yet the district court denied confrontation on the rationale that the violation relied on the probation officer’s “own conduct, rather than hearsay.” The panel identified the logical consequence: if the provider statement was not admitted for its truth, then there was no evidence that Rodriguez actually missed the appointment.

This is a notable evidentiary clarification: a court cannot sustain an allegation whose essential element depends on an out-of-court statement while simultaneously treating that statement as merely “background” or “explanatory” (i.e., not for its truth). If it is not-for-truth, it proves nothing about whether the appointment was missed; if it is for truth, then Frazier’s reliability/balancing must do real work.

D. Computer/modem restriction: Packingham remains distinguished in supervised-release conditions with prior approval

The panel affirmed the special condition prohibiting computer/modem use absent prior court approval, stating Rodriguez’s argument was foreclosed by Coglianese and Bobal. In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, Packingham does not invalidate routine federal supervised-release computer restrictions where there is a permission mechanism.

E. Remedy: resentencing under the “sentencing package” doctrine

Because two violations were vacated, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under Fowler, allowing the district court to reconsider the overall sentencing structure without those violations.

3) Impact

  • Revocation hearings and documentary “no-record” proof: The opinion reinforces that registry custodian affidavits can be sufficient, especially where the defendant cannot articulate any concrete reason the records/searches are wrong. It also underscores the appellate importance of Taylor—a defendant seeking reversal must make a reliability showing, not merely identify an asserted procedural deficit.
  • Sharper policing of “background” testimony: The vacatur of Violation 8 will be cited by litigants where the government attempts to prove a charged violation through out-of-court statements while characterizing them as non-hearsay “explanation.” If the statement is necessary to prove the violation, it is effectively for its truth, and the record must contain competent proof of the missed obligation.
  • Supervised-release tech restrictions remain stable in the Eleventh Circuit: By reaffirming Coglianese and Bobal, the court maintained a predictable rule: computer/internet limits tied to a sex offense involving a computer generally survive Packingham when the condition allows prior authorization for legitimate use—even when supervision is for life.
  • Sentencing consequences of partial vacatur: The use of Fowler signals that revocation sentencing is treated as a package; eliminating violations can reopen the entire sentencing calculus on remand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release (and revocation)
Supervised release is a period of court-ordered monitoring after prison. If conditions are violated, the court may “revoke” it and impose imprisonment and a new term of supervision, based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Minimal due process” vs. Sixth Amendment confrontation
In revocation proceedings, defendants do not receive the full trial right to confrontation. Instead, due process requires a fair process that includes, under Frazier, a balancing of the defendant’s interest in confronting the witness against the government’s reasons for using hearsay, plus reliability.
Hearsay “for truth” vs. “not for truth”
A statement is hearsay if offered to prove what it asserts. If it is admitted only to show why an officer investigated (not for truth), it cannot prove the underlying fact. This case illustrates the consequence: you cannot prove “he missed an appointment” with a statement treated as merely “explanatory.”
Preponderance of the evidence
The government need only show the violation is more likely than not.
Clear error review
Appellate courts defer to fact findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred.
Prior-precedent rule
A later panel follows earlier binding circuit precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
Sentencing package doctrine
If part of the basis for a sentence is removed, the district court may resentence holistically to achieve a coherent overall result.

Conclusion

United States v. Amaury Rodriguez reinforces two practical rules for supervised-release revocations in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) documentary registry evidence (including custodian affidavits) will generally sustain failure-to-register violations absent a meaningful showing of unreliability, and (2) treatment nonattendance cannot be sustained on a record that treats the only proof (a provider’s out-of-court statement) as “not for truth”—because then the government has not actually proven the missed appointment.

The decision also maintains the circuit’s established distinction between Packingham and individualized supervised-release computer restrictions with a prior-approval mechanism, and it underscores that vacating even some violations can require full resentencing under the “sentencing package” approach.