Revocation for Pervasive Client-Targeted Sexual Harassment Without Any “Propensity” Showing: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael Seung-Hyock Yang (2026 WI 14)

1. Introduction

In 2026 WI 14, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed attorney-discipline recommendations arising from Attorney Michael Seung-Hyock Yang’s conduct toward two indigent criminal-defense clients (Client 1 and Client 2) whom he represented through appointments by the State Public Defender’s Office (SPD). The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) appealed the referee’s recommendation of a one-year suspension and urged revocation. Attorney Yang cross-appealed, challenging a factual finding about physical contact, seeking a shorter suspension, and requesting reduced costs based on claimed “over-litigation.”

The case centered on whether sexually harassing, sexually explicit, and coercive-leaning communications with clients—occurring during active criminal representation—warrant revocation, and whether the OLR must prove a respondent’s “propensity” to reoffend as a prerequisite for revocation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the referee’s findings (no clear error), concluded the OLR proved all four misconduct counts by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, and imposed revocation rather than suspension. It also assessed full costs against Attorney Yang and rejected arguments that the OLR “over-litigated” or charged an unreasonable hourly rate.

Crucially, the court rejected the referee’s view that revocation requires proof—by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence—of a respondent’s propensity to repeat the misconduct. The court held that neither existing Wisconsin disciplinary jurisprudence nor the ABA Standards impose such a requirement when revocation is otherwise warranted by the nature of the proven conduct.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alfredson, 2019 WI 17

The court relied on Alfredson for the governing standards of review: referee factfinding stands unless clearly erroneous; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; and the Supreme Court may impose any sanction it deems appropriate regardless of the referee’s recommendation. That framework is especially important here because the court used it to depart from the referee’s one-year suspension recommendation and impose revocation.

Jacobson v. American Tool Companies, Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 384 (Ct. App. 1998)

This case supported the court’s treatment of credibility determinations. Because the referee did not expressly decide credibility about the alleged backrub/shoulder rub, the court treated credibility as implicitly resolved by adoption of the OLR’s proposed facts. This enabled affirmance of the disputed physical-contact finding without requiring explicit referee credibility language.

State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84

Arias supplied the “clearly erroneous” definition: a finding is clearly erroneous if against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Applying this standard, the court upheld that Attorney Yang hugged Client 1 and attempted unwanted physical contact in context.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against DeLadurantey, 2023 WI 17

The court invoked DeLadurantey for the sanctioning factors: seriousness/nature/extent of misconduct; protection of the public; impressing seriousness upon the attorney; and deterring other attorneys. It also cited DeLadurantey for the court’s “increasing scrutiny” of attorney sexual misconduct—an explicit warning that sanctions are trending more severe.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffen, 2025 WI 31

Steffen was the OLR’s primary comparator. Though Steffen involved criminal acts (surreptitious recording), the court emphasized the shared core: exploitation and abuse of professional power undermining the justice system. The court described Yang’s case as a “mirror image” of Steffen—here, the accused’s appointed defender, rather than the prosecutor, engaged in sexual exploitation that corrodes trust in the system’s neutrality and in constitutionally required representation.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Conmey, 2005 WI 166

The court cited Conmey to refute the referee’s “propensity” requirement. Conmey illustrates that the court can revoke for severe misconduct (there, conversion of estate funds) without undertaking a propensity analysis or relying on prior discipline—supporting the broader point that revocation can rest on the proven acts and their inherent danger.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luening, 2023 WI 76

Luening underscored a core discipline principle: no two cases are precisely the same; there is no standard sanction for a given type of misconduct. The court used this to answer Attorney Yang’s “out of step” and “without notice” arguments, reinforcing that sanction calibration is fact-sensitive and not constrained by a rigid “words vs. physical acts” taxonomy.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36

Ritland supplied the court’s modern framing: sexual misconduct by attorneys is not taken lightly, and attorneys act “at their professional peril.” The opinion used Ritland to stress contemporary understanding of harm—especially psychological harm and the silencing effect of power imbalances—making older, more lenient outcomes less persuasive.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanes, 2020 WI 89

The court quoted Hanes (as quoted in Ritland) for the profession’s evolved intolerance toward sexual abuse and recognition of victims’ powerlessness and psychological damage. This quotation provides normative support for severe sanctions even where a client does not immediately complain or where coercion is implicit rather than overt.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 59 Wis. 2d 312 (1973) and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis. 2d 1 (1992)

The court treated the two Heilprin decisions as long-standing notice that pervasive sexual misconduct with clients can warrant extremely severe discipline. The 1973 matter involved obscene talk, indecent proposals/advances, and indecent exposure leading to indefinite suspension; the 1992 proceeding led to revocation for repeated sexually explicit client-directed conduct—explicitly prioritizing public protection from “offensive behavior conducted under the authority of a license to practice law.”

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister, 2015 WI 8

Lister supported the cost-allocation principle: the court generally imposes full costs absent “extraordinary circumstances.” The court found none here, and also held Yang forfeited objections to the initial costs by not timely objecting under SCR 22.24(2).

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moodie, 2020 WI 39 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) and S. Ct. Order 19-10 (issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting)

These authorities appeared in Justice Ziegler’s concurrence to highlight a structural point: “revocation” in Wisconsin is not necessarily permanent because reinstatement may be petitioned for after five years (SCR 22.29(2)). The concurrence does not change the sanction but raises policy concerns about public perception and whether “permanent revocation” should exist for rare cases.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Misconduct and Proof

Attorney Yang admitted the rule violations (SCR 20:8.4(i) sexual harassment; SCR 20:8.4(g) in conjunction with SCR 40.15 offensive personality). The remaining disputes centered on certain facts (physical contact with Client 1) and sanction. The court affirmed the contested factfinding, crediting Client 1’s testimony in context and emphasizing that even without the backrub detail, the sanction analysis would not materially change.

Sanction: Why Revocation, Not Suspension

The court characterized the misconduct as “beyond the pale”: a pervasive course of sexually suggestive and explicit conduct directed at clients during criminal representation, including sexually explicit messaging and a genital photograph. The court focused on:

  • Power imbalance and vulnerability: indigent defendants facing incarceration, dependent on appointed counsel.
  • Systemic harm: undermining trust in the constitutional promise of competent defense and neutrality of the justice system.
  • Client harm: Client 1 testified she stipulated to probation revocation and served prison time to avoid Yang; Client 2 testified fear, disgust, and belief she might have to submit to sex to avoid prison.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors (ABA Standards)

The court agreed with key aggravators: selfish motive, pattern/multiple offenses, vulnerable victims, and substantial experience. It accepted limited mitigation (no prior discipline; cooperation), but rejected additional mitigation claims:

  • Personal/emotional problems: marital distress did not justify or reduce sanction absent evidence of a qualifying disorder and given the severity.
  • Collateral consequences: broken marriage, negative publicity, and social-media fallout were not “other penalties or sanctions” under ABA Standard 9.32(k) as the court understood it.
  • Remorse: the court found Yang’s contrition “perfunctory” and inconsistent with minimization and rationalizations (e.g., “puritanical” culture, “post-feminist world,” “thin line” between baseball talk and sexual content), indicating inadequate comprehension of wrongfulness.

ABA Standard 7.1 and the “Propensity” Issue

A pivotal doctrinal point is the court’s reliance on ABA Standard 7.1: revocation is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates professional duties intending personal benefit and causes serious or potentially serious injury. The court held this standard fit the facts.

The referee had required OLR to prove “propensity” to repeat as a condition for revocation. The Supreme Court rejected that framing: revocation may be imposed based on the misconduct’s nature and demonstrated danger without a separate “propensity” finding. The court reasoned that it does not require propensity findings even in revocations for financial conversion (citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Conmey), and it did not do so in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffen.

Costs

The court enforced the procedural structure of SCR 22.24: failure to timely object forfeits challenges to initial costs. On the merits, it rejected claims that OLR’s $125 hourly rate was unreasonable, noting BAO approval and the absence of specific line-item objections.

3.3. Impact

1) Revocation Standard Clarified: No “Propensity” Prerequisite

The most concrete precedential contribution is the court’s explicit statement that Wisconsin disciplinary jurisprudence and the ABA Standards do not require proof of “propensity” to reoffend before revocation may be ordered. Future referees and parties should treat “propensity” evidence as potentially relevant to risk and rehabilitation, but not as a mandatory element the OLR must prove to justify revocation.

2) Heightened Treatment of Defense-Side Exploitation

By framing the case as a “mirror image” of Steffen, the court elevated appointed-defense sexual exploitation to the same institutional-threat tier as prosecutorial abuse. This strengthens the disciplinary system’s focus on role-based power and the unique vulnerability of clients facing incarceration.

3) Remorse Requires More Than Words

The opinion signals that claimed remorse may be discounted where a respondent minimizes misconduct, blames cultural sensitivity, or portrays clearly prohibited behavior as merely “gray.” This will likely influence how mitigation is litigated, including the kind of therapeutic or expert evidence that might credibly demonstrate insight and rehabilitation.

4) Costs Litigation: Procedure Matters

The decision reinforces that cost challenges must be timely and specific; generalized “over-litigation” arguments are unlikely to succeed without concrete objections made within SCR timelines.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Revocation vs. disbarment: Wisconsin uses “revocation” in place of “disbarment,” but revocation is not necessarily permanent; reinstatement may be sought after five years (SCR 22.29(2)), a point highlighted by Justice Ziegler’s concurrence.
  • SCR 20:8.4(i) (sexual harassment): prohibits harassing a person on the basis of sex in connection with professional activities. In practice, it covers lawyer-client communications and conduct when tied to representation.
  • SCR 20:8.4(g) + SCR 40.15 (offensive personality): ties professional misconduct to violating the attorney’s oath, including the obligation to abstain from “all offensive personality.” Here it functioned as an additional professional-duty lens for sexually offensive conduct.
  • “Clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence”: a heightened civil proof standard used in Wisconsin lawyer discipline—more demanding than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Clearly erroneous review: appellate deference to factual findings; the court will not reweigh evidence if the finding is supported by the record.
  • ABA Standard 7.1: a disciplinary guideline indicating revocation is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates professional duties to gain personal benefit and causes serious/potentially serious injury.
  • Aggravating vs. mitigating factors: circumstances that increase or decrease sanction severity; the court emphasized that personal hardships and reputational fallout do not automatically mitigate.

5. Conclusion

2026 WI 14 is a forceful statement that pervasive, client-directed sexual harassment during criminal representation—particularly of indigent, vulnerable clients facing incarceration—can warrant revocation even without physical sexual contact and even without a separate evidentiary showing that the lawyer has a “propensity” to repeat the behavior. The court anchored sanctioning in the misconduct’s inherent danger, the fiduciary betrayal of the attorney-client relationship, and the institutional harm to the justice system’s legitimacy.

Doctrinally, the opinion’s clearest rule-like clarification is that revocation does not require proof of “propensity” to reoffend when the proven misconduct otherwise satisfies the disciplinary objectives of public protection, deterrence, and preservation of trust in the legal system.