Date: Mar 9, 2026

Revocation Cannot Rest on Unpronounced “Standard” Conditions: Rogers Nullities May Be Raised Through a Revocation Appeal

1. Introduction

In United States v. John McLaurin (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026), the Fourth Circuit vacated a supervised-release revocation where the revocation was based on “standard” supervised-release conditions that appeared in the defendant’s original written judgment but were never orally pronounced at his original sentencing hearing.

The case sits at the intersection of (i) the Fourth Circuit’s oral-pronouncement requirement for discretionary supervised-release conditions under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and (ii) later decisions restricting when and how defendants may raise a Rogers issue long after the original sentence—particularly United States v. Brantley, 87 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Cir. 2024).

Parties and posture. The United States was the appellee; John McLaurin was the appellant. McLaurin’s original 2013 sentence included a written judgment listing mandatory conditions, special conditions (orally recited), and fourteen “standard” conditions (not recited). In 2024, the district court revoked supervised release based on violations of two standard conditions (home visits and address notification) and imposed 90 days’ imprisonment plus 42 months of supervised release “with the exact same terms and conditions.” McLaurin appealed.

Key issues. The appeal raised three questions: (1) whether an appellate waiver in the 2012 plea agreement barred the appeal; (2) whether the appeal was procedurally proper and timely given the age of the 2013 judgment; and (3) whether revocation based on unpronounced discretionary conditions survives plain-error review.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The majority (Judge Gregory, joined by Judge Berner) held:

Appellate waiver: The waiver of the right to appeal “whatever sentence is imposed” did not bar a Rogers claim because the challenged discretionary conditions were never imposed (they were “nullities”).
Procedural propriety/timeliness: The appeal was timely as an appeal from the 2024 revocation judgment. Under Brantley and Newby, McLaurin used a “procedurally appropriate mechanism” because the revocation proceeding was “infected by the initial Rogers error.”
Merits (plain error): Revoking supervised release based on discretionary conditions that were not orally pronounced was plain error under Rogers. The error affected substantial rights (imprisonment and a new term of supervised release) and warranted correction to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.

The court therefore vacated the revocation judgment and remanded for revocation resentencing.

Judge Niemeyer dissented, arguing principally that the court lacked jurisdiction to “open” the final 2013 judgment in a revocation appeal; that any Rogers error was not plain (and may not have existed due to incorporation/adoption of the PSR); and that McLaurin invited any revocation error by stipulating to violations of the standard conditions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Oral pronouncement and “nullities”: United States v. Rogers and its progeny

United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020): The core rule: a district court must orally pronounce all non-mandatory (discretionary) supervised-release conditions at sentencing; discretionary conditions appearing for the first time in the written judgment are invalid. The majority applied Rogers directly to treat the unpronounced “standard” conditions as unenforceable.
United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021): Quoted for the proposition that such conditions are “nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions,” and for the further point that an appeal waiver of “whatever sentence is imposed” does not bar a Rogers claim.

B. Post-judgment timing and the “procedurally appropriate mechanism” requirement: Brantley and Newby

United States v. Brantley, 87 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2023): The majority relied on Brantley for the distinction between a judgment being “valid” despite containing “nullities,” and for the principle that defendants do not have an open-ended, free-standing right to correct a Rogers error outside procedural channels. The majority emphasized, however, that Brantley did not retreat from Rogers’ nullity rule.
United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Cir. 2024): Newby provided the framework: there is “no freestanding right” to seek correction of a Rogers error; a defendant must use a “procedurally appropriate mechanism.” The majority held that the 2024 revocation judgment—because it depended on the unpronounced conditions—was such a mechanism.

C. Appellate waivers and interpretation of plea agreements

United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2001): de novo review of plea agreement interpretation.
United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019): contract principles apply to plea agreements.
United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Under Seal, 902 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2018): ambiguities construed against the government as drafter; heightened scrutiny due to constitutional rights.
United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007): enforce unambiguous agreements absent overreaching.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2012): the government’s waiver cases recognized exceptions where fundamental issues are at stake, including sentences exceeding authority. The majority used this as further support that revoking supervised release based on never-imposed conditions goes to authority.

D. Procedural doctrines raised by the government: law of the case, revocation as a forum, and timeliness

United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1993) and Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007): law-of-the-case doctrine and forfeiture of issues that could have been raised earlier.
United States v. Sanchez, 891 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2018): cited by the government for the proposition that revocation is not a forum to test the underlying sentence. The majority distinguished Rogers as addressing conditions that were never validly imposed and therefore never became binding “law of the case.”
United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115 (4th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Whitley, 841 F. App’x 631 (4th Cir. 2021): invoked by the government for the general bar on attacking conditions at revocation; the majority found them inapplicable because they did not involve Rogers-type “nullities” and because Newby/Brantley sometimes make later proceedings the only procedural vehicle.
United States v. Cannady, 63 F.4th 259 (4th Cir. 2023): used to reject penalizing a defendant for failing to object based on a rule announced years later.

E. Plain-error framework and prejudice

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010): unpreserved issues reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2021) and Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): plain-error prongs and when appellate courts should correct error.
United States v. McKinney, 60 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2012): used to reject the government’s “no prejudice because other violations existed” argument; the analysis focuses on what the court actually relied upon, not what it could have relied upon.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The waiver does not reach conditions that were never imposed

The majority’s interpretive move is to treat a Rogers challenge as categorically different from a challenge to “a sentence” or “conditions” that were “imposed.” Under Rogers, unpronounced discretionary conditions are not merely defective; they are “nullities.” Thus, a waiver of appeals about the sentence “imposed” does not clearly waive an appeal asserting that the defendant was never sentenced to those conditions at all. This mirrors the reasoning in United States v. Singletary, which the majority treated as directly on point.

B. The revocation appeal is a permissible vehicle under Brantley/Newby

The majority accepted the premise that a defendant cannot simply revive an old case to correct a Rogers defect. But it held that this was not a belated direct attack on the 2013 judgment; it was a timely appeal from a new judgment (the 2024 revocation judgment) that was “infected” because the revocation rested on conditions that Rogers treats as nonexistent.

This is the opinion’s most consequential operational rule: it positions revocation proceedings (and their resulting judgments) as potential gateways for litigating old Rogers defects, so long as the challenged conditions are the ones actually used to revoke.

C. Plain error: the court lacked authority to revoke based on null conditions

The majority treated the failure to orally pronounce discretionary conditions as an error that is “plain” under Rogers. It then found substantial-rights prejudice because McLaurin received imprisonment and a new supervised-release term, and refused to deem the error harmless based on dismissed allegations. Finally, it rejected the government’s “technicality/windfall” framing, emphasizing Rogers’ due-process rationale: defendants must be present for sentencing and have an opportunity to object to discretionary conditions tailored (or not) to their circumstances.

D. Remedy: vacatur and remand for revocation resentencing (not dismissal)

Notably, while the dissent argued that McLaurin sought dismissal and that resentencing was “absurd,” the majority directed revocation resentencing. It also stated that because the admission/dismissal agreement was built on the assumption that the standard conditions were valid, “the agreement is invalid,” supporting resentencing rather than simply excising conditions.

3.3 Impact

Expanded practical availability of Rogers claims. For defendants sentenced pre-2020 who did not (and could not) raise Rogers at sentencing, this decision strengthens the argument that a later revocation judgment can be the “procedurally appropriate mechanism” under United States v. Newby, when revocation depends on unpronounced discretionary conditions.
Revocation litigation will focus more on the original sentencing record. Parties can be expected to scrutinize whether the allegedly violated condition was mandatory, specially pronounced, incorporated by reference, or otherwise validly imposed under Rogers.
Charging and bargaining incentives may shift. Probation and prosecutors may rely more on mandatory conditions (or clearly pronounced special conditions) when revocation is anticipated, or proactively seek modification/clarification under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) to avoid later “nullity” disputes.
Institutional tension (majority vs. dissent) signals future en banc or Supreme Court interest. The dissent framed the decision as undermining finality and creating a “new gate” into old judgments; the majority framed it as applying Rogers and harmonizing Brantley/Newby. This split suggests continued doctrinal development on jurisdiction/finality and invited-error constraints in the Rogers context.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandatory vs. discretionary supervised-release conditions: Mandatory conditions are required by statute and need not be orally pronounced under Rogers. Discretionary conditions (including many “standard” ones) must be orally pronounced or properly incorporated at sentencing.
“Standard” conditions are not automatically mandatory: “Standard” is a label of common usage, not a legal category that avoids Rogers. If the condition is discretionary, it must be pronounced.
“Nullity” (in this context): Under Rogers/Singletary, an unpronounced discretionary condition that appears only in a written judgment is treated as though it was never imposed; the defendant was “not sentenced” to it.
Appellate waiver: A defendant can waive many appellate rights in a plea agreement, but courts interpret waivers based on their plain language and construe ambiguity against the government. Here, the waiver covered sentences “imposed,” and the court held the challenged conditions were never imposed.
Plain-error review: When no objection is made below, the defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) warranting correction to protect the integrity of proceedings.
“Procedurally appropriate mechanism” (from Newby): A defendant cannot bring a stand-alone, late appeal just to fix a Rogers mistake; there must be some proper procedural posture (e.g., appeal from a later judgment that depends on the earlier error).

5. Conclusion

United States v. John McLaurin reinforces and operationalizes United States v. Rogers in the revocation context: a court cannot revoke supervised release based on discretionary “standard” conditions that were never orally pronounced at sentencing, because those conditions are “nullities.” The decision further holds that an appeal from a revocation judgment can be a procedurally proper vehicle under United States v. Brantley and United States v. Newby to litigate such a defect, and that broad plea waivers of appeals from the “sentence imposed” do not necessarily foreclose a claim that certain conditions were never imposed at all.

The dissent’s emphasis on finality, jurisdictional limits, incorporation of conditions via PSR adoption, and invited error highlights the doctrinal pressure points likely to shape future Fourth Circuit litigation: when revocation appeals may revisit earlier sentencing pronouncements, and how courts should reconcile Rogers with traditional limits on collateral attacks during revocation proceedings.