Reusch v. Hertz: Summary Judgment Improper Where Policy Applicability, Approved Leave, and Shifting Reasons Create a Jury Issue on Retaliatory Motive

Introduction

In George Reusch, Jr. v. The Hertz Corporation (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment for the employer on an Illinois retaliatory discharge claim. Reusch, a recently hired finance and insurance manager, reported coworker document forgery; shortly thereafter, Hertz investigated and fired the wrongdoers. Six days after Reusch’s report, his manager recommended terminating him, citing absenteeism and performance issues, and Hertz later issued a termination letter listing “excessive absenteeism,” “unsatisfactory performance,” and customer service concerns.

The central appellate issue was causation: whether a reasonable jury could find that Reusch’s protected report caused his termination. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact—especially around whether absences were approved and whether Hertz’s policies applied— required a trial.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the summary-judgment record de novo and concluded that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes. It held that a reasonable jury could infer retaliatory motive based on (i) disputed applicability of Hertz’s probationary and attendance/bereavement policies, (ii) evidence suggesting approved leave was later treated as misconduct, (iii) inconsistencies and apparent shifts in Hertz’s stated reasons for termination, and (iv) close temporal proximity between the report and the discharge without a clear, undisputed intervening event. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Ellison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 84 F.4th 750 (7th Cir. 2023)
    Provided the standard for de novo review of summary judgment and the obligation to view evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmovant. The panel invoked it to emphasize that the appellate court must reassess the record without deference to the district court’s view.
  • Johnson v. Edwards, 164 F.4th 1074 (7th Cir. 2026)
    Reinforced that at summary judgment courts may not weigh evidence, resolve credibility disputes, or choose between competing narratives. This principle was central to the court’s criticism that the district court effectively credited Hertz’s version of disputed events (e.g., whether absences were approved).
  • Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am., 749 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2014)
    Supplied multiple core propositions for Illinois retaliatory discharge litigation: causation must be supported by affirmative evidence; courts review the record “as a whole”; the focus is whether the stated reason is the true reason (not whether the decision was wise); and “suspicious timing” is usually insufficient alone but can be probative. The panel used Reid as the organizing framework for evaluating causation and pretext-like evidence without burden shifting.
  • Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. 1998)
    Established Illinois’s requirement that the plaintiff prove the discharge was motivated by retaliation and clarified that Illinois does not apply a burden-shifting framework to the retaliatory discharge tort. The court relied on Clemons (and Reid) to hold that Reusch bears the causation burden, while still permitting him to rely on evidence that the employer’s explanation is dishonest.
  • Gacek v. American Airlines, Inc., 614 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2010)
    Cited for the proposition that Illinois courts do not apply a burden-shifting framework to retaliatory discharge, underscoring that the plaintiff must prove causation directly.
  • Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2000))
    Contributed two key tools. First, it supplied the definition of a pretextual explanation as a “dishonest explanation” or “lie,” not merely an error. Second, it framed the “suspicious timing” analysis and the role of “significant intervening event[s]” in weakening temporal inferences. The panel used these principles to hold that timing plus disputed facts (approved leave; policy applicability; shifting reasons) could permit a retaliation inference.
  • Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Board, 731 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2013)
    Stated that systematic deviations from established policies may be probative of unlawful intent. The court applied this concept to Hertz’s alleged bypass of attendance/leave protections and progressive discipline—if those policies applied, noncompliance could support an inference that “attendance” was a cover for retaliation.
  • Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Flores v. Preferred Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1999))
    Supported the court’s reliance on “good reason and common sense” when assessing whether an employer honestly believed its stated reasons, and recognized that “honesty” and “reasonableness” analyses often overlap. This helped the panel justify why “approved absences treated as absenteeism” can look implausible enough to require a jury.
  • Sweet v. Town of Bargersville, 18 F.4th 273 (7th Cir. 2021) and Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2013)
    These cases delineate when evolving explanations do (and do not) show pretext. The court acknowledged that mere elaboration is not enough (Sweet), but held that materially inconsistent, shifting explanations can indicate a post hoc search for justification (Hitchcock), supporting a retaliation inference here.
  • Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2012) (as quoted) and Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2009), McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1997), Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 703 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2012)
    Provided comparative “closeness in time” benchmarks—ranging from one day to one week to a few days—supporting the proposition that very short gaps can help a jury infer causation, absent a clear intervening event. The panel used these cases to validate that six days can be “close on the heels” in context.
  • Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, 163 F.4th 1061 (7th Cir. 2026)
    The court refused to consider Hertz’s new appellate claim that probation lasted “90 business days,” because it was not supported by record evidence and was not raised below. This reinforced preservation and record-based adjudication principles, and it mattered because the probation end-date was pivotal to whether the July absences fell within or outside probation.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Illinois retaliatory discharge requires causation without burden shifting, but “pretext” evidence remains relevant.
    Even though Illinois does not employ burden shifting (Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co.; Gacek v. American Airlines, Inc.), the court treated Hertz’s asserted reasons (absenteeism and performance) as part of the causation inquiry: if a jury could find those reasons dishonest, it could also infer retaliatory motive (Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am.; Kidwell v. Eisenhauer).
  2. Policy applicability and “approved leave” were disputed facts that the district court could not resolve.
    A key overlooked dispute was whether Reusch was still in a 90-day probationary period when he took July bereavement leave and when Hertz relied on those absences. If the 90 days ran from April 12, a jury could find probation ended July 11—before the July 14–16 absences—and thus that bereavement leave and progressive discipline applied. Noncompliance with those policies could suggest a cover story (Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Board). Separately, if supervisors approved the absences, treating them as “excessive absenteeism” could appear implausible enough to indicate dishonesty (Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc.).
  3. Inconsistencies in the employer’s explanations can support an inference of retaliation.
    The record contained evidence that (a) July 5 transfer paperwork reported no performance concerns, yet (b) a July 18 termination recommendation listed multiple deficiencies, and (c) the termination letter differed in detail and emphasis (e.g., omitting “missing documents”), with later affidavits further elaborating. The panel held a jury could see this as materially shifting rationales rather than faithful contemporaneous reasoning (Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc.), not mere permissible elaboration (Sweet v. Town of Bargersville).
  4. Temporal proximity plus the absence of an undisputed intervening event can allow a jury inference.
    The district court treated post-report absences as an “intervening event” severing causation. The Seventh Circuit disagreed because whether those absences were authorized was disputed. Without an undisputed intervening event, the six-day gap could contribute to a causation inference under the timing cases (Kidwell v. Eisenhauer; Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co.; Casna v. City of Loves Park; McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc.; Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.).
  5. Cumulative-evidence approach at summary judgment.
    The court emphasized that the record must be assessed “as a whole” (Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am.). Here, disputed policy coverage, alleged approved leave, inconsistent explanations, and close timing collectively created a triable issue.

Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” the order is instructive for litigants and trial courts within the Seventh Circuit in several practical ways:

  • Policy ambiguity can be outcome-determinative at summary judgment. Where an employer invokes “probation” to justify bypassing ordinary leave or progressive discipline, factual uncertainty about the probation’s scope or end-date may itself create a jury issue—especially when discipline is based on the very absences that might have been protected or approved.
  • Approved leave vs. “intervening event.” The decision narrows a common defense tactic: characterizing post-complaint absences or conduct as an “intervening event” severing causation. If authorization is genuinely disputed, the “intervening event” cannot be assumed at summary judgment.
  • Shifting explanations remain potent evidence even without formal burden shifting. In Illinois retaliatory discharge cases, plaintiffs can use inconsistencies in internal emails, termination letters, and later affidavits to argue that stated reasons are pretextual, supporting causation.
  • Preservation matters on appeal. The court’s refusal to entertain the “90 business days” theory (Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita) underscores that employers should build and present policy-interpretation theories with record support in the district court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Retaliatory discharge (Illinois). A tort claim asserting an employee was fired because they engaged in protected conduct (here, reporting wrongdoing). The key question is “why was the employee fired?”
  • Causation. The employee must show the protected report was a motivating cause of the firing, not merely that the report happened before the firing.
  • Pretext. Not “the employer made a bad call,” but “the employer’s stated reason is not the real reason.” A “dishonest explanation” can allow a jury to infer retaliation.
  • Summary judgment. A pretrial ruling that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Courts must not decide whose story is more believable; they ask only whether a jury could.
  • Temporal proximity / suspicious timing. When termination follows closely after protected activity, timing can support (but rarely alone proves) an inference of retaliation, particularly if no undisputed intervening event explains the timing.
  • Intervening event. A separate, significant occurrence between the report and firing that independently explains the termination (e.g., serious misconduct). Here, whether absences were “misconduct” or “approved leave” was disputed, so the court would not treat them as an intervening event at summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision holds that, in an Illinois retaliatory discharge case, summary judgment is improper when the record contains genuine disputes over whether the employer’s attendance/leave rules applied, whether the employee’s absences were authorized, and whether the employer’s reasons for termination materially shifted over time—especially where the discharge followed closely on the heels of protected reporting. Even without Illinois burden shifting, a plaintiff can reach a jury by marshaling record evidence that the employer’s stated reasons are plausibly dishonest and that timing and context support a retaliatory motive.