Retroactive Enforcement of Iowa Code § 147.140: A Certificate of Merit Must Be Signed Under Oath or Penalty of Perjury and Noncompliance Requires Dismissal With Prejudice

1. Introduction

In Michelle Bunce, by and through Thomas C. Bunce as guardian, conservator and individually, and Victoria Bunce v. Calvin Hansen, M.D., Pradeep Panuganti, M.D., Seenaiah Byreddy, M.D., Mohammad Alsharabati, M.D., Iowa Physicians Clinic Medical Foundation d/b/a UnityPoint Clinic and Methodist Plaza Specialty, Central Iowa Hospital Corporation d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Center; Iowa Health System d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed whether a medical-malpractice plaintiff’s certificate of merit (COM) filed years earlier—one that recited it was “duly sworn on oath” but was not actually sworn before an authorized officer and did not include “penalty of perjury” language—could survive after the court’s statutory interpretation in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp..

The plaintiffs alleged catastrophic injury from delayed diagnosis and an allegedly unnecessary brain biopsy; the defendants sought dismissal with prejudice under Iowa Code section 147.140(6) for failure to file a compliant COM. The district court denied dismissal, reasoning (1) Miller should apply only prospectively, (2) defendants waived the COM challenge by waiting years, and (3) the plaintiffs substantially complied, especially in light of a later affidavit by the expert and a later notarized COM.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed. It held that Miller is not merely prospective: judicial interpretations of statutes generally apply to pending cases, and Miller did not announce a “new principle of law” that would justify prospective-only application under the Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co. (Chevron) framework.

Applying Rarick v. Smidt, the court further held that (a) the defendants did not waive their challenge by filing the dismissal motion before the dispositive-motion deadline, and (b) the COM lacking a jurat or “penalty of perjury” language did not substantially comply, nor did the plaintiffs’ later attempts cure the defect for purposes of avoiding dismissal with prejudice under section 147.140(6).

The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the action with prejudice.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., 7 N.W.3d 367 (Iowa 2024)
    This case supplied the operative statutory construction: section 147.140 “unambiguously requires a plaintiff’s certificate of merit (COM) to be signed by the expert under oath or penalty of perjury.” Bunce treats Miller not as a change in law, but as enforcement of what the statute meant from enactment—setting the stage for rejecting “prospective-only” arguments.
  • Rarick v. Smidt, ___ N.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1441855 (Iowa May 22, 2026)
    Rarick controlled the waiver and substantial-compliance issues. The court relied on Rarick to conclude that a motion to dismiss filed before the dispositive-motion deadline is timely (no implied waiver), and that a COM lacking a jurat or “penalty of perjury” language does not substantially comply—and later filings do not rescue the defective original COM for purposes of section 147.140(6).
  • Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co., 359 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 1984) and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)
    The district court used the “Chevron test” (as adopted in Beeck) to justify prospective-only application. The Supreme Court held this was a misapplication because the threshold condition was not met: the decision must “establish a new principle of law” (often by overruling prior precedent). Miller did not.
  • Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 2003)
    Cited for the baseline rule that judicial decisions generally operate both retroactively and prospectively and apply to cases pending when the court decides them.
  • State ex rel. Miller v. Pace, 677 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2004) and Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994)
    These authorities support the proposition that when a court construes a statute, the construction is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before and after the decision. This principle is central to rejecting claims that Miller cannot reach pre-Miller COMs.
  • N. River Ins. v. Iowa Div. of Ins., 501 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1993)
    Reinforces that the Chevron/Beeck analysis is not triggered when the court applies existing law without overruling precedent—supporting the conclusion that Miller was not “new law.”
  • Tarbox ex rel. S.K. v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Assocs. of Iowa City & Coralville, P.C., 13 N.W.3d 546 (Iowa 2024)
    Quoted (from a concurrence) to characterize Miller as enforcing the affidavit requirement present since section 147.140’s 2017 enactment, not innovating a new standard.
  • Est. of Fahrmann v. ABCM Corp., 999 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 2023)
    Cited for the standard of review: rulings under section 147.140(6) and statutory construction are reviewed for correction of errors at law.
  • Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., 18 N.W.3d 267 (Iowa 2025)
    Appears in Justice McDermott’s concurrence in the judgment (referencing his dissents) as part of the ongoing internal debate over what counts as “substantial compliance” under section 147.140.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Retroactivity: statutory interpretation applies to pending cases.

    The court framed the key move as ordinary judicial practice: decisions generally apply to the case at hand and other pending cases. It treated Miller as a clarification of unambiguous statutory text, not a shift in doctrine. Using Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, State ex rel. Miller v. Pace, and Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., the court emphasized that a statutory construction states what the statute “meant before as well as after” the decision.

    The court then rejected the district court’s reliance on Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co. because the threshold requirement (a “new principle of law”) was not satisfied: Miller did not overrule prior precedent; it “simply enforced the statutory [affidavit] requirement” in section 147.140.

  2. Waiver: litigation delay does not equal waiver when the motion is timely under scheduling rules.

    The district court found implied waiver because defendants participated in years of litigation before moving to dismiss. The Supreme Court, applying Rarick v. Smidt, rejected that approach and focused on procedural timeliness: filing the section 147.140(6) motion before the dispositive-motion deadline defeats implied-waiver reasoning on these facts.

  3. Substantial compliance: form matters when the statute demands a sworn (or perjury-penalty) expert signature.

    The plaintiffs’ original COM contained language suggesting it was “duly sworn,” but it was undisputed no oath was administered and the document had no jurat and no “under penalty of perjury” statement. Under Rarick (and consistent with Miller), that defect is not “substantial compliance.”

    The court also rejected cure-by-afterthought: a later affidavit from the expert asserting he “knew he was under oath” when he signed the earlier COM, and the later notarized COM filed after Miller, did not amount to substantial compliance with the statutory requirement in a way that avoids dismissal with prejudice under section 147.140(6).

C. Impact

  • Strict gatekeeping for medical-malpractice filings. Plaintiffs must ensure the COM is actually sworn (jurat/oath administered) or explicitly signed “under penalty of perjury.” Recitals that the signer is “duly sworn” are insufficient if no oath was administered.
  • Retroactivity eliminates “pre-Miller safe harbor.” Defendants may challenge older COMs in pending cases; Miller is treated as stating what section 147.140 always required.
  • Defense strategy and scheduling-order leverage. By tying “no waiver” to filing before dispositive-motion deadlines (per Rarick), the decision encourages defendants to raise COM defects within case-management timelines—while still allowing challenges even after substantial litigation activity.
  • High-stakes consequence: dismissal with prejudice. The remedy mandated by section 147.140(6) (as applied here) can terminate even allegedly meritorious claims, shifting risk onto plaintiffs’ counsel to perfect the COM at the outset.
  • Ongoing doctrinal debate continues—but majority rule is now entrenched. Justices Mansfield and McDermott (joined by Oxley) concurred in the judgment only, reiterating views (expressed in Rarick v. Smidt and Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C.) that these kinds of COMs should count as substantial compliance. Nevertheless, the controlling majority rule is the strict approach applied in Rarick and reaffirmed here.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Merit (COM)
A document filed early in a medical-malpractice case in which a qualified expert supports that the defendant breached the standard of care and caused harm—meant to deter unsupported claims.
Under oath / jurat
“Under oath” means the signer formally swore to the truth before an authorized person (often a notary). A “jurat” is the notarial certificate stating the oath was administered and the document was sworn/affirmed.
Penalty of perjury
An alternative to notarized oath-taking: the signer declares the statements are true “under penalty of perjury,” making false statements prosecutable as perjury.
Substantial compliance
A doctrine allowing minor deviations from technical requirements if the essential purpose is satisfied. Here, the court (via Rarick) treated the sworn/perjury declaration as essential, not technical.
Prospective-only application (Chevron/Beeck)
A rare judicial choice to apply a decision only to future cases, typically when the court announces a genuinely new legal rule (often by overruling prior precedent). The court held Miller did not qualify.
Interlocutory appeal
An appeal taken before final judgment, allowed to resolve an important controlling issue early—here, whether the case must be dismissed with prejudice for COM noncompliance.

5. Conclusion

Bunce solidifies a strict, administrable rule for Iowa medical-malpractice litigation under Iowa Code section 147.140: Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. applies to pending cases regardless of when the COM was filed; a COM must be genuinely sworn (with a jurat/oath administered) or signed under penalty of perjury; and defendants do not waive the defect by litigating where the dismissal motion is timely under scheduling deadlines. By reaffirming Rarick v. Smidt, the court underscores that noncompliance triggers dismissal with prejudice under section 147.140(6), making early, formal COM execution a critical, case-dispositive step.