Retroactive Application of MVRA-Extended Fine-Collection Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) Does Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause When Liability Had Not Expired

Introduction

In Arturo Solis v. Steven Merendino (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (nonprecedential), a federal prisoner, Arturo Solis, sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against the warden, challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) effort to collect a criminal fine through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). Solis argued that applying the post-1996 version of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)—which extends the time the government may collect a fine— to his pre-amendment offense violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109.

The key issue was temporal: Solis committed his offense in February 1995, when § 3613(b) provided that fine liability expired “twenty years after the entry of the judgment.” Before he was sentenced in July 1996, Congress enacted the MVRA (April 1996), amending § 3613(b) so liability terminates the later of 20 years from judgment or 20 years after release from imprisonment. Because Solis did not enter federal custody until 2017 (his federal sentence ran consecutive to a Texas state sentence), the amended rule materially extended the government’s collection window.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Solis’s § 2241 petition. It held:

  • Applying the MVRA-amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) to Solis does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because, at the time of the MVRA’s enactment, Solis’s pre-amendment liability period had not expired, and the amendment did not increase the fine amount or impose interest.
  • The general savings statute (1 U.S.C. § 109) does not require courts to preserve an older, “more lenient” collection-termination rule when Congress later extends collection time.
  • No evidentiary hearing was required because the dispute presented purely legal issues.
  • Claims of judicial bias failed; adverse rulings and case duration alone were insufficient.
  • A theory first raised in a reply brief was waived.
  • In forma pauperis status does not eliminate the appellate filing fee; it only excuses prepayment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Ex Post Facto framework: punishment and increased punishment

  • Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 538–39 (2013): Cited for the general principle that retroactive application of a law can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it increases punishment. The panel used Peugh as a baseline statement of Ex Post Facto doctrine.
  • Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618–19 (2003): Central to the court’s reasoning. Stogner held that reviving an expired criminal limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it imposes punishment when liability had lapsed. The Seventh Circuit treated Stogner’s “expired vs. unexpired” distinction as the operative framework.
  • United States v. Gibson, 490 F.3d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 2007): Applied Stogner in the Seventh Circuit and reinforced the constitutionality of extending an unexpired limitations period. The panel used Gibson to illustrate the accepted constitutional line: extension is permissible before expiration, impermissible after.

2) Circuit split on retroactive application of § 3613(b)

The court located its holding in a broader inter-circuit dispute over whether retroactive extension of the fine/restitution collection period is Ex Post Facto “punishment.” It noted decisions upholding retroactive application:

  • United States v. Weinlein, 109 F.4th 91, 99–104 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1425 (2025)
  • United States v. Rosello, 737 F. App’x 907, 909 (11th Cir. 2018)
  • United States v. Blackwell, 852 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017)
  • United States v. McGuire, 636 F. App’x 445, 447 (10th Cir. 2016)
  • United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 2002)

It contrasted those with the Third Circuit’s contrary view:

  • United States v. Norwood, 49 F.4th 189, 217–20 (3d Cir. 2022): Norwood found an Ex Post Facto violation, reasoning (as described by the Seventh Circuit) that § 3613(b) is not a statute of limitations and that extending collection time increases punishment by enabling the government to collect more. The Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to follow Norwood’s approach, even while acknowledging that § 3613(b) is not literally a limitations statute.

3) Intervening Supreme Court development: restitution is punishment, but the Court did not resolve the key analogy

  • Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482, 2026 WL 135982 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026): The Seventh Circuit stayed this case pending Ellingburg. Ellingburg held (as summarized by the panel) that restitution is punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes, but did not decide whether extending § 3613(b)’s collection window is analogous to extending an unexpired statute of limitations. The panel therefore treated Ellingburg as not controlling the dispositive question in Solis’s fine-collection challenge.

4) The general savings statute and sentencing-retroactivity principles

  • United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2010): Cited for the proposition that the savings statute generally prevents application of ameliorative sentencing changes that would reduce penalties for pre-amendment offenders absent clear congressional intent.
  • Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 661 (1974): Cited via Bell to explain the savings statute’s function in preventing repeal/amendment from extinguishing previously incurred penalties. The panel also cited Marrero (417 U.S. at 660) for the savings statute’s historical purpose: abolishing the common-law presumption that repeal of a criminal statute abates prosecutions.
  • Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 272 (2012): Cited as additional authority describing the savings statute’s default rule in the sentencing-retroactivity context.
  • Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 (1964): Cited (with Marrero) on the background purpose of the savings statute and abatement doctrine.
  • Bernacchi v. First Chicago Ins., 52 F.4th 324, 328 (7th Cir. 2022): Used by analogy to reject the suggestion that the government “waived” a savings-statute argument; the district court could not award relief based on a mistaken view of law even if a party did not press a particular theory.

5) Procedure: hearings, bias, waiver, and fees

  • Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 711 (7th Cir. 2022): Supported denial of an evidentiary hearing because Solis presented purely legal issues resolvable on the record.
  • Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2017): Cited for the rule that adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias.
  • Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for the waiver principle—arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief may be treated as waived.
  • Thomas v. Zatecky, 712 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 2013): Cited to clarify that habeas petitioners pay filing fees, and that in forma pauperis status excuses prepayment but not ultimate payment; habeas cases are exempt from PLRA partial-prepayment requirements but not from the fee itself.

Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s operative constitutional rule: “no revival of expired liability”

The panel framed § 3613(b)’s extension as constitutionally permissible so long as it does not revive a lapsed liability. Borrowing Stogner’s logic, the court treated the decisive question as whether Solis’s pre-MVRA liability had already expired when Congress amended § 3613(b). It had not: Solis’s offense was in February 1995 and the MVRA became law in April 1996—well within the earlier “20 years from entry of judgment” scheme and, more fundamentally, before any conceivable 20-year term could end.

On that basis, the court concluded the amendment did not impose punishment “when the party was not liable,” and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

2) No increase in punishment: collection window vs. fine amount

The opinion drew a sharp line between (a) the punishment imposed—here, the existence and amount of the $1,800 fine—and (b) mechanisms and timeframes for collecting what was already owed. The MVRA amendment changed only how long liability persists; it did not increase the fine amount. The court also stressed that Solis’s interest was waived, foreclosing an argument that delayed collection increased punishment through accruing interest.

The panel rejected the Norwood-style theory (as summarized in the opinion) that a longer collection period increases punishment because it increases the likelihood/amount of collection. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, increased likelihood of recovering an unchanged, interest-free fine is not an increase in “punishment” for Ex Post Facto purposes.

3) Extending Stogner’s framework beyond statutes of limitations

The court conceded that “the period of liability to pay a fine is not the same as a statute of limitations.” Nonetheless, it held that Stogner’s constitutional distinction—expired vs. unexpired exposure—applies “with equal force” to § 3613(b). This is the opinion’s core analytical move: it treats the “liability termination” rule in § 3613(b) as functionally akin, for Ex Post Facto analysis, to the limitations concept of whether the government is trying to restore lapsed authority.

4) The savings statute: rejecting a “reverse savings” theory

Solis attempted to use 1 U.S.C. § 109 to lock in the earlier, more favorable termination rule. The court rejected this as inconsistent with both the text and purpose of the statute.

  • Textual focus: § 109 prevents repeal from “release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred.” The MVRA amendment did the opposite: it extended the period of enforceability and did not “release or extinguish” anything.
  • Purpose: As Marrero and Bell v. Maryland describe, § 109 addresses abatement problems when criminal statutes are repealed. The court found no basis to expand that purpose into a mandate that courts preserve superseded leniency against later-enacted harsher provisions.

5) Procedural holdings reinforce limits of § 2241 litigation

The court treated several subsidiary arguments as either legally insufficient or procedurally defaulted:

  • No evidentiary hearing: Because the dispute was purely legal (which version of § 3613(b) applies; whether retroactive application is constitutional), Santiago supported resolving it on the existing record.
  • No bias: Owens foreclosed using adverse rulings as proof of bias; delay alone did not show bias where the judge remained engaged.
  • Reply-brief theory waived: Under Bradley, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to consider a new theory raised only in a reply.
  • Filing fee still owed: Thomas v. Zatecky controlled: in forma pauperis status delays prepayment but does not erase the obligation.

Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is still informative in three practical ways:

  • Seventh Circuit alignment with the majority view: The decision places the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning alongside circuits that have upheld retroactive application of § 3613(b), deepening the divide with United States v. Norwood (3d Cir. 2022).
  • Ex Post Facto analysis keyed to “lapse” rather than “collection success”: The court’s approach suggests future challenges will turn primarily on whether liability had expired at the time of amendment (and whether the amendment changes the amount/terms—e.g., interest—rather than the collection window).
  • Constrained role for § 109 in post-sentencing enforcement disputes: The rejection of “reverse savings” arguments signals that § 109 will rarely help defendants seeking to preserve older collection-termination rules in the face of later expansions of enforcement timeframes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Ex Post Facto Clause: A constitutional rule that generally bars the government from applying new laws retroactively in ways that increase punishment or impose punishment where a person was no longer legally exposed.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (termination of liability): A federal statute that defines when the obligation to pay a criminal fine (and often restitution) ends. The MVRA extended this endpoint by adding a “20 years after release” alternative.
  • Statute of limitations vs. liability-to-pay period: A statute of limitations limits how long the government has to bring a prosecution; § 3613(b) governs how long the government may enforce collection of a monetary judgment. The court treated them as analogous for one constitutional question: whether the government is trying to revive a liability that already expired.
  • General savings statute (1 U.S.C. § 109): A rule that prevents repeal/amendment from automatically wiping out penalties or liabilities already incurred under the old law unless Congress clearly says so. The court held it does not operate as a one-way ratchet preserving older leniency against later, harsher changes.
  • Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP): A BOP program that encourages inmates to make payments toward financial obligations; refusal can lead to loss of privileges. This case addressed whether the BOP could treat Solis as still owing a fine, not whether the IFRP itself is inherently unlawful.
  • In forma pauperis on appeal: Permission to proceed without paying fees up front due to indigency; it does not eliminate the fee obligation altogether.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that applying the MVRA’s extended termination rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) to a defendant whose liability had not expired when the MVRA was enacted does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, because it does not revive lapsed liability or increase the fine imposed. It also rejected an attempt to use the general savings statute (1 U.S.C. § 109) to preserve an older, more lenient collection-termination rule. Procedurally, the court reinforced waiver limits, the high bar for proving judicial bias, and the continued obligation to pay filing fees despite indigency.