Restitution May Run to Victim’s Parents as “Third-Party Compensators,” and Fund Restitution May Be Proven by Reliable Agency Records Without Live Testimony

Case: State of West Virginia v. Willie Edward Belmonte, Jr. (No. 23-588, Jefferson County 22-F-11)
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date: March 12, 2026
Disposition: Restitution order affirmed (memorandum decision).

1. Introduction

Willie Edward Belmonte, Jr., a Jefferson High School teacher, was indicted on numerous counts arising from sexual misconduct against a minor student, L.B. He pleaded guilty to multiple counts, including sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, use of obscene matter with intent to seduce a minor, and solicitation of a minor via a computer. After an earlier appeal challenging the plea and proportionality of sentence was rejected (see State v. Belmonte, No. 23-65, 2025 WL 452666 (W. Va. Feb. 11, 2025)), this appeal concerned only restitution.

The key issues were:

  • Whether restitution could be awarded to L.B.’s parents for certain expenses and economic losses they incurred as a consequence of the crimes.
  • Whether due process required a live evidentiary hearing before awarding restitution to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund (the “Fund”) for tutoring expenses it paid.

The plea agreement stated the petitioner would be “responsible for restitution” to the victim and/or any person or entity that paid expenses qualifying as restitution.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s September 12, 2023 restitution order. It upheld:

  • $2,089.30 to L.B.’s parents for lost wages and mileage tied to medical reasons or obtaining immediate protection for L.B., treated as third-party compensation to the victim.
  • $8,917.54 to the Fund for tutoring expenses, proven by documentary materials from the West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission (the Fund’s administrator).

The Court applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion review to restitution decisions unless statutory or constitutional commands are violated, and found neither.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. West Virginia restitution framework and plea-bargain enforcement

  • State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)
    The Court relied on Lucas in two ways:
    • Standard of review: Syllabus Point 1 provides that sentencing orders (including restitution) are reviewed for abuse of discretion unless they violate statutory or constitutional commands.
    • Presumption of full restitution: Syllabus Point 3 recognizes a “broad mandate” and a presumption favoring full restitution unless impractical, after weighing losses, defendant’s financial circumstances, rehabilitative consequences, and other factors. This supported the circuit court’s discretion to treat the parents’ expenditures as compensating victim losses and to order repayment accordingly.
  • State v. Bagent, 238 W. Va. 736, 798 S.E.2d 862 (2017) and State v. Atwell, 234 W. Va. 293, 765 S.E.2d 182 (2014) (Ketchum, J., dissenting)
    Quoting Bagent (which quoted Atwell’s dissent), the Court invoked the plea-bargain principle: when restitution is part of a plea deal, “a deal is a deal.” This strengthened enforcement of the agreement language obligating Belmonte to pay restitution not only to the “victim” but also to entities/persons paying qualifying expenses.
  • State v. Wasson, 236 W. Va. 238, 778 S.E.2d 687 (2015)
    Cited by the circuit court to illustrate that restitution can be ordered to third parties (e.g., insurers) who compensate victims, reinforcing the logic that parents can likewise qualify when they bear victim-related losses.
  • State v. Cummings, 214 W. Va. 316, 589 S.E.2d 48 (2003) (per curiam)
    Cummings was pivotal as a limiting precedent: it precluded restitution for wages lost due to attending court proceedings. The State conceded this point and reduced its request accordingly, and the circuit court tailored the parents’ award to losses tied to medical/protective needs rather than court attendance.
  • State v. Belmonte, No. 23-65, 2025 WL 452666 (W. Va. Feb. 11, 2025) (memorandum decision)
    The Court referenced the prior appeal chiefly to confirm the plea agreement’s restitution commitment and the procedural backdrop.

B. Due process at sentencing and the use of reliable hearsay/documents

  • Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)
    Used for the baseline proposition that sentencing must satisfy due process, framing restitution as part of sentencing and thus constitutionally constrained.
  • Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959) and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)
    These cases supported the Court’s conclusion that sentencing courts may consider “responsible unsworn or ‘out-of-court’ information” consistent with due process—i.e., cross-examination is not invariably required.
  • United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Williams, 319 F. Supp. 3d 812 (E.D. Va. 2018), aff'd, 783 F. App'x 269 (4th Cir. 2019)
    These authorities were used to translate general sentencing principles into the restitution context: courts may rely on evidence with “sufficient indicia of reliability,” and are “not required to hear live testimony at every restitution hearing.”
  • Commonwealth v. Casanova, 843 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006)
    Cited for the proposition that reliable hearsay may satisfy the prosecution’s burden at a restitution hearing.
  • United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274 (7th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Leyva, 916 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
    These cases supported the abuse-of-discretion approach to (1) a trial court’s selection of restitution procedures and (2) determinations that sentencing hearsay is reliable.
  • People v. Camacho, No. B210546, 2010 WL 1493178 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010)
    Provided an analog: itemized restitution documentation from an independent government agency constitutes reliable information for restitution purposes—mirroring the Court’s reliance on Commission investigator memoranda and Commission orders here.
  • United States v. Thomas, 635 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2011)
    Offered a concise description of restitution’s nature as compensation for crime-caused losses, reinforcing the remedial function underlying the restitution order.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Restitution to parents as third-party compensators under W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(e)

The petitioner argued that only L.B. was the “victim,” so only she could receive restitution; he also contested parental wage-loss items. The Court rejected the categorical “only the victim can receive restitution” framing by emphasizing the statute’s express third-party repayment mechanism.

W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(e) bars restitution for losses already compensated by a third party, but then provides an exception: in the interest of justice, a court may order restitution to “any person who has compensated the victim for loss” to the extent paid. The circuit court treated the parents as such a “third party” when they incurred economic losses to address L.B.’s health and safety needs.

Two features of the Court’s reasoning are notable:

  • Statutory fit plus plea agreement alignment: The plea agreement’s language tracked § 61-11A-4(e)’s concept (payment to the victim and/or any person/entity paying qualifying expenses), making the restitution award consistent with both contract-like plea terms and statutory authorization.
  • Cabining Cummings while preserving restitution breadth: The State conceded, and the circuit court avoided, the Cummings-prohibited category (wages lost to attend court proceedings). The affirmed award was instead for lost wages and mileage due to medical/protective reasons—framed as victim-directed protective and remedial expenditures, not litigation-participation costs.

B. Restitution to the Fund without live testimony: reliability-based due process

The petitioner’s core due process claim was procedural: the Fund request was supplemented after the June 12, 2023 hearing, and he argued he was entitled to examine/cross-examine evidence supporting the tutoring costs.

The Court treated restitution as part of sentencing (thus due process applies), but held due process does not require live testimony where documentary proof bears “minimal indicia of reliability.” Here, the State provided a set of approximately 30 documents, including:

  • Commission investigator memoranda recommending tutoring expenses as qualifying “replacement services,”
  • economic loss analysis sheets itemizing requested amounts, and
  • orders from the Presiding Commissioner granting the sums totaling $8,917.54.

The Court emphasized the documents’ reliability because they carried the “imprimatur” of independent evaluators (the investigator and the Presiding Commissioner). On that basis, it found no due process violation and no abuse of discretion in resolving the Fund claim without additional live testimony.

3.3. Impact

  • Broader practical reach of § 61-11A-4(e): The decision reinforces that restitution may flow to non-victims who paid victim-related losses—explicitly including parents—so long as the payments are framed as compensation of the victim’s loss and awarded “in the interest of justice.” This is particularly significant in crimes against minors, where parents routinely incur expenses to stabilize safety, mental health, schooling, and medical care.
  • Clearer procedural playbook for Fund restitution: The Court effectively approves a documentary route for Fund reimbursement: Commission/agency records can satisfy the State’s burden by a preponderance of the evidence if they show indicia of reliability. Future litigants should expect that itemized agency determinations may suffice without live witnesses, shifting the defense focus toward challenging reliability, completeness, nexus, or statutory eligibility rather than insisting on cross-examination as a default.
  • Continued constraint from Cummings: The decision preserves Cummings’ limitation on wage losses for court attendance, encouraging prosecutors to distinguish between (a) litigation participation costs (generally not recoverable under Cummings) and (b) protective/medical/rehabilitative wage losses tied to the victim’s needs (potentially recoverable).
  • Plea agreement drafting signal: Because the Court leaned on the plea’s restitution language, prosecutors may draft more explicit restitution clauses referencing third-party payors, while defendants will need to negotiate or clarify restitution scope at the plea stage to avoid later disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Restitution: Money the defendant must pay to address losses caused by the crime. It is part of the criminal sentence, not a separate civil lawsuit.
  • “Preponderance of the evidence”: The proof standard typically used for restitution amounts—more likely than not (just over 50%).
  • “In the interest of justice” (W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(e)): A discretionary judgment call allowing repayment to third parties who compensated the victim, when fairness supports shifting that burden back to the offender.
  • Third-party compensator: Someone (like a parent, insurer, or the Fund) who paid expenses or losses that otherwise would have been borne by the victim.
  • Hearsay at sentencing / “indicia of reliability”: Courts can consider out-of-court information at sentencing, including restitution, if it appears trustworthy (e.g., official, itemized, independently reviewed agency records).
  • Abuse of discretion (appellate review): A highly deferential standard; the appellate court will not overturn a restitution order simply because it might have decided differently—only if the trial court acted unreasonably or violated law/constitution.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a restitution order that (1) treated a minor victim’s parents as reimbursable third-party compensators under W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(e) for specific protective/medical-related economic losses, and (2) upheld Fund reimbursement for tutoring expenses based on reliable Commission documentation without requiring live testimony. The decision strengthens the practical enforceability of plea-bargained restitution, clarifies that reliable agency records can satisfy due process in restitution proof, and underscores that Cummings continues to bar restitution for wages lost merely to attend court proceedings.