Resolutions Cannot Curtail Codified Municipal Sick Leave Benefits: Legislative Equivalency in Matter of Koldin v. City of Schenectady

I. Introduction

In Matter of Koldin v. City of Schenectady, 2025 NY Slip Op 06769 (3d Dept Dec. 4, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, addressed a deceptively narrow question with broad implications for New York municipal law: can a city council, by mere resolution, restrict or effectively repeal a codified statutory benefit for employees, where that benefit was previously enacted into the city code by local law or ordinance?

The case arises from the City of Schenectady’s refusal to pay its former corporation counsel, Andrew B. Koldin (the petitioner), a lump-sum amount for his unused sick leave upon separation from service. Koldin relied on a longstanding provision of the City Code—Code of the City of Schenectady § 87‑13(A)—which guarantees nonunion employees a payout equal to 75% of accumulated sick leave, up to 240 days, upon termination of employment.

The City, however, denied his request on the basis of later-adopted resolutions that purported to limit or eliminate these payouts for employees hired after April 2009. Those resolutions were defended as being authorized under:

  • General Municipal Law (GML) § 92, which allows municipalities to grant sick leave “by local law, ordinance or resolution”; and
  • Local Law No. 2011‑05, an amendment to the City Charter granting the City Council broad authority over salaries, compensation, and benefits.

Koldin commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the City to pay the benefit mandated by § 87‑13(A). Supreme Court (Cuevas, J.) granted the petition. The City and related respondents appealed.

Writing for a unanimous panel (Pritzker, J.P., Lynch, Fisher and Mackey, JJ.), Justice Mackey affirmed. The decision clarifies and reinforces the doctrine of legislative equivalency in the municipal law context—holding that a city cannot, by resolution, repeal or curtail a benefit that is codified in its Code, even where state enabling law would have allowed initial action by resolution, and even after the adoption of a charter amendment granting broad authority over employee benefits.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

  • Petitioner: Andrew B. Koldin, former corporation counsel of the City, proceeding pro se.
  • Respondents: City of Schenectady and related municipal respondents.
  • Relief sought: Article 78 mandamus-type relief compelling payment of sick leave accruals under Code § 87‑13(A).
  • Supreme Court: Granted the petition and ordered the payout.
  • Appeal: Respondents appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department.

B. Holdings

  1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies: The City’s argument that Koldin failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing to the “sick leave committee” (Code § 87‑13[I]) fails. That provision applies to “employees,” and Koldin was no longer an employee when he commenced the proceeding. Thus he was not required to pursue that administrative route.
  2. Legislative equivalency and invalidity of modification by resolution: The City could not lawfully supersede Code § 87‑13(A), adopted in 1986, by later resolutions. Under the doctrine of legislative equivalency, a statute or code provision may only be amended or repealed by an act of equal dignity—here, another local law/ordinance and proper codification, not a resolution. Local Law No. 2011‑05 did not repeal § 87‑13(A) and, read by its plain terms, actually reaffirms that employee benefits must be codified in Chapter 87 of the City Code.
  3. General Municipal Law § 92 does not override legislative equivalency: Although GML § 92 authorizes a city to grant sick leave by “local law, ordinance or resolution,” this general enabling provision does not permit a municipality to amend or repeal an existing local law or code provision via resolution, contrary to the doctrine of legislative equivalency.
  4. Unconstitutional gift argument rejected: Because Code § 87‑13(A) remained in force, paying Koldin 75% of his accrued sick leave is a payment pursuant to a valid legal obligation, not a gratuitous “gift” prohibited by NY Const, art VIII, § 1. General Municipal Law § 92 recognizes such benefits as lawful compensation.
  5. Equitable estoppel and waiver defenses rejected: The City’s claims that Koldin was estopped from seeking the payout, or that he had waived his right to it, are unsupported by the record. There is no evidence that he deceived the City, concealed facts, made misrepresentations, or knowingly relinquished the benefit.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment directing respondents to pay Koldin 75% of his accrued sick leave under Code § 87‑13(A), “without costs.”

III. Analysis

A. The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Question

Respondents argued that Koldin’s article 78 proceeding was procedurally defective because he did not first seek relief from the City’s sick leave committee pursuant to Code § 87‑13(I). That provision states: “Employees seeking relief from the provisions of this section can appeal to the [s]ick [l]eave [c]ommittee.”

The court recited the general principle that a party must exhaust “every available administrative remedy” before resorting to the courts (Matter of Beckerman v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 232 AD3d 961, 964 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of Ferris v Grass, 219 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2023]). Exhaustion is particularly important where an agency has special competence, and where factual or discretionary issues must first be developed administratively.

However, the panel focused on the statutory text: § 87‑13(I) applies only to employees. At the time Koldin commenced his article 78 proceeding, he had already ended his employment with the City. Thus, there was no longer an “employee” relationship that would trigger the internal appeal right.

Because the provision, by its own terms, did not reach former employees, the court held that the exhaustion doctrine did not bar the proceeding. This is a straightforward, textual application of the ordinance: no administrative remedy that is legally applicable, no exhaustion requirement.

Practical implication: When municipal codes create internal appeal mechanisms limited to “employees,” those procedures generally will not bar judicial review when a former employee sues after separation, particularly in disputes over final pay or benefits upon termination.

B. Core Substantive Issue: Can Resolutions Override Codified Benefits?

The crux of the case concerned whether the City Council could, by resolution, curtail the right to a sick leave payout created by Code § 87‑13(A).

1. The Code Provision: § 87‑13(A)

Enacted in 1986, Code of the City of Schenectady § 87‑13(A) provides that nonunion employees:

“shall be entitled to convert 75% of [their] unused sick leave up to a maximum accumulation of 240 days to cash, upon termination of [their] services as an employee with the City.”

This language is:

  • Mandatory (“shall be entitled”);
  • Specific (nonunion employees, 75%, up to 240 days); and
  • Linked to termination (payout due upon cessation of service).

As a codified provision of the City Code, § 87‑13(A) is, effectively, a municipal statute. Under New York’s legislative-equivalency doctrine, such a provision can be changed only by an act of similar stature (i.e., another local law or ordinance properly codified), not by informal or lesser acts.

2. Local Law No. 2011‑05 and the City’s Argument

The City relied on Local Law No. 2011‑05, a charter amendment adopted in 2011, which:

  • Gave the City Council authority “to fix and determine salaries, compensation and benefits of all City employees and Officers”; and
  • Further provided that “[a]ll other compensation and benefits shall likewise be determined by the City Council pursuant to … General Municipal Law § 92 and codified in Chapter 87 of the Code of the City of Schenectady” (emphasis added).

The City argued that, in light of:

  • GML § 92, which authorizes municipalities to grant sick leave benefits “by local law, ordinance or resolution” (GML § 92[1]); and
  • Local Law 2011‑05’s reference to GML § 92;

the City Council had authority to modify employee sick leave benefits by resolution, including eliminating payouts for employees hired after April 2009.

3. The Doctrine of Legislative Equivalency

The court rejected this position, relying on the long-established doctrine of legislative equivalency. The classic formulation is from Matter of Moran v LaGuardia, 270 NY 450 (1936):

“To repeal or modify a statute requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import. Nothing less than another statute will suffice.”

The Third Department noted that this doctrine applies not only to state statutes but also to:

  • City codes and ordinances; and
  • Efforts to change such enactments via resolution.

Key cases cited include:

  • Matter of New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Dinkins, 83 NY2d 377, 384 (1994) – Reiterated the principle that statutory changes require legislation of equal formality.
  • Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Brunswick, 51 AD3d 1119, 1120 (3d Dept 2008) – Held the doctrine “applies to attempts to amend a [town] code or ordinance by use of a resolution.”
  • Matter of Collins v City of Schenectady, 256 App Div 389, 391 (3d Dept 1939) – Earlier recognition of the same principle in the context of the City of Schenectady.

Other Appellate Division cases from sister departments reinforce the point:

  • Paradis v Town of Schroeppel, 289 AD2d 1027, 1028 (4th Dept 2001) – Holds that amending or repealing a local law by resolution “is inconsistent with the doctrine of legislative equivalency.”
  • Naftal Assoc. v Town of Brookhaven, 221 AD2d 423, 424‑425 (2d Dept 1995), and
    Rockland Props. Corp. v Town of Brookhaven, 205 AD2d 518, 520 (2d Dept 1994) – Both reject attempts to use resolutions to alter legislatively enacted zoning or local law schemes.
  • JEM Realty Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Southold, 297 AD2d 278, 279 (2d Dept 2002), lv denied 99 NY2d 504 (2002) – Similar application in the land-use context; formal amendments must follow the process required for original enactment.
  • Matter of Calverton Manor, LLC v Town of Riverhead, 160 AD3d 838, 841 (2d Dept 2018), lv dismissed 35 NY3d 946 (2020) – A contrast case where actions apparently complied with required procedures.

By invoking this line of authority, the court underscores that once a municipality codifies a benefit as a provision of its Code (here, § 87‑13(A)), it cannot later strip that benefit away via resolution alone.

4. Interpretation of Local Law No. 2011‑05

The City’s fallback argument was that Local Law 2011‑05 itself had, by implication or effect, altered or superseded Code § 87‑13(A).

The court rejected this based on ordinary principles of statutory interpretation:

  • State of New York v Alfa Laval Inc., 213 AD3d 1171, 1173 (3d Dept 2023), and
  • Matter of United Jewish Community of Blooming Grove, Inc. v Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 207 AD3d 9, 12 (3d Dept 2022), affd 42 NY3d 348 (2024)

are cited for the basic rule that unambiguous statutory text is construed according to its plain meaning.

Applying that rule, the court observed:

  • Local Law No. 2011‑05 does not, on its face, repeal or amend any part of Chapter 87 of the City Code, including § 87‑13(A).
  • To the contrary, it expressly contemplates that “all other compensation and benefits” shall be “codified in Chapter 87” and determined pursuant to GML § 92.
  • Far from authorizing amendment of Chapter 87 by resolution, the local law reaffirms:
    • the central role of Chapter 87 as the repository of employee benefits; and
    • that such benefits must be codified there.

The City’s reliance on GML § 92 as permitting revision by resolution thus ran headlong into two constraints:

  1. The doctrine of legislative equivalency, which forbids repeal of a codified benefit by resolution; and
  2. Local Law 2011‑05’s own command that benefits be codified in Chapter 87, not implemented solely through uncodified resolutions that contradict the Code.

The court makes clear that although GML § 92 authorizes municipalities to act by resolution in granting sick leave benefits, a municipality that has already legislated a particular scheme into its Code—and has structured its charter/local laws to require codification—cannot later use resolutions to do by indirection what legislative equivalency forbids.

Footnote 1 of the opinion adds an important clarification: the portion of Local Law 2011‑05 that “permits action by resolution” pertains only to the City Council’s authority to approve collective bargaining agreements by resolution. It does not confer a general power to amend codified benefits by resolution.

5. Result: § 87‑13(A) Was Never Lawfully Repealed or Limited

Because:

  • Local Law 2011‑05 did not repeal § 87‑13(A);
  • No subsequent local law or ordinance of “equal dignity” altered § 87‑13(A); and
  • Resolutions cannot lawfully supersede a codified benefit under legislative equivalency;

the court held that Code § 87‑13(A) remained in full effect at all relevant times.

Consequently, Koldin—undisputedly a nonunion employee—was statutory entitled to the payout of 75% of his accrued sick leave up to 240 days, and Supreme Court properly ordered the City to make that payment.

C. The “Unconstitutional Gift” Argument

The City contended that paying Koldin’s sick leave payout amounted to an unconstitutional “gift” of public funds in violation of:

  • NY Const, art VIII, § 1; and
  • Related restrictions in General Municipal Law § 92.

The court rejected this argument succinctly:

  • Because § 87‑13(A) remains in force, payment is made pursuant to a legal obligation, not as an ex gratia gift.
  • General Municipal Law § 92(1) explicitly authorizes municipalities to provide sick leave and related benefits, reinforcing that such benefits are treated as lawful compensation, not gratuities.

The opinion cites two comparison cases:

  • Gratto v Board of Educ. of Ausable Val. Cent. School Dist., 271 AD2d 175, 176 (3d Dept 2000); and
  • Matter of Karp v North Country Community Coll., 258 AD2d 775, 775 (3d Dept 1999)

These cases illustrate the line between:

  • Lawful payments based on contractual or statutory entitlement (which are valid compensation); and
  • Payments with no legal basis, sometimes framed as goodwill or retroactive generosity, which can be unconstitutional gifts.

In Koldin, the existence of an on-the-books statutory benefit makes the gift-clause argument untenable.

D. Equitable Estoppel and Waiver

1. Equitable Estoppel

Equitable estoppel generally requires:

  • A misrepresentation or concealment of material facts;
  • Reasonable reliance by the party asserting estoppel; and
  • Detriment resulting from that reliance.

The court cites:

  • Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 326 (2006) – A leading case on equitable estoppel, setting out the basic elements and its careful application.
  • Matter of Hyundai Capital Am., Inc. v Marina, 233 AD3d 1318, 1320 (3d Dept 2024) – Applies estoppel principles in the commercial context.
  • Matter of Huntington TV Cable Corp. v State of N.Y. Commn. on Cable Tel., 94 AD2d 816, 819 (3d Dept 1983), affd 61 NY2d 926 (1984) – An example where estoppel was recognized against a governmental entity under particular circumstances.

Here, the City had no factual basis to assert that:

  • Koldin knew of § 87‑13(A) and was “lying in wait” to assert it later;
  • He misrepresented anything relating to his entitlement to sick leave payouts; or
  • He conspired to deceive the City regarding the application of § 87‑13(A).

The record showed no deception or concealment. Without evidence satisfying the elements of estoppel, the doctrine simply did not apply.

2. Waiver

Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” It requires:

  • Knowledge of the right; and
  • A clear manifestation of intent to give it up.

The court cites Matter of Aron Law PLLC v Town of Fallsburg, 199 AD3d 1286, 1290 (3d Dept 2021) for these principles.

The Third Department found no evidence that Koldin ever:

  • Expressly agreed to forego his entitlement under § 87‑13(A);
  • Signed any waiver; or
  • Engaged in conduct that could be fairly characterized as an intentional relinquishment.

Thus, waiver was not established.

IV. Precedents and Their Influence on the Decision

A. Legislative Equivalency Line of Cases

The decision is anchored in a robust line of New York authority on legislative equivalency:

  • Matter of Moran v LaGuardia, 270 NY 450 (1936) – Foundational statement: a statute can only be repealed or modified by another statute of equal dignity.
  • Matter of New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Dinkins, 83 NY2d 377 (1994) – Reaffirmed that substantive statutory changes must go through formal legislative channels.
  • Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Brunswick, 51 AD3d 1119 (3d Dept 2008) – Applied legislative equivalency to a town’s attempt to alter its code via resolution.
  • Paradis v Town of Schroeppel, 289 AD2d 1027 (4th Dept 2001); Naftal Assoc. v Town of Brookhaven, 221 AD2d 423 (2d Dept 1995); Rockland Props. Corp. v Town of Brookhaven, 205 AD2d 518 (2d Dept 1994); and JEM Realty Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Southold, 297 AD2d 278 (2d Dept 2002) – All prevent local governments from using resolutions to alter zoning or other legislatively enacted local laws.

By drawing on these cases, the Third Department situates Koldin firmly within the mainstream of New York’s home-rule and municipal-governance jurisprudence, and extends those principles clearly into the employee-benefits context.

B. Exhaustion: Beckerman and Ferris

The court relies on:

  • Matter of Beckerman v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 232 AD3d 961 (3d Dept 2024), and
  • Matter of Ferris v Grass, 219 AD3d 1008 (3d Dept 2023)

to restate the general exhaustion rule. But Koldin is noteworthy for its limit on exhaustion: when the text of the applicable regulation or ordinance clearly restricts an internal remedy to current employees, courts will not impose an implied obligation on former employees to pursue that remedy before seeking judicial review.

C. Statutory Interpretation: Alfa Laval and United Jewish Community

The court’s interpretation of Local Law 2011‑05 follows the traditional textualist approach:

  • State of New York v Alfa Laval Inc., 213 AD3d 1171, 1173 (3d Dept 2023) – Emphasizes plain meaning where text is unambiguous.
  • Matter of United Jewish Community of Blooming Grove, Inc. v Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 207 AD3d 9, 12 (3d Dept 2022), affd 42 NY3d 348 (2024) – Again, enforcing unambiguous statutory language as written.

This approach is critical in concluding that Local Law 2011‑05 did not silently repeal or loosen the codification requirement in Chapter 87, but rather presupposes and reinforces it.

D. Gift Clause and Employee Benefits

While the court’s discussion is brief, the citation to:

  • Gratto v Board of Educ. of Ausable Val. Cent. School Dist., 271 AD2d 175 (3d Dept 2000); and
  • Matter of Karp v North Country Community Coll., 258 AD2d 775 (3d Dept 1999)

signals continuity with prior decisions distinguishing between:

  • Legally authorized compensation or benefits, which are permissible uses of public funds; and
  • Purely gratuitous payments, not grounded in statute or contract, which may be unconstitutional gifts.

E. Estoppel and Waiver

Finally, the opinion’s handling of estoppel and waiver aligns with:

  • Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320 (2006) – Elements of estoppel;
  • Matter of Hyundai Capital Am., Inc. v Marina, 233 AD3d 1318 (3d Dept 2024) – Application of estoppel in civil disputes;
  • Matter of Huntington TV Cable Corp. v State of N.Y. Commn. on Cable Tel., 94 AD2d 816 (3d Dept 1983), affd 61 NY2d 926 (1984) – Estoppel in public-law settings; and
  • Matter of Aron Law PLLC v Town of Fallsburg, 199 AD3d 1286 (3d Dept 2021) – Requirements for establishing waiver.

This cluster of cases reinforces that both estoppel and waiver are fact-intensive doctrines—and that the court will not infer them in the absence of concrete evidence of misrepresentation, concealment, or knowing relinquishment.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. CPLR Article 78

A CPLR article 78 proceeding is a special type of New York court action used to challenge the actions (or inactions) of state or local government agencies and officials.

In this case, Koldin sought:

  • Mandamus to compel – asking the court to order the City to perform a clear, nondiscretionary legal duty: paying him a benefit mandated by Code § 87‑13(A).

2. Legislative Equivalency

The doctrine of legislative equivalency can be summarized as:

What it takes to build something legislatively is what it takes to tear it down.

In practice this means:

  • If a benefit or rule is created by a statute/local law/ordinance, it usually cannot be undone by:
    • An internal policy;
    • A memorandum; or
    • A simple resolution.
  • It must be repealed or modified using the same formal legislative process by which it was created (public notice, hearings where required, formal adoption as a local law, etc.).

3. General Municipal Law § 92

GML § 92(1) is a state statute giving municipalities the authority to provide their officers and employees with various fringe benefits, including sick leave.

It allows such benefits to be created by:

  • Local law;
  • Ordinance; or
  • Resolution.

Koldin clarifies that this enabling statute does not override the doctrine of legislative equivalency. If a municipality chooses to implement benefits via a formal code provision (local law), it must likewise use a formal local-law procedure to reduce or eliminate them, notwithstanding that GML § 92 would also have permitted a resolution at the outset.

4. Unconstitutional Gift of Public Funds

Article VIII, § 1 of the New York Constitution prohibits municipalities from giving or loaning money or property to private individuals except as authorized by law. The key distinction is:

  • Compensation/benefits owed under law or contract: valid, not a gift.
  • Pure gifts, with no legal obligation or public purpose: potentially unconstitutional.

Because Koldin’s benefit was mandated by an existing Code provision, his payout was legally required compensation, not a gratuitous gift.

5. Equitable Estoppel vs. Waiver

  • Equitable estoppel stops a person from asserting a right when:
    • That person’s conduct (misrepresentation, concealment) led another to reasonably rely to their detriment; and
    • It would be unfair to allow the first person to change positions.
  • Waiver is a voluntary, intentional giving up of a known right, which may be express (in writing or verbally) or implied by unequivocal conduct.

In Koldin, the City failed to prove either:

  • No misrepresentation or concealment (so no estoppel); and
  • No evidence that Koldin knowingly gave up his statutory right (so no waiver).

VI. Impact and Significance

A. For Municipalities

The decision sends a clear message to New York municipalities:

  • Review your codes and charters: If employee benefits are codified in the municipal code, they cannot be quietly curtailed or eliminated by resolutions or internal policies.
  • Follow proper legislative process: To change a codified benefit, the municipality must:
    • Draft a local law or ordinance amending the code;
    • Follow all procedural requirements (notice, hearings, voting thresholds); and
    • Formally codify the amendment.
  • Be wary of reliance on resolutions alone: Even where state enabling statutes (like GML § 92) permit action by resolution, a municipality that previously adopted a benefit as a local law cannot use resolutions to undo that law.

There may also be financial implications:

  • Employees who, like Koldin, were denied codified benefits based solely on conflicting resolutions may now have viable claims.
  • Municipalities may face retroactive liability for improperly withheld payouts, depending on statutes of limitation and other defenses.

B. For Public Employees (Especially Nonunion Employees)

For nonunion municipal employees, especially managers and appointed officers, the decision underscores that:

  • Codified benefits are powerful: If a benefit is written into the municipal code, it has the force of law and can be enforced via article 78.
  • Internal policies and resolutions can’t override the code: If there is a conflict between the Code and a later resolution, the codified provision generally controls unless properly amended.
  • Former employees can go straight to court: Where internal appeal mechanisms are limited to current “employees,” former employees are not necessarily barred from immediate judicial review.

C. For Drafting and Interpreting Local Laws

The decision illustrates the importance of careful drafting:

  • By requiring benefits to be “codified in Chapter 87,” the City effectively bound itself to legislative equivalency principles.
  • References to state enabling statutes (like GML § 92) will not be read to silently authorize departure from codification or to permit amendment-by-resolution of codified provisions.
  • Courts will adhere firmly to the plain text of local laws and codes, especially where clear.

D. Broader Doctrinal Significance

Koldin fortifies and extends legislative-equivalency doctrine into an area—municipal employee benefits—sometimes treated informally in practice. The decision makes clear:

  • Municipal codes are not mere suggestions; they are binding law.
  • Informal policy shifts or resolutions that contradict codified provisions are legally vulnerable.
  • Employees may sue to enforce codified benefits even after years of contrary administrative practice.

VII. Conclusion

Matter of Koldin v. City of Schenectady is a significant reaffirmation of the principle that municipal governments must respect their own laws. When a city enacts a benefit into its Code—such as Schenectady’s promise that nonunion employees “shall be entitled” to convert 75% of unused sick leave to cash upon termination—that benefit cannot be stripped away by simple resolution, even if state law would have permitted resolution-based action at the outset.

The Third Department’s opinion:

  • Clarifies that former employees are not bound by internal administrative appeal mechanisms limited to “employees”;
  • Reaffirms the doctrine of legislative equivalency and its application to local codes and ordinances;
  • Holds that codified sick leave payouts are lawful compensation, not unconstitutional gifts; and
  • Rejects estoppel and waiver defenses absent clear factual support.

In a broader sense, the case underscores a fundamental rule of public law: governments must honor the formal legislative commitments they have made, and must use equally formal processes if they wish to change them. For municipalities, public employees, and practitioners, Koldin serves as a reminder that the text of the municipal code is not just background—it is binding law, and its promises are enforceable in court.