Res Judicata Remains a Four-Part Test; No Separate “Full and Fair Opportunity” Finding Required for Rule 60(b)(6) Relief

1. Introduction

In Alexander Harvin v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Georgia’s denial of a pro se plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The underlying litigation stemmed from long-running disputes over an allegedly fraudulent assignment of a security deed and a resulting foreclosure.

The key procedural posture is critical: Harvin sought to reopen a final judgment in his 2021 action (“Harvin II”) after it was dismissed on res judicata grounds based on a prior 2014 action (“Harvin I”), which had been dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Harvin’s Rule 60(b)(6) theory relied primarily on a later Eleventh Circuit decision, Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Board of Education, which he argued required courts to make an independent finding that the party had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” before applying res judicata.

The issues on appeal were narrow: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and whether Rodemaker altered the res judicata analysis in a way that created “extraordinary circumstances” warranting reopening the judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that:

• Res judicata in this circuit remains governed by a four-part test (competent jurisdiction, final judgment, same parties/privity, same causes of action), and Rodemaker did not add a separate fifth element requiring an independent “full and fair opportunity to litigate” finding.
• Even assuming Rodemaker represented a change in law, an intervening change after the case is no longer pending is “hardly extraordinary” and does not justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
• The district court correctly applied res judicata: Harvin I’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits; the court was competent; defendants overlapped or were in privity (including foreclosure counsel in privity with the lender); and both suits arose from the same nucleus of operative fact—whether the 2013 assignment was valid.

The court also noted that attempts to relitigate the merits of Harvin I were outside the scope of review on a Rule 60(b) appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Board of Education, 110 F.4th 1318 (11th Cir. 2024)

Rodemaker supplied the opinion’s core clarifying move. Harvin argued that Rodemaker transformed res judicata into a five-part test by separately requiring an “independent finding” that a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. The panel rejected this reading as a “contort[ion]” of Rodemaker, emphasizing that the four-part test itself operationalizes the “full and fair opportunity” concept: if the four elements are satisfied, the doctrine presumes that the party had that opportunity.

The opinion also observed that the “full and fair opportunity” language in Rodemaker describes res judicata’s purpose, not an additional element. This is an important distinction: purpose statements guide interpretation but do not necessarily create new required findings.

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005)

Gonzalez anchored the Rule 60(b)(6) analysis. The court quoted Gonzalez for the proposition that a change in law after a case is no longer pending is “hardly extraordinary” and therefore does not justify relief under the catch-all provision. This is the doctrinal backstop against attempts to use Rule 60(b)(6) as a delayed substitute for appeal or certiorari.

Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 1996)

Rice supplied a key appellate constraint: review of a Rule 60(b) denial “does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” The panel used this to dismiss Harvin’s remaining arguments insofar as they tried to attack Harvin I’s merits rather than the Rule 60(b)(6) denial.

Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2015)

Diveroli provided the definition of “abuse of discretion” in this context: applying an incorrect legal standard, applying the law unreasonably, following improper procedures, or making clearly erroneous findings of fact. This framing matters because it sets a high bar for reversal even if another judge might have ruled differently.

Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984)

Griffin reinforced that Rule 60(b)(6) is an “extraordinary remedy” requiring “exceptional circumstances” and an “extreme” and “unexpected” hardship absent relief. The panel relied on this to conclude Harvin’s argument—essentially a disagreement with the res judicata analysis—fell far short.

Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) and Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2006)

These cases underscored the discretion and the heavy burden on the movant: even where relief could be “permissible,” the appellant must show a justification “so compelling” that the district court was required to grant the motion. This standard is particularly outcome-determinative in Rule 60(b)(6) appeals because it narrows the path to reversal.

Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999)

Ragsdale was cited to distinguish the standard of review on direct appeal of a res judicata dismissal (de novo) from review of a Rule 60(b) denial (abuse of discretion). Harvin argued for de novo review; the panel rejected that by applying Rice and Rule 60(b) doctrine.

Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010)

Griswold supported the privity holding. The panel treated Kutak Rock LLP and Aldridge Pite, LLP—law firms whose alleged conduct arose from representing Chase in foreclosure and post-foreclosure proceedings—as privies of Chase for nonparty preclusion, because “a substantive legal relationship” existed between them and a party to the prior judgment.

Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co. v. Bersin Bagel Grp., LLC, 817 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 2016)

This case addressed a procedural misconception: Harvin suggested the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier unpublished affirmance lacked binding force. The panel clarified that while unpublished opinions are not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit rules, judgments bind the parties to the litigation. The practical effect is that finality is not defeated by publication status.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38

Appellees sought sanctions for a frivolous appeal, but the court denied the request without prejudice because it was raised in briefing rather than in a separately filed motion as required by Rule 38. This reinforces procedural rigor even where a court may view arguments as meritless.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

1. Scope and standard of review: The court confined itself to reviewing the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief (not the underlying dismissal), applying abuse-of-discretion review per Rice and Diveroli.
2. What Rule 60(b)(6) requires: Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary situations; disagreement with a legal outcome or efforts to reargue a final judgment ordinarily do not qualify. The panel invoked Griffin, Galbert, and Cano to emphasize the exceptional-circumstances threshold and the movant’s heavy burden.
3. Rodemaker does not alter res judicata elements: The panel read Rodemaker as reiterating the traditional four-part test and describing the doctrine’s purpose (“full and fair opportunity”) rather than adding an additional element requiring an explicit factual finding.
4. Even a change in law would not suffice: Applying Gonzalez v. Crosby, the court reasoned that an intervening change in law after finality is not “extraordinary,” so it would not justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief anyway.
5. Res judicata properly applied on the record: The panel concluded each element was satisfied:
   • Final judgment on the merits: Harvin I’s dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) qualifies.
   • Competent jurisdiction: Undisputed.
   • Same parties or privity: Overlapping defendants (Chase, Nationwide, Wargo) plus privity for foreclosure counsel (Kutak Rock and Aldridge Pite) under Griswold.
   • Same cause of action: Both suits turned on the same nucleus of operative facts—the alleged invalidity of the 2013 assignment and resulting foreclosure.
   The court then treated the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” as satisfied by the four elements, not as an additional required inquiry.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is instructive in three ways likely to matter in future litigation:

• Res judicata framing in the Eleventh Circuit: The opinion squarely rejects attempts to repackage “full and fair opportunity” language as an additional formal element. Litigants should expect courts to continue treating that concept as embodied within the four-part test, not as a separate factual finding requirement.
• Rule 60(b)(6) is not a vehicle for post-finality doctrinal debates: Citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, the panel reinforces that later legal developments rarely qualify as “extraordinary circumstances,” limiting Rule 60(b)(6) to truly exceptional situations.
• Privity for foreclosure counsel and related agents: By applying Griswold to treat foreclosure and post-foreclosure counsel as privies of the lender, the opinion signals that adding new law-firm defendants will not readily avoid claim preclusion where the factual nucleus and interests align with the prior defendant.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Res judicata (claim preclusion)

A rule preventing a party from suing again over the same dispute once a court has issued a final judgment. In this opinion, the four elements are: (1) competent jurisdiction, (2) final judgment, (3) same parties or privity, and (4) same cause of action.

“Full and fair opportunity to litigate”

A fairness rationale behind res judicata: the doctrine applies because the party already had a legitimate chance to present the dispute. The court clarified this is not a separate required element beyond the four-part test.

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “with prejudice”

A dismissal for failure to state a claim that permanently ends the case; “with prejudice” generally means the plaintiff cannot refile the same claim. The court treated this as a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.

Rule 60(b)(6)

A “catch-all” mechanism allowing relief from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but only in extraordinary circumstances. It is not meant to reargue issues that could have been raised earlier.

Privity

A relationship close enough that a nonparty can be bound by (or benefit from) a prior judgment—such as a substantive legal relationship where interests are aligned. Here, foreclosure counsel were treated as in privity with the lender-client.

Abuse of discretion (appellate standard)

A deferential standard: the appellate court will not reverse unless the district court used the wrong legal standard, acted unreasonably, used improper procedures, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms two practical rules. First, res judicata remains a four-part inquiry; courts do not have to make a separate, stand-alone “full and fair opportunity to litigate” finding beyond satisfying those elements, and Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Board of Education does not change that structure. Second, Rule 60(b)(6) relief is exceptionally limited: even arguable post-judgment shifts in legal framing will not typically constitute the “extraordinary circumstances” required to reopen a final judgment, particularly where the movant’s arguments amount to relitigation of matters already resolved.