Res Judicata Bars Relitigation of Standing, But Jurisdictional Preclusion Still Requires Dismissal Without Prejudice

Introduction

In Devins v. Armstrong (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026), pro se plaintiff James Devins brought his third federal lawsuit seeking to challenge the denial of an F-1 student visa for Rita Raut, a Nepali citizen whom he wished to sponsor as part of his asserted religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. Devins sued the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs in his official capacity, requesting court-ordered changes to how the visa decision was made and administered.

The key procedural history mattered more than the underlying RFRA merits. Devins had already filed two prior actions arising from the same 2023 visa denial:

  • Devins v. Jaddou, 5:23-CV-152-OLG, 2024 WL 88004 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2024) (adopting 2023 WL 9132334 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2023)), dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.
  • Devins v. Bitter, 5:24-CV-257 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2024), dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (lack of standing and non-redressability due to consular nonreviewability).

In the third case, the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds and did so with prejudice. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed res judicata barred Devins from relitigating the already-decided jurisdictional defect (standing), but held it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice because the bar being enforced was jurisdictional: the proper disposition remained dismissal without prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held:

  1. The district court properly invoked res judicata (even sua sponte) to dismiss Devins’s third action because the earlier dismissals conclusively resolved the jurisdictional issue of Devins’s lack of standing, and the third suit arose from the same nucleus of operative facts.
  2. The district court nevertheless erred by dismissing with prejudice. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, jurisdictional dismissals—especially for lack of standing—must be without prejudice, even where res judicata bars relitigation of the jurisdictional question.

Disposition: AFFIRMED in part (res judicata dismissal proper); REVERSED and REMANDED in part (must be dismissed without prejudice).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review: de novo for 12(b)(6); abuse of discretion for “with prejudice”

  • Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015): supplied the de novo standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
  • Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corp. v. Lake, 108 F.4th 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2024): supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing a dismissal “with prejudice.”

2) When res judicata may be applied at the pleading stage and raised sua sponte

  • Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2020): allowed Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata when the bar is apparent from the complaint and judicially noticed facts and the plaintiff does not challenge the defendant’s failure to plead it.
  • Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir. 2001): recognized that a district court may raise res judicata sua sponte in the interest of judicial economy when both actions were brought before the same court.
  • Pie Dev., LLC v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., 128 F.4th 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2025): emphasized the systemic values served by res judicata (comity, continuity in the law, essential justice) and endorsed judicial invocation where the relevant records are before the court.

These cases anchored the panel’s threshold conclusion that the district court’s procedural route—raising res judicata on its own initiative—was permissible on these facts.

3) Elements of res judicata and the “same nucleus of operative facts”

  • Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005): stated the familiar four-part test for claim preclusion.
  • United States v. Davenport, 484 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2007): explained that the “nucleus of operative facts,” not the label of legal theories or relief, defines whether the “same claim” is involved.
  • Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009): reiterated that a final judgment precludes issues raised or that could have been raised.

Applying these authorities, the court treated Devins’s third complaint—attacking the same 2023 denial, seeking effectively the same outcome, against the same consular leadership—as the same claim.

4) Jurisdictional determinations can have preclusive effect

  • Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982): recognized that res judicata principles apply to jurisdictional determinations.
  • Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2013): supplied two key points: (i) res judicata does not depend on whether the prior judgment was correct; and (ii) dismissal for lack of standing can constitute a “final judgment on the merits” for res judicata purposes.
  • Bank of La. v. FDIC, 33 F.4th 836, 838 (5th Cir. 2022): clarified that jurisdictional dismissals, even without prejudice, are preclusive as to the jurisdictional issue decided.
  • Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980): stated the classic distinction: jurisdictional dismissals do not preclude the substantive claim on the merits, but they do preclude repeated attempts to relitigate the same jurisdictional defect.
  • Lopez v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2019): suggested the preclusive effect of jurisdictional determinations can be avoided if later facts cure the jurisdictional defect (e.g., standing arises later).

The panel used these cases to frame its central preclusion holding: Devins’s lack of standing had already been finally determined, and his third complaint alleged no new facts since 2023 to change that result.

5) With-prejudice dismissal versus jurisdictional limits

  • Mitchell v. Bailey, 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020): stated the general rule that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are normally without prejudice.
  • Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 804 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1986): identified a narrow scenario where dismissal for lack of jurisdiction with prejudice was upheld because state law did not grant a cause of action—illustrating that labels and posture can matter, and signaling an exception rather than the rule.
  • Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993) and Wilder Corp. of Del., Inc. v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Servs., 494 F. App'x 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2012): recognized that res judicata typically supports dismissal with prejudice.
  • Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979): described res judicata’s “bedrock” function—ensuring finality.
  • Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 57 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2008); Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Palm Beach Cnty., 518 F. App'x 607, 610 (11th Cir. 2013); Bush v. Phila. Redev. Auth., 2022 WL 17691563, at *1 n.5 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2022): cited to show other circuits’ receptiveness to with-prejudice res judicata dismissals.
  • Griener v. United States, 900 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2018): supplied the decisive limiting principle: a jurisdictional dismissal is res judicata only of the lack of power to act; otherwise it is without prejudice to the plaintiff’s claims.
  • Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 n.3 (5th Cir. 2023); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons Educ. Found. v. Am. Bd. of Internal Med., 103 F.4th 383, 396 (5th Cir. 2024); Denning v. Bond Pharmacy, Inc., 50 F.4th 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2022); Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996): collectively reinforced the Fifth Circuit’s rule that jurisdictional dismissals “by their very nature” must be without prejudice.
  • Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of La., 79 F.4th 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2023); A&R Eng'g & Testing, Inc. v. Scott, 72 F.4th 685, 691 n.1 (5th Cir. 2023); Gibson v. United States, 809 F.3d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2016): emphasized that standing-based jurisdictional dismissals are ordinarily without prejudice because standing can arise later.
  • Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 218 (2021): cautioned that some jurisdictional dismissals may simultaneously function as merits judgments in certain statutory contexts, leaving room for future doctrinal refinement.
  • United States v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996): invoked to underscore liberal construction of pro se pleadings and to resist harsh pleading penalties that could unnecessarily foreclose potentially curable claims.

6) RFRA and consular nonreviewability in the background

  • Calvary Albuquerque Inc. v. Rubio, 136 F.4th 1217, 1230 (10th Cir. 2025), vacated on other grounds, 154 F.4th 1246 (10th Cir. 2025): cited for the proposition that RFRA does not authorize judicial review of consular visa decisions (though the Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of Devins’s RFRA theory).

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two distinct steps—one about preclusion, and the other about remedy/labeling of the dismissal.

1) Why res judicata applied (even though earlier cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)

The court treated Devins’s suit as a paradigmatic attempt to relitigate a jurisdictional defect already decided. Under Bank of La. v. FDIC and Boone v. Kurtz, a jurisdictional dismissal—though not a merits adjudication of the underlying substantive claim—still precludes re-asserting the same jurisdictional basis in a later suit. The court further relied on Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée to confirm that jurisdictional determinations can have preclusive effect.

The “same claim” element was satisfied because the third suit arose from the same “nucleus of operative facts” as the earlier actions—namely, the 2023 denial of Raut’s student visa and Devins’s attempt to leverage RFRA to compel reconsideration and procedural accommodations. Under United States v. Davenport, changing the requested relief (e.g., asking for a “vetting” process, record updates, or a consular liaison) does not change the claim if the operative facts are the same.

The court also emphasized a crucial limiting point: Devins might have escaped preclusion if he alleged new post-judgment facts creating standing (as contemplated in Lopez v. Pompeo), but he alleged none.

2) Why the dismissal still had to be without prejudice

Having endorsed res judicata as a bar, the panel confronted a tension: res judicata often justifies dismissal with prejudice (finality), yet dismissals for lack of jurisdiction must ordinarily be without prejudice (no power to reach merits).

The Fifth Circuit resolved that tension in favor of the jurisdictional rule. Relying principally on Griener v. United States and a line of Fifth Circuit decisions (Abdullah v. Paxton; Denning v. Bond Pharmacy, Inc.; Warnock v. Pecos Cnty.; Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz), the court held that when the operative barrier being enforced is jurisdictional—here, lack of standing—then the court is recognizing it lacks power to adjudicate the merits, and thus it cannot foreclose the claim “on the merits” by a with-prejudice dismissal.

Put differently, the panel treated the res judicata dismissal here as enforcing a prior, preclusive jurisdictional determination. Because the court still lacks jurisdiction, the correct form is dismissal without prejudice, even if (as a practical matter) the plaintiff is unlikely to cure standing.

The court expressly cabined the holding as narrow, noting that Brownback v. King recognizes scenarios where “jurisdiction” and “merits” can intertwine in a way that may justify a stronger preclusive effect; and it also pointed out alternative tools to deter abusive litigation (sanctions, pre-filing injunctions) without converting a jurisdictional disposition into a merits bar.

Impact

  • Clarifies the “with prejudice” label in jurisdictional-preclusion cases: The opinion’s most concrete contribution is operational: even when res judicata correctly bars a repeat attempt to establish standing already rejected, the district court should dismiss without prejudice because the court is still acting on a lack of power to reach the merits.
  • Channels courts toward alternative deterrents for vexatious litigation: By highlighting sanctions and pre-filing injunctions, the panel signals that district courts need not rely on “with prejudice” to control repetitive filings where jurisdiction is absent.
  • Reinforces that plaintiffs must plead new facts to escape preclusion of standing: The decision underscores the practical importance of Lopez v. Pompeo: if standing truly changes, it must be supported by new allegations; otherwise, res judicata will terminate the case at the threshold.
  • Limited signals on RFRA/visa litigation: Although the panel cited Calvary Albuquerque Inc. v. Rubio, it avoided deciding whether RFRA can overcome consular nonreviewability in the Fifth Circuit. Future litigants should not read Devins as a merits holding on RFRA’s interaction with visa refusals; it is primarily a jurisdiction/preclusion decision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Standing: A constitutional requirement that the plaintiff show a concrete, personal injury caused by the defendant and likely to be redressed by the requested court order. If standing is missing, the federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction.
  • Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s authority to hear a kind of case at all. Without it, the court cannot decide the merits.
  • Res judicata (claim preclusion): A doctrine that prevents parties from re-litigating a claim (or issues that could have been raised) after a final judgment. Here, it functioned to prevent Devins from re-litigating the already-decided question of his standing based on the same visa denial.
  • “Same nucleus of operative facts”: A test for whether two lawsuits are the “same claim” for res judicata. If both suits arise from the same core events, changing legal labels or remedies usually won’t avoid preclusion.
  • Consular nonreviewability: A doctrine generally barring federal courts from reviewing consular officers’ visa decisions. The district court referenced it as part of why Devins’s injury was not redressable.
  • Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”: “With prejudice” typically bars refiling the same claim; “without prejudice” allows refiling if the defect can be cured. The Fifth Circuit held that when the defect is jurisdictional (like standing), the dismissal must be without prejudice—even if res judicata blocks reasserting the same jurisdictional theory.

Conclusion

Devins v. Armstrong is a procedural decision with a pointed takeaway: the Fifth Circuit will enforce res judicata to prevent repeated attempts to establish standing already rejected, but it will also enforce the principle that federal courts lacking jurisdiction must dismiss without prejudice. The opinion thus separates finality of jurisdictional determinations (preclusive as to power-to-hear) from finality on the merits (which a court without jurisdiction cannot impose), while leaving room for district courts to address abusive repeat filings through sanctions and filing restrictions rather than jurisdictionally incongruent “with prejudice” dispositions.