Res Judicata Bars Federal Vagueness and Related Constitutional Claims After Illinois Zoning Enforcement, Even Where Rooker-Feldman Leaves Room for Some Damages

1. Introduction

In Clay Wortham v. Village of Barrington Hills (7th Cir. June 9, 2026) (nonprecedential), Clay and Anita Wortham challenged the Village of Barrington Hills’ enforcement of its municipal code against their short-term rental activity conducted via Vrbo. After the Village pursued administrative adjudications (fines and an order barring further short-term leasing), and after Illinois courts affirmed those outcomes, the Worthams filed a federal suit alleging (i) a Due Process vagueness violation and (ii) a First Amendment violation based on the Village’s demand—made during later enforcement proceedings—that they remove their Vrbo listing.

The central federal issues were whether the Worthams’ claims were barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) and whether the federal court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims would effectively seek review of state-court judgments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the federal complaint. It held:

  • Rooker-Feldman did not strip jurisdiction over the due-process claim to the extent the Worthams sought lost revenue (damages not requiring the federal court to overturn a state judgment).
  • The due-process vagueness claim was nonetheless barred by Illinois res judicata because the Illinois appellate decision rejecting their vagueness argument constituted a final judgment on the merits for claim-preclusion purposes.
  • The First Amendment claim was also barred by res judicata, and in any event the Worthams waived their appellate challenge to that ruling by failing to contest the Village’s res judicata argument in the district court.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and permissible materials

The court reviewed the res judicata dismissal de novo under Baek v. Clausen, and reiterated the Rule 12 posture requirement to view facts favorably to the nonmovant as framed in Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wynndalco Enters., LLC. It also relied on White v. Keely to confirm that courts may take judicial notice of public records (including court documents), which matters in preclusion disputes where prior proceedings define the litigation landscape.

2) Jurisdictional gatekeeping: Rooker-Feldman

Even though the parties did not press Rooker-Feldman on appeal, the panel emphasized its independent duty to confirm subject-matter jurisdiction under Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.. The court applied the Seventh Circuit’s modern, en banc articulation of the doctrine in Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., which in turn quotes Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md. for the proposition that Congress has not authorized federal district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.

Crucially, Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. directs courts to examine the relief sought to determine whether the plaintiff is asking the federal court to “review and reject” a state judgment. Applying that framework, the panel distinguished between (i) reimbursement of state-imposed fines (closer to undoing the state result) and (ii) damages for lost revenue (which “usually does not affect a state court judgment not sounding in monetary terms”). That distinction allowed jurisdiction over at least part of the due-process claim.

3) Illinois res judicata elements and scope

Because the prior litigation occurred in Illinois courts, the panel applied Illinois claim-preclusion principles as required by Chi. Title Land Tr. Co. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Sales Ltd.. It then stated the elements (final merits judgment, identity of causes of action, identity of parties/privies) via Doherty v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (quoting DeLuna v. Treister).

For the preclusion “reach,” the panel cited River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park (through Baek v. Clausen): res judicata bars not only what was decided, but also what could have been decided in the first action. This principle did much of the work against the Worthams’ federal claims.

4) Vagueness doctrine: as-applied requirement outside the First Amendment

The Worthams argued that the Illinois appellate court did not reach their “as-applied and facial” vagueness claims. The Seventh Circuit rejected that characterization by pointing to the actual basis for the state appellate ruling: the state court deemed the vagueness challenge baseless absent an argument that the ordinance was vague as to the Worthams’ specific conduct, citing Wortham v. Village of Barrington Hills and Shachter v. City of Chicago.

The panel reinforced the doctrinal premise with federal authority: United States v. Pacilio (quoting United States v. Calimlim) for the rule that a vagueness challenge not premised on the First Amendment is generally evaluated as-applied, not facially. The upshot is that the Illinois court’s rejection—because the Worthams failed to make the necessary as-applied showing—was treated as a merits ruling that can support res judicata.

5) Waiver/forfeiture on appeal

As to the First Amendment claim, the panel relied on Bradley v. Village of University Park: failing to respond to an argument in the district court (here, the Village’s res judicata defense) waives that contention on appeal. The court further noted that even the Worthams’ appellate theory (that the claim arose only after the March 2022 decision) did not address the district court’s key point: the claim could have been raised during the subsequent April 2022 enforcement proceedings.

6) The panel’s caution about over-compartmentalized pleading analysis

In a footnote, the court criticized the district court’s tendency to offer multiple alternative grounds without committing to a clear basis, and it signaled skepticism about rigidly splitting due-process vagueness into “facial” and “as-applied” compartments at the pleading stage. The footnote references Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n) as part of that discussion, and it expressly warns that a conclusory Rooker-Feldman analysis illustrates the risks of the district court’s approach.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Rooker-Feldman: narrow jurisdictional screen, focused on the relief requested

The panel treated Rooker-Feldman as a limited doctrine: it bars de facto federal appellate review of state judgments, but it does not automatically bar all federal claims that arise after or alongside state litigation. Using Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. as its guide, the court looked to the requested relief and held that at least the damages request for lost revenue would not necessarily require rejecting a state judgment. Therefore, jurisdiction existed over that aspect of the due-process claim.

2) Res judicata: “final on the merits” includes a state court’s rejection for failure to make a required as-applied showing

The dispositive step was claim preclusion. The Worthams contested only the first Illinois element—final merits judgment—arguing that the Illinois appellate court had not truly decided their constitutional theory. The Seventh Circuit disagreed: the Illinois court rejected the vagueness challenge for a substantive deficiency (no argument that the ordinance was vague as applied to them), a deficiency that is doctrinally central outside the First Amendment (as underscored by United States v. Pacilio and United States v. Calimlim).

That treatment matters: once the state court has issued a final merits judgment rejecting the vagueness challenge, res judicata prevents a federal “second try” at the same cause of action (and prevents repackaging closely related constitutional theories that could have been raised in the earlier litigation, consistent with River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park).

3) First Amendment claim: could-have-been-litigated plus waiver

The First Amendment claim failed for two reinforcing reasons. First, on the merits of preclusion, the court accepted the district court’s logic that the Worthams could have raised that claim during the state enforcement proceedings and did not. Second, as a procedural matter, Bradley v. Village of University Park made the appellate result straightforward: by failing to respond to the res judicata argument in the district court, the Worthams waived the issue on appeal.

C. Impact

  • Federal challenges after state zoning enforcement face steep preclusion barriers. Even when plaintiffs frame claims as “new” constitutional theories (e.g., vagueness or speech-related objections), Illinois res judicata will bar relitigation if the claims were—or could have been—litigated in the state trajectory (administrative review and related enforcement proceedings).
  • Rooker-Feldman remains narrow but often irrelevant once res judicata applies. The opinion illustrates a common sequencing reality: a federal court may have jurisdiction over some damages theories under Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., but preclusion can still end the case.
  • Vagueness doctrine strategy is constrained outside the First Amendment. Litigants attacking zoning and land-use ordinances on vagueness grounds must be prepared to make an as-applied showing tied to their conduct; failure to do so can produce a merits defeat that later precludes federal relitigation.
  • Preservation matters. The waiver holding (under Bradley v. Village of University Park) is a reminder that parties must respond to preclusion arguments in the district court or risk losing the ability to contest them on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Res judicata (claim preclusion)
A doctrine that prevents a party from suing again over the same dispute after a final judgment. In Illinois (as stated via Doherty v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. quoting DeLuna v. Treister), it generally requires a final merits judgment, the same cause of action, and the same parties/privies—and it bars not only what was decided, but also what could have been decided (per River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park).
Rooker-Feldman
A jurisdictional rule: federal district courts cannot act like appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments. Under Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., the question is whether the plaintiff’s claim asks the federal court to “review and reject” the state judgment; the requested remedy is central to that inquiry.
Void for vagueness
A due-process principle requiring laws to give ordinary people fair notice of what is prohibited and to limit arbitrary enforcement. Outside the First Amendment context, vagueness challenges are typically evaluated as-applied (as in United States v. Pacilio quoting United States v. Calimlim), meaning the challenger must show the law was unclear as to their specific conduct.
As-applied vs. facial challenge
An as-applied challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in how it was enforced against a particular person; a facial challenge argues the law is unconstitutional in all (or most) applications. This case treats the as-applied requirement as central for non-First-Amendment vagueness claims, and it treats the state court’s rejection on that basis as a merits disposition supporting res judicata.
Waiver on appeal
If a party does not raise an argument in the trial court, it often cannot raise it later on appeal. Here, under Bradley v. Village of University Park, the Worthams’ failure to respond to the Village’s res judicata argument in the district court foreclosed their appellate challenge.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s disposition underscores that post-enforcement federal constitutional litigation is frequently decided not on the underlying constitutional merits, but on preclusion and preservation. Even where Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction over certain damages theories (notably lost-revenue claims), Illinois res judicata can still foreclose federal claims when a state appellate court has already rejected the operative constitutional theory—here, a vagueness challenge rejected for failure to articulate how the ordinance was vague as applied to the plaintiffs’ conduct. The decision also serves as a procedural warning: failing to contest a preclusion defense in the district court can independently doom an appeal.