Repeated Substance-Abuse Relapse After Successful Improvement Periods Can Justify Denial of Another Improvement Period and Termination of Parental Rights

1. Introduction

In In re M.M., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed whether a parent’s current sobriety and participation in services required another opportunity for reunification when earlier successful improvement periods had repeatedly been followed by renewed substance abuse and child endangerment. The court affirmed the denial of a further post-adjudicatory improvement period and the termination of parental rights.

The petitioner, Mother B.M., appealed an order concerning her fourteen-year-old child, M.M., who had substantial autism-related support needs. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) defended the termination order, and the child was represented by a guardian ad litem. The father’s parental rights had already been terminated in a previous proceeding.

The decision’s central principle is that successful participation in services does not necessarily establish a lasting ability to parent safely. Where earlier interventions have repeatedly failed to prevent renewed abuse or neglect, a circuit court may find another improvement period futile and terminate parental rights if the statutory requirements are satisfied. The memorandum decision applies established law rather than announcing a categorical rule that relapse or multiple proceedings automatically require termination.

2. Background and Procedural History

The 2025 incident

DHS filed its petition in February 2025. It alleged that the mother, while under the influence of amphetamines, inappropriately kissed M.M. while they stood in the middle of a road. The temperature was approximately thirty degrees, and the child lacked socks, shoes, and a coat. The petition described the child as severely autistic and functioning at approximately the developmental level of a four-year-old.

At the May 2025 adjudicatory hearing, the mother stipulated to the petition’s allegations, and the circuit court adjudicated her accordingly. She later admitted using methamphetamine during the incident. Thus, the appeal concerned the appropriate disposition, not whether the current abuse and neglect had occurred.

The history of prior proceedings

The current proceeding was the fifth abuse and neglect case involving the mother since 2003:

• 2003: She voluntarily relinquished parental rights to another child following allegations that substance abuse prevented her from providing adequate care.
• 2009: Another child’s father received sole custody following allegations of emotional abuse and neglect associated with the mother’s substance abuse.
• 2017: Proceedings concerning M.M. arose from substance-related neglect. The mother was convicted of child neglect creating risk of injury, stipulated to the petition’s allegations, completed a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and regained custody.
• 2019: Another petition concerning M.M. followed a collision caused when the mother drove under the influence of diphenhydramine hydrochloride with the child in the vehicle. She again stipulated, successfully completed an improvement period, and regained custody.

These earlier outcomes were not all terminations of parental rights. Their significance was that they documented repeated substance-related parenting failures and, particularly in 2017 and 2019, substantial interventions that did not produce sustained protection for M.M.

Evidence at disposition

At the September 2025 dispositional hearing, DHS witnesses acknowledged that the mother had completed required drug screens without testing positive for illicit substances. Nevertheless, they recommended termination because she had previously complied with services, regained custody, and then returned to conduct that endangered the child.

The mother presented substantial evidence of current efforts. She testified that she had taken 117 drug tests, remained drug-free since the petition, maintained employment, participated in therapy and counseling, attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous, and undertaken autism-specific parenting classes. She also maintained that the 2019 incident involved accidentally taking excessive sleep medication, rather than a methamphetamine relapse, and that she had abstained from amphetamine and methamphetamine for nine years before the 2025 incident.

A service-provider case manager testified that quarterly home visits from May 2023 until the current petition suggested adequate care. Friends and relatives described the mother as loving and supported another opportunity for reunification. The circuit court nevertheless observed that the supporting witnesses lacked knowledge of the incident underlying the current petition.

After considering the prior proceedings, including petitions and orders admitted from the 2009, 2017, and 2019 cases, the circuit court denied another improvement period. It found that the mother could not remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect, independently or with assistance, and that termination served the child’s best interests. Its written termination order was entered on November 10, 2025.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed on both issues presented:

1. Denial of an improvement period: The circuit court acted within its discretion because the mother had already received extensive services and successfully completed improvement periods, yet repeatedly returned to substance-related conduct that endangered M.M.
2. Termination rather than a less restrictive disposition: The record supported findings that the conditions of abuse and neglect could not reasonably be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.

The court resolved the appeal without oral argument under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. Its reasoning did not disregard the mother’s present compliance; instead, it concluded that her longer history supported the circuit court’s assessment of whether that compliance would produce durable parental change.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re K.S.

Syllabus point 1 of In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026), supplied the appellate standards of review: substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo.

This framework mattered because the mother’s arguments depended heavily on the weight given to competing evidence. The appellate court did not decide disposition afresh merely because current sobriety and favorable testimony could support a different outcome. It examined whether the circuit court’s factual findings and discretionary decisions were legally sustainable.

In re M.M.

The court cited the earlier, identically titled In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015), for the proposition that West Virginia law gives circuit courts discretion to grant or deny an improvement period.

That 2015 decision is distinct from the present case. Its role was to establish that an improvement period is not an automatic entitlement. Evidence of willingness to participate must be considered within the circuit court’s discretionary assessment.

In re Tonjia M.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002), recognizes that an improvement period may be denied when no improvement is likely.

This precedent supplied the futility principle. Although a parent may be willing to attend services, the court may consider whether those services are likely to change the underlying conditions. Here, repeated recurrence after earlier interventions supported the conclusion that another period would not likely produce lasting improvement.

State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer

In State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 520, 836 S.E.2d 472, 487 (2019), the court explained that improvement periods have frequently been found futile and improper when parents previously received services but continued the same behaviors.

This authority connected the mother’s treatment history to the denial of further services. The relevant question was not whether services had ever been offered or completed, but whether they had effectively prevented renewed abuse or neglect. The present decision applies that principle to a recurring pattern of apparent compliance followed by later relapse and endangerment.

In re J.D.-1

In re J.D.-1, 247 W. Va. 270, 279, 879 S.E.2d 629, 638 (2022), was the closest cited analogy concerning denial of an improvement period. It upheld denial where a parent had completed earlier improvement periods but repeated the conditions of abuse and neglect after the children returned.

This precedent directly answered the contention that past successful completion favored another opportunity. Previous completion can demonstrate an ability to comply under supervision while simultaneously revealing that such compliance has not translated into safe parenting after reunification.

In re Kristin Y.

Syllabus point 5, in part, of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), establishes that termination may occur without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected.

This authority addressed the mother’s second assignment of error. It rejected the premise that the circuit court necessarily had to attempt a lesser disposition before terminating parental rights.

In re R.J.M.

The rule quoted from In re Kristin Y. originated in syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Its significance lies in the longstanding distinction between recognizing less restrictive alternatives and requiring courts to exhaust them mechanically. The present opinion invokes that rule through In re Kristin Y.; it does not separately examine the underlying facts of In re R.J.M..

In re G.L.-1

Finally, In re G.L.-1, No. 25-608, 2026 WL 1244690, at *2–3 (W. Va. May 6, 2026) (memorandum decision), affirmed termination where a parent successfully completed two earlier improvement periods but resumed substance abuse after the children returned.

This recent factual parallel reinforced the termination ruling. Together with In re J.D.-1, it supported both stages of the analysis: refusing another improvement period and concluding that termination was justified.

5. Legal Reasoning

A. Likely participation does not compel an improvement period

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) permits a post-adjudicatory improvement period when the parent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is likely to participate fully. The mother’s current treatment, testing, and parenting education were plainly relevant to that inquiry.

The court nevertheless treated this statutory requirement alongside settled precedent recognizing judicial discretion and permitting denial where improvement would be futile. Evidence of likely participation did not compel a grant when the record showed that previous participation had repeatedly failed to protect the child after reunification.

The decision therefore distinguishes participation in a plan from lasting correction of the conditions that made the plan necessary. It does not replace the statutory participation standard with a newly announced test; it applies the existing discretionary framework to an unusually extensive history.

B. Prior proceedings were evidence of future risk, not merely past wrongdoing

The mother’s history mattered because it showed a recurring sequence: substance-related danger, court intervention, successful service completion, reunification, and renewed danger. The prior cases helped the circuit court evaluate whether current progress would persist once the immediate structure of the proceedings ended.

The distinction between methamphetamine and diphenhydramine did not defeat this reasoning. The court focused on substance-related impairment of parenting and renewed risk to the child, rather than requiring every incident to involve the same drug.

The supporting witnesses’ lack of knowledge about the latest incident also limited their ability to resolve the central concern. Their observations of affection and adequate care at other times did not necessarily establish that the mother could consistently prevent serious episodes of endangerment.

C. Formal completion of treatment was not conclusive proof of a sustained response

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(1) identifies circumstances supporting a finding that the conditions cannot reasonably be substantially corrected. These include habitual substance abuse or addiction that seriously impairs parenting, together with failure to respond to or follow through with recommended, appropriate treatment capable of improving parental functioning.

The important interpretive feature is that the mother had formally completed earlier improvement periods. The court nevertheless found the statutory conclusion supported because renewed substance abuse and child endangerment showed that earlier interventions had not produced a sustained parenting benefit.

On these facts, successful completion of services was therefore not conclusive proof of an adequate, lasting response to treatment. The opinion does not establish that every relapse satisfies § 49-4-604(d)(1); its reasoning depends on repeated proceedings, repeated intervention, and renewed harm.

D. Termination required both a correction finding and a child-welfare finding

Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is authorized when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

The repeated failure to sustain safe parenting supported the first finding. The child’s substantial care needs, together with the recurring dangerous incidents, informed the second. The decision did not treat the child’s disability as an independent ground for termination; it was relevant to the level of reliable care and protection required.

The statutory focus is correction in the near future, not proof that the parent could never recover. Because the required findings were supported, the court held that a less restrictive alternative did not have to be tried first.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

• A longitudinal assessment of parenting capacity: Courts may consider the full history of intervention and reunification rather than treating current compliance as the only meaningful evidence.
• Service completion is not a guarantee of reunification: The practical question remains whether treatment has produced sustained change sufficient to protect the child.
• Prior records can be important: Earlier petitions, orders, treatment histories, and reunification outcomes may help establish whether another improvement period is likely to be effective.
• Child-specific needs remain central: Evidence must connect parental functioning to the actual care and safety needs of the particular child.
• Less restrictive alternatives need not be exhausted automatically: Supported statutory findings can justify proceeding directly to termination.

The decision also has clear limits. It establishes no numerical threshold of prior proceedings, creates no automatic termination rule for parents with substance-use histories, and does not make a child’s disability a ground for severing parental rights. Nor does it declare clean drug screens irrelevant. Rather, it illustrates how favorable current evidence may be outweighed by a documented pattern of unsuccessful long-term correction.

Although the opinion notes that M.M. was living in a residential facility for children with special needs, it does not identify an adoption plan or resolve future placement arrangements. Those matters should not be inferred from the affirmance.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication

The stage at which the court determines whether abuse or neglect occurred. Here, the mother stipulated to the allegations.

Disposition

The later stage at which the court decides what legal response is appropriate, including whether parental rights should be terminated.

Post-adjudicatory improvement period

A court-authorized opportunity, after abuse or neglect has been established, for a parent to address the problems through services and demonstrate improvement.

Clear and convincing evidence

A demanding evidentiary standard requiring a firm belief in the proposition proved. The opinion applies it to the parent’s showing of likely full participation in an improvement period.

Abuse of discretion

Review of whether the trial court’s discretionary decision stayed within legally permissible bounds, rather than whether the appellate court would have made the same choice initially.

Clear error and de novo review

Clear-error review gives deference to factual findings; de novo review independently examines legal questions.

Judicial notice

Here, the circuit court’s recognition of its prior proceedings as part of the history relevant to the current case.

Less restrictive disposition

An outcome short of terminating parental rights. The court need not attempt every such outcome when the legal grounds for termination are established.

Guardian ad litem

A lawyer appointed to represent the child’s interests in the proceeding.

8. Conclusion

In re M.M. reinforces that child-protection proceedings assess sustained parental capacity, not service completion alone. The mother’s current sobriety and substantial efforts did not require another improvement period where earlier successful interventions had repeatedly been followed by renewed substance-related danger.

The broader lesson is qualified but important: courts may decline another opportunity for improvement and terminate parental rights when an individualized record supports both the absence of likely substantial correction in the near future and the necessity of termination for the child’s welfare.