Repeated Failed Improvement Periods and Parental Deception Justify Denial of Further Improvement and Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

Case: In re G.L.-1 and A.L. (No. 25-608, Hardy County CC-16-2024-JA-57 & CC-16-2024-JA-58)
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date Issued: May 6, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed (memorandum decision)

1. Introduction

This abuse-and-neglect appeal arose from extreme substance exposure to two young children, including a suspected overdose requiring multiple doses of Narcan for then-two-year-old A.L., and positive drug screens for then-five-year-old G.L.-1. The petitioner father (G.L.-2) challenged the Circuit Court of Hardy County’s dispositional order terminating his parental rights, arguing (1) the circuit court should have granted him a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and (2) termination was not the least restrictive alternative.

The factual context was central: the father had already received extensive reunification services and multiple prior improvement periods in earlier abuse-and-neglect cases driven by the same problem—substance abuse—yet the cycle resumed. Compounding the relapse history, the father was found to have been deceptive about his relationship with the mother and to have permitted unsupervised contact between the mother and G.L.-1 despite a prohibition after the mother’s custodial rights were relinquished/terminated.

Key Issues

• Whether the father proved, by clear and convincing evidence, he was likely to fully participate in a post-adjudicatory improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B).
• Whether termination of parental rights was permissible without less restrictive alternatives where the court found “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future and necessity for the children’s welfare under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying clear-error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions, the Court held:

• The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a further improvement period given the father’s long history of services and relapse, the severity of the children’s drug exposure, and the father’s minimization/blame-shifting.
• Termination was not required to be preceded by less restrictive alternatives because the record supported the statutory finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction in the near future, and termination was necessary for the children’s welfare and permanency.
• The Court deferred to the circuit court’s credibility findings regarding the father’s deception about his relationship with the mother and associated violations of prior court restrictions.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

• Role in decision (standard of review): The Court invoked Syl. Pt. 1 for the governing appellate review framework in abuse-and-neglect cases: factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions reviewed de novo. This framing mattered because the father’s appeal largely contested discretionary and fact-dependent determinations (likelihood of participation, credibility, reasonable likelihood of correction).
• Role in decision (limits on waiting for improvement): The Court also relied on Syl. Pt. 4, in part, emphasizing that courts need not “exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement” where a child’s welfare would be seriously threatened. This principle supported the refusal to gamble on yet another improvement period after repeated failures and severe harm risk.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)

• Role in decision (discretion to deny improvement): Quoted for the proposition that a circuit court may refuse an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” The Court applied this directly: despite the father’s claim of current sobriety via medication-assisted treatment, his history of unsuccessful treatments and relapse culminating in child endangerment supported the circuit court’s predictive judgment that improvement was unlikely.

In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)

• Role in decision (least restrictive alternative doctrine): The Court quoted Syl. Pt. 5: termination may be used without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions can be substantially corrected. This case supplied the doctrinal bridge between the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding and the rejection of the father’s “least restrictive alternative” argument.

In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

• Role in decision (foundation for immediate termination): The Court cited the syllabus points incorporated through In re Kristin Y. and In re Cecil T., reinforcing that, where correction is not reasonably likely and the child is at risk, courts may proceed to termination without incremental measures. In this opinion, the extreme facts (Narcan intervention; positive heroin/fentanyl exposure) anchored why delay was inconsistent with child safety.

Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997)

• Role in decision (credibility deference): The Court relied on this case to decline reweighing credibility on appeal. That deference was pivotal because the circuit court found the father deceptive (including fabricating a “fictitious girlfriend” narrative) and noncompliant with protective boundaries concerning the mother’s contact—facts that undermined trust in prospective compliance during any new improvement period.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The governing statute, W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), is permissive: a parent “may” be granted an improvement period only if the parent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate. The Court’s reasoning followed a predictable but rigorous evaluation of the father’s “likelihood” showing:

• History of services and relapse: The father had previously received extensive services (drug screening, parenting and life skills, treatment, domestic violence services) and had prior improvement periods; yet the problem recurred with greater severity.
• Severity and immediacy of harm: The children’s exposure was not abstract or speculative—one child tested positive for heroin and fentanyl, and the younger child required multiple doses of Narcan, indicating acute danger.
• Accountability and insight: The father’s blame-shifting (faulting others for not removing drugs from the home, including drugs he overdosed on) was treated as evidence undermining his claimed readiness for change and consistent participation.
• Deception/avoidance of oversight: Misrepresentations to the DHS and the court about the relationship with the mother supported the inference that compliance occurred mainly under supervision and that the father circumvented court-ordered safeguards when not closely monitored.

Against this background, the Court held the circuit court acted within its discretion (consistent with In re Tonjia M.) in concluding that another improvement period was not justified.

2) Termination as the Appropriate Disposition

The father’s “least restrictive alternative” argument failed because West Virginia law does not require lesser measures when two statutory predicates are met: (1) “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The Court emphasized:

• Statutory definition applied: Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), “no reasonable likelihood” includes a demonstrated inadequate capacity to solve the problems “on [one’s] own or with help.” Multiple prior opportunities “with help,” followed by relapse and endangerment, satisfied this definition.
• Permanency and safety: The circuit court’s focus on “safe, stable permanency” aligned with the dispositional mandate in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
• No need for speculative delay: Invoking In re Cecil T. (and its quotation of In re R.J.M.), the Court reaffirmed that courts are not required to wait for uncertain parental improvement where the child’s welfare is seriously threatened.
• Credibility as an operational fact: Because compliance prospects are predictive, credibility matters. The Court refused to disturb the circuit court’s findings of deception under Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C..

C. Impact

• Reinforces a “no more chances” principle where the record shows repeated, service-saturated failures: While not creating a new statute-based rule, the decision underscores that the improvement-period inquiry is not about a parent’s current verbal commitment alone; it is strongly informed by demonstrated outcomes after prior services.
• Elevates child-safety facts as dispositive in timing decisions: Drug exposure requiring emergency intervention (e.g., multiple Narcan doses) will support an accelerated move to permanency, including termination, even when a parent presents evidence of recent sobriety efforts.
• Signals that deception and circumvention of court orders are highly relevant to “likelihood of participation”: The opinion highlights that dishonesty aimed at avoiding scrutiny can itself be evidence that a parent is unlikely to fully participate or comply meaningfully with an improvement period.
• Affirms appellate deference to circuit court credibility and predictive judgments: Appeals challenging the denial of an improvement period and the “no reasonable likelihood” finding face a substantial hurdle when the circuit court made supported credibility determinations and relied on a documented service history.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A structured, court-supervised chance after a parent is adjudicated as abusing/neglecting, during which the parent must complete services (treatment, testing, parenting education, etc.). It is not automatic; the parent must prove likely full participation.
• Clear and convincing evidence: A higher burden than “more likely than not.” The parent must present strong, reliable evidence that participation and progress are genuinely likely—not merely hoped for.
• No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected: A statutory conclusion that the parent cannot fix the core problems in the near future, even with help—often shown by repeated failures despite extensive services.
• Least restrictive alternative: The idea that courts should prefer less drastic measures than termination (like guardianship or continued improvement periods). West Virginia law allows skipping those intermediate steps when correction is not reasonably likely and the child needs permanency and safety.
• Medication-assisted treatment (MAT): Treatment for substance use disorders using prescribed medications (often combined with counseling). Participation can support recovery, but the court may still consider relapse history, accountability, and child safety.
• Credibility determinations: The trial judge’s assessment of whether witnesses are truthful. Appellate courts generally will not re-decide who to believe from a paper record.

5. Conclusion

In re G.L.-1 and A.L. affirms that West Virginia courts may deny an additional improvement period—and proceed directly to termination—when a parent has already received extensive reunification services and multiple opportunities yet continues substance abuse to a degree that gravely endangers children, especially where the parent demonstrates deception and limited accountability. The decision consolidates established principles from In re Tonjia M., In re Kristin Y., In re R.J.M., In re Cecil T., and Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C. into a clear practical message: child safety and permanency may outweigh speculative prospects of parental rehabilitation when the record shows repeated, service-resistant relapse and circumvention of court-ordered protections.