Repeated Armed Extortion and Threats Without Physical Harm May Not Compel a Finding of “Past Persecution” Under Substantial-Evidence Review

1. Introduction

In Carrasco-Aguilar v. Blanche (5th Cir. June 30, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review from a Honduran national, Delmy Celina Carrasco-Aguilar, who sought asylum and withholding of removal after experiencing repeated armed demands for cell-phone “minutes” at her convenience store in Choluteca, Honduras.

The core dispute was whether Carrasco-Aguilar’s experiences—recurring armed theft/extortion and threats to kill her and family members, without physical injury—rose to the level of past persecution. A secondary procedural issue shaped the case’s scope: the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) deemed her arguments about future persecution waived because she did not meaningfully challenge the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) finding that internal relocation within Honduras was reasonable.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Carrasco-Aguilar did not establish past persecution. The court distinguished her case from Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, where threats escalated into an organized campaign culminating in killings and a bombing.

Because the “past persecution” determination was supported by the record under the deferential standard of review—and because Carrasco-Aguilar did not contest the BIA’s waiver finding regarding future persecution—the petition for review was DENIED. Her Convention Against Torture claim was treated as forfeited because it was not pursued on appeal (citing Lopez-Perez v. Garland).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Lopez-Perez v. Garland, 35 F.4th 953, 957 n.1 (5th Cir. 2022)
    Used for the appellate forfeiture principle: when a petitioner does not brief an issue (here, CAT protection), the claim is treated as forfeited. This underscores that immigration appeals are constrained not only by the record but also by issue preservation.
  • Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2020)
    Cited for the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive understanding of “persecution” and the common negative framing: persecution is more than “harassment, intimidation, threats, or even assault.” The panel leaned on this baseline to categorize Carrasco-Aguilar’s events as falling short of compelled “past persecution.”
  • Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 863 (5th Cir. 2009)
    Supplies the scope-of-review rule: the court reviews the BIA’s decision and considers the IJ’s reasoning only to the extent it influenced the BIA. This mattered because the BIA affirmed on a single ground—no past persecution—narrowing the Fifth Circuit’s analysis.
  • Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026)
    Cited for the definition of substantial evidence and reinforces the highly deferential posture in review of agency factfinding. The court quotes the familiar formulation: “more than a mere scintilla” and adequate for a reasonable mind.
  • Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015)
    Supplies the complementary “compelling evidence” gloss: reversal requires that evidence be so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could reach the contrary conclusion. This is the critical lens through which the panel rejects Carrasco-Aguilar’s arguments.
  • Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004)
    Cited for the principle that harassment, mere threats, and minor violence do not qualify as past persecution. In effect, Eduard helps set the threshold that Carrasco-Aguilar could not clear on this record.
  • Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 345–48 (5th Cir. 2006)
    The petitioner’s main comparator. The panel recounts how FARC pursued Tamara-Gomez and his family after he participated in a mission to retrieve bodies of murdered police officers; threats escalated to a bombing and executions. The court uses Tamara-Gomez to illustrate what “kind and degree” of severity can constitute persecution—then holds Carrasco-Aguilar’s experience was materially less extreme.
  • Rubio v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 568, 577–79, 581 (5th Cir. 2025)
    Cited twice: (1) to illustrate application of substantial-evidence review in the persecution context, and (2) for the rule that failing the asylum standard necessarily defeats withholding (“When an alien does not meet the bar for asylum, he also does not meet the standard for withholding of deportation.”). Rubio operates as both methodological support (deference) and doctrinal linkage (asylum vs. withholding).
  • Munoz-De Zelaya v. Garland, 80 F.4th 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam)
    Cited for waiver/issue-preservation in immigration appeals. Here, it supports the BIA’s conclusion that future-persecution arguments were waived because Carrasco-Aguilar did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s internal-relocation finding.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The court’s review was tightly bounded by what the BIA decided.
Applying Shaikh v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit limited review to the BIA’s sole merits ground: Carrasco-Aguilar did not establish past persecution. The IJ had ruled on additional elements (nexus to a protected ground, particular social group, government unable/unwilling, future fear, and relocation), but the BIA did not reach most of them, and it treated future-persecution arguments as waived.

(b) Substantial-evidence deference did most of the work.
Citing Urias-Orellana v. Bondi and Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, the panel emphasized that it could not reweigh facts; Carrasco-Aguilar had to show the evidence compelled the opposite result. The court expressly acknowledged that “a different adjudicator” might have found persecution, but that is not enough under substantial-evidence review.

(c) The panel characterized the harm as repeated armed theft/extortion without physical injury or deprivation of essentials.
The court described the conduct as repeated taking of cell-phone credits and threats, including one incident in which pistols were trained on her, but noted: (i) no physical harm occurred; and (ii) there was no showing of deprivation of “the essentials of life.” Anchored by Gjetani v. Barr and Eduard v. Ashcroft, the court held this record did not compel a “past persecution” finding.

(d) Tamara-Gomez was treated as the outer comparator—organized, escalating violence culminating in deaths.
The court explained that Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales involved sustained pursuit by FARC and escalation to a bombing and executions. By contrast, Carrasco-Aguilar’s experience—serious and frightening—was deemed different “in kind and degree.” This distinction reinforces a Fifth Circuit theme: not all grave criminal victimization, even with guns and death threats, necessarily compels the legal label of “persecution.”

(e) Waiver narrowed the case and foreclosed future-persecution review.
The BIA treated the future-persecution issue as waived due to failure to meaningfully contest internal relocation, and the Fifth Circuit accepted that framing (citing Munoz-De Zelaya v. Garland). As a result, even if the record might have supported forward-looking fear, that question effectively never reached merits review.

(f) Withholding fell with asylum.
Relying on Rubio v. Bondi, the panel reiterated the doctrinal linkage: if the applicant cannot satisfy asylum’s standard, she necessarily cannot meet withholding’s higher standard.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and not precedential under Fifth Circuit rules, the opinion is practically significant in three ways:

  1. It reaffirms a high threshold for “past persecution” in the Fifth Circuit.
    Applicants alleging repeated threats and armed intimidation—without physical injury or extreme escalation—face an uphill battle, especially when the record resembles criminal extortion rather than sustained political/organizational targeting.
  2. It highlights how substantial-evidence review can preserve agency outcomes even in close cases.
    The court’s statement that another adjudicator might have ruled differently, yet the BIA still stands, captures the practical force of deference.
  3. It underscores the decisive role of issue preservation (waiver/forfeiture).
    The petitioner’s inability (or failure) to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s internal-relocation determination prevented review of future fear, and the failure to brief CAT resulted in forfeiture. The case is a cautionary example: appellate outcomes may turn on briefing as much as on the facts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Past persecution: A level of harm considered severe enough (in type and degree) to qualify as “persecution,” not merely crime, harassment, or threats. Fifth Circuit cases often treat it as a demanding threshold.
  • Substantial evidence: A deferential standard of review. The court asks whether a reasonable factfinder could have reached the agency’s result, not whether the court would have decided differently.
  • Well-founded fear / future persecution: A forward-looking showing that the applicant would face persecution if returned. Even strong fear can be legally insufficient if internal relocation is reasonable or if other legal elements are missing.
  • Internal relocation: If an applicant can reasonably and safely live in another part of the home country, asylum may be denied even if danger exists in one area.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Both involve losing an argument by not properly raising it. In this opinion’s usage, CAT was treated as forfeited (not briefed), and future-persecution issues were treated as waived (not meaningfully challenged).
  • Asylum vs. withholding of removal: Withholding generally has a higher burden. Thus, failure on asylum commonly implies failure on withholding (as applied here via Rubio v. Bondi).

5. Conclusion

Carrasco-Aguilar v. Blanche applies familiar Fifth Circuit doctrine in a fact pattern common to Central American asylum claims: repeated armed threats and extortion by private actors. The court’s key move was not to deny the seriousness of the events, but to hold—under substantial-evidence deference—that the record did not compel the legal conclusion of “past persecution,” especially when contrasted with the extreme escalation in Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales.

The decision’s broader lesson is twofold: (1) “past persecution” remains a demanding showing in this circuit when physical injury and extreme escalation are absent; and (2) petitioners must meticulously preserve and brief issues—particularly internal relocation and CAT—because waiver and forfeiture can effectively decide the case.