Repeat Neglect and Incomplete Treatment: When Limited Reunification Efforts Support Termination of Parental Rights

1. Introduction

In In re J.C., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered whether a mother should receive another opportunity to remedy abuse and neglect after previously receiving extensive services, relapsing into substance abuse, and leaving inpatient treatment prematurely. The appeal also raised an important question about the Department of Human Services’ (“DHS”) reunification obligations: whether its failure to provide parenting classes and arrange ordered telephone visitation required reversal of an order terminating parental rights.

The court affirmed the termination of S.F.’s parental rights to J.C. It concluded that the mother had not established that she would fully participate in a post-adjudicatory improvement period and that the services DHS provided or attempted to provide were reasonable under the particular circumstances.

The decision’s central significance is its fact-specific application of existing law: prior unsuccessful services, incomplete treatment, and failure to meaningfully acknowledge abusive or neglectful conduct can support denial of another improvement period and termination, even when the agency’s current reunification efforts contain identifiable gaps. The opinion does not establish a general exemption from DHS’s duty to provide services.

2. Background and Procedural History

The child’s living arrangements and the safety concerns

J.C. was under his maternal grandmother’s legal guardianship but primarily lived with his mother. In October 2024, a walk-through of the mother’s home revealed suspected methamphetamine residue, drug paraphernalia, a scale, and a large knife on the child’s bed. DHS implemented a safety plan requiring J.C. to reside with his grandmother and requiring the mother to submit to drug screening. The mother subsequently moved into the grandmother’s home as well.

After the mother repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine and other substances and failed to participate in treatment offered during the safety plan, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in December 2024. The petition alleged that her continued drug use following a 2019 proceeding endangered J.C., caused emotional injury, and prevented her from providing a safe home.

Adjudication and disputed acknowledgment

At the preliminary hearing, the mother disputed significant portions of the allegations. She described suspected methamphetamine residue as sugar, attributed the scales to her boyfriend’s gold-weighing activities, and initially attributed a positive methamphetamine screen to contaminated marijuana. Although she ultimately admitted methamphetamine use, she maintained that she did not use around the child.

In March 2025, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusive and neglectful parent. It found that she was in active addiction and that her testimony lacked credibility. Her lack of formal custodial rights did not prevent adjudication because she had allowed J.C. to live with her in unsafe conditions.

The dispositional evidence

At the August 2025 dispositional hearing, evidence showed that the mother had left inpatient treatment in May before completing it. Although her counsel had earlier proffered completion of a separate, short treatment program around the turn of the year, the later treatment episode remained unfinished. She said she left to work but had not obtained employment, lacked stable housing, and had not sought to resume inpatient treatment.

The record also contained evidence favorable to her: recent drug screens were clean, she was seeking housing assistance, and she expressed willingness to comply with an improvement period. DHS, meanwhile, acknowledged that parenting classes had not been provided and that it had been slow to arrange telephone visitation.

Nevertheless, the mother questioned whether further inpatient treatment was necessary. When asked whether she had abused and neglected J.C., she initially answered, “No, I truly don’t,” before qualifying that response and acknowledging an inappropriate home and relapse. The circuit court found that these concessions did not demonstrate a meaningful understanding of the underlying problems.

The court denied an improvement period and terminated parental rights on August 13, 2025. J.C.’s father’s rights had already been terminated in an earlier proceeding, and the child’s permanency plan was adoption in his current placement.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court resolved the appeal without oral argument under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 and affirmed on three principal grounds:

1. No entitlement to another improvement period: The mother did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to participate fully. Her incomplete treatment, limited acknowledgment of neglect, and relapse after earlier services supported the circuit court’s discretionary denial.
2. Reasonable reunification efforts despite service gaps: Drug screening and assistance in obtaining inpatient treatment constituted reasonable efforts in the circumstances. The omitted parenting classes and unarranged telephone visits did not require reversal, particularly because the termination decision did not appear to rest on the absence of visitation.
3. Statutory grounds for termination: The evidence supported the finding that the mother was unable or unwilling to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. Termination was also found to serve J.C.’s best interests, a determination she did not challenge on appeal.

4. Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate review respected the circuit court’s different decision-making functions

The court distinguished among three standards of review: substantive rulings receive abuse-of-discretion review; factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and legal questions receive independent, or de novo, review.

This distinction mattered because much of the appeal concerned credibility, motivation, and likely future participation. The circuit court had heard the mother’s testimony and found it inconsistent and unpersuasive. The Supreme Court did not replace those findings with a more favorable interpretation simply because the record also contained recent clean screens and promises of cooperation.

B. An improvement period requires demonstrated likelihood of participation

Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a parent seeking a post-adjudicatory improvement period must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is likely to participate fully. The statute permits an improvement period; it does not make one automatic.

The court evaluated the mother’s assurances against her conduct. She had left treatment, had not returned, had maintained little contact with DHS, and did not believe that further inpatient treatment was necessarily needed. Her earlier successful completion of an improvement period had not produced lasting protection for the child.

The acknowledgment issue was especially important. The mother admitted having a substance abuse problem, but the circuit court found that she did not meaningfully recognize how her conduct constituted abuse and neglect. The opinion therefore distinguishes between acknowledging drug use in the abstract and accepting the need to change the conditions that harmed or endangered the child.

The reasoning does not make relapse alone an automatic bar to further assistance. Rather, relapse operated alongside incomplete treatment, credibility concerns, and an insufficient showing of future engagement.

C. Reasonable efforts were assessed contextually, not as flawless performance

The mother’s strongest agency-performance argument concerned services DHS admittedly failed to deliver. Parenting classes were contemplated but not provided, and telephone visitation ordered by the court was not arranged.

The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the reasonable-efforts finding. It emphasized that DHS had provided or attempted to provide drug screening and assistance with inpatient substance abuse treatment, addressing the principal condition underlying the proceedings. It also considered the comprehensive services offered during the earlier case and the mother’s failure to secure lasting benefit from them.

The court treated the absence of visitation carefully: it did not appear that the circuit court relied on that absence when terminating parental rights. Instead, termination rested on the mother’s inadequate acknowledgment and treatment of her longstanding substance use disorder. An agency-created obstacle to contact therefore was not used as an independent indication of parental unwillingness.

Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iv), the dispositional order must address whether reasonable reunification efforts were made or whether specific circumstances made those efforts unreasonable. Here, the circuit court expressly found that DHS had made reasonable efforts; the Supreme Court upheld that finding rather than dispensing with the obligation.

D. Termination did not require an intervening lesser disposition

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) permits termination when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. Section 49-4-604(d) explains the first requirement in terms of the parent’s inadequate capacity to solve the problems independently or with assistance.

The mother’s treatment history, continued minimization, and lack of meaningful progress supported the finding that she was unable or unwilling to correct the conditions. The circuit court also found no reasonable, available less drastic alternative and concluded that termination served J.C.’s best interests.

Because those findings were supported, the court was not required to grant another improvement period before terminating parental rights. The child’s need for stability was particularly significant after a second abuse and neglect proceeding arising from the mother’s addiction.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)

Syllabus Point 1 supplied the governing standards of appellate review. Its importance was methodological: it required the Supreme Court to separate factual assessments from legal interpretation and discretionary decision-making. That framework supported deference to the circuit court’s credibility findings while preserving independent review of the governing statutory rules.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)

This case established the circuit court’s discretion to deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely. It reinforced the statutory distinction between requesting an opportunity and proving entitlement to the court’s favorable exercise of discretion. In J.C.’s case, the mother’s expressions of willingness did not overcome evidence suggesting that meaningful participation was improbable.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013)

The court relied on this decision for the principle that a parent must recognize and acknowledge that her conduct constituted abuse before she can remedy the problem. This precedent connected the mother’s minimization directly to the prospects of successful rehabilitation. Her admissions about relapse and housing conditions were insufficient, in the circuit court’s assessment, to establish genuine recognition of the neglect.

State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 520, 836 S.E.2d 472, 487 (2019)

This authority explained that improvement periods may be futile and improper when parents have previously received services but continue the relevant behaviors. It gave legal significance to the 2019 proceeding and the extensive services already directed at the mother’s substance abuse. Earlier participation was not treated as proof that she deserved another opportunity; its failure to produce lasting improvement supported the contrary conclusion.

In re K.V., 251 W. Va. 418, 426, 914 S.E.2d 517, 525 (2025)

This decision recognized that DHS has a statutory obligation to provide services as a prerequisite to termination. Its citation is an important qualification on the result: parental noncompliance does not erase the agency’s responsibilities. The court reconciled that obligation with affirmance by finding that the services actually provided or attempted were reasonable in this particular case, notwithstanding omitted classes and visitation.

In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)

Syllabus Point 5 supplied the rule that termination may occur without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected. It supported moving directly to termination once the statutory findings were established, rather than requiring another rehabilitative stage merely because termination is the most severe disposition.

In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

Syllabus Point 2 was the underlying authority quoted through In re Kristin Y.. Its inclusion demonstrated that the rule permitting termination without first exhausting lesser alternatives was longstanding. The court applied that existing doctrine rather than announcing a new exception to a requirement of sequential dispositions.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Greater significance for the history of prior services

The decision supports examining whether earlier interventions produced durable change. In repeat proceedings, formal completion of a prior improvement period may carry less weight than subsequent conduct showing whether the parent maintained a safe environment.

A need for specific reasonable-efforts findings

Future courts may distinguish between incomplete service delivery and legally inadequate reunification efforts. The inquiry should identify the central conditions requiring correction, the services actually offered, parental engagement, and whether an omitted service affected the basis for termination. The opinion does not make parenting education or visitation categorically dispensable.

Conduct may outweigh assurances

Recent negative screens and promises of compliance remain relevant, but they need not outweigh a broader pattern of incomplete treatment and minimization. The decision emphasizes an evidence-based prediction of participation, not acceptance of a parent’s stated intentions at face value.

Important limits on broader application

• The opinion does not establish that every relapse justifies termination.
• It does not require inpatient treatment in every substance-related case; that treatment was the identified intervention here.
• It does not authorize reliance on missed visits caused by agency delay as proof of parental disinterest.
• Although unemployment and unstable housing appeared in the record, the rationale centered on unresolved abuse and neglect, not poverty alone.
• As a memorandum decision applying established authorities, it should not be read as announcing a broad new exemption from reunification duties.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication and disposition

Adjudication determines whether abuse or neglect occurred. Disposition determines the appropriate response, including services, an improvement period, or termination.

Post-adjudicatory improvement period

A court-authorized opportunity, after an abuse or neglect finding, for a parent to address the problems. The parent must show a strong likelihood of full participation.

Clear and convincing evidence

A demanding level of proof requiring a firm conviction that the asserted fact is true. Here, it governed the mother’s showing that she would fully participate in an improvement period.

Reasonable reunification efforts

Services and assistance reasonably directed toward correcting the conditions separating parent and child. Reasonableness depends on the circumstances; it does not necessarily require every possible service.

No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction

A finding that the parent lacks adequate capacity to solve the abuse or neglect problems, either independently or with help. It concerns realistic prospects for change, not merely a promise to improve.

Less restrictive alternatives

Dispositions that preserve parental rights instead of ending them. Courts need not try each alternative when the statutory grounds for termination are established.

Guardian ad litem

The lawyer appointed to represent the child’s interests. Here, the guardian opposed another improvement period and supported termination to secure stability.

8. Conclusion

In re J.C. confirms that another improvement period is not automatic when extensive prior services have failed to produce lasting change. The mother’s incomplete treatment, limited acknowledgment of neglect, and poor prospects for meaningful participation supported denial of further time.

The decision also illustrates that acknowledged service gaps do not invariably defeat a reasonable-efforts finding. Its significance lies in the combination of circumstances: targeted treatment assistance, unsuccessful prior intervention, findings supporting termination, and an unchallenged determination that termination served the child’s best interests. DHS’s statutory obligations remained intact, but J.C.’s need for permanence did not require another unsuccessful rehabilitative cycle.