Repeat Exposure to a Barred Parent Justifies Denial of a Second Post‑Adjudicatory Improvement Period and Supports Termination

1. Introduction

Case: In re J.B. and E.B. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, March 3, 2026).
Parties: Petitioner Mother (R.H.); the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”); children J.B. and E.B.; and the children’s guardian ad litem.
Procedural posture: Mother appealed the Circuit Court of Wood County’s March 28, 2025 dispositional order terminating her parental rights. She challenged (1) the denial of her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and (2) the termination decision.

Core factual backdrop: DHS alleged Mother allowed J.B.’s father—whose parental rights had already been terminated and who was court-ordered to have no contact with J.B.—to stay at/return to the home. While J.B. was present, the father overdosed (Mother administered multiple doses of Narcan) and later committed domestic violence against Mother. Mother stipulated to the petition’s allegations, and later stipulated again to an amended petition alleging THC positivity at E.B.’s birth.

Key issues on appeal: (a) whether Mother established entitlement to a post-adjudicatory improvement period under West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), and (b) whether termination was permissible under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) given the “no reasonable likelihood” finding under § 49-4-604(d).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because the record supported the finding that “no improvement was likely,” particularly given Mother’s prior improvement period in a 2023 case and her near-immediate return to the same harmful dynamics (allowing the barred father back into the home, resulting in renewed domestic violence and drug-related danger in front of J.B.).

The Court also affirmed termination of parental rights, concluding that the evidence supported the circuit court’s findings that (1) there was no reasonable likelihood Mother could substantially correct the conditions of abuse/neglect in the near future and (2) termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

This syllabus point supplies the appellate standard of review in abuse and neglect cases: factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. By invoking In re Cecil T., the Court framed the appeal as one focused on whether the circuit court’s findings were adequately supported by the record and whether the circuit court correctly applied the governing statutes—an approach that typically favors affirmance when the circuit court’s narrative is consistent and evidence-based.

In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015)

In re M.M. is cited for the proposition that granting an improvement period is discretionary, even where a parent seeks one under the statutory standard. This citation matters because Mother’s argument centered on her professed willingness to participate (restraining order, treatment re-enrollment, therapy). The Court relied on In re M.M. to emphasize that willingness alone does not compel an improvement period when the circuit court finds participation unlikely to yield meaningful improvement.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)

The Court used In re Tonjia M. to reinforce that a circuit court may deny an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” In this case, the “no improvement likely” finding was tethered to Mother’s relapse into the same endangering conduct after previously receiving services—especially continued association with a prohibited individual whose presence recreated the core hazards (domestic violence and drug-related crisis).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))

These cases provide the doctrinal foundation for termination without exhausting “less restrictive alternatives” when there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correction. By quoting this rule, the Court validated the circuit court’s move directly to termination once statutory findings were met. In practical terms, it answers the implicit argument that the court should have tried another improvement period or a less drastic disposition: West Virginia law does not require that if the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” threshold is satisfied and termination is necessary for welfare.

In re Jonathan Michael D., 194 W. Va. 20, 27, 459 S.E.2d 131, 138 (1995) (quoting W. Va. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Peggy F., 184 W. Va. 60, 64, 399 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990))

This line of authority addresses a recurring problem in abuse-and-neglect litigation: a parent may “comply” with discrete case-plan tasks yet fail to internalize the underlying protective capacities needed for safe parenting. The Court used these cases to support the circuit court’s finding that Mother “only went through the motions” previously—i.e., prior formal completion of an improvement period did not equate to durable behavioral change, particularly where she again exposed J.B. to the very risks the prior case was meant to remediate.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Denial of Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The governing statute, West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), allows a post-adjudicatory improvement period only if the parent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate. The Court treated the circuit court’s decision as a credibility-and-prognosis determination: would additional services plausibly change outcomes, given Mother’s history?

The circuit court relied heavily on the pattern evidence:

  • Mother previously received a post-adjudicatory improvement period (2023 case involving domestic violence).
  • After father’s rights to J.B. were terminated and Mother was ordered to prevent contact, she allowed father back into the home “almost immediately.”
  • That choice led to acute safety events in J.B.’s presence (overdose requiring multiple Narcan doses; subsequent physical attack).
  • Mother minimized or misrepresented the extent of father’s presence (court found she lied to DHS).

Against this record, Mother’s asserted steps (restraining order, re-enrollment in treatment, willingness to comply) were not viewed as clear and convincing proof of likely successful participation; rather, the prior failed learning and rapid recurrence of the same dangers supported a finding that another improvement period would not meaningfully remediate conditions.

(B) Termination of Parental Rights

The Court affirmed termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which permits termination when: (1) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

The “no reasonable likelihood” definition in § 49-4-604(d) focuses on inadequate capacity to solve the abuse/neglect problems “on [one’s] own or with help.” The Court endorsed the circuit court’s conclusion that Mother demonstrated such inadequacy because, even with prior help (a prior improvement period), she resumed behavior that re-created the same risks—continued association with a dangerous, barred parent and failure to protect the child from domestic violence and drug-related hazards.

Importantly, the Supreme Court also noted that Mother did not challenge the circuit court’s finding that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. That unchallenged finding reinforced affirmance because § 49-4-604(c)(6) requires both prongs.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the opinion concretely illustrates how West Virginia courts operationalize discretion under § 49-4-610 and apply § 49-4-604(c)(6) in repeat-risk scenarios. Its practical impacts include:

  • No “automatic second chance” after prior services: Completion of a prior improvement period does not create entitlement to a new improvement period when the parent quickly re-engages in the same endangering conduct.
  • Protective capacity is central: Courts may treat continued involvement with a prohibited individual—especially one tied to overdose and domestic violence in the child’s presence—as strong evidence that the parent cannot or will not protect the child.
  • “Compliance” vs. genuine change: The decision reinforces that courts evaluate substantive safety outcomes and parental insight, not just attendance or procedural participation in services.
  • Termination without lesser alternatives: When the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” and “welfare” findings are supported, courts may terminate without layering in incremental alternatives.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised chance (after the parent is adjudicated as abusing/neglecting) to complete services aimed at fixing the problems. It is not guaranteed; the parent must show they are likely to participate fully, and the court must believe improvement is realistically likely.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened burden of proof—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, Mother needed strong, persuasive proof she would fully engage and that services would matter.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” of correction: A legal conclusion that the parent probably cannot fix the core problems in the near future, even with assistance. It focuses on real-world capacity and sustained behavior change.
  • Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., additional improvement periods, guardianship, temporary placements). Under In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., courts need not use these alternatives when statutory termination findings are met.
  • Judicial notice of the record: The court may consider its own case file, prior testimony, and reports without reintroducing them as new evidence—especially when no party objects—allowing a holistic view of the parent’s pattern over time.

5. Conclusion

In re J.B. and E.B. affirms that West Virginia circuit courts retain broad discretion to deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period where the evidence shows that additional services are unlikely to produce genuine protective change—particularly when a parent, after prior services, repeats the same conduct that endangers a child. The decision also reiterates that termination may proceed without less restrictive alternatives when the record supports “no reasonable likelihood” of near-future correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.