Remote-Hearing Choice of Law: No Remand Required Where the IJ Provides an Alternative First Circuit Analysis Adopted by the BIA

1. Introduction

Bromfield v. Blanche (1st Cir. Aug. 25, 2026) arises from removal proceedings against Duke St. Vaughn Keith Bromfield, a Jamaican citizen who overstayed a B-2 visa and later sought multiple forms of relief. The Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable, and Bromfield pursued (1) adjustment of status and (2) fear-based relief (asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection).

The case presented three recurring immigration-law flashpoints:

  • Choice of law in remote hearings (the IJ appeared from Virginia while venue was Boston).
  • Jurisdiction-stripping over discretionary immigration determinations (adjustment of status and asylum-timeliness exceptions).
  • Merits of withholding turning on adverse credibility and the cognizability of a proposed particular social group.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit:

  • Dismissed the petition as to adjustment of status, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial.
  • Dismissed the petition as to asylum, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that no “changed” or “extraordinary” circumstances excused an untimely filing.
  • Denied the petition as to withholding of removal, affirming (i) the adverse credibility finding under the substantial-evidence standard and (ii) the legal determination that Bromfield’s proposed PSG was not cognizable.

On the threshold “choice of law” issue, the court held that First Circuit law governed because administrative venue lay in Boston, and it found no remand was required even though the IJ initially stated the case fell under Fourth Circuit jurisdiction—because the IJ analyzed First Circuit law in the alternative and the BIA’s decision reflected First Circuit/agency-law review.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Choice of law and remote adjudication

  • Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5 (1st Cir. 2023): The court relied on Bazile for the rule that, for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), an IJ “completes the proceedings” in the administrative venue where proceedings commenced (absent a formal change of venue). Bromfield extends Bazile’s practical logic: litigants reasonably expect the same circuit law to govern through the immigration court, the BIA, and the petition for review.
  • Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. 693 (B.I.A. 2023): Cited as the BIA’s own choice-of-law rule requiring IJs/BIA to apply the circuit law of administrative venue. The First Circuit treated Garcia as aligning agency practice with Bazile and used it to reinforce why First Circuit law applied despite the IJ’s remote location.
  • Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, 39 F.4th 233 (4th Cir. 2022): The IJ had relied on this Fourth Circuit approach (looking to the IJ’s physical location). The First Circuit explained that, under its later-decided Bazile framework and under Matter of Garcia, this was not the governing approach in the First Circuit.
  • Robidoux v. Muholland, 642 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2011): Used for the standard proposition that choice-of-law determinations are reviewed de novo.
  • Akinsanya v. Garland, 125 F.4th 287 (1st Cir. 2025): The court distinguished Akinsanya’s remand requirement when the BIA applies the wrong legal standard and thus fails to provide “meaningful” review. In Bromfield, the court concluded the BIA’s review was meaningful because the IJ provided an alternative First Circuit analysis and the BIA’s reasoning reflected First Circuit/agency precedent.

B. Jurisdiction to review and “questions of law”

  • Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020): Cited to define the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law, including certain mixed questions applying law to established facts.
  • Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022): Anchored the jurisdictional analysis under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), emphasizing that courts are barred from reviewing “any judgment” under enumerated discretionary-relief provisions, not merely the “last-in-time” discretionary call.
  • Mele v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2015), and Moreno v. Garland, 51 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022): Cited for the First Circuit’s application of jurisdiction-stripping to discretionary determinations regarding adjustment-type relief.

C. Asylum one-year bar and exceptions

  • Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 329 (1st Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Zapet-Alvarado v. Blanche, No. 25-1081, 2026 WL 1855098 (U.S. June 29, 2026): The controlling First Circuit authority that determinations whether “changed” or “extraordinary” circumstances exist “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” are unreviewable discretionary judgments.
  • Real v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 147 F.4th 361 (3d Cir. 2025), and A.P.A. v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 104 F.4th 230 (11th Cir. 2024): Cited to show alignment with other circuits’ jurisdictional treatment of asylum-timeliness exceptions.
  • Lordes v. Mukasey, 288 F. App'x 712 (1st Cir. 2008): Cited for the principle that courts may not “second-guess” the agency’s assessment of extraordinary-circumstances merits.

D. Credibility, fact review, and corroboration limits

  • Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5 (1st Cir. 2023); Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2006); and Guzman v. INS, 327 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2003): Cited for the substantial-evidence framework and the deference owed to factfinding across asylum/withholding/CAT contexts.
  • Molina-Diaz v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2021), and Mam v. Holder, 566 F.3d 280 (1st Cir. 2009): Used to support deference to IJ credibility determinations, especially demeanor-based findings.
  • Melhem v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2007): Cited for the proposition that an adverse credibility finding can be fatal to withholding where the applicant cannot prove the claim without relying on his own testimony.
  • Rodrigues v. Garland, 124 F.4th 58 (1st Cir. 2024): Cited to underscore that generalized country conditions reports typically do not establish the applicant’s individualized risk.

E. Particular social group (PSG) cognizability

  • Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland, 86 F.4th 482 (1st Cir. 2023), and Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238 (1st Cir. 2015): Provided the three-part PSG test: immutable characteristic, particularity, and social distinction.
  • Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023), and Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2012): Used to reject PSGs that are amorphous, diffuse, or overbroad.
  • Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2010), quoting Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010): Cited for the requirement that the PSG be generally recognized as a cohesive group and for skepticism toward “resistance”-based, subjective group boundaries.
  • Alvarado-Reyes v. Garland, 118 F.4th 462 (1st Cir. 2024), and Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010): Applied to show that “resistance” language tends to create subjective, ill-defined membership boundaries.
  • Out-of-circuit comparisons: Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2017), and R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2014): The court found these unpersuasive as support for Bromfield’s specific PSG formulation, emphasizing the indefiniteness of “resisted corruption and gang activity.”

F. Ineffective assistance backdrop

  • Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988): Invoked by Bromfield to argue he should be placed in the position he would have occupied absent prior counsel’s deficiencies. The court did not treat Lozada as undermining the independent statutory/discretionary bases for denying adjustment.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. A pragmatic choice-of-law holding: alternative correct-circuit analysis can cure an IJ’s initial misidentification

The court agreed that First Circuit law governed because administrative venue was Boston (per Bazile v. Garland and Matter of Garcia), even though the IJ sat remotely in Virginia. The crucial move was remedial: the First Circuit declined to remand because:

  • The IJ expressly stated that even if First Circuit law applied, the outcome would be the same, and he cited First Circuit cases in that alternative analysis.
  • The BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning and separately cited First Circuit law on credibility while avoiding reliance on Fourth Circuit law.
  • This was therefore not a scenario where the BIA’s review was “meaningless” under Akinsanya v. Garland.

In effect, the opinion articulates a functional rule: where the agency record demonstrates that the correct circuit’s law was applied in substance (even if the IJ initially referenced another circuit), and the BIA’s disposition reflects correct-law review, remand is unnecessary.

B. Adjustment of status: jurisdictional bar reinforced by an independent discretionary denial

Bromfield attacked the adjustment denial as legal error (including a Matter of Lozada framing). The court did not reach those theories because the IJ made an explicit alternative holding: even if eligible, adjustment would be denied as a matter of discretion due to serious convictions. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and Patel v. Garland, that discretionary judgment is unreviewable, compelling dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Asylum: the “exceptions to the one-year bar” determination is unreviewable in the First Circuit

Bromfield conceded untimeliness and sought review of the agency’s refusal to excuse it based on changed/extraordinary circumstances. The First Circuit treated that request as squarely foreclosed by Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi: whether the exception is met “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” is a discretionary judgment. By characterizing Bromfield’s argument as an effort to “second-guess” the merits of the exceptions, the court aligned with Lordes v. Mukasey and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without reaching asylum merits.

D. Withholding: substantial evidence supported adverse credibility, and the PSG failed as a matter of law

On credibility, the court applied deferential review, stressing inconsistencies between affidavits and testimony, internal contradictions, and demeanor concerns. It also emphasized that generalized country evidence and limited corroboration did not compel a contrary finding (Rodrigues v. Garland).

Independently, the court affirmed that the PSG—“immediate family of police officers who have resisted corruption and gang activity”—failed particularity and social distinction. The term “resisted” was treated as inherently vague and subjective, paralleling Alvarado-Reyes v. Garland and Mendez-Barrera v. Holder.

3.3. Impact

A. Administrative-venue choice of law in remote hearings: a “no-remand” safety valve

Post-Bazile v. Garland and Matter of Garcia, the governing rule is clear: administrative venue controls which circuit law applies. Bromfield’s added significance is procedural: it signals that agency mislabeling of the governing circuit is not automatically remand-worthy where the record shows the correct law was applied in the alternative and adopted by the BIA.

B. Litigation strategy and record-making

The opinion incentivizes advocates to:

  • Press for explicit application of the correct circuit’s law at both IJ and BIA stages, but
  • Recognize that courts may deny remand if the agency supplied a correct-circuit alternative rationale that is outcome-determinative.

C. Jurisdictional clarity: discretionary and exception-based determinations remain difficult to judicially review

The decision confirms that, in the First Circuit, review of (i) discretionary adjustment denials and (ii) asylum-timeliness exceptions remains sharply constrained, leaving petitioners to focus on preserved legal questions, procedural defects that rise to questions of law, and properly exhausted claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Administrative venue: the immigration court location where the case is officially docketed (here, Boston), not necessarily where the IJ is physically sitting during a remote hearing.
  • Jurisdiction-stripping: statutes (notably 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)) that prevent federal courts from reviewing certain immigration decisions, especially discretionary ones.
  • Asylum one-year bar: asylum generally must be filed within one year of arrival; late filings can be excused only for “changed” or “extraordinary” circumstances, but in the First Circuit that excuse determination is treated as discretionary and unreviewable.
  • Withholding of removal: a higher-burden protection than asylum; the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” that life or freedom will be threatened for a protected reason.
  • Adverse credibility: if the IJ finds key testimony not believable—due to inconsistencies, implausibility, or demeanor—the claim may fail unless strong independent evidence establishes the required facts.
  • Particular social group (PSG): a protected category requiring clear boundaries (“particularity”) and recognition as a distinct group within the society (“social distinction”), not merely a loosely described set of people.
  • Exhaustion/forfeiture: issues generally must be raised to the BIA before they can be reviewed in the court of appeals (as noted regarding CAT).

5. Conclusion

Bromfield v. Blanche is most notable for its pragmatic handling of remote-hearing choice-of-law problems: although First Circuit law governs cases venued in the First Circuit under Bazile v. Garland and Matter of Garcia, remand is not required when the IJ provided an alternative First Circuit analysis and the BIA’s decision reflects correct-law review.

Substantively, the opinion reinforces the First Circuit’s strict jurisdictional limits over discretionary adjustment denials and asylum-timeliness exceptions, while illustrating how adverse credibility findings and poorly bounded “resistance”-based PSG formulations can independently defeat withholding claims.