Remand Futility in Asylum Appeals: Nexus Error Does Not Require Remand Where Lack of Future Persecution Independently Defeats Relief

I. Introduction

In Carbajal-Carbajal v. Blanche (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit denied a petition for review challenging a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision that affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Petitioner Francisca Sandra Carbajal-Carbajal, a native and citizen of El Salvador, alleged past persecution and feared future persecution based on physical abuse and sexual violence by her former intimate partner, Gerber Luis Santamaria (“Gerber”). She argued that the abuse was on account of her membership in asserted particular social groups (“PSGs”): (1) “Salvadoran female intimate partners or former intimate partners of her abuser,” (2) “Salvadoran females,” and (3) “post-pubescent Salvadoran females.”

The key issues before the Second Circuit were: (a) whether the agency properly rejected or discounted the PSG and “nexus” showing (i.e., whether a protected ground was “one central reason” for harm), (b) whether any error in the agency’s nexus analysis required remand, and (c) whether the record compelled CAT relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court acknowledged a serious analytical flaw in the agency’s nexus reasoning: the IJ failed to grapple with petitioner’s strongest evidence that the abuse was gender-motivated, including testimony reflecting possessive, patriarchal control (“I was his woman”), coercive sexual violence, and expert/country-conditions evidence about “machismo” and gender-based violence in El Salvador.

Nevertheless, the Second Circuit denied asylum and statutory withholding without remand on the ground of futility. It held that the IJ’s supported finding that petitioner lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution constituted an independent barrier: she had not seen Gerber for more than a decade, communications were minimal, she believed he lived in the United States, and she had previously relocated within El Salvador for years without encountering him. Even assuming nexus error, the court could “confidently predict” the same outcome because “overwhelming untainted evidence” supported the future-fear determination.

The court also denied CAT relief, emphasizing that CAT has no nexus requirement, and that generalized violence in El Salvador cannot substitute for “particularized evidence” that petitioner herself would more likely than not be tortured by or with governmental acquiescence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005)
    Used for the standard of review framework: the Second Circuit reviews the IJ’s decision “as supplemented by the BIA.” This matters because alleged error may stem from either level, and the court evaluates the combined reasoning actually relied upon.
  • Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland, 118 F.4th 250, 253 (2d Cir. 2024)
    Cited for the split standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for “substantial evidence,” while legal questions and application of law to fact are reviewed de novo. The nexus and PSG inquiries often straddle this divide, and the court’s approach signals careful attention to what is treated as fact-bound versus legally constrained.
  • Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008)
    Invoked for the remand principle: even under deferential substantial-evidence review, the court “will vacate and remand” when the agency’s reasoning or fact-finding process is “sufficiently flawed.” The court later applied this concept to the IJ’s failure to confront material gender-motivation evidence—an error that ordinarily warrants remand.
  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109-14 (2d Cir. 2022)
    Clarified that the “one central reason” nexus standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal. This foreclosed any attempt to treat withholding as requiring a different nexus showing in this circuit.
  • Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2014)
    Cited for PSG cognizability requirements, specifically that a PSG must be “socially distinct.” The court affirmed the agency’s conclusion that “Salvadoran female intimate partners or former intimate partners of her abuser” was not cognizable on this record because social distinction in Salvadoran society was not established.
  • Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2022)
    Played two roles:
    1. The agency need not “expressly parse or refute” every piece of evidence, but must provide some indication it considered “material evidence.”
    2. When expert declarations/reports are submitted, the agency must acknowledge them and explain why it departs from the expert’s view.
    Carbajal-Carbajal relied on this to label the IJ’s nexus analysis erroneous for failing to confront both the petitioner’s most probative testimony and the expert/country-conditions record.
  • Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005)
    Reinforced that the agency must show it considered “material evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim.” The case underwrote the court’s criticism of the IJ’s selective treatment of motivation evidence.
  • Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2020)
    Cited for the principle that failure to acknowledge and explain departure from expert evidence renders the agency decision “summary or conclusory.” This bolstered the finding of nexus-analysis error where the IJ did not meaningfully engage with expert materials describing gender hierarchy and violence.
  • Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 102-05 (2d Cir. 2020)
    Used as an analogy: the agency errs when it fails to “adequately consider” evidence that persecution is connected to opposition to “male-dominated social norms” and “a culture that perpetuates female subordination.” The court treated petitioner’s “machismo” evidence as similar in kind and potentially powerful on nexus.
  • Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2006)
    Central to the disposition: articulated the “confidently predict” standard for denying remand as futile. The court applied it to hold that, even if the nexus issue were fixed, the lack of future-persecution fear was independently dispositive.
  • Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2010)
    Cited for the proposition that CAT relief has no “nexus” requirement. This separated the nexus error (relevant to asylum/withholding) from the CAT analysis (focused on likelihood of torture and state involvement/acquiescence).
  • Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 592 (2d Cir. 2021)
    Set out the CAT burden: petitioner must show it is “more likely than not” she would be tortured by, or with acquiescence of, government officials. The court used this to frame petitioner’s evidentiary shortfall on individualized torture risk.
  • Mu Xiang Lin v. Department of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)
    Applied to reject reliance on generalized country violence to meet CAT’s individualized burden; “particularized evidence” is required that the applicant herself is likely to be tortured.
  • Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (“Matter of A-B- III”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“Matter of A-B- I”); Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“Matter of A-B- II”); Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025)
    The petitioner sought a remand based on intervening shifts in the A-B- line. The court rejected remand because the IJ did not rely on Matter of A-B- I, and it noted later administrative developments: Matter of A-B- III “has since been vacated, restoring A-B- I and A-B- II” per Matter of S-S-F-M-. Functionally, this portion underscores that remand for intervening authority is unlikely where (i) the IJ did not apply the challenged precedent and (ii) the asserted intervening change is itself unstable or reversed.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. PSG cognizability versus nexus
    The court separated two common asylum problems: whether a claimed PSG is legally cognizable and whether the harm is “on account of” (nexus to) membership in that PSG. It accepted the agency’s conclusion under Paloka v. Holder that the “intimate partners of her abuser” PSG lacked evidence of “socially distinct” recognition in Salvadoran society. For the broader gender-based groups, the IJ assumed cognizability but denied for insufficient nexus.
  2. Nexus error identified: failure to address material evidence
    Applying Poradisova v. Gonzales, Tanusantoso v. Barr, and Ojo v. Garland, the court held the IJ’s nexus discussion was deficient because it emphasized incident-specific “precipitants” (arguments over money, accusations of affairs, objections to makeup) while failing to address evidence that directly reflects gender domination and entitlement:
    • “I was his woman,” under his roof, had to do what he said;
    • Control over clothing (no pants, only skirts);
    • Rape when she refused sex;
    • Expert/country evidence of “machismo” and acceptance/tolerance of violence to enforce gender roles; and
    • A report indicating sexual violence is gender-based violence.
    In short, the court viewed the record as containing significant evidence that gender status could be “one central reason,” and the IJ did not adequately show it had grappled with that proof.
  3. Why no remand: futility based on an independent dispositive finding
    Despite recognizing the nexus error (a type of error that “generally requires remand”), the court invoked the futility doctrine from Ojo v. Garland and the “confidently predict” formulation of Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Department of Justice. It treated the lack of a well-founded fear of future persecution as an independent barrier:
    • Petitioner had not seen Gerber in more than a decade;
    • Only limited recent contact (a call years before the hearing; a Facebook friend request);
    • Petitioner believed Gerber was living in the United States;
    • After leaving him, she lived in a different Salvadoran state for years without encountering him.
    The court also addressed the regulatory presumption that can arise from a past-persecution finding (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); § 1208.16(b)(1)) and the government’s rebuttal mechanisms (fundamental change in circumstances; internal relocation). It concluded, however, that the agency’s future-fear analysis did not truly turn on burden allocation and was supported by substantial evidence of changed circumstances and ability to avoid the abuser.
  4. CAT denial: individualized proof and state involvement
    Relying on Kone v. Holder, the court emphasized that CAT does not require a protected-ground nexus; thus, the nexus error did not affect CAT. Applying Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland and the regulation (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)), the court held petitioner did not provide record evidence compelling the conclusion that she personally was more likely than not to face torture by her abuser upon return, nor sufficient evidence of torture with government acquiescence. Under Mu Xiang Lin v. Department of Justice, general country violence was insufficient without particularized risk evidence.

C. Impact

Although issued as a non-precedential “summary order,” the decision is practically significant in three ways for Second Circuit immigration litigation:

  • Remand is not automatic even when the court finds a core analytical error: The opinion illustrates a stringent application of the futility doctrine: when an independent, well-supported future-fear finding defeats asylum/withholding, the court may deny without remand despite acknowledging error on nexus.
  • Gender-based nexus evidence must be confronted, especially where expert materials are submitted: The court reaffirmed that agencies must meaningfully acknowledge expert declarations and material country-conditions evidence, not merely describe incident-level triggers that can mask a broader discriminatory motive.
  • CAT claims require individualized risk proof beyond generalized violence: The decision reinforces the evidentiary hurdle that country conditions—however dire—do not substitute for “particularized evidence” that this applicant is likely to be tortured, and that state action/acquiescence remains central.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Particular Social Group (PSG) & “socially distinct”
A PSG is a protected ground for asylum/withholding. “Socially distinct” means the relevant society recognizes the group as a distinct class. Here, the court agreed the record did not show Salvadoran society viewed “female intimate partners or former intimate partners of her abuser” as a distinct group.
Nexus / “one central reason”
The applicant must show the protected ground (e.g., gender-based PSG) was at least one central reason for the persecution—not merely incidental. The court found the IJ failed to engage key evidence suggesting gender domination/machismo drove the abuse.
Substantial evidence
A deferential standard: factual findings stand unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court used this to uphold the no-future-fear finding.
Presumption of future persecution after past persecution
If past persecution is established, regulations create a presumption of future fear that the government may rebut by showing changed circumstances or that the applicant can reasonably relocate internally. The court held that, on this record, future fear failed regardless of burden allocation.
CAT “more likely than not,” and “acquiescence”
CAT requires proof that torture is more likely than not, and that it would be inflicted by (or with the consent/acquiescence of) public officials. General violence is not enough; the applicant must show a personal, individualized likelihood.

V. Conclusion

Carbajal-Carbajal v. Blanche underscores two simultaneously true propositions in Second Circuit immigration review: (1) agency adjudicators must address material testimony and expert/country-conditions evidence—especially where gender-based persecution and “machismo” are advanced to prove nexus; but (2) even a meaningful nexus-analysis error may not warrant remand when the record independently and overwhelmingly supports denial based on the absence of a well-founded fear of future persecution. On CAT, the decision reiterates that applicants must present particularized evidence of a personal likelihood of torture and cannot rely on generalized country violence.