Relief-from-Abuse Orders May Rest on Circumstantial Proof of Nonaccidental Injury and a Parent’s Acts or Omissions Failing to Protect a Child

Note on authority: This decision is an Entry Order issued by a three-justice panel and, as the Opinion itself states, such decisions “are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Even so, it is instructive on how Vermont courts analyze relief-from-abuse (RFA) petitions, evidentiary objections, and appellate preservation.

I. Introduction

Case: Courtney Bianchi v. Cody Bussiere
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
Date: 2026-09-04

The parties (Mother and Father) were in a relationship from 2019–2022 and share two minor children (O.B. and F.B.). A March 2024 parentage order awarded Mother primary physical and legal rights and responsibilities, with Father receiving parent-child contact (PCC).

In September 2025, Mother sought an RFA order protecting herself and both children. After a two-day hearing, the Family Division granted the RFA. Father appealed, narrowing his challenge to the trial court’s determination that the children were abused—arguing the findings regarding F.B.’s bruising were speculative and contesting the conclusion that he failed to protect O.B. from sexual abuse.

The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the preponderance standard, deference to trial-court factfinding and credibility assessments, and the requirement that appellate arguments be preserved and properly briefed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court affirmed the RFA order protecting Mother and the children.
  • As to F.B., it held the trial court could find by a preponderance that Father inflicted a suspicious facial bruise during Father’s custodial period, even without pinpointing the precise date of injury.
  • As to O.B., it held “abuse” under the RFA statute includes “acts or omissions” by a parent responsible for the child’s welfare that cause harm or create substantial risk of harm, including sexual abuse or risk of sexual abuse under the juvenile definitions incorporated by statute.
  • The Court rejected several arguments as unpreserved or inadequately briefed, including challenges to expert/medical testimony and hearsay-related objections.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Raynes v. Rogers, 2008 VT 52

The Court relied on Raynes v. Rogers for core RFA principles:

  • Purpose: RFA orders provide immediate relief from intrafamily violence and protect victims from future abuse (¶ 8).
  • Construction: The Abuse Prevention Act is remedial and construed liberally to suppress the harm and advance the legislative remedy (¶ 15).
  • Appellate review: Abuse-of-discretion standard; findings upheld if supported by evidence and conclusions if supported by findings (¶ 9).

In this case, those principles supported affirmance where the trial court drew reasonable inferences from the record and tailored protective conditions to prevent further abuse.

2. In re M.L., 2010 VT 5

In re M.L. supplied the meaning and practical force of the preponderance of the evidence standard (¶¶ 25–26): the petitioner need only prove the facts are “more probably true than false,” and a “bare preponderance” suffices.

That standard was central to rejecting Father’s “speculation” argument regarding timing and causation of F.B.’s bruise: the trial court was not required to eliminate every alternative possibility, only to find the abuse scenario more likely than not on the whole record.

3. Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485 (1997)

The Court invoked Cabot v. Cabot to underscore the trial court’s role as factfinder: assessing witness credibility and weighing persuasiveness is the trial court’s “province.”

This was particularly important because the Family Division explicitly discredited the testimony of paternal relatives who denied observing injuries and denied abuse, while crediting Mother and medical testimony.

4. In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294 (1988)

In re S.B.L. stands for the appellate principle that the appellant bears the burden to show error and the Supreme Court will not “comb the record searching for error.”

Here, Father’s failure to cite the record demonstrating preservation of certain objections was treated as independently fatal to some claims.

5. V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4)(A) and Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160 (1992)

V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4)(A) requires an appellant to state the issues, how preserved, and supporting reasons with citations. Johnson v. Johnson confirms the Court will not address contentions so inadequately briefed that they fail to meet those minimum standards.

The Court used these authorities to dispose of Father’s underdeveloped challenge to whether “acts or omissions” concepts from juvenile law apply within the RFA statutory framework, and to highlight preservation and briefing deficiencies.

6. V.R.E. 803(4) and In re White, 172 Vt. 335 (2001)

V.R.E. 803(4) creates a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. In re White supplies the preservation rule: issues must be raised with “specificity and clarity” to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule.

The Court applied these principles to Father’s attempt to exclude (or attack admission of) medical records and testimony about O.B.’s statement “Nonnie did this.” Because Father’s trial objections did not specifically press the appellate theory (that the statement impermissibly related to “inception or cause”), the claim was not preserved.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The statutory framework: RFA “abuse” includes child-abuse definitions and omissions

The Opinion ties the RFA statute to juvenile child-protection definitions:

  • 15 V.S.A. § 1103(c)(1)(A): the court must make necessary protective orders if the defendant abused the plaintiff and there is a danger of further abuse.
  • 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A)(i) and (iii): “abuse” includes causing physical harm and “abuse to children” as defined in 33 V.S.A. §§ 4911–4923.
  • 33 V.S.A. § 4912(1): an abused or neglected child is one harmed or at substantial risk of harm by the “acts or omissions” of a parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare, and includes sexual abuse or substantial risk of sexual abuse.

This cross-reference matters: it allows an RFA finding for child abuse based not only on a parent’s direct violence, but also on failures to protect when the parent is the responsible caregiver during the relevant timeframe.

2. F.B.: circumstantial proof and nonaccidental trauma inference

The Court upheld the inference that Father abused F.B. based on a synthesis of facts the trial court found credible: (i) Father had responsibility during a five-day visit; (ii) Mother immediately observed the bruise upon return; (iii) the primary care provider described it as yellowed/healing (older rather than fresh); (iv) no intervening events during transport or upon arrival reasonably explained the injury; (v) Father did not report an injury.

Critically, the Court rejected the premise that the factfinder must identify the exact time of infliction. Under In re M.L.’s “more probably true than false” standard, the question is whether the totality makes Father’s responsibility more likely than not.

3. Medical testimony on bruise aging: admissibility vs. weight

Father challenged the primary care provider’s testimony about estimating bruise age. The Court noted Father’s preservation failures but also described how the trial court carefully evaluated the provider’s qualifications and the limits of bruise aging, treating it as an estimate, considering reliable sources (American Academy of Pediatrics and Johns Hopkins University), and incorporating caution urged by studies.

This reasoning reflects a common evidentiary distinction: the provider’s experience-based observations were considered alongside limitations, and any uncertainty went to weight rather than categorical exclusion.

4. O.B.: abuse by “acts or omissions” and failure to protect during custodial responsibility

The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court did not find Father “knowingly” allowed abuse; it found Father, through acts or omissions while responsible for the children’s welfare, allowed O.B. to be harmed physically, sexually, or both.

The evidence credited by the trial court included: O.B.’s genital redness after the visit; O.B.’s behavior and statement during medical evaluation (“Nonnie did this” while twisting/pulling his penis); and Father permitting overnight contact with paternal grandparents despite a prior court order restricting paternal grandmother’s unsupervised access and despite Mother’s stated concerns.

On appeal, Father disputed whether grandparents were ever “alone” with the children, but the trial court could reject that narrative in light of testimony conceding incomplete observation of “every single interaction,” and could find the circumstances created a substantial risk of harm during Father’s custodial period.

5. Appellate discipline: preservation and briefing as outcome-determinative

A significant portion of the Opinion enforces appellate standards:

  • Arguments attacking evidence must be preserved with specific objections and supported with record citations (In re S.B.L.; V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4)(A)).
  • New theories on appeal (e.g., a more specific hearsay rationale) are waived if not distinctly presented below (In re White).
  • Underdeveloped legal challenges are not addressed (Johnson v. Johnson).

C. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision signals several practical implications for RFA litigation:

  • Circumstantial evidence can carry the day in child-focused RFA proceedings when coupled with medical evaluation and credible timelines, even absent an exact injury timestamp.
  • “Acts or omissions” expands the theory of liability in RFA child-abuse determinations: a respondent’s failure to protect during custodial responsibility can satisfy the incorporated juvenile-law definition.
  • Medical records and disclosures are often litigated through V.R.E. 803(4); parties must object with precision if they intend to challenge particular statements as beyond diagnosis/treatment.
  • Appeals are won or lost on preservation: failure to cite the record and articulate preserved legal theories can be dispositive regardless of the underlying facts.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Relief-from-abuse (RFA) order
A civil protective order designed to stop abuse quickly and prevent future harm. It can include no-contact provisions and restrictions on parent-child contact.
Preponderance of the evidence
“More likely than not.” The judge need not be certain—only persuaded that the abuse scenario is slightly more probable than the alternative.
Nonaccidental trauma
Injury that appears inconsistent with ordinary accident patterns, based on location, appearance, development of the child, history given, and clinical judgment.
Acts or omissions
Not only what a caregiver does, but what they fail to do (e.g., failing to protect a child from a foreseeable risk while responsible for the child’s welfare).
Preservation
To raise an issue on appeal, the party must have clearly objected or argued it in the trial court so the judge had a fair chance to rule on it.
V.R.E. 803(4)
A hearsay exception allowing statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment—often including what happened and sometimes who was involved—if pertinent to care decisions.

V. Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed an RFA order protecting Mother and the parties’ children, holding that the trial court could find child abuse by a preponderance based on suspicious injury evidence and medical assessments, without pinpointing the exact moment an injury occurred. It also reinforced that child “abuse” under the RFA framework incorporates juvenile-law concepts of harm or risk of harm caused by a caregiver’s acts or omissions—supporting findings based on failure to protect during custodial responsibility. Finally, the Opinion serves as a cautionary appellate roadmap: evidentiary and legal challenges must be preserved with specificity, supported by record citations, and adequately briefed.