Reimposing a De Facto “Stacked” § 924(c) Term as an Upward Variance After First Step Act § 403

1. Introduction

United States v. Jason Scott (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 2025) addresses a recurring post–First Step Act resentencing problem: when mandatory “stacked” penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) have been reduced by Congress (via § 403 of the First Step Act of 2018), may a district court nonetheless impose an upward variant sentence that effectively recreates the former stacked outcome—so long as the court explains the sentence under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors?

The defendant, Jason T. Scott, committed a multi-offense crime spree including multiple carjackings, multiple § 924(c) brandishing counts, firearms theft offenses, and sexual exploitation of a minor. After complex postconviction proceedings (including partial relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), the case returned to the district court for resentencing where § 403 of the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimum exposure on Scott’s “second” and “third” § 924(c) counts. Even so, the district court reimposed the same aggregate 75-year sentence as an upward variance. Scott appealed, asserting both procedural and substantive unreasonableness.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that:

  • Procedurally, the district court adequately explained the overall sentence in a multi-count case, tied its reasoning to § 3553(a), addressed Scott’s non-frivolous arguments, and was not required to justify each count’s term in isolation.
  • Substantively, the 75-year upward variant sentence was within the district court’s discretion given the seriousness of the conduct, the number of victims, the enduring harm, deterrence/protection of the public, and the court’s assessment of rehabilitation potential. The panel rejected arguments that the court relied improperly on Scott’s state murder convictions, ignored § 3553(a)(6) disparity concerns, or contravened Congress’s intent in altering § 924(c) stacking.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built from well-established Fourth Circuit sentencing review doctrine, emphasizing deference and contextual explanation:

  • United States v. Dominguez, 128 F.4th 226 (4th Cir. 2025): Supplies the core appellate framework—sentences are reviewed for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, analyzing procedural error first and substantive reasonableness second. The Scott panel repeatedly returns to Dominguez’s “totality of the circumstances” and “due deference” approach for variances.
  • United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2020): Reinforces the duty to provide an “individualized assessment” sufficient for meaningful appellate review and perception of fair sentencing. Scott applies Lewis to test whether the resentencing explanation, though not lengthy, was tailored to Scott’s conduct and circumstances.
  • United States v. Fowler, 58 F.4th 142 (4th Cir. 2023): Adds the requirement that courts address non-frivolous arguments for a different sentence and explain their rejection. Scott uses Fowler to evaluate Scott’s mitigation claims (especially his First Step Act and disparity arguments) and to uphold the district court’s responses.
  • United States v. Davis, ___ F.4th ___, ___, No. 23-4174, 2025 WL 628334 (4th Cir. Feb. 27, 2025): Cited for the proposition that when varying from the Guidelines, the district court must show “serious consideration” of the extent of the divergence, and for the principle that variant sentences are generally reasonable when tied plausibly to § 3553(a). Scott treats the reimposed 75-year term as a classic upward variance problem.
  • United States v. Gaspar, 123 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2024): Supports reading the sentencing explanation “in context,” not “in a vacuum.” This matters in Scott because the resentencing explanation incorporated the judge’s prior knowledge from trial and earlier sentencing.
  • United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2017): Endorses a “holistic approach” in multi-count sentencing. Scott invokes Ventura to justify focusing on the aggregate sentence rather than requiring a count-by-count rationale—particularly relevant where § 924(c) terms are consecutive by design but the court’s explanation is directed at the overall punishment.
  • United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 500 (4th Cir. 2021): Allows some “generic recitations” of statutory goals if paired with a defendant-specific explanation. Scott uses Williams to defeat the claim that the court’s language was too generic.
  • United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816 (4th Cir. 2023): Reiterates substantive reasonableness review: whether the district court abused discretion in concluding the sentence satisfies § 3553(a). Scott applies Reed to uphold the variance under the overall circumstances.
  • United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934 (4th Cir. 2022): Used to reject simplistic disparity comparisons, emphasizing that defendants who go to trial are not “similarly situated” to those who plead guilty and cooperate for § 3553(a)(6) purposes. Scott relies on Gillespie to explain why Scott’s cited “murderer sentences” were not meaningful comparators.
  • United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2020): Confirms district courts have extremely broad discretion in weighting § 3553(a) factors. This underwrites Scott’s holding that victim harm and public protection could be weighted above generalized disparity arguments.
  • United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2021): Provides an example where a very long term-of-years sentence was upheld as substantively reasonable due to enduring harms inflicted on victims and families. Scott uses Friend to normalize a de facto life term grounded in victim impact and the court’s assessment of risk and deterrence.
  • United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 470 (2019): Part of the procedural history. The Supreme Court invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, enabling Scott’s § 2255 relief and vacatur of Count 9 (a § 924(c) count predicated on sexual exploitation of a minor). Without this predicate change, the resentencing posture—and later First Step Act remand—would not exist.
  • United States v. Scott, 531 F. App'x 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-4130): Prior appeal affirming Scott’s convictions. The present panel treats the district judge’s familiarity with the original record and earlier sentencing rationale as relevant context in evaluating explanation and discretion on resentencing.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Reasonableness: Explaining an Upward Variance After § 403 Reduces Mandatory Minimums

Scott’s core procedural argument was that the district court did not adequately explain why it effectively “kept” the former 25-year consecutive structure for Counts 4 and 6 despite § 403 reducing the mandatory minimum for those counts.

The Fourth Circuit’s answer has two moving parts:

  1. Holistic explanation suffices in multi-count cases. Citing United States v. Ventura, the panel emphasized that a sentencing court need not provide a separate justification for each count so long as it gives an individualized explanation for the overall sentence, ties it to § 3553(a), and meaningfully addresses non-frivolous arguments (United States v. Fowler).
  2. Context matters—and the judge’s prior familiarity matters. Under United States v. Gaspar, the panel read the resentencing remarks together with the judge’s original sentencing statements. Because the same judge presided at trial, heard victims, imposed the original 100-year term, and expressly referenced the earlier sentencing rationale, the resentencing explanation was not “generic”; it was anchored in the established record of victim harm, community impact, and the judge’s assessment of Scott’s characteristics and rehabilitation prospects.

Importantly, the panel treated the reimposed 75-year term as a variance question: the Guidelines and mandatory minimums did not, in the district court’s view, “reflect the seriousness” and “enduring harm.” Under United States v. Davis (4th Cir. 2025), the appellate question becomes whether the district court gave “serious consideration” to the extent of deviation and offered a plausible § 3553(a)-based justification. The panel concluded it did.

B. Substantive Reasonableness: Deference Despite Congress’s Rejection of Mandatory Stacking

Scott’s substantive challenges were answered sequentially:

  • Alleged improper factor (state murder convictions). Although the district court asked about state murder convictions sua sponte, the Fourth Circuit found no indication the federal sentence was designed to punish those state offenses. The panel stressed that the court “specifically disclaimed any consideration of the state sentences” and that the record showed the upward variance was driven by the federal conduct: multiple victims, terrorizing the community, and the need to ensure he would not return.
  • Unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6). The panel held Scott’s comparisons to “murderer sentences” were not usable because the district court lacked necessary details (including plea/cooperation context). With United States v. Gillespie, the panel underscored that trial defendants are not similarly situated to cooperating plea defendants, making broad comparisons unreliable.
  • “Greater than necessary” and the First Step Act. The panel acknowledged Congress lowered mandatory minimums by eliminating automatic stacking for multiple § 924(c) counts in the same case, but held that the First Step Act does not preclude a judge from imposing a longer sentence as a matter of discretion—especially given that the statutory maximum for even one § 924(c) conviction is life imprisonment. The court framed Congress’s choice as removing a mandatory structure, not imposing a ceiling on judicial sentencing discretion.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and non-binding within the circuit, the opinion has practical persuasive significance for post–First Step Act resentencings:

  • § 403 relief is not a guaranteed sentence reduction. Even when stacked mandatory minimums no longer apply, district courts may impose an upward variance to reach an aggregate term similar to the pre–First Step Act outcome—if justified under § 3553(a) and explained in an individualized way.
  • Aggregate-sentence reasoning is likely to survive appellate review. By leaning on United States v. Ventura, Scott reinforces that explanation can be “holistic” in multi-count cases, a point that matters where the defense attempts to attack the sentence count-by-count.
  • Disparity arguments must be comparator-strong. The decision illustrates that § 3553(a)(6) arguments often fail without detailed, truly similar comparator cases (same posture, plea/trial status, cooperation, criminal history, offense specifics). Mere “murder cases got less” framing is unlikely to move courts.
  • Victim harm and community terror can justify de facto life terms. In line with United States v. Friend, the opinion affirms that extraordinary victim impact findings can support exceptionally long term-of-years sentences.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “§ 924(c) stacking”: Historically, multiple § 924(c) counts charged in one indictment could trigger a 7-year minimum on the first brandishing count and 25-year minimums on additional counts—even without any prior final § 924(c) conviction. Section 403 of the First Step Act removed that automatic enhancement for same-case “second or subsequent” counts.
  • Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range based on the judge’s application of § 3553(a) factors, rather than based on a Guidelines “departure” provision.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
    • Procedural asks whether the court followed the right steps (correct range, considered § 3553(a), explained its choice).
    • Substantive asks whether the final sentence is too extreme given the total circumstances and § 3553(a)’s purposes.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief: A postconviction mechanism allowing federal prisoners to challenge convictions/sentences as unlawful. Here it mattered because United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), invalidated part of § 924(c), leading to vacatur of Count 9 and a resentencing posture.
  • § 3553(a)(6) “unwarranted disparities”: Courts should avoid unjustified differences in sentences among similarly situated defendants, but the comparison must be meaningful—similar conduct, similar record, similar procedural posture.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jason Scott stands for a clear practical principle: even after the First Step Act eliminates mandatory § 924(c) stacking, a district court may reimpose a comparably severe aggregate sentence as an upward variance if it (1) ties the decision plausibly to § 3553(a), (2) provides an individualized explanation (which may be holistic in a multi-count case), and (3) addresses non-frivolous mitigation arguments. The opinion underscores the breadth of district court discretion in extreme multi-victim cases and the high hurdle defendants face in challenging substantial upward variances on appeal.