Reid v. Bondi: Immigration Judges Must Explain the Adequacy of Competency Safeguards in Light of the Respondent’s Specific Disabilities

I. Introduction

In Reid v. Bondi (2d Cir. amended Mar. 14, 2025), the Second Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) order removing Everod Ray Anthony Reid to Jamaica and denying his applications for former INA § 212(c) relief, adjustment of status, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The appeal did not turn on the merits of those immigration benefits. Instead, it centered on procedural fairness where mental illness raises competency concerns. Reid presented evidence—credited by the IJ—that he suffers from schizophrenia with psychotic symptoms (including delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia) that prevented him from assisting counsel and caused him to believe court personnel were conspiring against him.

The IJ implemented several “safeguards” but declined to make a complete competency determination and offered only a conclusory statement that the safeguards were “adequate.” The BIA affirmed on the ground that the safeguards sufficed and that Reid had not identified additional safeguards the IJ should have used.

The Second Circuit granted the petition, vacated, and remanded. Its central holding establishes a reviewability-and-reason-giving rule: when safeguards are imposed due to incompetency (or potential incompetency), the IJ must explain why the safeguards are adequate with reference to the character, scope, and severity of the respondent’s impairments; otherwise, a court cannot meaningfully review adequacy as contemplated by the INA and the BIA’s competency framework.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court applied Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011), the INA (including 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3)), and Fifth Amendment due process principles. It concluded:

  • The IJ properly recognized “indicia of incompetency” and conducted an M-A-M- hearing.
  • But the IJ did not complete the required competency analysis and, crucially, did not explain why the chosen safeguards were adequate given Reid’s specific disabilities.
  • The BIA erred in accepting the IJ’s conclusory adequacy statement; without reasoning tied to the nature and severity of the impairment, appellate review is not possible.
  • Reid was not required to show prejudice because the agency failed to follow procedures protecting fundamental rights under the INA and due process, invoking the Second Circuit’s line of cases including Montilla v. INS, Waldron v. INS, and Picca v. Mukasey.
  • Remand was required so the IJ can (a) explain adequacy of safeguards at the time of the hearing in light of Reid’s disabilities, or (b) reevaluate current competency and determine appropriate safeguards, creating a record permitting meaningful review.

The court expressly declined to reach Reid’s challenges to the denials of § 212(c), adjustment of status, or CAT protection.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The BIA’s Competency Framework: Matter of M-A-M- and Progeny

The decision is anchored in the BIA’s competency framework established by Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). The Second Circuit treated Matter of M-A-M- not as a loose set of suggestions but as a “rigorous procedural” structure (echoing the Ninth Circuit’s characterization in Mejia v. Sessions, 868 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2017)).

Key Matter of M-A-M- contributions, as used by the court:

  • Presumption of competency, rebutted by “indicia of incompetency.”
  • Competency test: rational and factual understanding; ability to consult counsel; reasonable opportunity to examine/present evidence and cross-examine.
  • Two-step obligation: determine competency; if incompetent (or insufficiently competent absent safeguards), select safeguards and articulate rationale.

The Second Circuit also relied on subsequent BIA decisions that refine the framework and underscore record-development and case-specific tailoring:

  • Matter of J-S-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 679 (B.I.A. 2015): no formal burden on a party; preponderance standard; collaborative record development; competency is “not a static condition.”
  • Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 2015): competency issues can affect reliability of testimony; adjudication may need adjustments.
  • Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773 (B.I.A. 2016): safeguards are discretionary but must be adequate to ensure fairness; termination without prejudice can be an available safeguard in certain circumstances.
  • Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136 (B.I.A. 2013): addressed procedural responses when competency issues arise after proceedings begin (cited in connection with re-service of the charging document).
  • Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 74 (B.I.A. 2020): reaffirmed entitlement to a full and fair hearing under the INA and the Fifth Amendment.

The court’s innovation was to make explicit what it described as an implicit statutory requirement: because Congress required safeguards (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3)) and allowed judicial review, the IJ must explain adequacy in a way that permits review—i.e., by connecting safeguards to the impairment’s character, scope, and severity.

2. Due Process and the INA’s Hearing Guarantees

The court situated competency safeguards within dual sources of protection: the Fifth Amendment and the INA’s procedural guarantees (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B)). It cited Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), for the proposition that noncitizens are entitled to due process and a full and fair hearing in removal proceedings.

It also drew a critical distinction, taken from Matter of M-A-M-, between criminal and civil contexts: incompetency does not categorically bar immigration proceedings, but it requires procedural fairness through safeguards.

3. The “Meaningful Review” Requirement and Remand for Unreasoned Decisions

A central analytic lever is the Second Circuit’s administrative-law principle that courts cannot defer to unreasoned agency action. The opinion cited:

  • Dong Gao v. BIA, 482 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2006)): no deference to “unreasoned rulings.”
  • Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 433 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2006)): authority to vacate and remand when law is misapplied or analysis is faulty; need “meaningful” appellate review.
  • Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152 (2d Cir. 2022): de novo review of legal questions and remand when agency fails to follow its own precedent.

Within the competency context, the Second Circuit aligned with the Ninth Circuit’s articulation in Mejia v. Sessions, 868 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), that an IJ must explain the competence assessment and why safeguards are adequate.

4. No Prejudice Requirement for Failures to Follow Protective Procedures

The court held Reid need not show prejudice because the agency failed to adhere to procedures protecting rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute. It relied on a well-established Second Circuit doctrine:

  • Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991)
  • Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1993)
  • Picca v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2008)
  • United States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002)

In effect, the court treated the Matter of M-A-M- framework and the INA safeguard requirement as protective rules whose violation is structural enough to warrant remand without a separate prejudice showing.

5. Administrative Closure and Termination Authority

The opinion clarified that, on remand, the IJ is not barred from considering administrative closure or termination as safeguards. It cited:

  • Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I. & N. Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021) (overruling Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018))
  • Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I. & N. Dec. 648 (A.G. 2022) (overruling Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018))
  • Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17 (B.I.A. 2017); Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652 (B.I.A. 1988)
  • Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023) (distinguished as inapplicable because the agency did not rely on now-overruled limits when denying termination)

The court further warned (in a detention-focused footnote) that administrative closure, for detained incompetent respondents, can create “Kafkaesque” prolonged detention concerns, citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 2020).

6. Additional Persuasive Authorities

The court cited:

  • Calderon-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2018), for the observation that the INA/regulations do not fully specify competency determinations and how proceedings may proceed for incompetent respondents able to appear.
  • Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70 (4th Cir. 2015), for the caution that removal proceedings without meaningful participation risk becoming “a charade,” and that past mental health “snapshots” are not dispositive.
  • Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), via Matter of M-A-M-, for the proposition that competency can vary over time and in degree.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s Core Rule: Adequacy Must Be Explained in Relation to the Impairment

The opinion’s principal doctrinal move is to link (i) Congress’s safeguard mandate (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3)) and (ii) the availability of judicial review to a requirement of reasoned explanation. Because safeguards must “protect the rights and privileges” of the respondent, the court reasoned, they must be responsive to the respondent’s actual functional limitations—i.e., the “character, scope, and severity” of the disability that creates incompetency (or potential incompetency).

This is both a substantive and institutional point:

  • Substantive: generic safeguards may be inadequate for certain symptoms (e.g., persecutory delusions about counsel and the court).
  • Institutional: without an explanation connecting symptoms to safeguards, a court cannot evaluate adequacy and thus cannot perform meaningful review.

2. Application to Reid: Why the Record Was Unreviewable

The IJ found (or strongly suggested) Reid could not assist counsel and implemented measures such as relying on objective evidence, not requiring Reid to testify, allowing witnesses/affidavits, purported unshackling, and the IJ not wearing a robe. But the IJ did not:

  • complete the Matter of M-A-M- competency determination under the three-part test, or
  • explain why those measures addressed Reid’s particular symptoms (hallucinations, paranoia, delusional conspiracy beliefs about counsel and the court).

The BIA compounded the problem by affirming based largely on (i) the fact that safeguards had been implemented and (ii) the notion that Reid had not identified additional safeguards. The Second Circuit rejected this as insufficient: the adequacy inquiry is not satisfied by “he asked for these” or by a conclusory “adequate” label; it requires a reasoned nexus between impairment and protection.

3. Remedy and Remand Instructions

The court ordered remand with two pathways:

  • Backward-looking explanation: assess Reid’s disabilities “as they were at the time” of the hearing and explain why the safeguards were adequate (or not).
  • Current reevaluation: because competency can change and years have passed, the agency may reevaluate present competency first, then craft safeguards and explain adequacy.

Either way, the IJ must build a record that enables meaningful appellate review and consider the “full range” of safeguards, including (in the agency’s discretion) administrative closure or termination without prejudice.

C. Impact

1. Operational Consequences for Immigration Courts

Practically, Reid v. Bondi increases the required specificity of IJ decisions in competency-affected cases. IJs may continue proceedings with safeguards, but they must:

  • identify the respondent’s functional deficits with enough clarity to show what is being safeguarded against, and
  • explain why each safeguard chosen is adequate (and why other plausible safeguards are unnecessary).

This is likely to increase remands when IJs use boilerplate language about “adequate safeguards” without analysis tied to clinical findings or observed behavior.

2. Strengthening Judicial Review and Standardizing Adequacy Analysis

The decision frames “adequacy” as reviewable only if it is reasoned. That may standardize how competency issues are litigated before the BIA and reviewed in the Second Circuit, bringing immigration adjudication closer to general administrative-law expectations (reasoned decisionmaking and reviewable records).

3. Potential Effects on Available Safeguards (Including Termination/Closure)

By emphasizing that safeguards must match severity and that some respondents may not be able to cooperate “more than likely never” absent treatment, the decision may encourage:

  • greater use of continuances to facilitate treatment where restoration is plausible,
  • more careful analysis of guardians/family participation and attorney representation as safeguards, and
  • renewed attention to termination without prejudice or administrative closure as safeguards in appropriate cases—while also weighing detention consequences (as cautioned via Velasco Lopez v. Decker).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Competency” in immigration proceedings: Not a bar to proceeding (unlike many criminal contexts), but if a person cannot meaningfully understand or participate, the judge must add protections (“safeguards”) to keep the hearing fair.
  • Matter of M-A-M- test: The respondent must (1) understand what the case is about, (2) be able to work with counsel if represented, and (3) have a fair chance to present and challenge evidence.
  • “Safeguards”: Practical measures to ensure fairness—e.g., counsel/guardian involvement, changing how testimony is taken, developing the record more actively, continuances for treatment, or in some cases pausing/ending proceedings without prejudice.
  • “Character, scope, and severity”: A functional description of how the person’s condition affects participation (what symptoms do, how broadly they interfere, and how intense/persistent they are). The court required safeguards to be justified against that functional reality.
  • Administrative closure vs. termination: Administrative closure pauses a case (often as a docket tool); termination ends the case and generally requires the government to file new charges to restart. For detained respondents, closure can raise prolonged-detention concerns.
  • No “prejudice” showing: When the agency fails to follow rules meant to protect fundamental statutory/constitutional rights, the petitioner need not prove the outcome would have changed; the process error itself warrants remand under Second Circuit doctrine.
  • Former INA § 212(c): A repealed but still sometimes available discretionary waiver for certain long-term lawful permanent residents whose proceedings began before key 1996 changes; it remains intensely fact- and discretion-driven.
  • CAT deferral: A form of protection requiring proof that torture is more likely than not, with governmental involvement and specific intent; it is separate from asylum/withholding and has distinct standards.

V. Conclusion

Reid v. Bondi establishes that when competency concerns lead an IJ to impose safeguards, the IJ must do more than list measures and declare them “adequate.” The INA’s safeguard requirement and the availability of judicial review demand an explanation tying adequacy to the respondent’s particular impairments—their character, scope, and severity—so courts can meaningfully review whether the hearing was full and fair.

The decision reinforces Matter of M-A-M- as a rigorous procedural framework, strengthens record-based accountability in immigration adjudication, and signals that conclusory competency-safeguard rulings will not survive appellate review in the Second Circuit.