Rehabilitation Act Rule: No Failure-to-Accommodate Liability Absent an Accommodation Request—and No Accommodation Duty for “Regarded As” Disability

I. Introduction

In Traniece Morgan v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr. (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) on a Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claim. Traniece Morgan, a long-tenured financial associate at the Franklin Medical Center within ODRC, alleged that ODRC (1) failed to accommodate her history of transient ischemic attacks (“TIAs”) and (2) failed to engage in the interactive process to identify an accommodation.

The dispute arose after ODRC placed Morgan on paid administrative leave for alleged workplace misconduct and required an independent medical exam (“IME”) by a psychologist before allowing her to return. The IME suggested work restrictions and further evaluation. Morgan insisted she was not disabled and provided medical documentation clearing her for full duty without restrictions. She later sued to recover economic damages tied to her use of personal leave during the period ODRC would not reinstate her without a compliant medical opinion.

The core legal issues were whether Morgan could maintain a failure-to-accommodate and interactive-process claim when she (a) never requested an accommodation beyond intermittent hospitalization leave historically associated with acute TIA events and (b) affirmatively denied needing any accommodation—especially where the case could be characterized as a “regarded as” disability dispute.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even assuming Morgan’s TIAs qualified as a disability, she could not establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim because she did not request an accommodation for her ability to work and repeatedly asserted she did not need one. Further, by choosing to dispute the IME’s findings and by submitting medical opinions stating she could work without restrictions, Morgan effectively opted out of the interactive process for determining accommodations.

Separately, if the case was understood as a “regarded as” claim (i.e., ODRC mistakenly perceived her as disabled), Sixth Circuit precedent foreclosed an accommodation obligation for a disability the employee does not have. On either framing—actual disability or “regarded as”—ODRC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework

  • Levine v. DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment; it anchors the appellate posture and underscores that the Sixth Circuit reevaluates the record without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986): Supplies the classic “sufficient disagreement” vs. “so one-sided” standard, framing the court’s conclusion that no genuine dispute of material fact existed on the accommodation-request and interactive-process elements.

2. Rehabilitation Act disability standards and ADA cross-application

  • Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002): Defines “disabled” under the Rehabilitation Act (actual impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, record of impairment, or “regarded as”).
  • McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 119 F.3d 453, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1997): Supports construing the Rehabilitation Act consistently with ADA standards, allowing the court to lean on ADA doctrine (including “regarded as” principles and accommodation rules).

3. Failure-to-accommodate elements and the interactive process

  • Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 669 (6th Cir. 2020): Recognizes that employees may bring claims for failure to accommodate and for failure to engage in the interactive process; the opinion uses this to acknowledge both theories but concludes Morgan’s facts do not satisfy them.
  • DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 419 (6th Cir. 2004): Provides the prima facie elements for failure to accommodate (disability, qualification, employer awareness, need for accommodation, and failure to provide it). The court’s analysis turns primarily on “need” and the absence of a request consistent with a claimed need.

4. “Regarded as” doctrine and accommodation limits

  • Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635, 651 (6th Cir. 2025) and Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp., 683 F.3d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 2012): Cited to confirm that an employee may sue if the employer regards the employee as disabled, even if the employee is not. The Sixth Circuit then distinguishes “adverse treatment based on perceived impairment” from entitlement to accommodations.
  • Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999): The controlling Sixth Circuit precedent relied upon for the key rule applied here: if an employee does not have a disability, the employer has no obligation to provide an accommodation. The opinion uses Workman to reject any accommodation duty in a “regarded as” scenario.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4): Reinforces, as a regulatory matter under ADA standards, the limited accommodation obligation where a person is only “regarded as” disabled.

5. Employee’s denial of need for accommodation and evidentiary significance

  • Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1997): Cited for the proposition that where an employee’s own evidence indicates ability to perform duties without accommodation, the failure-to-accommodate theory falters. The court uses Morgan’s own medical note(s) and stance—“no restrictions”—as central proof.

6. Distinguishing plaintiff’s comparator authorities

  • Root v. Decorative Paint, Inc., No. 23-3404, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25207 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 2024) and Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, 813 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2016): Morgan invoked these for interactive-process and accommodation principles, but the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that they involved employees who did not deny the need for accommodations—making them materially different from Morgan’s posture.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The court assumed disability but focused on the “need/request” gap. The panel accepted (for purposes of analysis) that Morgan’s TIAs could qualify as a disability. Nonetheless, the failure-to-accommodate framework still requires that the employee needed an accommodation and that the employer failed to provide it. Morgan’s history of renewing FMLA paperwork for intermittent leave—hospitalization when a TIA occurred—did not translate into a request for a workplace accommodation relevant to the 2023 return-to-work dispute.
  2. Morgan’s consistent position undermined both accommodation and interactive-process theories. The opinion treats Morgan’s litigation stance as a mismatch with her pre-suit conduct. She “always maintained that she was not disabled,” insisted she could perform her job, and sought to rebut the IME rather than explore restrictions or modifications. By electing to dispute the IME and submit clearance for “full duty” with “no restrictions,” she did not initiate (and effectively declined) the accommodation-identification dialogue.
  3. Either “actual disability” or “regarded as” framing leads to ODRC’s victory. The panel expressly held that the label is “not determinative”:
    • If Morgan had an actual disability, she still never requested an accommodation for working and did not participate in identifying one because she denied needing any.
    • If ODRC merely “regarded” her as disabled, then—under Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc. and the cited regulation—there is no duty to accommodate a non-existent disability.
    This “either-way” structure is important: it narrows how plaintiffs can survive summary judgment when their core grievance is being treated as disabled while simultaneously insisting they are not.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies the practical boundary of the interactive process in the Sixth Circuit. While employers must engage in an interactive process when accommodations are at issue, this decision emphasizes that the process is not triggered (or cannot meaningfully proceed) where the employee takes an unequivocal position that no accommodation is needed and instead litigates the employer’s perception.
  • Reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s “no accommodation for ‘regarded as’” rule. By leaning on Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc. and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4), the court reaffirmed that “regarded as” status supports certain discrimination claims but does not create entitlement to reasonable accommodation—an important doctrinal distinction for pleadings and summary-judgment strategy.
  • Signals how return-to-work disputes after IMEs are likely to be analyzed. Where an employer conditions return on medical review and the employee responds by submitting “no restrictions” clearance, courts may treat the dispute as one about fitness-for-duty determinations rather than unmet accommodation needs—unless the employee identifies a specific work-related limitation and requested adjustment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rehabilitation Act (Section 504): A federal law barring disability discrimination by programs or employers receiving federal funds. It uses ADA disability standards.
  • Reasonable accommodation: A change to the job or workplace that allows a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job functions (e.g., modified schedule, reassignment, assistive tools). It presupposes some work-related limitation requiring an adjustment.
  • Interactive process: A cooperative back-and-forth between employer and employee to identify limitations and potential accommodations. It depends on the employee conveying a need tied to a disability-related limitation.
  • “Regarded as” disabled: The employer treats an employee as having an impairment (even if the employee does not). This can support claims for discriminatory treatment, but (as applied here) does not create a right to accommodations for a disability the employee does not actually have.
  • Independent medical exam (IME): An employer-requested evaluation to assess fitness for duty or work restrictions. Disputing an IME by insisting on “no restrictions” may, depending on the facts, undercut later claims that the employer failed to identify or provide accommodations.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling for one party when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the law entitles that party to win without a trial.

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision underscores a central rule for Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate litigation: an employer is not liable for failing to provide (or to discuss) accommodations that the employee neither requests nor claims to need, and—under Sixth Circuit precedent—there is no accommodation duty in a purely “regarded as” disability scenario. By holding that Morgan’s consistent denial of disability and insistence on unrestricted fitness for duty defeated both accommodation and interactive-process theories, the opinion highlights the importance of aligning an employee’s asserted limitations and accommodation requests with the legal elements of the claim.