Rehabilitation Act Rule: An Employee Who Concedes Inability to Perform Essential Functions Is Not “Qualified,” and Prior-Agency Duties End After Reasonable Reassignment

Case: Stephanie Redding v. Kristi Noem (Fourth Circuit, Mar. 3, 2026) — Published opinion by Wilkinson, J. (King and Gregory, JJ., joining).
Statutes/Standards: Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (d); ADA standards, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n), (o).

I. Introduction

Stephanie M. Redding, a former Federal Air Marshal (“FAM”) employed within the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), sued the Department of Homeland Security under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging a failure to accommodate multiple medical conditions that limited her ability to perform airborne law-enforcement duties. Over time, TSA placed her in temporary “light duty” and a ground-based Regional Coordinator assignment, but later determined she could not meet FAMS medical standards—particularly “mission ready” flight requirements. TSA recommended reassignment; Redding requested a “retirement position not affected by medical restrictions,” acknowledged an “inability to perform the essential duties” of her position, and ultimately self-selected a transfer to a Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (“FLETC”) vacancy.

The appeal presented two core issues at the pleading stage: (1) whether Redding plausibly alleged she was a “qualified individual” for the position she “holds or desires,” and (2) whether TSA failed to provide a reasonable accommodation when it facilitated reassignment rather than making a temporary/light-duty arrangement permanent.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that Redding’s own pleadings defeated her claim because she conceded that reassignment was needed due to her “inability to perform the essential duties” of the very Regional Coordinator role she wanted permanently. Independently, the court concluded TSA provided a reasonable accommodation through a good-faith interactive process culminating in reassignment to FLETC—a “last resort” accommodation that ended TSA’s obligations once Redding ceased to be a TSA employee.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058 (2025): Cited for the Rule 12(b)(6) limitation that courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and “do not consider evidence beyond that pleading.” The panel used Stanley to frame review strictly around what Redding alleged—including admissions undermining “qualified individual” status.
  • Basta v. Novant Health Inc., 56 F.4th 307 (4th Cir. 2022): Provided the Fourth Circuit’s de novo standard for reviewing dismissals and the lens for evaluating plausibility on the pleadings.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Supplied the “plausible on its face” pleading standard used to test whether Redding stated a viable failure-to-accommodate claim.
  • Elledge v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020): Central to the opinion’s deference framework. The court relied on Elledge for two propositions: (1) “considerable deference” to an employer’s identification of “essential functions,” and (2) the employer retains “ultimate discretion” to select among reasonable accommodations once the interactive process explores options.
  • D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 1998): Quoted through Elledge to support judicial deference to employer judgments about essential job functions.
  • Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009) and Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004): Cited alongside Elledge to reinforce that courts should not “second-guess” informed employer judgments on job structure and essential duties.
  • Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994) and Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993): Used to articulate the “more than a marginal relationship” test for essential functions and the statutory command to give “consideration” to the employer’s judgment.
  • Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999): Applied to treat Redding’s own assertion of inability to perform essential duties as “negat[ing] an essential element” of an ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim (i.e., that she is “qualified”).
  • Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2021): Provided the “reassignment as a last resort” principle, as informed by EEOC guidance, supporting TSA’s progression from temporary adjustments to reassignment once effective accommodations in-role were unavailable.
  • Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015): Cited for the proposition that the interactive process guarantees a meaningful voice, not the employee’s preferred accommodation; if the employer offers a “reasonable” alternative, the statute is satisfied.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. “Qualified individual” is an element, and admissions can defeat it at the pleading stage.

The court anchored the Rehabilitation Act analysis in the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual”: someone who can perform the job’s “essential functions” with or without reasonable accommodation. Redding’s complaint alleged that reassignment was requested due to “inability to perform the essential duties” of her current (Regional Coordinator) position. The panel treated that allegation as dispositive: if she could not perform the essential functions of the job she “desires” (a permanent Regional Coordinator role), she is not “qualified,” and no failure-to-accommodate claim lies. Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp. supplied the doctrinal bridge for why such assertions can negate an essential element; Stanley v. City of Sanford reinforced that the court must take the pleadings as they come.

2. Essential functions are primarily for the employer to define—especially in mission-critical settings.

The opinion emphasized that a reasonable accommodation may assist performance of an essential function but cannot eliminate it. The court invoked Elledge v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC (and the cross-circuit authorities it cites) to underscore “considerable deference” to employer determinations of essential functions. Applying that deference, the court accepted TSA/FAMS’s insistence that even Regional Coordinators must remain “mission ready” for flight duties and that airborne law-enforcement activity is fundamental to an agency whose name includes “Air.” The panel also gave this deference added force due to the law-enforcement/national-security context: the government must be able to impose baseline readiness requirements without judicial rewriting of job criteria.

3. The interactive process does not entitle an employee to dictate accommodations or make temporary light duty permanent.

Even assuming qualification arguendo, the court held TSA provided a reasonable accommodation through an interactive process culminating in reassignment to FLETC. The panel described a stepwise accommodation trajectory: temporary light duty, search for vacant positions within TSA, then collaboration with Redding on transfer outside TSA. Wirtes v. City of Newport News (and the quoted EEOC guidance) supported reassignment as a “last resort” when in-position accommodations cannot enable performance of essential functions. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty. supplied the limiting principle: the interactive process gives the employee a meaningful voice but not veto power; the employer may choose a reasonable option over the employee’s preferred one. On the pleadings, reassignment was “manifestly reasonable,” particularly because Redding identified and self-selected the FLETC vacancies.

4. Once reassignment is completed, the former employer’s Rehabilitation Act obligations end.

The court rejected Redding’s attempt to attribute later difficulties in the FLETC role to TSA’s earlier decision. Because TSA was no longer her employer, TSA’s accommodation obligations ceased upon completing the reassignment. The court pointed to the practical boundary this creates: the accommodation process “must end somewhere,” and the Act does not permit indefinite linkage of “current and future difficulties” to an earlier, reasonable reassignment decision.

C. Impact

  • Pleading-stage gatekeeping via “qualified individual” admissions: The decision signals that explicit allegations of “inability to perform essential duties” can be fatal under Rule 12(b)(6), narrowing opportunities to litigate accommodation adequacy when the complaint itself concedes non-qualification.
  • Temporary light duty is not presumptively convertible into a permanent job: The opinion reinforces that accommodations cannot nullify essential functions and that employers are not required to freeze temporary modified-duty arrangements into permanent roles when essential-function requirements remain.
  • Heightened practical deference in national-security/law-enforcement roles: While doctrinally framed as general essential-function deference, the court’s emphasis on “mission ready” readiness may be cited to defend stringent medical/fitness baselines in security-sensitive positions.
  • Clear endpoint for former-employer liability after reassignment: Future plaintiffs may face difficulty extending Rehabilitation Act liability beyond the reassignment date; the proper channel for later accommodation disputes is the new employing entity.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Qualified individual”: A person is protected for accommodation purposes only if they can do the job’s core tasks (“essential functions”) with reasonable help. If they cannot do those core tasks even with accommodation, the statute does not require the employer to keep them in that job.
  • “Essential functions”: The fundamental duties of the job—not marginal tasks. An accommodation may adjust how work is done, but it cannot erase a fundamental duty (e.g., a role requiring flight readiness cannot be accommodated by permanent exemption from flying if flying is essential).
  • Interactive process: A cooperative back-and-forth to identify workable accommodations. It is not a guarantee of the employee’s preferred solution; it is a process aimed at a reasonable solution.
  • Reassignment as a “last resort”: When no accommodation enables the employee to perform essential functions in their current job (or all such accommodations impose undue hardship), moving the employee to a vacant job they can perform may be the reasonable accommodation.
  • Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts assume the complaint’s factual allegations are true. If those allegations themselves negate a required element (like being “qualified”), the case can be dismissed without discovery.

V. Conclusion

Stephanie Redding v. Kristi Noem crystallizes two practical rules for Rehabilitation Act litigation in the Fourth Circuit: (1) a plaintiff who pleads (or otherwise concedes) inability to perform a job’s essential functions fails the “qualified individual” requirement, and (2) when an employer engages in good-faith interactive process and effectuates a reasonable reassignment—particularly as a last resort—the employer need not make temporary light duty permanent, nor remain responsible for accommodation issues after the employee transfers to a new agency. The decision strengthens employer discretion over essential functions and underscores that the Rehabilitation Act’s accommodation duty is bounded by job fundamentals, reasonableness, and an endpoint once a lawful reassignment is completed.