Rehabilitation Act Retaliation Requires But-For Causation (Not “Solely By Reason Of”)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Indiana University’s termination of Jennifer Shirk, an online instructional designer in the university’s eLearning Design and Services Group. After taking multiple periods of approved FMLA leave and pursuing disability-related accommodations for obsessive-compulsive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, Shirk was fired for what the university characterized as “serious misconduct”: a series of emails to high-level officials (including a key funding-side “client” leader and a superior in her chain of command) that escalated an internal, time-limited licensing funding issue, criticized her supervisors’ competence, and accused them of mismanagement.

Shirk sued, bringing multiple claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the FMLA. On appeal she narrowed her challenge to retaliation only—arguing that the university fired her for engaging in protected activity (taking FMLA leave, requesting accommodations, and raising discrimination concerns), and that the district court used an overly demanding causation standard on the Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. While acknowledging a legal error below on the Rehabilitation Act retaliation causation standard, the court held that the record could not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory causation under the correct standard.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court reviewed summary judgment de novo and emphasized it “review[s] judgments, not opinions,” allowing affirmance despite the district court’s misapplication of a “sole-cause” standard in part of its Rehabilitation Act retaliation analysis.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is precedent-driven in two main ways: (i) it clarifies the causation standard applicable to Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims, and (ii) it applies established Seventh Circuit approaches to circumstantial proof of retaliatory motive (timing, remarks, comparators, and pretext).

• Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842 (7th Cir. 2023)
  Cited for the summary-judgment standard of review: de novo, with evidence construed in the nonmovant’s favor. This frames the appellate posture and supports the court’s willingness to re-evaluate causation without deference to the district judge’s articulation.
• Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2012)
  Supplies the “familiar elements” of a Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim: protected activity, materially adverse action, and a causal connection. The case anchors the doctrinal structure before the court turns to the key dispute—what “causal connection” requires.
• Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013)
  Used to explain the Rehabilitation Act’s heightened discrimination causation: a disability-discrimination claim fails if the employer acted for any reason other than disability, because § 794(a) uses “solely by reason of.” The opinion’s significance lies in contrasting this discrimination standard with retaliation’s different causal inquiry.
• Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255 (7th Cir. 2021)
  Cited for the ADA causation approach as “only that the plaintiff’s disability be a reason for the challenged action,” within the opinion’s discussion of imported standards (via § 794(d)). The court then situates retaliation within the broader but-for framework, aligning retaliation causation with Title I ADA and Title VII approaches.
• Swain v. Wormuth, 41 F.4th 892 (7th Cir. 2022) and Burks v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2006)
  These cases support treating Rehabilitation Act retaliation like retaliation under Title I of the ADA and Title VII, respectively. The court uses them to justify importing the same causation analysis—ultimately expressed as but-for causation.
• Kedas v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 149 F.4th 951 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Provides the opinion’s operational definition of retaliation causation: protected activity must be a “but for” cause, meaning the adverse action “would not have happened” without it. This is the doctrinal centerpiece correcting the district court’s “sole cause” misstep for Rehabilitation Act retaliation.
• Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2014)
  Adds an important nuance: a single event can have multiple but-for causes. This prevents an overly rigid reading of but-for causation (i.e., that protected activity must be the only cause), while still requiring evidence that it was necessary to the outcome.
• Rhodes v. Dittmann, 783 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2015) and Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2016)
  Together establish the appellate methodology: the court “review[s] judgments, not opinions,” and can affirm on the correct legal ground after independent review. These citations do critical work in insulating the affirmance from the district court’s partial legal error.
• Freelain v. Village of Oak Park, 888 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2018)
  Provides the parallel “three familiar elements” for FMLA retaliation—again emphasizing causation as the dispositive element. The opinion treats both statutes under a shared causation analysis, though their protected activities differ.
• Simpson v. Off. of Chief Judge, 559 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2009)
  Supports the distinction between frustration with protected leave itself versus frustration with operational issues such as lack of notice. The court treats that distinction as legally meaningful to causation: annoyance at poor notice is not retaliation for taking leave.
• Beverly v. Abbott Labs., 107 F.4th 737 (7th Cir. 2024) and Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012)
  These cases frame comparator evidence and pretext. The opinion uses them to explain why Shirk’s attempt to rely on Christy Cavanaugh as a “similarly situated” comparator fails: differences in rank and responsibility undermine comparability, and pretext cannot be inferred from materially different circumstances.
• Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 2002)
  Supplies a key limiting principle: complaining about discrimination does not immunize an employee from discipline for inappropriate behavior. The opinion uses Hall to reject the notion that inserting discrimination language into an otherwise insubordinate email transforms the discipline into retaliation.
• Davis v. Time Warner Cable, 651 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2011)
  Used rhetorically and analytically to emphasize the “elephant in the room”: the content and audience of Shirk’s emails. This helps the court characterize the employer’s justification as facially substantial and not plausibly displaced by speculative retaliatory inferences.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in two steps: (1) clarify the governing causation standard for Rehabilitation Act retaliation; (2) apply that standard (and the same causation framework for FMLA retaliation) to the record evidence of motive, pretext, and decisionmaking.

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical significance lies in its explicit separation of Rehabilitation Act discrimination and retaliation causation standards and its disciplined approach to what evidence is sufficient to reach a jury on retaliation where intervening misconduct is substantial.

• Doctrinal clarification within Rehabilitation Act litigation: The opinion reinforces that plaintiffs (and district courts) must not import § 794(a)’s “solely by reason of” standard into retaliation claims. Retaliation is analyzed under a but-for framework that allows multiple causal factors (Malin v. Hospira, Inc.) but still requires necessity.
• Stronger gatekeeping at summary judgment in “misconduct-plus-protected-activity” cases: The court signals that where the employer offers a concrete, contemporaneously documented misconduct basis—especially involving professional protocol and chain-of- command escalation—plaintiffs must produce evidence that materially undermines that basis, not merely point to prior protected activity.
• Limits on “bootstrapping” discrimination complaints into otherwise sanctionable conduct: By relying on Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., the opinion cautions that adding discrimination language to a problematic communication does not create a retaliation safe harbor. Future plaintiffs will need to separate protected reporting from the manner and forum used, especially when communications plausibly harm client relationships.
• Comparator evidence is constrained by hierarchy and role: The decision reiterates that comparator analysis is sensitive to rank and responsibilities (Burks; Coleman). In workplace-communications discipline cases, plaintiffs may face difficulty locating truly comparable employees where escalation authority differs by level.
• Operational complaints about leave logistics are not per se retaliation: The “lack of notice” distinction (Simpson) is likely to be cited in future FMLA retaliation cases, especially where employers document disruption and emphasize communication breakdown rather than the leave entitlement itself.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Sole” causation vs. “but-for” causation
  Sole causation (“solely by reason of”) means the prohibited factor must be the only reason for the decision; if any other reason also motivated the employer, the claim fails. But-for causation means the outcome would not have happened without the prohibited motive—yet other reasons may also be present (a decision can have multiple but-for causes).
• “Pretext”
  Pretext is not “the employer’s decision was harsh” or “I disagree.” It means the stated reason is a lie or not the real reason. A common way to show pretext is comparator evidence (others did the same thing and weren’t punished), but only if the comparator is genuinely similarly situated in role, rules, and decisionmaker.
• “Stray remarks”
  A negative comment (e.g., calling accommodations “ridiculous”) may be legally insufficient if it is isolated, remote in time, not tied to the termination decision, or not made by the decisionmaker in connection with the challenged action.
• “Protected activity does not immunize misconduct”
  Employees may complain about discrimination and take protected leave, but that does not shield them from discipline for separate workplace-rule violations. The key question becomes whether the discipline would have occurred absent the protected activity.

5. Conclusion

Jennifer Shirk v. Trustees of Indiana University clarifies—within the Seventh Circuit—that Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims are not governed by the Act’s “solely by reason of” discrimination standard, but instead require proof of but-for causation consistent with ADA and Title VII retaliation analysis. Yet the case is equally notable for its evidence-based message: even under the correct, less rigid standard, plaintiffs must connect protected activity to the termination decision in a concrete way, particularly where the employer’s stated reason involves plainly sanctionable conduct and the protected activity was repeatedly approved and processed. The decision thus tightens analytical discipline in Rehabilitation Act and FMLA retaliation litigation while preserving the doctrinal distinction between discrimination and retaliation causation.