Rehabilitation Act § 504 Imposes a “Solely by Reason of” Causation Requirement (Not ADA But-For)

Introduction

In Keisha Lewis v. Indiana Department of Transportation (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”) after it fired Keisha Lewis, a Black employee with a kidney-related disability, for poor performance and insubordination. Lewis alleged (after voluntarily dismissing some claims) disability discrimination and retaliation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The central issues on appeal were (1) the proper causation standard under the Rehabilitation Act, (2) whether INDOT’s stated performance/insubordination reasons were pretext, (3) whether the record could support retaliation, and (4) whether Lewis preserved and supported her Title VII theories at summary judgment and on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims require proof that the adverse action occurred “solely by reason of” disability, a stricter standard than the ADA’s “on the basis of” (but-for) causation. On the undisputed record—highlighting a large backlog of work, refusal to perform tasks, and workplace conduct viewed as insubordinate—no reasonable jury could find that Lewis’s disability was the sole cause of her termination.

The court further held that Lewis failed to create a triable issue of pretext because the relevant question is whether the employer honestly believed its stated reasons. It also rejected Lewis’s retaliation theories under both the stricter and more lenient causation formulations identified in Seventh Circuit precedent, because the record supported non-retaliatory reasons for discharge. Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims, emphasizing both the lack of comparator/supporting evidence and waiver/underdevelopment of arguments.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Bourke v. Collins, 142 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo summary judgment review and the principle that the Rehabilitation Act incorporates ADA liability standards—but not the ADA’s causation standard as against § 504’s statutory text.
  • Downing v. Abbott Lab'ys, 48 F.4th 793 (7th Cir. 2022): Used to cabin inferences at summary judgment—an inference is unreasonable if directly contradicted by record evidence.
  • Royan v. Chi. St. Univ., 145 F.4th 681 (7th Cir. 2025): The decision’s centerpiece for causation: § 504 requires proof the plaintiff was denied benefits/discriminated against “solely because of” disability; also illustrates how lack of evidence tying decisionmakers’ action to disability defeats “sole causation.”
  • Swain v. Wormuth, 41 F.4th 892 (7th Cir. 2022) and Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255 (7th Cir. 2021): Reinforce that the Rehabilitation Act’s “solely” requirement is more stringent than the ADA’s “but for” inquiry.
  • Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013): Confirms the “solely by reason of” causation requirement is unique to the Rehabilitation Act and not present in the ADA.
  • Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2018), G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013), K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013), Houston v. Tex. Dep't of Agric., 17 F.4th 576 (5th Cir. 2021): Out-of-circuit authorities aligning with a stricter § 504 causation standard, reinforcing the Seventh Circuit’s reading.
  • Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 871 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017), Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008), Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2025): These cases supply the pretext framework: courts ask whether the employer honestly believed its explanation; pretext requires a “lie” or phony reason; and courts are not a “super personnel department.”
  • Bruno v. Wells-Armstrong, 93 F.4th 1049 (7th Cir. 2024): Recognizes insubordination as a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for adverse action.
  • Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887 (7th Cir. 2023), Greenbank v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618 (7th Cir. 2022), Fednav Int'l Ltd. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2010), Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2012): Cited for waiver/underdevelopment rules on appeal—arguments not raised below or not meaningfully developed are waived.
  • Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th 946 (7th Cir. 2022): Supports the proposition that a district court may consider uncited record materials at summary judgment under Rule 56(c)(3).
  • Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., S.I., 168 F.4th 483 (7th Cir. 2026): Emphasizes that plain-error review in civil cases is “severely constricted,” and affirmatively waived arguments need not be reviewed.
  • Fuller v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686 (7th Cir. 2023) and Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424 (7th Cir. 2022): Acknowledged tension within Seventh Circuit retaliation causation standards (but-for vs “played a part”); the panel declined to resolve it.
  • Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2021), Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 2020), McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Johnson v. Advoc. Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2018): Provide the Title VII framework: the “single pile” approach at summary judgment, the optional McDonnell Douglas method, and the importance of comparator evidence for disparate treatment theories.
  • Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2020), Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012): Used to reject retaliation causation and timing-based inferences where the temporal gap is too large or pretext is not shown.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Rehabilitation Act discrimination = “sole causation.” The panel treated the statutory text—discrimination “solely by reason of” disability—as dispositive. While § 504 incorporates ADA liability standards, it does not import the ADA’s causation language. Thus, a plaintiff must show disability was not merely a factor, but the exclusive cause of the adverse action.

    Applying that standard, the court highlighted undisputed evidence of performance deficiencies and insubordination, including a reported backlog exceeding 400 outstanding parcels and refusals to complete certain tasks or provide requested reporting. Because those independent reasons existed, Lewis could not show her disability was the sole cause of discharge.

  2. Pretext is about honest belief, not optimal management. The court framed the pretext inquiry through Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Transp. and Argyropoulos v. City of Alton: the question is whether INDOT honestly believed its stated reasons—not whether the employer was correct, wise, or fair. It reiterated Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc.’s admonition that federal courts do not sit as “super personnel departments.”

    On this record, the court concluded INDOT had consistent performance-based reasons, and Lewis failed to contest key facts in the district court—creating both a merits problem (no triable pretext) and an appellate waiver problem.

  3. Retaliation claims fail even without choosing a causation standard. Noting inconsistency between Brooks v. Avancez (but-for) and Fuller v. McDonough (“played a part”), the panel found it unnecessary to resolve the split because Lewis’s evidence did not support causation under either test. INDOT documented productivity/communication concerns unrelated to protected activity, defeating the inference of retaliatory intent.
  4. Title VII claims failed for evidentiary and preservation reasons. Under Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul. and Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., the question was whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, would allow a reasonable jury to find race caused the adverse action. Lewis primarily relied on a raise-percentage disparity (9% vs 12%) but did not supply comparator details (job title/duties/situational similarity) or rebut INDOT’s explanation that different base salaries explained different raise percentages. The panel also emphasized waiver and underdevelopment on appeal.
  5. Procedural doctrines mattered: waiver and the summary-judgment record. The court enforced waiver for arguments not preserved below (Bradley v. Village of University Park) and for perfunctory appellate briefing (Greenbank v. Great Am. Assurance Co., Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.). It also approved the district court’s reliance on uncited record materials under Flynn v. FCA US LLC and Rule 56(c)(3), and it limited any attempt to reframe waived issues as plain error under Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., S.I..

Impact

  • Sharper causation line between ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The opinion fortifies the Seventh Circuit’s already-established position that § 504 disability-discrimination claims face a heightened causation burden. Plaintiffs must be prepared to negate other plausible and documented reasons for termination (e.g., performance and conduct).
  • Employment cases will continue to turn on documentation and “honest belief.” By emphasizing the honest-belief/pretext framework and refusing to second-guess management judgments, the decision incentivizes employers to maintain contemporaneous records of performance and directive compliance, particularly when accommodations are in place.
  • Retaliation causation remains unsettled—but plaintiffs still need strong evidence. The panel acknowledged the Brooks/Fuller tension but avoided choosing. Practically, litigants should expect courts to scrutinize whether non-retaliatory performance rationales are well-supported; without evidence of insincerity or linkage to protected activity, retaliation claims may fail under either standard.
  • Procedural rigor at summary judgment is decisive. The waiver holdings underscore that (1) parties must dispute material facts in the district court, (2) appellate arguments must engage the district court’s reasoning, and (3) Title VII disparate-treatment theories often require comparator evidence developed with specificity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Solely by reason of” vs. “but-for.” “But-for” causation asks whether the outcome would have happened without the protected trait. “Solely by reason of” is stricter: the protected trait must be the only reason—if the employer also acted for another independent reason (like documented performance issues), the claim fails.
  • Pretext. Pretext is not showing the employer was harsh or mistaken; it is showing the employer’s stated reason is not the real reason—i.e., a cover story. Courts focus on whether the employer honestly believed its stated rationale.
  • Comparator evidence (Title VII). A comparator is another employee similarly situated in relevant ways (role, duties, standards, supervisor, misconduct/performance history) who was treated better. Without meaningful similarity details, “someone outside my race got a better outcome” often does not prove discrimination.
  • Waiver on appeal. Arguments not properly presented in the trial court, or not developed with legal reasoning and record citations on appeal, may be treated as waived and not considered—even if they might have had potential merit.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision reinforces a consequential rule for § 504 litigation: Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claims require proof that disability was the sole cause of the adverse action, not merely a but-for cause. Applying that standard—together with the honest-belief approach to pretext, a skeptical view of timing-only retaliation theories, and strict enforcement of waiver—the court found no triable dispute and affirmed summary judgment for INDOT. In the broader employment-discrimination landscape, the opinion highlights how statutory text, employer documentation, and careful issue preservation can be outcome-determinative.