Date: Jun 18, 2026

“Regular Use” in UIM Policies Is a Fact Question for the Jury—Improper to Discharge the Jury on Contract-Interpretation Grounds

I. Introduction

In Peter A. O'Rourke v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (R.I. June 17, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court confronted a recurring uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage dispute: whether an insurer may deny UIM benefits under a “regular use” exclusion when the insured is injured while driving a non-owned employer vehicle.

The petitioner, Peter A. O’Rourke, sought UIM coverage under his Nationwide personal auto policy after being rear-ended while driving a Verizon bucket truck assigned to him for work. Nationwide denied coverage based on the policy’s “regular use” exclusion for injuries suffered while occupying a vehicle “furnished for the regular use” of the insured but not insured under the policy.

The central issue on certiorari was procedural but outcome-determinative: is “regular use” a question of fact for the jury, such that it was error for the Superior Court trial justice to discharge the jury after plaintiff rested—despite a detailed statement of “undisputed” facts?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court quashed the Superior Court’s order discharging the jury and remanded for a new trial. It held that, under controlling Rhode Island precedent, the determination of whether the particular use of a non-owned automobile constitutes a “regular use” within the meaning of an auto policy exclusion is a question of fact for the factfinder.

The Court reaffirmed that Ricci v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 110 R.I. 68, 290 A.2d 408 (1972), governs and that the trial justice erred to the extent he treated “regular use” as a legal question unsuitable for a jury. Because the case was remanded for a new trial, the Court did not reach the plaintiff’s “law of the case” argument.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Barnes v. Hodys, 307 A.3d 173 (R.I. 2024), and State ex rel. Coventry Police Department v. Charlwood, 224 A.3d 467 (R.I. 2020)
Role in the opinion: These decisions supply the certiorari lens: the Supreme Court examines the record for errors of law and does not reweigh evidence. The Court used these cases to frame why it could intervene: the Superior Court’s discharge of the jury turned on an incorrect legal characterization of the “regular use” inquiry.
Ricci v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 110 R.I. 68, 290 A.2d 408 (1972)
Role in the opinion: Ricci is the controlling authority. It explicitly states that “[t]he question whether the particular use of a 'non-owned' automobile is a 'regular use' within the meaning of the policy is a question of fact.” Ricci also articulates the purpose of “drive other automobiles”/non-owned vehicle provisions—to cover casual or occasional use—and warns that broader readings impose additional risk without additional premium.
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Marr, 128 F.Supp. 67 (D.N.J. 1955)
Role in the opinion: Cited within Ricci and adopted as practical “signposts” for the factfinder, Marr supplies a structured, multi-factor approach to assessing regular use (availability, frequency, permission, purpose, and geographic/expected area of use).

B. Legal Reasoning

The trial justice discharged the jury after plaintiff rested, reasoning that the case “all comes down” to the regular use exclusion, calling the policy “ambiguous,” and concluding it was “a legal question” and “too ambiguous” for a jury of lay people. Nationwide defended the ruling by arguing that once material facts are undisputed, the remaining task is contract interpretation.

The Supreme Court rejected the framing that converted the dispute into a purely legal question. Its reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Ricci controls the classification of the issue. Even if application of a policy term can involve “a mixture of law and fact,” Ricci’s holding is explicit: determining whether use is “regular use” is for the factfinder.
“Undisputed facts” do not eliminate the need for a factfinder when the ultimate issue is evaluative. The Court treated “regular use” as a classic mixed, fact-intensive judgment—turning on characterizations such as “most of the time,” “mere occasional,” and the practical scope of permission and purpose. Stipulating to historical facts (e.g., assigned truck, keys, daily use for work) does not necessarily stipulate to the ultimate inference (whether that use is “regular” in the policy sense).
Ambiguity does not justify withdrawing the case from the jury on this issue. The trial justice’s concern that the issue was “too ambiguous” for jurors ran headlong into Ricci, which presumes juries (or trial judges sitting as factfinders) can apply the signposts to the circumstances. The Supreme Court therefore treated the discharge as legal error abridging the jury’s role on a factual issue.

The Court’s operative doctrinal clarification is not merely that “regular use” can involve facts—it is that the determinative “regular use” classification itself belongs to the factfinder, and a trial justice errs by converting it into a purely legal question and terminating the jury’s function mid-trial.

C. Impact

This opinion is a strong reaffirmation of Rhode Island’s jury-centered approach to “regular use” exclusions in UIM (and analogous) disputes:

Trial management: Superior Court judges should be cautious about removing “regular use” from the jury via mid-trial discharge (or similar mechanisms) when the dispute turns on applying Ricci’s fact-intensive criteria—even with extensive stipulations.
Litigation strategy: Parties should expect that “regular use” will typically require a factfinder verdict unless the case is structured as a true legal issue (e.g., a stipulation that expressly resolves the ultimate “regular use” characterization, not just underlying events).
Insurance coverage practice: Insurers relying on “regular use” exclusions will still press for summary disposition, but this decision underscores that Rhode Island views the exclusion’s application as highly context dependent. Insureds, conversely, gain leverage to argue that even frequent work use may have limiting features (permission scope, purpose restrictions, availability constraints) that a jury must weigh.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage: Coverage under your own auto policy that can pay damages when the at-fault driver lacks insurance or has insufficient limits.
“Regular use” exclusion: A policy limitation designed to prevent an insured from effectively obtaining coverage for another frequently used vehicle (often a work vehicle) without paying a premium for that vehicle. The idea is: the policy covers occasional use of other cars, not a substitute household/work car used routinely.
Question of fact vs. question of law: A question of fact is decided by a jury (or a judge acting as factfinder) and involves weighing circumstances and drawing conclusions from them. A question of law is decided by the judge and involves interpreting legal rules. This opinion holds that deciding whether use is “regular” is for the factfinder under Rhode Island law.
Certiorari: A discretionary Supreme Court review procedure focused on correcting legal errors apparent on the record, not re-trying the case.
“Law of the case” doctrine: A principle that generally discourages revisiting a prior ruling in the same case. The Court did not decide this issue because it remanded for a new trial based on the jury-discharge error.

V. Conclusion

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision establishes (and emphatically reaffirms) a clear procedural and substantive directive: the application of a “regular use” exclusion to a non-owned vehicle is a fact question for the jury (or other factfinder), guided by Ricci’s signposts. A trial court errs by discharging a jury on the theory that “regular use” is a purely legal issue or “too ambiguous” for jurors.

By quashing the Superior Court order and ordering a new trial, the Court strengthens the role of juries in insurance-coverage disputes where the ultimate question depends on practical, real-world use patterns—availability, frequency, permission, purpose, and expected area of operation—rather than on abstract contract interpretation alone.