Record-Based Sentencing Explanations and Uncharged-Conduct Justifications for Upward Variances in Illegal Reentry Cases

1. Introduction

In United States v. Cristofer Pecero-Ramirez (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 24-month sentence for illegal reentry—the statutory maximum—even though the advisory guideline range was zero to six months. The appeal raised two central questions: (1) whether the district court adequately explained the upward variance (procedural reasonableness), and (2) whether the magnitude of the variance and any resulting disparity rendered the sentence unreasonable (substantive reasonableness).

The case involved the United States as Plaintiff-Appellee and Cristofer Ruben Pecero-Ramirez as Defendant-Appellant. The sentencing record emphasized repeated unlawful entries following removals and arrests involving controlled substances, plus testimony about flight during apprehension. Pecero-Ramirez also argued mitigation, including that he was in the United States to escape cartel violence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the sentence was:

  • Procedurally reasonable because the district court’s explanation, viewed in context of the hearing record and the court’s colloquy confirming the defendant’s repeated reentries and removals, adequately demonstrated consideration of the parties’ arguments and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
  • Substantively reasonable because the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the defendant’s history, characteristics, and the need for deterrence more heavily than mitigation, and because reliance on uncharged conduct could justify the upward variance and any resulting disparity.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel grounded its reasoning in established Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court sentencing doctrine:

  • United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023)
    Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable to preserved procedural-reasonableness challenges to sentencing explanations. This frames the appellate posture: the question is not whether the appellate court would have explained the sentence differently, but whether the district court’s explanation fell outside permissible bounds.
  • United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007))
    Steiger (and Gall) supply the core rule: the sentencing court must “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review,” and the amount of explanation required scales with the extent of deviation from the guideline range—major departures generally require more explanation. The panel applied this sliding-scale concept but found the explanation sufficient when read against the record as a whole.
  • United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023)
    Hamilton supports two key points used to reject the procedural challenge: (1) a district court need not explicitly tick through every § 3553(a) factor, and (2) the explanation may be brief and derive substance from hearing context, the defendant’s characteristics, and party argument. Hamilton also underpins the panel’s acceptance that the rationale for an upward variance may be “clear from the record” even if not exhaustively restated at the end of the hearing.
  • United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013)
    Kuhlman provides the sufficiency benchmark: the court must set forth “enough information” to satisfy the reviewing court that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for decision. The panel treated the district court’s colloquy confirming repeated reentries and removals as supplying that “enough information.”
  • United States v. Hamilton, 168 F.4th 1354 (11th Cir. 2026)
    Cited for the substantive-reasonableness abuse-of-discretion framework: abuse occurs if the court (1) fails to consider relevant factors due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper factor, or (3) clearly errs in judgment balancing proper factors. This provided the lens through which the panel evaluated the statutory-maximum variance.
  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Butler contributes two rules central to the opinion: (1) a district court’s acknowledgement that it considered § 3553(a) factors and arguments is generally sufficient, and (2) “uncharged conduct” may justify an upward variance as tied to the defendant’s history and characteristics and the statutory aims of deterrence, respect for law, and protection of the public. The panel used Butler to answer the defendant’s disparity argument.
  • United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Hayden is invoked to address mitigation: even if the district court does not expressly discuss a mitigation argument, the record may suffice if it reflects the court considered the factors and heard the argument. The panel relied on this to reject the claim that the court’s lack of explicit discussion of cartel-violence mitigation was reversible error.
  • United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009)
    Shaw supplies the “justification compelling enough” formulation for variances—compelling enough to support the degree and complete enough for appellate review—while emphasizing that an “extraordinary justification” is not required for a non-guideline sentence. The panel applied Shaw to uphold a significant upward variance based on recidivist reentry and related conduct.
  • United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2015)
    Cited for the deference-heavy reversal standard in substantive reasonableness: reversal is warranted only if the court has a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court clearly erred in judgment in weighing § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2020)
    Cited for the proposition that the defendant bears the burden to show that an unwarranted sentencing disparity renders a sentence substantively unreasonable. This shifts the disparity argument from mere comparison to a requirement of demonstrating “unwarrantedness.”
  • United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015)
    Used alongside Butler to reinforce that the court may consider uncharged conduct in sentencing and that doing so can legitimately distinguish a defendant from purported comparators.

In addition to case law, the opinion centers the statutory explanation duties of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) and, for variances, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), as well as the substantive sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness: explanation can be “brief,” record-based, and contextual

The procedural claim focused on whether the district court explained why it jumped from a 0–6 month guideline range to the 24-month statutory maximum. The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. The governing duty is adequacy for review, not exhaustive narration. By invoking Steiger/Gall and Hamilton, the panel emphasized that explanation requirements scale with circumstances, but do not demand a factor-by-factor recital.
  2. The variance-specific duty is to state “the specific reason,” which may be apparent from the hearing. Under § 3553(c)(2), a variance triggers an additional duty, but Hamilton permits the “specific reason” to be gleaned from the record.
  3. The record supplied the rationale. The panel pointed to the district court’s references to (among other § 3553(a) considerations) the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, seriousness, respect for law, just punishment, and deterrence; and to the colloquy confirming that Pecero-Ramirez had illegally entered a total of four times, including twice after removal, along with testimony of arrests involving controlled substances and flight. Those facts, as framed by Kuhlman, constituted “enough information” for meaningful review.

2) Substantive reasonableness: deference to district court’s weighting of deterrence and recidivist history

On substance, the panel treated the appeal as a challenge to the district court’s weighing of proper factors rather than a use of improper ones. Applying Hamilton (2026) and Johnson (2015), the panel held there was no clear error of judgment where the court:

  • weighed recidivist illegal reentry history heavily (four unlawful entries, including post-removal reentries),
  • considered testimony about flight and arrests on drug charges as aggravating context linked to the defendant’s history and deterrence needs,
  • and chose to give comparatively less weight to mitigation (cartel-violence motivation), which it heard but did not expressly discuss.

The panel’s approach reflects a familiar substantive-reasonableness principle: appellate courts generally do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors; they ask only whether the district court’s balance fell outside the range of reasonable sentences.

3) Disparity: defendant’s burden and the legitimizing role of uncharged conduct

Pecero-Ramirez argued that the statutory maximum created a disparity with similarly situated defendants. The panel responded in two moves:

  • Burden of proof: Under Johnson (2020), it was Pecero-Ramirez’s burden to show an “unwarranted” disparity, not merely a difference.
  • Warranted distinction: Butler and Azmat authorize consideration of uncharged conduct as it relates to history, deterrence, respect for law, and protection of the public. The panel reasoned that defendants who have not repeatedly reentered and been arrested on drug charges are not true comparators, making any difference in sentence plausibly “warranted.”

C. Impact

Although issued as “Not for Publication,” the opinion is a clear application of Eleventh Circuit sentencing doctrine with practical effects:

  • Record-driven affirmance: It reinforces that sentencing explanations—especially for variances—can be upheld when the rationale is apparent from the hearing record (colloquies, testimony, and party proffers), reducing the likelihood of reversals based solely on brevity.
  • Recidivist illegal reentry as a powerful aggravator: The decision signals that repeated reentries after removals may justify substantial upward variances, including to the statutory maximum, particularly when paired with additional concerning conduct (e.g., drug-related arrests).
  • Disparity arguments face a high bar: Defendants must do more than cite different outcomes; they must show true comparability and that the difference is unwarranted, especially where the district court relied on individualized history and uncharged conduct.
  • Mitigation need not be explicitly discussed to be “considered”: The court’s reliance on Hayden underscores that hearing the argument may be enough, even absent express discussion, so long as the record reflects consideration of the sentencing framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Guideline range vs. statutory maximum: The guideline range (here, 0–6 months) is an advisory recommendation under the Sentencing Guidelines. The statutory maximum (here, 24 months) is the highest sentence Congress permits for the offense of conviction.
  • Upward variance: A sentence above the guideline range based on the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not based on a guidelines “departure” mechanism.
  • Procedural reasonableness: Focuses on how the sentence was imposed—e.g., whether the court properly calculated the guidelines, considered § 3553(a), and adequately explained the sentence.
  • Substantive reasonableness: Focuses on what sentence was imposed—whether, considering the totality of circumstances and § 3553(a), the sentence is within the range of reasonable choices.
  • “Meaningful appellate review”: The appellate court must be able to understand why the district court chose the sentence; this can come from the judge’s remarks and the broader hearing record.
  • Uncharged conduct: Conduct not charged as a separate offense (or not resulting in a conviction) that a sentencing court may still consider as part of the defendant’s “history and characteristics” and the need for deterrence, respect for law, and protection of the public.
  • Unwarranted sentencing disparity: Differences in sentences are not automatically problematic; they become a basis for relief only when similarly situated defendants receive materially different sentences without a legitimate justification grounded in § 3553(a).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Cristofer Pecero-Ramirez affirms two practical sentencing lessons within existing Eleventh Circuit doctrine: (1) a district court’s explanation for an upward variance may be brief yet sufficient when the rationale is evident from the sentencing record and tied to § 3553(a); and (2) substantial upward variances—including to the statutory maximum—can be upheld where the record supports heightened deterrence and respect-for-law concerns, particularly for repeated illegal reentry, and where distinctions from other defendants are supported by individualized history and even uncharged conduct. The decision thus exemplifies the breadth of district-court discretion, and the difficulty of overturning a sentence absent a clear procedural defect or a demonstrable, unwarranted disparity unsupported by the record.