Record-Based Peque Claims Belong on Direct Appeal; Prior Felony Guilty Plea Without Sentence Does Not Defeat Youthful Offender Eligibility

1. Introduction

In People v Williams (2026 NY Slip Op 02679), the Appellate Division, Second Department addressed two post-judgment challenges brought by Omarny Williams, a Jamaican citizen and lawful permanent resident who pleaded guilty in Queens County to robbery in the first degree under Indictment No. 1721/16. After the federal government initiated removal proceedings in 2022 based on that conviction, Williams moved to: (i) vacate the judgment under CPL 440.10 (arguing the plea court failed to advise about deportation risk), and (ii) set aside the sentence under CPL 440.20 (arguing the sentencing court mishandled a required youthful offender determination).

The Supreme Court granted both forms of relief. The People appealed, and the Second Department split the result: it reinstated the conviction (rejecting the CPL 440.10 plea-vacatur) but ordered resentencing because the youthful offender eligibility analysis was legally incorrect.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department modified the order below and held:

  • The trial court’s failure to provide an immigration warning under People v Peque could not be raised via CPL 440.10 here because the claim was record-based and therefore was subject to direct appeal; the defendant did not justify his failure to appeal under CPL 440.10(2)(c). Thus, vacatur of the judgment was improper.
  • The sentencing court committed legal error in concluding the defendant was not an “eligible youth” because he had previously “been convicted of a felony” when, in fact, he had only pleaded guilty in the prior case and had not yet been sentenced. Because the court must make a correct youthful offender determination in every eligible case, the sentence was properly set aside and the matter remitted for resentencing.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Immigration-warning (“Peque”) claims and CPL 440 limits

  • People v Peque (22 NY3d 168, 197): Established that to protect noncitizen felony defendants, trial courts must advise that if a defendant is not a U.S. citizen, a felony guilty plea “may expose them to deportation.” In Williams, the defendant answered “Yes” when asked if he was a citizen, and the plea court gave no immigration advisement. The Second Department treated this as a classic Peque-type issue—but emphasized the procedural channel for raising it.
  • People v Samaroo (205 AD3d 822, 825); People v Terrero (198 AD3d 930, 931); People v Malik (166 AD3d 650, 653): These cases support applying CPL 440.10(2)(c) to deny collateral relief where sufficient facts appear on the record to have permitted review on direct appeal and the defendant fails to justify not appealing. The court relied on them to characterize Williams’s Peque argument as record-based and therefore procedurally barred on a CPL 440.10 motion.
  • People v DeMicheli (129 AD3d 743, 744) (quoting People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d 1108, 1109); People v Evans (16 NY3d 571, 575 n 2): These authorities address “mixed claims” of ineffective assistance—claims that depend partly on the record and partly on off-the-record facts—often making CPL 440 a proper vehicle. The Second Department used them to reject the defendant’s attempt to frame the issue as “mixed”: whether the court gave an immigration warning was apparent from the plea minutes, so it was not an ineffective-assistance “mixed claim.”
  • People v Young (150 AD3d 429, 429); People v Hernandez (214 AD3d 900, 901); People v Jones (200 AD3d 713): These cases reinforce that a record-based Peque issue is “not cognizable” on a CPL article 440 motion even if Peque litigation can sometimes require additional fact-finding. The court adopted that framing to deny CPL 440.10 relief here.

2) Youthful offender determination is mandatory and must be legally correct

  • People v Kimble (228 AD3d 886, 886); People v Rudolph (21 NY3d 497, 501): These decisions establish that CPL 720.20(1) requires a court to make a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even if the defendant does not request it or agrees to forego it in a plea bargain. Williams applied that mandate to hold that resentencing was required once the sentencing court’s eligibility analysis was legally mistaken.
  • People v Steele (244 AD3d 57); People v Khan (184 AD3d 864); People v Middlebrooks (25 NY3d 516, 527); People v Rosado (148 AD3d 1058): These cases support the remedy of remittal for new sentencing proceedings when a youthful offender determination was not made, or was made under an incorrect legal standard. The Second Department relied on them to remit for resentencing once it found that the court wrongly deemed the defendant ineligible.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why CPL 440.10 relief was unavailable for the immigration-warning claim

The core procedural rule applied was CPL 440.10(2)(c): a court must deny a motion to vacate judgment when sufficient facts appear on the record to have allowed adequate review on direct appeal, unless the defendant shows a justifiable reason for failing to appeal.

The Second Department held the immigration-warning issue lived entirely on the plea record: the court asked citizenship; the defendant said “Yes”; the court gave no immigration advisement. Because that was reviewable on direct appeal and the defendant did not justify failing to appeal, the Supreme Court could not use CPL 440.10 to vacate the conviction on this ground.

The court also rejected an effort to repackage the issue as a “mixed” ineffective-assistance claim. Even though immigration consequences often implicate counsel’s advice and off-the-record discussions, this particular ruling addressed the court’s failure to warn, which is recorded (or not) in the plea minutes.

2) Why resentencing was required for the youthful offender issue

Turning to CPL 720.10 and CPL 720.20, the Second Department emphasized:

  • A court must make a youthful offender determination whenever the defendant is an “eligible youth,” regardless of whether the defendant asks.
  • Under CPL 720.10(2)(b), a youth is ineligible if the youth has “previously been convicted and sentenced for a felony.”

The sentencing court denied youthful offender treatment on the stated rationale that the defendant had previously “been convicted of a felony” and had pleaded guilty. The Second Department held that was a legal misread of the statute on this record: while the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a felony in an unrelated case, he had not yet been sentenced in that case, meaning the statutory disqualifier (“convicted and sentenced”) was not satisfied. Because the court’s eligibility determination was incorrect, resentencing was required so that a proper youthful offender determination could be made under the correct standard.

C. Impact

1) Procedural channeling of Peque claims

Williams reinforces a practical and often case-dispositive point: when the alleged Peque defect is apparent from the plea minutes, the claim is expected to be raised on direct appeal, not through a later CPL 440.10 motion. This can sharply limit post-conviction immigration litigation where defendants did not appeal and cannot show a legally “justifiable” reason for that omission.

2) Youthful offender eligibility turns on “convicted and sentenced,” not merely a prior plea

The decision underscores careful statutory adherence in youthful offender determinations. Courts may not treat a prior guilty plea, standing alone, as the equivalent of being “convicted and sentenced” for felony-disqualification purposes. The likely future effect is increased scrutiny of YO eligibility findings, especially when a defendant has other pending or not-yet-sentenced matters.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CPL 440.10 vs. direct appeal: A direct appeal challenges errors shown in the trial record. A CPL 440.10 motion is a collateral attack often used for issues needing facts outside the record. If the problem is visible in the minutes, courts generally expect it to be raised on appeal.
  • “Record-based” claim: A claim decided by what is (or is not) written in transcripts and filed documents—no additional testimony required.
  • “Mixed claim” of ineffective assistance: A claim that requires both the record and outside facts (for example, what counsel advised privately). Such claims are often suitable for CPL 440, but only if the decisive facts are not fully on the record.
  • Peque warning: A New York plea-court advisement that noncitizen defendants should understand a felony plea may have immigration consequences, including deportation.
  • Youthful offender (YO) treatment: A statutory mechanism that can replace a criminal conviction with a youthful offender adjudication for eligible young defendants, often reducing long-term consequences. Eligibility is tightly defined by statute, and the court must make the determination in every eligible case.

5. Conclusion

People v Williams delivers two operational rules with immediate consequences in New York post-conviction practice. First, a record-based claim that the plea court failed to give a People v Peque immigration warning must be pursued on direct appeal; absent a justified failure to appeal, CPL 440.10(2)(c) bars vacatur. Second, a sentencing court’s youthful offender analysis must track the statute: a prior felony guilty plea without a prior felony sentence does not, by itself, render a defendant ineligible under CPL 720.10(2)(b). The conviction stands, but resentencing is required so the trial court can make a legally correct youthful offender determination.