Reconsidering Youngblood Under Michigan’s Due Process Clause for Destroyed Police Interview Recordings

1. Introduction

People of Michigan v. Dangelo Ladonn McWilliams (Mich Sup Ct, Sept 17, 2026) arose from an interlocutory challenge to a former Ypsilanti Police Department (YPD) practice: detectives recorded interviews with complaining witnesses in sexual assault and domestic violence investigations, used the recordings to draft written reports, and then deleted the recordings once the reports were complete.

The defendant—charged with multiple sex crimes allegedly occurring while he lived in a fraternity house at Eastern Michigan University—moved to dismiss, arguing the deletions destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence and violated due process. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding no bad faith and no showing the recordings would have aided the defense. The Court of Appeals denied leave. The Michigan Supreme Court likewise denied leave, with Justice Welch concurring separately to flag a significant constitutional question Michigan has not yet resolved: whether Arizona v Youngblood’s “bad faith” requirement should govern under the Michigan Constitution.

2. Summary of the Opinion (Order and Concurrence)

The Court’s order denied leave to appeal because it was “not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed.” Justice Welch concurred in the denial but wrote to:

  • Explain that the trial court applied Arizona v Youngblood, which requires a showing of police bad faith when “potentially useful” evidence is lost or destroyed.
  • Emphasize how demanding—and rarely satisfied—the bad-faith standard is in practice.
  • Note that numerous state supreme courts have declined to follow Youngblood as a matter of their own state constitutional law, instead applying multi-factor balancing.
  • State openness, in an appropriate case, to considering whether destruction of evidence can violate due process under Const 1963, art 1, § 17 even absent bad faith.
  • Conclude that this case was not the vehicle because the defendant did not raise a Michigan constitutional claim.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51 (1988)

Youngblood supplies the controlling federal framework for lost/destroyed evidence that is merely “potentially useful,” rather than apparently exculpatory: “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Justice Welch underscores that Michigan courts applied this rule here but that Michigan caselaw offers little guidance on what qualifies as “bad faith,” and that other jurisdictions applying Youngblood seldom find the standard satisfied.

Illinois v Fisher, 540 US 544 (2004) and Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963)

Justice Welch uses Illinois v Fisher to restate the critical distinction between:

  • Suppressed or withheld material exculpatory evidence (Brady v Maryland): “the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant.”
  • Lost or destroyed potentially useful evidence (Arizona v Youngblood): the defendant must show bad faith.

Justice Welch also quotes Illinois v Fisher, 540 US 544, 550 n * (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), which questions whether due process should turn on an officer’s subjective good/bad faith when liberty is at stake.

State v Morales, 232 Conn 707 (1995) and State v Delisle, 162 Vt 293 (1994)

These cases illustrate the alternative state-constitutional approach Justice Welch highlights. State v Morales is cited for the proposition that fairness concerns counsel against making police bad faith the determinative factor, and for adopting a framework where good faith is merely one factor among several. State v Delisle is cited for criticizing Youngblood because even negligent loss may severely prejudice a defendant.

Hendricks v State, 871 A2d 1118 (Del, 2005) and Commonwealth v Sanford, 460 Mass 441 (2011)

Justice Welch cites these decisions (along with Morales) to exemplify multi-factor balancing tests used by some state high courts and to emphasize that remedies can be less drastic than dismissal—such as suppression or an adverse-inference instruction.

People v McWilliams, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 17, 2025 (Docket No. 376585)

This reference situates the procedural posture: the Court of Appeals denied interlocutory leave, and the Supreme Court declined discretionary review. The concurrence functions less as a case-specific ruling and more as a signal about an unresolved doctrinal question in Michigan.

Secondary Authorities

Justice Welch cites scholarship (Chen; Bawden; Bay) to support the empirical claim that Youngblood’s bad-faith requirement is “almost insurmountable,” both in doctrinal framing and in outcomes.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Application of existing federal doctrine at the trial level: The trial court treated the recordings as “potentially useful” (not established as materially exculpatory) and therefore required proof of bad faith under Arizona v Youngblood. On the evidentiary record, it found no bad faith and denied dismissal.
  2. Limits of the current Michigan record and posture: Justice Welch acknowledges serious concerns raised by a routine practice of deleting complainant-interview recordings, but concludes that, given Youngblood’s demanding standard and the record, the trial court’s refusal to find bad faith is not easily reversible.
  3. Structural critique of Youngblood: The concurrence argues that focusing due process on an “unspecified level of misconduct” risks missing the core question—whether the defendant received a fair process when evidence that could matter to guilt or innocence is gone.
  4. State constitutional pathway: The concurrence identifies an open doctrinal space: Michigan “has neither adopted nor rejected” other states’ approaches under their own constitutions and notes the absence of Michigan caselaw deciding whether Youngblood is the right standard for Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
  5. Vehicle problem (why no review here): Even if the issue is important, Justice Welch explains this case does not present it properly because the defendant did not raise a claim under Michigan’s Constitution.

C. Impact

Although the Court denied leave and created no binding new rule, Justice Welch’s concurrence has potential influence in three ways:

  • Litigation strategy in Michigan: Defendants challenging lost/destroyed evidence are effectively invited to plead and develop arguments expressly under Const 1963, art 1, § 17, not only under federal due process.
  • Doctrinal development: The concurrence signals receptivity to a multi-factor balancing approach that may consider (i) materiality/importance of missing evidence, (ii) police culpability, and (iii) prejudice—rather than making bad faith dispositive.
  • Remedial flexibility: By highlighting remedies short of dismissal (suppression; adverse-inference instructions), the concurrence suggests Michigan could craft a proportional remedial regime if it moves away from Youngblood under state law.

Practically, the decision also places pressure on law-enforcement retention policies—especially for recorded interviews—because routine deletion practices create recurring appellate issues and undermine confidence in case documentation. (Justice Welch notes YPD “no longer engages in this practice,” but the broader policy question remains for other agencies and future cases.)

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Material exculpatory” vs. “potentially useful” evidence: If evidence is clearly favorable and important to the defense (“material exculpatory”), nondisclosure can violate due process regardless of good faith under Brady v Maryland. If evidence might have helped but its exculpatory value is uncertain (“potentially useful”), Arizona v Youngblood requires proof the police acted in bad faith when it was lost or destroyed.
  • “Bad faith”: More than negligence or poor practice; it generally implies deliberate or dishonest conduct related to depriving the defense of evidence. Justice Welch’s concern is that the concept is difficult to define and extraordinarily difficult to prove.
  • State constitutional independence: State courts may interpret their own constitutions to provide more protection than the federal Constitution. Justice Welch highlights that some state supreme courts have rejected Youngblood as a matter of state constitutional due process.
  • Adverse-inference instruction: A trial instruction permitting (or requiring) jurors to infer that missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss—used as a remedy when dismissal is too extreme.
  • Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before final judgment. Here, appellate courts exercised discretionary review authority and declined to intervene mid-case.

5. Conclusion

People of Michigan v. Dangelo Ladonn McWilliams does not change Michigan law because leave was denied. But Justice Welch’s concurrence sharply frames an unresolved question of Michigan constitutional law: whether due process challenges to destroyed evidence should remain tethered to Arizona v Youngblood’s rarely satisfied bad-faith requirement, or whether Michigan should adopt a more protective, multi-factor approach under Const 1963, art 1, § 17. The key takeaway for future cases is procedural and substantive: to make Michigan-specific arguments, litigants must raise the state constitutional claim—and build a record on materiality, culpability, prejudice, and appropriate remedies.