1. Introduction
In State v. Carlson, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether a defendant charged with manslaughter arising from reckless driving was entitled to a separate jury instruction addressing unconsciousness caused by a medical event. The court held that refusing the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error because the instructions actually given adequately addressed the required mental state and preserved the State’s burden of proof.
Mark Carlson was involved in a September 2023 motor vehicle collision that killed Anna Bosma. The State of Nebraska alleged that Carlson had engaged in “road rage” and “racing” with a vehicle driven by Cameron Robinson. Carlson presented a different explanation: Having previously been diagnosed with vasovagal syncope, he allegedly experienced a syncopal episode that rendered him unconscious before the collision. He argued that this loss of consciousness prevented him from possessing the mental state necessary for reckless driving, the unlawful act underlying the manslaughter charge.
A jury convicted Carlson of manslaughter, and the district court sentenced him to 10 to 14 years’ incarceration. His appeal raised a single issue: whether the district court erred by refusing to give, or incorporate, his proposed instruction concerning unconsciousness or automatism caused by a medical event.
The decision is principally about the adequacy of jury instructions, not whether Carlson actually lost consciousness. Its significance lies in recognizing that instructions defining the offense’s mental-state requirement can adequately accommodate a medical-unconsciousness theory without separately naming that theory.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The instructions given
Instruction No. 6 required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carlson killed Bosma while operating a motor vehicle and did so “without malice unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act to wit: reckless driving as defined in Instruction No. 7.” It directed the jury to acquit unless the State proved every required element.
Instruction No. 7 defined reckless driving as driving “in such a manner as to indicate an indifferent or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” It expressly placed the burden of proving the elements of that unlawful act beyond a reasonable doubt on the State. An additional definition explained that recklessness meant disregard for, or indifference to, another’s safety or the consequences of one’s act, and treated “wanton” and “reckless” synonymously.
The requested instruction
Carlson’s proposed instruction would have expressly required the State to prove that he did not faint, become unconscious, or experience automatism from a sudden medical event involving a syncopal episode and vasovagal response. The proposal also included an alternative form of manslaughter involving an intentional killing without malice upon a sudden quarrel.
The district court refused the proposed instruction because it concluded that Instructions Nos. 6 and 7 adequately covered Carlson’s position.
The Supreme Court’s decision
The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that Carlson had not demonstrated prejudice. Read together, the instructions required proof of the mental state necessary for reckless driving. That requirement would preclude conviction if the jury determined that Carlson was driving lawfully when an unforeseen and unavoidable medical episode caused him to lose consciousness and control of the vehicle.
The court also rejected Carlson’s contention that the prosecutor’s closing argument established the need for a separate instruction. It interpreted the challenged remarks as addressing a possible loss of consciousness occurring after Carlson had consciously created a dangerous situation, not as suggesting that the jury could convict without finding the required mental state.
The holding was limited: Because Carlson failed to establish prejudice, the court did not decide whether his proposed instruction correctly stated the law or was warranted by the evidence.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
State v. Haynie, 317 Neb. 371, 9 N.W.3d 915 (2024)
State v. Haynie supplied the principal framework for reviewing the instructional claim. First, whether jury instructions are correct is a question of law reviewed independently of the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court therefore evaluated the instructions’ legal adequacy for itself.
Second, State v. Haynie states that courts ordinarily should use an applicable instruction from the Nebraska Jury Instructions in criminal cases. This preference promotes consistency, but Carlson’s case presented a subject for which Nebraska had no model instruction: unconsciousness or automatism.
Third, State v. Haynie establishes three requirements for reversible error when a requested instruction is refused:
- The proposed instruction correctly states the law.
- The evidence warrants the instruction.
- The refusal prejudices the appellant.
The same precedent recognizes that a trial court does not err by refusing an instruction whose substance is already covered by the instructions given. This principle was decisive. Even assuming Carlson could satisfy the first two requirements, he still needed to establish prejudice. The Supreme Court concluded that the existing instructions adequately covered the mental-state issue, so that requirement was not met.
State v. Samuels, 205 Neb. 585, 289 N.W.2d 183 (1980)
State v. Samuels provides that when no standard jury instruction is available, the court must draft an instruction appropriate to the existing conditions. Carlson relied on the absence of a Nebraska unconsciousness instruction in seeking language specifically addressing his medical explanation.
The decision does not treat that absence as automatically requiring a separately labeled defense instruction. Rather, the instructions must appropriately address the legal issues presented. Here, the Supreme Court found that the instructions defining manslaughter and reckless driving already performed the necessary function by requiring proof of the relevant mental state.
The opinion also identified California and North Carolina model instructions addressing unconsciousness: Cal. Jury Instr. Crim. § 3425 (2026) and N.C. Jury Instr. Crim. § 302.10 (2009). These references demonstrated that such model instructions exist elsewhere. The court did not adopt their language as Nebraska law or decide whether either should have been used in Carlson’s case.
Olson v. Sherrerd, 266 Neb. 207, 663 N.W.2d 617 (2003)
Olson v. Sherrerd governed preservation of error. It requires a party challenging the refusal of a proposed instruction to object at the jury instruction conference.
Before that conference, Carlson had filed a brief requesting a specific instruction and suggesting another state’s model instruction as an alternative. But he did not preserve objections concerning every alternative contained in his brief. The Supreme Court therefore limited its review to the proposed instruction received as exhibit 270.
This application carries an important procedural lesson: Including proposed instructions in a written submission does not, by itself, preserve every associated appellate argument. Counsel must object to the refusal of the particular instruction at the required stage.
State v. Cerros, 312 Neb. 230, 978 N.W.2d 162 (2022)
State v. Cerros supplied the substantive foundation for rejecting Carlson’s argument that the instructions omitted a mental-state requirement. It established that reckless driving has the necessary mens rea to serve as the unlawful act supporting a manslaughter conviction.
The instructions in State v. Cerros used the same basic structure employed in Carlson’s trial: One instruction defined manslaughter by reference to the unlawful act of reckless driving, while a separate instruction defined reckless driving using the statutory language concerning indifferent or wanton disregard for safety. The court had found that formulation sufficient to include the required mental state.
Applying that reasoning, the Supreme Court concluded that Carlson’s instructions likewise required proof of mens rea. The manslaughter instruction did not need to repeat the mental-state language because it expressly incorporated the separately defined reckless-driving offense.
B. Legal Reasoning
The statutory relationship between manslaughter and reckless driving
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-305(1) (Reissue 2016) defines manslaughter to include causing another’s death unintentionally while committing an unlawful act. The unlawful act alleged here was reckless driving under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,213 (Reissue 2021), which prohibits driving in a manner indicating indifferent or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.
The resulting legal structure separates the unintended death from the culpability associated with the driving. The State did not need to prove an intention to kill Bosma. It did, however, need to prove the mental state required for reckless driving. Thus, describing the death as “unintentional” did not eliminate the offense’s mental-state requirement.
The instructions had to be read together
Carlson argued that Instruction No. 6 allowed conviction without specifying mens rea, even when considered with Instruction No. 7. The Supreme Court disagreed because Instruction No. 6 expressly referred the jury to Instruction No. 7’s definition of reckless driving.
Together with the additional definition of recklessness, the instructions required the jury to find indifferent or wanton disregard for safety beyond a reasonable doubt. Their adequacy depended on their combined legal effect, not on whether every element appeared in one instruction.
Unconsciousness was relevant to the required mental state
The court treated Carlson’s medical explanation as capable of negating the culpability necessary for reckless driving. If he was operating his vehicle lawfully when an unforeseen and unavoidable medical episode caused unconsciousness and loss of control, the instructions’ mental-state requirement would prevent conviction.
This reasoning explains why an instruction expressly mentioning fainting or automatism was unnecessary on the record presented. The existing instructions already required the jury to decide an issue to which Carlson’s medical evidence was relevant: whether the State had proved the required reckless mental state.
The opinion did not establish unconsciousness as a freestanding affirmative defense with a separately defined burden of proof. Nor did it decide that the State must always disprove a medical episode as an additional element. Instead, it emphasized that the burden of proving the offense’s required mental state remained with the State.
The timing of unconsciousness mattered
The prosecutor told the jury that “[u]nconsciousness does not equal not guilty,” then described a possible physical reaction occurring after Carlson consciously created an unsafe situation. The Supreme Court evaluated the statement in that context rather than treating the initial phrase as a complete proposition of law.
The court found no suggestion that Carlson could be convicted without proof of the required mental state. Its reasoning distinguishes an unavoidable medical episode interrupting lawful driving from a possible loss of consciousness after culpable driving has already created danger.
The decision therefore does not make unconsciousness at the moment of impact automatically exculpatory. Equally, it does not hold that unconsciousness is irrelevant. The nature and timing of the alleged medical episode remain important to whether the State has established the charged offense.
The absence of prejudice resolved the appeal
The court’s analysis stopped at the third requirement for reversible instructional error. Because the instructions already covered the substance of Carlson’s mental-state argument, refusing his proposed instruction did not prejudice him.
This approach left unresolved the proposed instruction’s legal accuracy and evidentiary foundation, including the significance of its sudden-quarrel language and its express requirement that the State disprove unconsciousness. The affirmance should not be read as approval or rejection of those features.
C. Potential Impact
Future medical-event defenses
The decision gives Nebraska courts a framework for evaluating requests for unconsciousness instructions in reckless-driving manslaughter cases. The central inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole adequately state the offense’s mental-state requirement and accommodate the defense theory.
Its reach is not categorical. The court did not hold that a separate unconsciousness instruction can never be necessary. A future case involving materially different instructions or circumstances would require its own assessment of legal correctness, evidentiary support, and prejudice.
Trial preparation and preservation
Defense counsel should connect any medical-event theory to the precise element it allegedly defeats and explain what a proposed instruction adds to the existing charge. Counsel must also preserve objections to each refused instruction at the instruction conference; offering alternatives in a brief is insufficient by itself.
For prosecutors, the opinion supports distinguishing a sudden medical event during lawful driving from unconsciousness allegedly occurring after dangerous conduct. It does not authorize arguments that dispense with proof of recklessness.
Continuity rather than a new substantive offense rule
The decision primarily applies established instructional principles and the mental-state analysis from State v. Cerros. Its contribution is the application of those principles to a medically based unconsciousness theory. It neither removes recklessness from unlawful-act manslaughter nor announces a comprehensive doctrine governing automatism in every criminal prosecution.