Reciprocal Discipline in New York: Deference to Foreign Sanctions and Public Censure for False Statements to Tribunals

1. Introduction

Matter of Bernstein (2026 NY Slip Op 05239 [1st Dept Sept. 10, 2026]) is a reciprocal-discipline decision of the Appellate Division, First Department, arising from discipline previously imposed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey (262 NJ 380 [2025]). The New York Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department (petitioner) sought reciprocal discipline against respondent attorney Scott Howard Bernstein based on a New Jersey reprimand.

The underlying misconduct concerned respondent’s representations to two federal courts (the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in an adversary proceeding, and the Southern District in a civil RICO action) in motions to withdraw as counsel. The key issues were whether (i) New York should impose reciprocal discipline under Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13, (ii) any statutory/regulatory defenses to reciprocal discipline applied, and (iii) what sanction was appropriate in New York given New Jersey’s reprimand.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department imposed reciprocal discipline and publicly censured respondent. The court held that none of the defenses available under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) applied because respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard in New Jersey, entered a stipulation admitting misconduct, and the admitted conduct would also constitute misconduct in New York—specifically, violations corresponding to New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal) and 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

On sanction, the court followed its general practice of deferring to the originating jurisdiction’s sanction. Because New Jersey imposed a “reprimand,” New York imposed a functionally commensurate sanction: a public censure.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Matter of Milara

The court relied on Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108 (1st Dept 2021), for two foundational propositions in reciprocal-discipline cases: (1) the three exclusive defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) (due process; infirmity of proof; no New York analogue), and (2) the principle that New York generally defers to the sanction imposed by the foreign jurisdiction.

Here, Matter of Milara provided the decision’s analytic roadmap: identify whether any defense is established, then—if not—apply reciprocal discipline and consider sanction deference.

Matter of Tabacco; Matter of Blumenthal

The court cited Matter of Tabacco, 171 AD3d 163 (1st Dept 2019), and Matter of Blumenthal, 165 AD3d 85 (1st Dept 2018), for the “general rule” that the First Department defers to the sanction imposed in the jurisdiction where charges were originally brought, because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in calibrating discipline for the misconduct at issue.

These cases framed deference not as a rubber stamp, but as a presumptive approach grounded in comity, institutional competence, and the originating forum’s superior vantage point on local practice expectations and case-specific context.

Matter of Karambelas; Matter of McHallam

The court then cited Matter of Karambelas, 203 AD3d 75 (1st Dept 2022), and Matter of McHallam, 160 AD3d 89 (1st Dept 2018), to emphasize that departures from the foreign sanction are “rare.” These citations function as a limiting principle: even where New York might conceptualize sanctions differently, it generally harmonizes outcomes absent unusual circumstances.

Matter of Murray-Nolan; Matter of Myerowitz

To anchor the sanction choice in comparable New York outcomes, the court cited:

  • Matter of Murray-Nolan, AD3d, 2026 NY Slip Op 03365 (1st Dept 2026), where reciprocal censure followed a New Jersey censure involving, among other things, false statements regarding a client’s view of requested fees in a fee motion.
  • Matter of Myerowitz, 173 AD3d 155 (1st Dept 2019), where censure followed federal-court suspension and New Jersey censure for knowing misrepresentations to a federal court.

These comparators strengthened the court’s proportionality analysis: misrepresentations to courts—particularly tied to withdrawal and fee assertions—tend to draw public discipline short of suspension where the record supports mitigation and the originating forum imposed a non-suspensory sanction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The reciprocal-discipline framework under 22 NYCRR 1240.13

The court applied the structured reciprocal-discipline inquiry required by 22 NYCRR 1240.13:

  1. Foreign discipline established: New Jersey reprimanded respondent by order dated December 19, 2025, adopting the DRB’s recommendation (262 NJ 380 [2025]).
  2. Defenses considered and rejected: The court tested respondent’s case against the three enumerated defenses in 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) (as articulated in Matter of Milara).
    • Due process: Rejected because respondent had notice and opportunity to be heard and, notably, entered a stipulation admitting misconduct and consenting to discipline.
    • Infirmity of proof: Rejected because respondent’s stipulation and admitted facts “sufficiently support” the misconduct admissions underlying the New Jersey discipline.
    • No New York analogue: Rejected because the conduct would violate New York Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c).
  3. Reciprocal discipline imposed: With no defense available, reciprocal discipline was “appropriate” (22 NYCRR 1240.13[c]).

(b) Why the admitted conduct mapped to New York misconduct

The opinion stresses two core professional duties that transcend jurisdiction:

  • Candor to tribunals (Rule 3.3): Respondent’s withdrawal motions conveyed (i) that the client had terminated him without acknowledging the client contested termination, and (ii) that the client “did not dispute” termination without producing any such communication—facts the New Jersey proceeding treated as materially misleading. New York likewise treats false statements (and materially misleading omissions) to a tribunal as serious misconduct.
  • Honesty and absence of deceit (Rule 8.4[c]): Respondent’s fee assertions in the withdrawal papers—stating amounts the record did not support and omitting key context (discounts, allocation of payments, and the fact that amounts included unbilled time not invoiced)—were viewed as misrepresentations connected to a request for a lien.

The First Department’s approach reflects that reciprocal discipline is not a re-trial of the foreign matter; it is a compatibility and fairness check. Once the conduct comfortably fits within New York’s own conduct rules, New York’s interest becomes ensuring the attorney’s New York bar status reflects discipline already imposed elsewhere.

(c) Sanction selection: “reprimand” vs “public censure”

New York and New Jersey label sanctions differently. New Jersey’s “reprimand” is typically public discipline; in New York, “public censure” serves a similar role. The court treated censure as “commensurate” with New Jersey’s reprimand, consistent with the deference principle articulated in Matter of Milara, Matter of Tabacco, and Matter of Blumenthal, and without the kind of exceptional circumstances that might justify divergence under Matter of Karambelas or Matter of McHallam.

3.3. Impact

(a) Reinforcement of strict candor norms in withdrawal and fee disputes

The case underscores that motions to withdraw are not merely procedural; they are representations to a tribunal where precision matters—especially when asserting client termination, nonpayment, or seeking a lien. A lawyer’s characterization of client communications (e.g., “terminated,” “did not dispute”) can be sanctionable if it omits known contest or lacks evidentiary support.

(b) Reciprocal discipline remains presumptive and efficient

The opinion reaffirms that New York’s reciprocal-discipline process is designed to be streamlined. Where an attorney stipulates to misconduct in a foreign jurisdiction, defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) will be difficult to sustain because the stipulation tends to defeat due-process and proof challenges simultaneously.

(c) Harmonization of sanctions across jurisdictions

The decision continues the First Department’s project of sanction harmonization: where another jurisdiction has already imposed a public, non-suspensory sanction for misrepresentations to tribunals, New York will ordinarily impose a similar public sanction absent strong countervailing reasons.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reciprocal discipline: A process where New York imposes discipline on a New York-admitted lawyer because another jurisdiction already disciplined the lawyer for misconduct.
  • 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) defenses: The lawyer can avoid reciprocal discipline only by proving one of three things: (1) the foreign process was fundamentally unfair (no notice/opportunity to be heard), (2) the foreign finding lacks reliable proof, or (3) the conduct is not misconduct in New York.
  • Candor to the tribunal (Rule 3.3): Lawyers must not lie to courts and must not omit key facts when an omission would mislead the court.
  • Conduct involving dishonesty (Rule 8.4[c]): A broad rule capturing deceitful or misleading behavior, including in written court filings.
  • Public censure vs reprimand: Different labels across states for similar public discipline. New York often uses “public censure” where another state uses “reprimand.”
  • “Infirmity of proof”: Not a disagreement with how the foreign tribunal weighed facts; it means the evidence was so unreliable that New York cannot safely rely on the foreign adjudication. A stipulation admitting misconduct typically defeats this defense.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Bernstein confirms a durable New York principle in reciprocal discipline: absent one of the narrow 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) defenses, New York will impose reciprocal discipline and will generally defer to the originating jurisdiction’s sanction, translating it into New York’s sanction framework (here, a public censure commensurate with a New Jersey reprimand).

Substantively, the case highlights the disciplinary risk of imprecise or unsupported assertions in withdrawal motions—especially where an attorney characterizes client termination and fee arrears in a manner that can mislead a court. The opinion thus serves as a cautionary precedent: when the record is contested, court submissions must fairly reflect that contest and must not overstate fee entitlement or payment status.