Reciprocal Discipline for Unverified AI-Generated Court Filings: FRCP 11 Sanctions as New York Professional Misconduct

1. Introduction

Matter of Zareh (2026 NY Slip Op 00619 [1st Dept Feb. 10, 2026]) addresses attorney discipline arising from a federal court sanction tied to a brief containing extensive citation errors and misstatements of case law—errors the federal court found consistent with (and ultimately attributable to) artificial intelligence (AI) drafting. The Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department (AGC) sought reciprocal discipline under Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13 based on a public reprimand/admonishment imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

The core issues were: (i) whether respondent could invoke any defense to reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b), (ii) whether sanctionable conduct under FRCP 11(b) constituted misconduct under New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct, and (iii) what New York sanction should follow given the foreign jurisdiction’s disposition and First Department precedent.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department granted the AGC’s motion and imposed a public censure. It held that respondent failed to establish any defense under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b): the federal proceedings afforded due process; the proof was not infirm; and the misconduct would also constitute New York misconduct. The Court further concluded that the appropriate sanction was a censure, matching the gravity and public nature of the federal reprimand and aligning with comparable First Department attorney-discipline outcomes.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108, 110 (1st Dept 2021)
    Role in the decision: Supplied the governing framework for reciprocal discipline defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) (due process; infirmity of proof; non-misconduct in New York). The Court applied this template to reject respondent’s opposition.
  • Matter of Blumenthal, 165 AD3d 85, 86 (1st Dept 2018) and Matter of Jaffe, 78 AD3d 152, 158 (1st Dept 2010)
    Role in the decision: Established the principle that “significant weight” is given to the sanction chosen by the jurisdiction where the misconduct occurred because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in calibrating discipline for conduct before it. This anchored the First Department’s decision to track the federal court’s public reprimand with an equivalent New York censure.
  • Matter of Karambelas, 203 AD3d 75, 80-81 (1st Dept 2022) and Matter of McHallam, 160 AD3d 89 (1st Dept 2018)
    Role in the decision: Reinforced that deviation from the “match the foreign sanction” approach is rare. The Court cited these cases to justify adhering to the reciprocal-discipline norm absent unusual mitigation.
  • Matter of Weitzman, 202 AD3d 5 (1st Dept 2021)
    Role in the decision: Provided an in-department comparator for censure where an attorney asserted frivolous claims in violation of Rule 3.1(a), supporting censure as proportionate where filings are substantively deficient and professionally blameworthy.
  • Matter of Mueller, 194 AD3d 68 (1st Dept 2021)
    Role in the decision: Supported censure as an appropriate response to failure-to-supervise misconduct—highly relevant given the Court’s observation (and footnote) that New York Rules 5.1(b)(2) and 5.1(d)(2)(ii) were implicated by respondent’s supervisory lapse.
  • Matter of Vialet, 120 AD3d 91 (1st Dept 2014); Matter of Hsu, 104 AD3d 138 (1st Dept 2013); Matter of Zhang, 101 AD3d 79 (1st Dept 2012); Matter of Mundie, 97 AD3d 194 (1st Dept 2012)
    Role in the decision: These “deficient briefing” reciprocal-discipline precedents were used to show that public censure is the typical First Department response to materially deficient appellate/court submissions (often grounded in a public reprimand elsewhere). They collectively frame the sanction as consistent with established departmental practice.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Reciprocal discipline mechanism and defenses.
    The Court treated the federal court’s public reprimand/admonishment as “discipline by a foreign jurisdiction” within the reciprocal discipline regime and applied the three defenses identified in Matter of Milara. Respondent failed on each:
    • Due process: Respondent had notice of the AI-related allegations and multiple opportunities to respond (written submissions including sworn declarations, and testimony at a show-cause hearing).
    • Proof: The District Court’s AI finding rested on the brief’s error pattern, internal inconsistencies, an adverse credibility assessment of the drafting attorney, and rejection of counsel’s alternative explanation.
    • New York misconduct equivalency: The Court found that the conduct underlying the FRCP 11(b) violation would also violate New York Rules of Professional Conduct—specifically Rules 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)(1).
  2. FRCP 11(b) misconduct can map onto New York ethics violations.
    A key point of doctrine in the opinion is that reciprocal discipline is not avoided merely because the originating sanction was framed as a violation of a civil practice rule (FRCP 11) rather than an attorney-disciplinary rule. The Court held it was “of no moment” that the federal court admonished counsel under FRCP 11(b), because the same conduct—submitting legal contentions without adequate inquiry and with misrepresented authority—constitutes professional misconduct under New York’s ethics rules.
  3. AI is not the sole trigger; the failure of reasonable verification is.
    Although the District Court did not believe respondent personally used AI or knew of AI use at the outset, the First Department focused on what was professionally decisive: filing and then defending an unverified brief with false or unsupported citations and propositions. The Court emphasized the District Court’s “bad faith” finding tied to denial of AI use while simultaneously admitting counsel had not reviewed or verified each citation—undercutting the credibility and competence of the submission and the defense of it.
  4. Sanction selection: deference and proportionality.
    Following Matter of Blumenthal and Matter of Jaffe, the Court afforded significant weight to the federal court’s chosen sanction and, per Matter of Karambelas and Matter of McHallam, found no rare or unusual circumstances warranting deviation. It selected a public censure as commensurate with a public reprimand and consistent with analogous deficient-briefing and supervision-failure cases.

C. Impact

  • AI-era filing duties are framed as traditional duties of inquiry and supervision. The opinion effectively treats AI-related drafting failures as an application of existing standards: attorneys must ensure citations and legal propositions are accurate and warranted after reasonable inquiry, and supervising lawyers must ensure subordinate work product is competent before filing.
  • “We didn’t use AI” is not a safe harbor when the filing is unverified. Even where a lawyer claims lack of knowledge of AI use, reciprocal discipline may follow if the record shows the submission was not reviewed competently and was defended despite an inability to account for fabricated/misleading citations.
  • Federal court sanctions can be discipline predicates even when styled as procedural. The Court’s “no moment” reasoning signals that New York will look past labels (procedural sanction vs. ethics violation) to the substance of the conduct when evaluating reciprocal discipline.
  • Predictability in reciprocal sanctions. By reiterating deference to the originating jurisdiction and aligning censure with a public reprimand, the opinion strengthens predictability: public federal reprimands for serious briefing deficiencies are likely to yield public New York discipline absent extraordinary mitigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reciprocal discipline
A process where New York imposes discipline based on discipline already imposed elsewhere (another state or a federal court), unless the lawyer proves limited defenses (lack of due process, infirm proof, or non-misconduct under New York rules).
FRCP 11(b)
A federal rule requiring that filings are made after a reasonable inquiry and that legal contentions are warranted by existing law (or a nonfrivolous argument for change). Violations can result in sanctions.
Rule 3.1 (New York Rules of Professional Conduct)
Generally prohibits frivolous claims and requires that lawyers’ legal positions have a basis in law and fact; in this opinion, the Court links unsupported legal propositions and misrepresented authority to Rule 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)(1).
Supervisory responsibility (Rule 5.1)
Requires lawyers with supervisory authority to make reasonable efforts to ensure other lawyers’ work complies with ethics rules. The opinion’s footnote highlights that inadequate supervision of the drafting associate was also implicated.
Public reprimand vs. public censure
Different jurisdictions use different labels; functionally, both are public, non-suspensory дисциплинар measures expressing formal condemnation of misconduct.
“Bad faith” in this context
Not merely making mistakes, but advancing and defending a filing while lacking a credible, competent account of its authorities—especially after admitting the underlying citations were not verified.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Zareh crystallizes an AI-relevant but technology-neutral disciplinary rule: filing (and defending) court papers containing false or unsupported citations—particularly where counsel failed to verify authorities—can warrant public discipline in New York through reciprocal discipline, even if the originating sanction arose under a procedural rule like FRCP 11(b). The decision reinforces that competent inquiry, accurate citation, and effective supervision remain non-delegable professional obligations, and it signals that AI-driven “hallucinated” authorities will be treated as an ethics problem when lawyers do not perform the traditional verification that litigation practice demands.