A. Precedents Cited
Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108 (1st Dept 2021)
Milara supplies the governing reciprocal-discipline framework quoted and applied by the Court: in a proceeding under 22 NYCRR
§ 1240.13, an attorney may raise only three defenses—(1) lack of due process (notice/opportunity to be heard), (2) infirmity of proof,
or (3) that the misconduct would not be misconduct in New York. The Dunphy Court used Milara both to define the available
defenses and to reinforce that reciprocal discipline is not a retrial of the foreign case; it is a limited review tethered to the
foreign adjudication or admissions.
Matter of Tabacco, 171 AD3d 163 (1st Dept 2019) and Matter of Blumenthal, 165 AD3d 85 (1st Dept 2018)
These cases support the “general rule” that the First Department defers to the sanction imposed by the originating jurisdiction because
that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in calibrating discipline for misconduct occurring in its regulatory sphere. Dunphy applies
that deference principle to align New York’s sanction with Connecticut’s reprimand, absent a reason to diverge.
Matter of Karambelas, 203 AD3d 75 (1st Dept 2022) and Matter of McHallam, 160 AD3d 89 (1st Dept 2018)
These decisions are cited for the proposition that departure from the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction is “rare.” The Dunphy Court invoked
them to frame the default posture: unless there is a compelling reason (e.g., materially different New York discipline norms for the same
conduct, or extraordinary aggravation/mitigation), New York will impose a commensurate reciprocal sanction.
Matter of Dratch, – AD3d –, 2025 NY Slip Op 05463 (1st Dept 2025) and Matter of Cook, 168 AD3d 108 (1st Dept 2019)
The Court cited these as examples supporting that public censure is consistent with First Department precedent for comparable reciprocal
discipline outcomes. In Dunphy, these citations function as a proportionality check: censure is presented as a typical First Department
response where the foreign jurisdiction has imposed a public reprimand and the misconduct concerns noncooperation/administrative
compliance rather than proven escrow conversion.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. The limited defenses under 22 NYCRR § 1240.13(b)
The Court applied the reciprocal-discipline rule that New York does not re-litigate the foreign matter; instead, it asks whether any of
the three enumerated defenses is established. Dunphy effectively contested only the “no New York misconduct” defense (misconduct
mismatch), while also offering mitigation (family health crises; claimed lack of willfulness; account closure; relocation and address
confusion).
2. Due process and proof: foreclosed by notice and stipulation
On due process, the Court emphasized repeated notice (certified mailings and multiple emails), an opportunity to respond, and the fact
that Dunphy requested and received a continuance yet did not appear for the later hearing. Most importantly, the Connecticut matter
ended in a stipulation in which Dunphy admitted violations and consented to a reprimand. That admission mooted arguments that proof was
infirm: the stipulation “fully support[ed] his discipline.”
3. “Would it be misconduct in New York?”—mapping Connecticut violations to New York RPC
The Court rejected Dunphy’s characterization that the matter “cannot be categorized as mishandling of funds.” New York’s focus was not
on whether client funds were misappropriated, but on the duty to maintain and produce required escrow bookkeeping records and to
cooperate with disciplinary oversight. The Court held that the Connecticut conduct would violate:
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Rule 1.15(i) (requiring that escrow bookkeeping records be made available to disciplinary authorities),
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Rule 1.15(j) (failure to maintain or produce required bookkeeping records subjects an attorney to discipline), and
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Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
This is the opinion’s most concrete “translation” move: it treats noncooperation with a random IOLTA audit and related investigative
demands as independently disciplinable in New York, even if the underlying account was later shown to have been closed and the audit was
ultimately closed.
4. Sanction: deference and commensurability, despite nonreporting under 22 NYCRR § 1240.13(d)
The Court reiterated the deference principle: New York generally mirrors the foreign sanction because the originating jurisdiction has
the strongest regulatory interest. Connecticut imposed a public reprimand; New York imposed a public censure as the commensurate
reciprocal sanction.
Notably, the Court did not treat Dunphy’s failure to self-report the Connecticut discipline (required by 22 NYCRR § 1240.13(d)) as
necessitating a harsher penalty in this case. The AGC argued that, in light of precedent and mitigating considerations (eventual
cooperation/admission), nonreporting did not justify departing from a censure. The Court adopted that bottom line by imposing censure
without an upward departure.