Reciprocal Disbarment in New York Following Foreign-Jurisdiction Disbarment Based on a Nolo Contendere Disciplinary Stipulation
1. Introduction
Matter of Spolin (2026 NY Slip Op 01735) is a reciprocal-discipline decision of the Appellate Division,
First Department, concerning attorney Aaron Spolin, admitted in New York in 2014 and later disbarred in California.
The Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department (AGC) sought reciprocal discipline under
Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13.
The core issues were (i) whether any statutory/regulatory defenses to reciprocal discipline applied under
22 NYCRR 1240.13(b), (ii) whether the underlying California misconduct would constitute misconduct in New York,
and (iii) what sanction should be imposed—particularly whether New York should defer to California’s disbarment, where the
California outcome followed a disciplinary stipulation including a nolo contendere plea treated as an admission of culpability.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The First Department granted AGC’s motion and imposed reciprocal disbarment, effective immediately, striking
respondent’s name from the roll of New York attorneys. The Court held:
- No reciprocal-discipline defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) applied.
- The California misconduct would also constitute misconduct in New York under the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.00).
- As a general rule, the Court defers to the sanction imposed by the originating jurisdiction; therefore, disbarment was appropriate.
The Court also noted respondent’s failure to report the foreign discipline to New York authorities as required by
22 NYCRR 1240.13(d).
3. Analysis
3.1. Precedents Cited
Matter of Milara , 194 AD3d 108 , 110 [1st Dept 2021]
Role in the decision: The Court relied on Matter of Milara for the governing framework of reciprocal discipline,
specifically the three enumerated defenses available under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b):
(1) lack of notice or opportunity to be heard (due process);
(2) infirmity of proof; or
(3) the foreign misconduct does not constitute misconduct in New York.
Application here: Even though Spolin did not appear in the New York proceeding, the Court independently assessed
the record described in the California stipulation and found none of the defenses applicable: the respondent had notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and entered a knowing, voluntary plea that would be treated as an admission of culpability; proof was
not infirm; and the conduct mapped onto New York rule violations.
Matter of Tabacco , 171 AD3d 163 , 165 [1st Dept 2019]
Role in the decision: Cited for the sanction principle that, in reciprocal-discipline matters, the First Department
generally defers to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction where the charges originated because that jurisdiction has
the “greatest interest in fashioning sanctions for misconduct.”
Application here: The citation supports a presumption of comity and consistency: absent a compelling reason,
New York will not relitigate sanction from scratch when the foreign jurisdiction has already calibrated the penalty.
Matter of Blumenthal , 165 AD3d 85 , 86 [1st Dept 2018]
Role in the decision: Used both to reinforce deference to foreign sanctions and to support disbarment as an appropriate
reciprocal sanction when the originating jurisdiction imposed disbarment.
Application here: The Court treated California’s disbarment—entered pursuant to respondent’s agreement and plea—as a
strong anchor for New York’s sanction analysis.
Matter of Jaffe , 78 AD3d 152 , 158 [1st Dept 2010]
Role in the decision: Cited as additional support for imposing disbarment where it is “commensurate” with the foreign
jurisdiction’s discipline, underscoring that parity of sanction is a guiding objective in reciprocal cases.
People v Franklin , 63 Cal 4th 261, 284, 370 P3d 1053, 1065 [2016], cert denied 580 US 1022 [2016]
Role in the decision: Not a discipline precedent, but cited in a footnote to define a “Franklin hearing.” The
inclusion matters because it reflects the type of postconviction relief the respondent marketed and billed for, and it provides
context for how respondent packaged services to clients seeking resentencing/mitigation-related relief.
3.2. Legal Reasoning
(a) Continuing jurisdiction over the New York-admitted attorney
The Court began by confirming its authority: as the admitting department, it retains continuing jurisdiction under
22 NYCRR 1240.7(a)(2), even though the underlying misconduct occurred in California.
(b) Trigger for reciprocal discipline and the limited defenses
Reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13 is not a retrial of the foreign matter. The inquiry is structured and narrow:
whether the foreign discipline is established and whether any of the three defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) applies.
The Court, tracking Matter of Milara, found:
-
No due process defect: respondent had notice, an opportunity to be heard, and entered a nolo contendere plea
in a stipulation explicitly acknowledging it would be treated “as an admission of culpability.”
-
No infirmity of proof: the stipulation and resulting California disbarment order supplied a sufficient and reliable basis.
-
New York equivalency: the conduct would violate New York’s professional rules as well.
(c) “Misconduct in California would also constitute misconduct in New York”
The Court expressly matched the foreign misconduct to New York rules, concluding it would violate:
1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b) (communication/informing client),
1.5(a) (fees),
2.1 (advisor—independent professional judgment and candid advice),
and 7.1(a)(1) (false or misleading advertising).
Although the Opinion does not re-litigate each client matter, the misconduct narrative supports the rule-mapping:
respondent took substantial fees from incarcerated individuals and their families while failing to provide candid, accurate
information about the actual resentencing pathways and gatekeeping policies of prosecutors’ offices; pursued or promoted
relief that was unlikely or procedurally unavailable; gave inadequate billing information (“block billing”); and maintained a
website statement suggesting credit for a commutation that occurred before the client retained his firm.
(d) Sanction: deference to the originating jurisdiction
The sanction analysis is explicit and precedential in tone: “as a general rule” the First Department defers to the
foreign jurisdiction’s sanction (citing Matter of Milara, Matter of Tabacco, and Matter of Blumenthal).
Because California imposed disbarment—entered pursuant to respondent’s agreement—New York imposed the same sanction as
“commensurate” discipline (citing Matter of Blumenthal and Matter of Jaffe).
(e) Failure to report foreign discipline
The Court noted respondent’s noncompliance with the self-reporting requirement in 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d).
While the Opinion does not treat the failure to report as a separate charge driving a distinct penalty, its inclusion
reinforces the Court’s view that immediate reciprocal disbarment was warranted and unopposed on any cognizable defense.
3.3. Impact
(a) Reinforcement of New York’s reciprocal-discipline architecture
The decision underscores that reciprocal discipline in New York is designed to be efficient and rule-bound:
the foreign order plus the absence of a 1240.13(b) defense typically leads to the imposition of comparable discipline.
The Opinion’s reliance on the established “general rule” of deference signals continued institutional preference for
sanction parity and comity.
(b) Treatment of stipulations and nolo contendere pleas in attorney discipline
Practically, the Opinion signals that where a foreign disciplinary resolution is based on a stipulation in which the attorney
acknowledges that a nolo contendere plea will be treated as an “admission of culpability,” New York will treat the foreign
discipline as sufficiently reliable for reciprocal purposes, absent a demonstrated defense.
(c) Client-protection message for “resentencing/clemency” marketing
The factual narrative—fees charged to prisoners and families while failing to disclose known policy barriers and while
maintaining potentially misleading website content—illustrates how traditional professional rules (communication, fees,
candid advice, advertising) apply forcefully to modern, policy-driven postconviction practices, including resentencing initiatives.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Reciprocal discipline: A process where New York imposes professional discipline because another jurisdiction
already disciplined the attorney. New York does not fully retry the case; it asks whether the foreign result is valid and
whether limited defenses apply.
-
22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) defenses: The only three routes to avoid reciprocal discipline are: (1) no due process in the foreign case,
(2) proof was unreliable/insufficient, or (3) the conduct would not be misconduct in New York.
-
Nolo contendere (no contest) plea in discipline: A plea where the respondent does not contest the charges.
Here, the key detail is that respondent agreed the plea would be treated as an admission of culpability, reducing room to argue
“infirmity of proof” in New York.
-
AB2942 resentencing context: The Opinion describes a California resentencing scheme and prosecutor policies indicating
that certain defendants were not prioritized and that unsolicited communications were not helpful or not accepted—facts central
to why the billed “applications” and letters were of questionable value.
-
Franklin hearing: As explained by the Opinion citing People v Franklin, a proceeding allowing presentation of
mitigating “youthfulness” evidence for parole considerations.
-
Block billing: Grouping multiple tasks into a single time entry or lump-sum description, which can impede a client’s
ability to evaluate what work was actually done—especially relevant where a client requests an itemized bill.
5. Conclusion
Matter of Spolin reaffirms a clear operational rule in New York reciprocal-discipline practice: where an attorney is
disbarred in a foreign jurisdiction and no 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) defense is shown, the First Department will generally
defer to the foreign sanction and impose a commensurate penalty—here, immediate disbarment.
The Opinion is significant both for its doctrinal clarity (tight adherence to the reciprocal-discipline framework) and for its
practical warning: lawyers who market postconviction “resentencing” or clemency-adjacent services must provide candid, accurate
advice about procedural realities, charge reasonable fees tied to meaningful work, avoid misleading advertising, and comply with
mandatory reporting duties when disciplined elsewhere.