Reasoned-Consideration Requirement When the BIA Treats an Appeal as Withdrawn Despite a Pending Motion to Cancel Withdrawal

I. Introduction

In Angielih Estefania Godoy-Cartagena v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order deeming a noncitizen’s appeal withdrawn under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4—even though she had filed a timely, counseled motion to cancel her earlier motion to withdraw before the BIA acted on the withdrawal.

The petitioner, a Honduran citizen, had been ordered removed in absentia in 2007 after failing to appear for a hearing that followed a Notice to Appear listing the hearing date and time “to be set.” In 2025 she moved to reopen the in absentia order; the Immigration Judge denied reopening; she appealed to the BIA. While the appeal was pending, she filed an “emergency” withdrawal of appeal, explaining she had been told the Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to accept certain emergency filings while the appeal was pending. After she was removed, she promptly moved at the BIA to cancel the withdrawal so she could maintain her appeal.

The core issue was not the ultimate merits of reopening, but whether the BIA violated the Eleventh Circuit’s “reasoned consideration” requirement by finalizing withdrawal without acknowledging—let alone addressing—the pending motion to cancel the withdrawal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s withdrawal order, and remanded. The court held that the BIA failed to provide reasoned consideration because its order stated there was “nothing pending before the Board” while omitting any mention of the petitioner’s motion to cancel withdrawal, which had been filed weeks earlier.

The court declined to reach the petitioner’s due process claim, resolving the case on administrative-law grounds.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate jurisdiction and the reviewability of withdrawal determinations

  • Clement v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 75 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir 2023): The court relied on Clement to confirm it had jurisdiction to review whether the BIA properly deemed an appeal withdrawn. This matters because a “withdrawal” order can otherwise look ministerial; Clement frames it as reviewable when challenged via a petition for review.

2. The “reasoned consideration” doctrine and its application

  • Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 810 F.3d 792 (11th Cir. 2016), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023): Jeune supplied the standard that reasoned-consideration challenges are reviewed de novo. The court noted Santos-Zacaria only to clarify that Jeune was overruled on other issues, preserving the reasoned-consideration framework used here.
  • Jathursan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 17 F.4th 1365 (11th Cir. 2021): Provided the canonical articulation: whether the BIA “heard and thought and not merely reacted,” and the remedy of remand when it does not. The court invoked Jathursan repeatedly to emphasize that ignoring a ground or argument requires remand.
  • Ali v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019): The opinion leaned heavily on Ali for two points: (i) reasoned-consideration review asks whether the agency adequately explained itself and made reviewable findings—not whether it was right; and (ii) failure to discuss “highly relevant” matters can render a decision “incapable of review.”
  • Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 992 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2021): Supplied the familiar three circumstances indicating lack of reasoned consideration (misstating the record; failing to explain rejection of logical conclusions; giving unreasonable justifications not responsive to the record). The court placed this case in the second/third categories: the BIA’s silence left an unexplained, unreviewable disposition of the cancellation motion.
  • Min Yong Huang v. Holder, 774 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited (via Ali) for the proposition that the BIA need not write an “exegesis on every contention,” but still must address what is necessary to make the decision reviewable.
  • Indrawati v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2015): Quoted (via Ali) to reinforce that remand for lack of reasoned consideration is not a merits disagreement; it is about the decision being unreviewable.
  • Tan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2006): Used by analogy: in Tan the BIA misstated the evidentiary record by describing the evidence as consisting only of certain items. Here, while not a “substantive evidence” omission, the BIA effectively misstated the procedural record by asserting nothing was pending while a motion to cancel was pending.
  • Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 717 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2013): Cited for the “heard and thought” formulation that frames the minimum explanation needed for judicial review.

3. Due process review standards (not reached on the merits)

  • Lapaix v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for de novo review of constitutional challenges. The court ultimately did not decide the due process claim after granting relief on reasoned-consideration grounds.

4. “Presumption of regularity” and why it did not cure the BIA’s silence

  • United States Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1 (2001) and F.C.C. v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965): The government invoked these to argue that because the motion to cancel was in the administrative record, the court should presume the BIA properly considered it. The Eleventh Circuit rejected extending the presumption that far: receipt/filing does not equal reasoned consideration.
  • Matter of Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27 (BIA 1995): The government analogized to the strong presumption of effective service in certified-mail notice contexts. The court distinguished it: that presumption goes to whether notice was attempted/received, not whether an adjudicator provided a reviewable explanation.

5. Authority and discretion to reopen/reconsider and why the timing mattered

  • Luna-Flores v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 859 F. App'x 869 (11th Cir. 2021): The government relied on this to argue that reinstating an appeal after withdrawal resembles reopening/reconsideration, which can be discretionary and potentially unreviewable. The court distinguished Luna-Flores on a key procedural fact: there, the motion to reinstate came after the BIA had acted and returned the record; here, the motion to cancel was filed before the BIA acted on the withdrawal—so there was “nothing to reopen” at the time of the cancellation motion.
  • Lenis v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited in connection with the general rule that some sua sponte reopening decisions are committed to agency discretion by law and are not reviewable. The court used Lenis to underscore why it mattered whether this was a “reopen” request at all—and concluded it was not, given the cancellation motion’s timing.
  • Collado v. J. & G. Transp., Inc., 820 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2007)): Cited to explain that unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinions (like Luna-Flores) are not binding.
  • Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945): Mentioned in the court’s discussion of deference to the BIA’s interpretations of its own regulations—highlighting that deference presupposes an articulated agency interpretation to evaluate.

6. Unpublished BIA decisions and the BIA Practice Manual (persuasive context, not binding law)

  • In re Addil Gibbs, 2007 WL 3318656 (BIA Sept. 14, 2007): Example where the BIA declined to treat a mistaken “withdrawal” as dispositive and instead construed the filing consistent with the relief sought.
  • In re Walter Crimi, 2014 WL 3889565 (BIA June 27, 2014): Example suggesting withdrawals can be revisited where withdrawal was not the party’s intent, advising immediate notification if withdrawal was unintended.
  • Matter of Carlos Anderson Beneth-Garcia, 2023 WL 8826893 (BIA Apr. 17, 2023): Example of the BIA vacating a prior “withdrawn” order and proceeding to adjudicate remaining issues.
  • BIA Prac. Man. Ch. 4 and BIA Prac. Man. Ch. 5: Used to clarify the distinction between a motion to withdraw appeal (accepting the IJ’s decision) and a motion to remand (seeking return of jurisdiction to the IJ for further proceedings). The court flagged that the petitioner may have sought “remand-like” relief but filed “withdrawal,” making the cancellation motion especially salient.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The operative procedural principle: silence in the face of a pending motion is not reasoned consideration

The court’s holding is tightly procedural: when the BIA has before it a motion that materially bears on the dispositive action it takes (here, whether an appeal remains “pending”), the BIA must say enough to show it considered the motion and to allow meaningful judicial review. The BIA’s order did not merely fail to discuss a peripheral detail; it finalized withdrawal and declared that “there is now nothing pending” while a motion to cancel the withdrawal was, in fact, pending in the record.

2. No need to decide whether “cancellation of withdrawal” is authorized—yet

A central feature of the reasoning is restraint: the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether (a) a withdrawal is effective immediately upon filing, (b) the regulations permit cancellation, (c) cancellation is discretionary, or (d) the petitioner should win cancellation on these facts. Instead, the court held that the BIA must first address those questions in a way that is reviewable.

3. The presumption of regularity cannot substitute for an explanation

The government’s “presumption of regularity” argument failed because it attempted to convert a presumption about proper performance of routine duties (e.g., receipt, mailing procedures) into a presumption that the BIA supplied the legally required level of explanation. The court treated “reasoned consideration” as an external judicial-review constraint: if the BIA does not reveal how it disposed of an issue, the decision is “incapable of review” regardless of whether the motion is physically present in the record.

4. Timing as a jurisdictional and doctrinal pivot (distinguishing reopening)

The court rejected analogies to post-withdrawal “reinstatement” motions (as in Luna-Flores) because, here, the motion to cancel was filed before the BIA acted on the withdrawal. That timing mattered in two ways:

  • Doctrinally, it reinforced that the BIA was being asked to decide what effect to give contemporaneous filings—not to reopen a closed matter.
  • Jurisdictionally, it avoided prematurely treating the cancellation request as an unreviewable sua sponte reopening issue under Lenis. Even if discretion might ultimately exist, the court required a BIA decision that identifies the governing framework.

C. Impact

  • Procedural accountability at the BIA: The decision signals that when the BIA uses 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 to finalize withdrawal, it must address any timely filing that calls the withdrawal’s effect into question (e.g., a motion to cancel, vacate, or clarify intent), at least enough to permit review.
  • Limits on “ministerial” withdrawal orders: Withdrawal processing cannot be treated as purely administrative when the record contains a motion that contests withdrawal or indicates a different litigating intent.
  • Future litigation posture: Litigants may rely on this opinion to argue that the BIA must acknowledge and dispose of time-sensitive, outcome-determinative filings—especially those affecting jurisdiction and finality—rather than silently proceeding as if they do not exist.
  • Clarifying a gray zone in immigration procedure: The court noted that neither the INA nor regulations explicitly address “cancellation” of withdrawal. On remand (and in later cases), the BIA may develop a clearer rule (e.g., whether withdrawals are immediately effective; whether cancellation is permitted before the BIA acts; whether a showing of mistake/coercion is required). This opinion effectively forces that issue into a reasoned, reviewable posture.
  • Practical consequence for removed appellants: Because removal can occur quickly after procedural steps, the requirement that the BIA address cancellation motions may be critical to preserving an appellant’s ability to obtain meaningful appellate consideration before finality attaches.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “In absentia” removal order: A removal order entered because the person did not appear for the hearing.
  • Motion to reopen: A request to restart immigration proceedings based on specified grounds (e.g., lack of notice, changed facts).
  • Appeal withdrawal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4: A party may withdraw an appeal; if the BIA has not decided the appeal, the case returns and the underlying IJ decision becomes final as if no appeal had been taken.
  • Motion to remand (vs. withdraw): A motion to remand asks the BIA to send the case back to the IJ for further action while the appeal remains alive; a withdrawal ends the appeal and typically makes the IJ decision final.
  • Reasoned consideration: The BIA must show—through its written decision—that it considered the key issues raised and explained itself enough for a court to review what it did and why.
  • Presumption of regularity: A general presumption that agencies properly perform routine duties (like mailing or file processing). This case holds that such a presumption cannot replace the BIA’s duty to provide a reviewable explanation when a motion squarely presents an issue.
  • “Committed to agency discretion by law” / sua sponte reopening: Some agency choices (like reopening on the agency’s own initiative) may be largely unreviewable. Here, the court emphasized that a pre-decision motion to cancel withdrawal is not automatically such a request.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s key contribution in Godoy-Cartagena is a procedural rule of administrative law in the immigration context: the BIA cannot deem an appeal withdrawn without addressing a timely, record-filed motion that seeks to cancel that withdrawal. The court did not decide whether cancellation must be granted; it held only that the BIA must acknowledge and resolve the request in a way that makes the decision reviewable.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion reinforces that “reasoned consideration” is not a formality—it is the mechanism that makes agency adjudication accountable, intelligible, and judicially reviewable, particularly where finality and removal consequences can turn on fast-moving procedural filings.