Reasonableness Over Benchmarks: Strack’s 20–30% and 1.5 Multiplier Ranges Are Flexible When Oklahoma § 2023(G)(4)(e) Factors Justify a Higher Class-Fee Award

1. Introduction

This long-running Oklahoma oil-and-gas royalty underpayment class action began in 2011 and settled in 2015 for a $52 million common fund. The litigation thereafter “continued over the evergreen issue of attorneys’ fees.” The certified class (represented by Chieftain Royalty Company) obtained a settlement; class counsel sought a percentage-based fee; and two class members (Danny George and the Nutley Estate) repeatedly objected.

The key legal issue in this appeal was not whether Oklahoma allows percentage-of-the-fund fees (that was clarified after the first remand), but whether the district court’s fee award—$17,333,333.33 (33.33% of the fund), cross-checked through a lodestar analysis yielding a 2.15 multiplier—was “reasonable” under Oklahoma’s class-action fee statute as interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reinstated fee order. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the panel held:

• Strack requires “reasonableness,” not strict adherence to statistical benchmarks. The district court permissibly deviated from the 20–30% “average” range because it justified the deviation with the statutory factors and evidence.
• The lodestar cross-check was properly performed. Identifying the multiplier needed to match the percentage award is not impermissible “reverse engineering” when the court then evaluates the multiplier’s reasonableness with the statutory factors and evidence.
• “Fees-on-fees” may be included when reasonable. Relying on State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, the court held Oklahoma permits recovery for reasonable time spent applying for and defending a fee award, including (here) appellate efforts the district court found within reasonable professional judgment.
• Reconstructed time records are acceptable under Oklahoma law. Under Spencer v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. and Conti v. Rep. Underwriters Ins. Co., reconstructed records can support a fee award if they provide an adequate record for reasonableness review.
• Objections to factor analysis largely failed under deferential review. Alleged “double counting,” factor misconstruction, and other claimed errors did not establish legal error or clear factual error.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest Energy Inst. Fund XIII-A, L.P. (Chieftain I)
  Role: Established that state law governs fee availability and calculation in this diversity class action; originally interpreted Oklahoma law to require a lodestar approach (based on then-understood authority) and expressed concern about counsel’s billing records.
  Influence here: Frames the case’s procedural history and explains why the fee dispute became a state-law reasonableness question under evolving Oklahoma precedent.
• Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc.
  Role: Oklahoma Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of Oklahoma class-fee standards: either percentage-of-the-fund or lodestar may be used so long as the ultimate award is reasonable; courts should compare results of both methods (cross-check) and must meaningfully analyze the § 2023(G)(4)(e) factors; multipliers “rarely” above 1.5; 20–30% described as an “average” class-action range.
  Influence here: The controlling substantive framework. The Tenth Circuit’s central interpretive move is to read Strack as guidance—serious but flexible—rather than as imposing ceilings. The opinion also distinguishes Strack on facts and on the quality of the trial court’s factor analysis.
• Chieftain Royalty Co. v. SM Energy Co. (Chieftain II)
  Role: Vacated the fee award on a notice defect without reaching merits.
  Influence here: Sets up why the district court “reinstituted” its prior merits analysis after curing notice, and why the appeal finally squarely addressed reasonableness under Oklahoma law.
• State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City
  Role: Foundational Oklahoma fee decision; among other things, permits recovery for reasonable time spent securing and defending a fee application (“fees-on-fees”) and emphasizes detailed time records.
  Influence here: Supplies the Oklahoma rule allowing compensation for fee-defense time, which undercut objectors’ attempt to excise appellate fee-defense work from the lodestar. The panel also treated Burk’s “detailed time records” requirement as tempered by later Oklahoma cases allowing reconstruction.
• Spencer v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. and Conti v. Rep. Underwriters Ins. Co.
  Role: Clarify that reconstructed records can support a fee award if adequate for reasonableness review.
  Influence here: Directly defeats the argument that reconstructed timesheets are categorically barred by Burk.
• Parsons v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. (noted in the record as sometimes referenced under an alternate name)
  Role: Cited for Oklahoma’s “strong presumption” that the lodestar alone is reasonable and for Oklahoma’s recognition of the significance of the relationship between “amount sued for” and “results obtained.”
  Influence here: Supports the district court’s ability to treat “results obtained” as an important factor, rebutting objectors’ reliance on non-Oklahoma federal authority limiting that factor’s independent weight.
• Gottlieb v. Barry
  Role: Cited (via Strack) for choosing the methodology that best yields a reasonable award under the circumstances.
  Influence here: Reinforces flexibility of method and the primacy of reasonableness.
• Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.
  Role: Source of twelve factors incorporated into Oklahoma’s § 2023(G)(4)(e), plus Oklahoma’s additional “risk of recovery” factor.
  Influence here: Supplies the analytical checklist the district court had to apply in a non-cursory, evidence-based way.
• Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters (O’Connor, J., statement re denial of certiorari)
  Role: Cited (via Strack) for the concept that reasonableness asks whether there is a rational relationship between fee and recovery.
  Influence here: Used to reinforce the “windfall” concern and the necessity of a cross-check.
• Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC
  Role: Notes that class certification can “make or break” litigation.
  Influence here: Supports treating successful certification in a difficult environment as evidence of counsel’s skill and the case’s difficulty—facts the district court used to justify a higher award.
• Standards of review authorities: Schell v. OXY USA Inc., ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc. v. Biamp Sys., Moothart v. Bell, McEwen v. City of Norman, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.
  Role: Define abuse-of-discretion, de novo review of legal principles, clear-error review of factfinding, and deference to permissible ranges of conclusions.
  Influence here: These cases supply the doctrinal lens that made it difficult for objectors to overturn a detailed, evidence-supported fee order.
• Preservation / forfeiture authorities: Kitchen v. Herbert, Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.
  Role: Address forfeiture on appeal and limits on raising forfeited arguments on remand.
  Influence here: Bars the objectors’ late-developed “statutory interest inflates amount-in-controversy” argument.
• Other cited cases in argument context: Miller v. Magnus, Blum v. Stenson, United States v. Wright
  Role: Used to evaluate (and reject) objectors’ analogies about reasonableness and factor weighting; and to define “arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.”
  Influence here: The court treats these as either distinguishable or subordinate to Oklahoma-specific authority.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s central interpretive move: Strack is guidance, not a ceiling

The panel read Strack as prioritizing “reasonableness” over any particular methodology and over statistical ranges. The “20% to 30%” and “rarely” above “1.5” statements were treated as presumptive reference points—important, but not “set in stone.” The operative constraint is instead procedural and evidentiary: the trial court must apply all thirteen § 2023(G)(4)(e) factors meaningfully and support deviations with evidence.

B. Why 33.33% was affirmed despite the 20–30% “average range”

The district court did not rubber-stamp counsel’s original 40% request. It evaluated the statutory factors and found eleven of thirteen supported enhancement, emphasizing:

• Results obtained: “nearly complete success,” including expert-supported findings that the settlement approximated 100% of claimed principal underpayments.
• Risk and complexity: high non-recovery risk, fact and law complexity (diverse leases; unsettled substantive law), and “mercurial” industry conditions.
• Skill and certification success: certification achieved when “controlling law regarding class certification was in flux,” contrasted with other royalty underpayment cases where classes were not certified.

The appellate court treated these as permissible reasons—tied to the statutory factors—to justify a modest departure (3.33 percentage points) above the upper end of the “average” range.

C. The lodestar cross-check: not forbidden “reverse engineering”

The objectors argued the district court impermissibly “reverse engineered” a multiplier to match the percentage award, pointing to Strack’s criticism of a multiplier selected “based on nothing more” than matching 40% of the fund. The Tenth Circuit rejected this as a category error:

• A cross-check necessarily computes the multiplier required to equate the percentage award.
• The legal question is whether the court then justifies that multiplier under the statutory factors with evidence.

Because the district court performed that second step in detail, the process matched what Strack requires.

D. “Fees-on-fees” and reconstructed records

Two additional moves reinforced the award’s stability under Oklahoma law:

• Fees-on-fees: Relying on Burk, the court upheld inclusion of reasonable fee-defense time, including contested appellate efforts. It acknowledged the “close issue” of extraordinary petitions (rehearing, en banc, certiorari) but deferred to the district court’s evidence-backed finding of reasonableness, especially given that counsel’s position was later vindicated in Oklahoma by Strack.
• Reconstructed time: The court applied Spencer and Conti to reject any per se bar to reconstructed timesheets.

E. Statutory factors and deference

The objectors’ factor challenges largely failed because (i) the district court explicitly addressed double-counting concerns by discounting factors subsumed in hourly rates or time, and (ii) many objections attacked factual assessments subject to clear-error review, a “highly deferential” standard. The opinion underscores that, once a district court produces a detailed, record-cited factor analysis, overturning it is difficult absent a concrete legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding.

3.3 Impact

• In Oklahoma-governed common-fund class actions in federal court, Strack ranges function as presumptions, not caps. This opinion will be cited to defend awards slightly above 30% (and multipliers above 1.5) when the district court’s factor analysis is thorough and evidence-based.
• It legitimizes a “transparent cross-check” model. The court effectively blesses the standard class-action practice described by treatise authority: calculate the multiplier implied by the percentage award, then ask if that multiplier is reasonable in context—rather than pretending the two methods must produce independently derived numbers.
• It strengthens fee-defense recoverability under Oklahoma law. By affirming inclusion of certain appellate fee-defense hours as “reasonable” under Burk, the opinion may encourage broader “fees-on-fees” requests in Oklahoma fee litigation—subject to reasonableness scrutiny.
• It reduces the leverage of “recordkeeping” objections post hoc. Reconstructed time records remain usable if they create an “adequate record” for reasonableness review, limiting objectors’ ability to win solely on imperfect contemporaneous billing in contingency-style class practice.
• It signals the strategic importance of building a factor-by-factor evidentiary record. The decisive feature was not the percentage or multiplier in the abstract, but the district court’s robust § 2023(G)(4)(e) findings and citations—suggesting future litigants should focus on evidence supporting (or undermining) each factor.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Common fund: A settlement pool created for the class (here, $52 million). Attorneys’ fees are paid from that fund, reducing what class members receive.
• Percentage-of-the-fund fee: The court awards counsel a stated percentage of the common fund (here, 33.33%).
• Lodestar: A baseline fee computed as reasonable hours × reasonable hourly rates.
• Multiplier (lodestar enhancement): A factor applied to the lodestar to reflect case-specific considerations (risk, results, complexity). A 2.15 multiplier means the final fee is 2.15 times the baseline lodestar.
• Lodestar cross-check: A “sanity check” used when awarding a percentage fee: compute the implied multiplier and decide if it would be a reasonable enhancement, to avoid a windfall.
• “Fees-on-fees”: Time counsel spends requesting or defending its fee request. Oklahoma (via Burk) generally allows recovery for reasonable fees-on-fees.
• Abuse of discretion / clear error: Deferential appellate standards. Even if appellate judges might have chosen a different number, they affirm unless the trial court applied the wrong legal rule or made a plainly mistaken factual finding.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s 2026 decision confirms that, in Oklahoma-governed class actions, the decisive legal command is not adherence to Strack’s benchmark ranges but a disciplined, evidence-based “reasonableness” inquiry under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2023(G)(4)(e), coupled with a meaningful lodestar cross-check. The opinion also clarifies that computing a multiplier to match a percentage award is not improper “reverse engineering” when the multiplier’s reasonableness is independently justified. For future fee disputes, the lesson is procedural and evidentiary: detailed factor findings—and the record to support them—are what make a fee award durable on appeal.