Reasonable Suspicion for a PBT Is Not “Dispelled” by a Passed HGN and No Physical Signs When Other Objective Facts Still Support Impairment

Case: Melissa Ann Lorsung v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date: February 4, 2026
Disposition: Reversed (court of appeals); license revocation upheld

1. Introduction

This implied-consent appeal asked whether police had a lawful basis to request a preliminary breath test (PBT) under Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1. After a bar closed around 2:00 a.m., Melissa Lorsung backed her car into a pedestrian in the bar’s parking lot. During the accident investigation, she admitted she had consumed three beers. The responding officer observed no classic physical indicia of impairment (e.g., slurred speech, poor balance, bloodshot eyes) and administered an initial horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test showing no clues of impairment. On body-worn camera, both officers made statements indicating they did not think she was impaired. Nonetheless, the primary officer later requested a PBT; Lorsung initially declined, then ultimately consented and registered a high alcohol concentration.

The district court sustained the Commissioner’s license revocation, finding reasonable suspicion supported the PBT request. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the initial suspicion was “dispelled,” emphasizing the passed HGN. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the PBT request was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, whether suspicion had been dispelled, and whether the PBT request unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the officer had an objectively reasonable suspicion that Lorsung drove while impaired when he requested the PBT. The Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion is a “low hurdle” and found the key objective facts—(1) Lorsung’s admission to drinking three beers and (2) her backing into a pedestrian in a bar parking lot at closing time—supported the inference of impairment.

The Court rejected the court of appeals’ approach of giving a passed HGN test “elevated weight.” A satisfactory HGN is a factor that may diminish suspicion, but it does not conclusively establish non-impairment. The Court further held that reasonable suspicion is “dispelled” only when new information conclusively negates the basis for suspicion—an exacting standard not met here. Finally, the Court held the PBT request was not an unlawful expansion of the stop because it was reasonably related to the accident investigation involving alcohol.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. PBT authority and the governing suspicion standard

  • State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981): The Court treated Juncewski as supporting a reasonable-suspicion requirement for PBT requests (though it assumed the point without definitively deciding it, because the parties agreed). Juncewski used “specific and articulable suspicion” and tied its analysis to Terry-style reasonable suspicion.
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): The foundational source of the “specific and articulable facts” standard and the “totality”/common-sense approach to assessing whether an intrusion is justified.
  • State v. Cavegn, 294 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1980) and Marben v. Department of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697 (Minn. 1980): Cited to show that Minnesota’s impairment-investigation framework historically applied traditional Terry reasonable suspicion principles.

B. The “totality of the circumstances,” objectivity, and the low threshold

  • State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 2021): Central to the Court’s framing. Taylor supplied multiple governing propositions: reasonable suspicion is a “low hurdle”; there is no bright-line requirement for physical indicia of impairment; and courts evaluate the “whole picture.”
  • United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981): Source of the “whole picture” language reinforcing that courts must aggregate facts rather than isolate them.
  • State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2007) and State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 2008): Cited for the proposition that suspicion must be more than a hunch and that the standard is not demanding.
  • Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014): Used (via Taylor) to emphasize that reasonable suspicion requires “considerably less” proof than a preponderance and “obviously less” than probable cause.
  • State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 2011) and State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2014): Reinforced the objective nature of the inquiry—courts do not validate suspicion based on an officer’s subjective belief.
  • State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. 2016): Supported consideration of time (near bar close) and location (bar areas) as contextual factors that can contribute to suspicion when combined with other facts.

C. The evidentiary role of the HGN test (and why a “pass” is not dispositive)

  • State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 1994): Explained what HGN measures and held HGN evidence satisfies the Frye standard for scientific evidence (where properly administered). The Supreme Court relied on Klawitter to make a crucial asymmetry point: Klawitter supports that the presence of nystagmus may indicate impairment, but it does not establish that the absence of nystagmus proves non-impairment.
  • Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923): Cited within Klawitter to define the general-acceptance standard for scientific evidence.
  • State v. Elmourabit, 373 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1985): Though addressing a different procedural posture, the reasoning mattered: “negative” field sobriety/dexterity results are not “unimpeachable” proof of sobriety; they are simply evidence to be weighed among other facts.
  • State v. Graham, 222 N.W. 909 (Minn. 1929): Quoted in Elmourabit for the idea that a person can appear outwardly fine and still be under the influence.
  • Swapinski v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. App. 1985): Cited in Elmourabit to show that individuals with illegal alcohol concentrations may still pass field sobriety tests.

D. “Dispelling” reasonable suspicion requires conclusive negation

  • State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996): Provided the canonical example: suspicion based on the assumption that the driver is the owner with a suspended license is dispelled when the officer learns the driver is not the owner.
  • State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 2000): Reinforced that suspicion is not dispelled merely because a database check suggests the vehicle is not stolen, where officers know databases can be wrong. The Court drew from Pike and Britton to articulate a high bar: new information dispels suspicion only when it conclusively negates its basis.

E. Scope-of-stop doctrine under the Minnesota Constitution

  • State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004): Established Minnesota’s two-step inquiry for traffic stops—justified at inception, and actions during the stop must be reasonably related to the basis for the stop.
  • State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2011): Provided the articulation of Askerooth’s second step (actions “reasonably related to and justified by” the circumstances giving rise to the stop).
  • State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2021): Cited for the principle that an expansion requires independent reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.

F. Preservation/forfeiture and nonprecedential authority

  • Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 2020) and State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 2016): Used to reject an argument raised too late (that suspicion was dispelled because the driver was “free to leave”).
  • State v. Horn, No. A17-1276, 2018 WL 2770465 (Minn. App. June 11, 2018): A non-precedential case invoked by the driver; the Supreme Court declined to consider the argument due to forfeiture.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. What facts created reasonable suspicion for the PBT request

The Court identified an objective, particularized basis for suspecting impaired driving at the time of the PBT request:

  • Admission of drinking: Lorsung told the officer she consumed three beers before driving. The Court treated this as a “strong basis” to infer impairment.
  • Driving conduct: She backed into a pedestrian—an event that can reasonably be seen as consistent with impairment even if not definitive.
  • Context: Bar parking lot shortly after 2:00 a.m. closing time, reinforcing the inference of alcohol involvement when combined with the admission and the collision.

The Court stressed that reasonable suspicion does not require proof that impairment is more likely than not; it requires “considerably less” than a preponderance and far less than probable cause.

B. Why contrary facts did not defeat suspicion

  • No physical indicia: This cuts against suspicion, but Taylor forecloses any bright-line rule that physical indicators must be present.
  • Passed initial HGN: The Court’s key doctrinal move was refusing to treat a passed HGN as dispositive—nothing in Klawitter supports an inference that “no nystagmus” equals “not impaired.” The Court treated the passed HGN as an ordinary factor that “diminishes” suspicion rather than extinguishing it.
  • Officer statements suggesting sobriety: The Court reiterated that subjective beliefs are not the focus. It assumed (without deciding) that these statements could be considered to the extent they illuminate what an objective officer would think, but held they were non-dispositive and insufficient to overcome the objective facts.
  • 11-minute gap and accident dynamics: The delay was explained by scene-management tasks and did not meaningfully undercut suspicion. Shared fault or the pedestrian’s intoxication did not erase the inference that a driver who drank and then struck a pedestrian might be impaired.

C. “Dispelling” suspicion: a demanding standard

Building on State v. Pike and State v. Britton, the Court articulated a stringent rule: reasonable suspicion is dispelled only when new information conclusively negates the basis for suspicion. Applied here, the defense facts (passed HGN, no physical signs, officers’ remarks) did not conclusively negate the core basis: admission of drinking plus an alcohol-adjacent collision at bar close.

D. No unlawful expansion of the stop

Under State v. Askerooth and State v. Diede, the PBT request was not an expansion requiring separate suspicion because it remained reasonably related to the circumstances giving rise to the stop: an accident investigation involving alcohol in a bar-lot setting. Even if viewed as an “expansion,” the Court’s reasonable-suspicion holding would supply the needed justification.

3.3. Impact

  • Recalibrates the weight of a passed HGN at the suspicion stage: The decision rejects treating a satisfactory HGN result as uniquely powerful evidence of non-impairment for purposes of reasonable suspicion. In practice, drivers cannot expect that passing HGN (standing alone or paired with “no classic signs”) automatically terminates DWI suspicion when other objective facts support impairment.
  • Strengthens “dispelled suspicion” doctrine: By emphasizing conclusive negation, the Court limits arguments that suspicion evaporates due to mixed or merely countervailing evidence. This matters in fast-moving roadside investigations where evidence is often ambiguous and incremental.
  • Affirms contextual cues plus drinking admissions as sufficient: Admissions to drinking, coupled with bar-close context and an accident, will commonly satisfy the “low hurdle” for PBT requests under Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 even when an officer observes minimal outward signs.
  • Scope-of-stop guidance in accident settings: The holding supports that PBT requests may be viewed as naturally related to alcohol-linked accident investigations, reducing the force of “unlawful expansion” challenges when the investigation remains tied to the crash circumstances.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Preliminary Breath Test (PBT): A roadside breath test used to help an officer decide whether there is enough basis to proceed with a DWI arrest/investigation. Minnesota authorizes PBT requests when the officer has reason to believe the person may have driven while impaired. (Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1.)
  • Reasonable suspicion: A low evidentiary threshold—more than a hunch but much less than probable cause—based on specific facts and reasonable inferences.
  • Totality of the circumstances: Courts do not check boxes or apply rigid formulas; they look at all facts together and ask whether an objective officer would reasonably suspect impaired driving.
  • HGN test: A field test observing involuntary eye movements that can correlate with impairment. Importantly here, the Court treated “HGN clues present” as potentially supportive of impairment, but rejected the idea that “no HGN clues” proves sobriety.
  • “Dispelling” suspicion: Counterevidence does not automatically erase suspicion. Under this opinion, suspicion is dispelled only when new information conclusively eliminates the factual basis for the suspicion.
  • Expansion of a stop: Police actions during a stop must relate to the original reason for the stop (or be supported by new, independent reasonable suspicion). A PBT request tied to an alcohol-adjacent crash investigation can be within the stop’s permissible scope.

5. Conclusion

Melissa Ann Lorsung v. Commissioner of Public Safety clarifies Minnesota’s reasonable-suspicion analysis for PBT requests in an important, practical way: when objective facts support impairment—especially a driver’s admission to drinking coupled with bar-close context and an accident—reasonable suspicion generally persists even if the driver shows no classic physical signs and initially “passes” an HGN test. The Court also reinforces that “dispelling” reasonable suspicion requires conclusive negation, not merely mixed evidence, and confirms that a PBT request can be reasonably related to an accident investigation without constituting an unlawful stop expansion.