Reasonable Efforts Are Not a Prerequisite to Termination: Stagnation and Parental Noncontact—Including Consequences of Incarceration—Support TPR

Important context: The decision is an Entry Order issued by a three-justice panel; the Opinion itself notes that such decisions “are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Even so, it meaningfully illustrates how Vermont’s established termination framework is applied to a record involving parental incarceration, failed communication, and a “reasonable efforts” challenge.

1. Introduction

Case: In re I.G., Juvenile (A.G., Father*) (Vt. Apr. 10, 2026), Case No. 25-AP-353.
Parties: The State of Vermont (petitioner) sought termination of parental rights; Father appealed the termination of his rights to I.G. (born June 2017). Mother’s rights were terminated in the same order and she did not appeal.
Underlying proceeding: A Child in Need of Care or Supervision (CHINS) petition filed July 2022 based on Mother’s substance abuse and disengagement from treatment; Father was incarcerated at filing.

Key issues on appeal:

  • Whether the family division erred in finding a change in circumstances (primarily stagnation) where Father argued DCF did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
  • Whether the family division erred in concluding termination was in I.G.’s best interests, including whether the court properly considered Vermont’s statutory purposes favoring family preservation alongside the Act’s emphasis on safety and timely permanency.
  • How the “reasonable efforts” inquiry interacts with (but does not control) the termination analysis.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights. The Court held that:

  • The family division’s findings that DCF made reasonable, good-faith efforts to contact Father and support reunification were supported by credible evidence; any communication failures largely stemmed from Father’s failure to provide updated contact information and to follow through.
  • Changed circumstances were properly found based on Father’s stagnation over nearly three years: minimal case plan progress, prolonged absence of contact, continued instability, and incarceration risks.
  • Termination was in I.G.’s best interests under the statutory factors, especially the “most important” factor: the likelihood Father could resume parental duties within a reasonable time from the child’s perspective.
  • “Reasonable efforts” are a distinct inquiry and are not a prerequisite to termination; while DCF’s assistance can be relevant, the court may not attribute stagnation to factors beyond a parent’s control—and the record here supported attributing stagnation to Father’s choices and noncompliance.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Opinion is heavily anchored in established Vermont termination doctrine and clarifies how multiple lines of cases fit together when a parent reframes stagnation as agency failure.

  • In re D.S., 2016 VT 130 (¶ 6): Cited for the two-step post-disposition termination framework under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b)—first, determine changed circumstances; second, evaluate best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The Court also uses it for the stagnation concept (“progress expected in the plan of services … despite the passage of time”).
  • In re S.W., 2003 VT 90 (¶ 4): Supplies the frequently repeated formulation that changed circumstances are “most often found” when parental capacity has “stagnated or deteriorated” over time.
  • In re D.S., 2014 VT 38 (¶ 22; ¶ 26; ¶ 31): Used in three ways: (1) to emphasize that the “most important” best-interests factor is the parent’s likelihood of resuming duties within a reasonable time (§ 5114(a)(3)); (2) to reinforce that incarceration and its consequences are attributable to the parent’s own conduct (parents are responsible for behavior leading to incarceration); and (3) to reject the notion that courts must “preserve the family” at the expense of a child’s best interests.
  • In re R.W., 2011 VT 124 (¶ 15): Sets the burden of proof—State must prove both changed circumstances and best interests by clear and convincing evidence.
  • In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33 (38): Cited twice for key principles: (1) termination decisions are committed to family court discretion; and (2) a court cannot base stagnation on factors beyond a parent’s control—making it the bridge between “reasonable efforts” arguments and stagnation findings.
  • In re N.L., 2019 VT 10 (¶ 9; ¶ 27): Provides appellate review standards (clearly erroneous findings; conclusions supported by findings) and underscores that DCF’s efforts are not a best-interests factor in themselves, even if related evidence may be relevant.
  • In re C.P., 2012 VT 100 (¶ 38; ¶ 30): Central to the Opinion’s core clarification: the reasonable-efforts determination under 33 V.S.A. § 5321(h) is “separate” from termination and “is not a prerequisite” to termination. Also cited regarding a child’s need for timely permanency.
  • In re D.F., 2018 VT 132 (¶ 49): Explains that the same evidence can be relevant to both reasonable efforts and termination, while the inquiries remain distinct; and that DCF efforts may bear on whether stagnation is due to factors beyond a parent’s control.
  • In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175 (178): Reinforces deferential appellate review of factfinding—credibility and weight of evidence are for the family court; the Supreme Court asks only whether findings are supported by credible evidence.
  • In re K.F., 2004 VT 40 (¶ 12): Provides an incarceration-and-contact template: frequent incarceration, failure to maintain consistent contact with the caseworker, and lack of bond can support termination, and are not “beyond the parent’s control.”
  • In re J.M., 2015 VT 94 (¶ 12): Reaffirms that the best interests of the child is the “touchstone” and the court’s paramount concern in termination proceedings.

How these precedents shaped the result: The Opinion is less about announcing a new doctrine and more about synthesizing existing doctrine into a structured answer to Father’s theory: even if DCF’s efforts are relevant evidence, termination does not rise or fall on a reasonable-efforts dispute; and stagnation remains a valid changed circumstance when the parent does not engage, does not maintain contact, and does not complete plan steps—especially where the parent’s incarceration-related barriers flow from the parent’s own conduct.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory two-step framework and standards

The Court applies the post-disposition two-step analysis required by 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b) and articulated in In re D.S., 2016 VT 130:

  1. Changed circumstances: commonly proven by stagnation or deterioration over time.
  2. Best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a): four factors, with § 5114(a)(3) (resuming parental duties within a reasonable period) described as “most important.”

The Court reiterates the State’s burden—clear and convincing evidence at both stages (In re R.W., 2011 VT 124)—and the appellate posture: findings reviewed for clear error, conclusions upheld if supported, and substantial discretion afforded to the family court (In re N.L., 2019 VT 10; In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33).

B. “Reasonable efforts” is distinct—yet can be evidentially relevant

Father’s appellate argument attempted to reframe the termination decision as resting on factors beyond his control—namely, DCF’s alleged failure to make reasonable efforts. The Supreme Court’s response is doctrinally precise:

  • Under In re C.P., 2012 VT 100 (¶ 38), the reasonable-efforts determination under 33 V.S.A. § 5321(h) is separate and not a prerequisite to termination.
  • Nonetheless, under In re D.F., 2018 VT 132 (¶ 49) and In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33 (38), DCF’s efforts may be relevant to whether stagnation is attributable to factors beyond a parent’s control—because a court may not rely on stagnation caused by external barriers the parent cannot control.
  • Under In re N.L., 2019 VT 10 (¶ 27), DCF’s efforts are not themselves a best-interests factor, even if overlapping evidence informs the parent’s likely timeframe to resume duties.

This structure allows the Court to do two things at once: (1) reject the premise that a reasonable-efforts deficiency automatically defeats termination, while (2) still scrutinize whether Father’s stagnation was improperly attributed to him rather than to systemic or agency obstacles.

C. Applying those principles to Father’s two “reasonable efforts” theories

1) DCF’s contact with Father during the final incarceration period

Father focused on a narrow window: roughly two months between his July 2025 reincarceration and the September 2025 termination hearing. The evidence showed:

  • Father did not inform the caseworker he was incarcerated; she learned in August 2025.
  • She attempted to call and encountered a new DOC requirement: DCF needed an attorney PIN to contact incarcerated parents.
  • She began the process, obtained the PIN during the week of the hearing, but had not yet called by the hearing date.
  • Father conceded he could place calls and write letters while incarcerated.

The Supreme Court held the family court’s “reasonable efforts” findings were supported by credible evidence and not clearly erroneous (In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175). Critically, even if DCF could have visited or called earlier, the Court found Father failed to explain how that would “meaningfully impact” the assessment of his near-three-year stagnation and lack of contact.

2) Reinitiating visitation after the letter and Father’s proposal for therapy

Father argued DCF should have placed I.G. in therapy after I.G.’s negative reaction to Father’s reintroduction letter, suggesting therapy could have facilitated renewed visits. The Court treated this as speculative and outweighed by record facts:

  • Father’s relationship eroded due to earlier lack of attendance and follow-through (visits discontinued in December 2022; a 2023 attempt to restart failed due to Father’s non-follow-through).
  • DCF required a modest, transitional step—“at least one or two more” letters—before reintroducing in-person visits, given the long gap and the child’s hesitancy.
  • Father did not send further letters despite being able to do so.
  • DCF considered therapy but concluded it was unnecessary once I.G. “balanced back out again.”

The Court implicitly accepted the family court’s view that the “letters first” condition was reasonable and, importantly, that Father’s failure to complete that condition undermined his reasonable-efforts critique.

D. Changed circumstances: stagnation established and attributable to Father

The family court’s changed-circumstances finding rested on extensive evidence that Father was “no closer” to reunification than when the plan was adopted (nearly three years earlier). The Supreme Court affirmed that this is classic stagnation under In re S.W., 2003 VT 90 and In re D.S., 2016 VT 130:

  • Minimal progress on core action steps (no domestic-violence class, parenting class, or mental-health assessment; no releases signed).
  • Inability to provide stable housing; repeated incarceration and probation violations.
  • Little to no contact with I.G. (last in-person contact November 2022; one letter in 2024).
  • Lack of knowledge of I.G.’s current needs.

On the “beyond a parent’s control” point, the Court emphasized a consistent principle from In re D.S., 2014 VT 38 and In re K.F., 2004 VT 40: parents are responsible for the conduct that leads to incarceration and its foreseeable consequences for reunification. The Court treated Father’s incarceration-related limitations as largely self-caused barriers, not agency-created ones.

E. Best interests: permanency and timeframe from the child’s perspective

The Supreme Court affirmed the family court’s best-interests analysis under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a), giving special weight to § 5114(a)(3) per In re D.S., 2014 VT 38:

  • I.G. was eight and had spent four of his years with the foster family; he was bonded, stable, and wanted to remain.
  • The foster family sought permanency and treated him as family.
  • Father was “very far away” from reunification and would be “starting from scratch,” making it unknown when or whether he could meet I.G.’s immediate need for permanency.

Father’s statutory-purpose argument under 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(3)-(5) (family preservation; safety; timely permanency; value of positive parent-child relationships) did not change the outcome because Vermont law treats the child’s best interests as paramount. The Court quoted and relied on In re J.M., 2015 VT 94 (best interests as touchstone) and reiterated In re D.S., 2014 VT 38 (court is not obligated to preserve the family at the expense of best interests).

3.3 Impact

Although nonprecedential as an Entry Order, the decision has practical (and predictably recurring) implications for litigants and trial courts:

  • Clarifies litigation framing: Parents frequently argue that termination rests on agency shortcomings. This Opinion reinforces that “reasonable efforts” disputes do not automatically defeat termination; instead, they are evaluated for whether agency conduct actually caused stagnation or undermined the best-interests timeframe analysis.
  • Highlights the importance of parent-driven communication: The Court treats providing updated contact information, maintaining consistent contact with DCF, and completing simple transitional steps (like letters) as foundational. Failure to do so can neutralize reasonable-efforts challenges.
  • Reinforces incarceration doctrine: The decision continues Vermont’s approach that incarceration is not a “get-out-of-stagnation” explanation; the parent remains responsible for underlying conduct and for using available channels (calls/letters) to maintain engagement.
  • Child-centered timing: The “reasonable period” analysis is explicitly anchored to the child’s perspective and need for permanency, especially after multiple extended custody episodes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision): A court finding that a child requires the State’s intervention because the child is without proper parental care or is at risk of harm. It can lead to temporary custody with DCF and a family case plan.
  • Disposition order / case plan: After a CHINS merits finding, the court adopts a plan (services and action steps) aimed at reunification or another permanency goal. A parent’s progress is measured against these steps over time.
  • Termination of “residual parental rights”: “Residual” rights include the remaining legal rights and responsibilities of a parent after custody has shifted—such as visitation and decision-making rights. Termination ends the legal parent-child relationship.
  • Two-step termination analysis (post-disposition): (1) Has something materially changed since disposition—often stagnation/deterioration? (2) If yes, is termination in the child’s best interests under statutory factors?
  • Stagnation: Not simply “lack of perfection,” but a sustained failure to make expected progress over time—especially where the plan has been in place for years and the parent remains no closer to reunification.
  • Reasonable efforts: DCF must generally make reasonable efforts to support the permanency plan (often reunification). But Vermont law treats this as a separate determination; it can inform (without controlling) whether a parent’s stagnation is fairly attributed to the parent.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A high civil burden of proof—stronger than “more likely than not,” requiring the factfinder to be firmly convinced.
  • “Reasonable period” from the child’s perspective: The key question is not how long a parent might eventually need, but whether the parent can resume duties within a timeframe consistent with the child’s developmental and permanency needs.

5. Conclusion

In re I.G. affirms termination where a parent’s prolonged nonengagement, inconsistent communication, and failure to complete basic plan steps supported a finding of stagnation and a best-interests conclusion favoring permanency with a stable, bonded foster family. The Opinion underscores that while DCF’s “reasonable efforts” may be relevant evidence, they are not a prerequisite to termination—and a parent cannot convert self-created barriers (including incarceration and failure to maintain contact) into “factors beyond the parent’s control.” Above all, the decision reiterates Vermont’s consistent theme: the child’s safety and timely permanency remain paramount in the termination analysis.