Reaffirming Valid Faretta Waivers and Intended-Loss Sentencing in PPP/EIDL Fraud (Anders Dismissal)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Divine-Seven El (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal after appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The defendant, Divine-Seven El, had been convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, two counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and two counts of unlawful monetary transactions, arising from an $11.5 million scheme involving fraudulent PPP/EIDL applications and “title-washing” of vehicles using counterfeit lien releases.

The appeal’s potential issues centered on (i) El’s self-representation and the Sixth Amendment, (ii) “sovereign citizen” jurisdictional arguments, (iii) sufficiency of the evidence, (iv) a potential Bruton confrontation issue, and (v) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 150-month, within-Guidelines sentence—particularly the loss calculation using intended loss rather than actual loss.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. Relying on the adequacy of counsel’s Anders submission, the court limited its review to the topics counsel addressed, citing United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014). It concluded there was no nonfrivolous basis to challenge:

  • the district court’s acceptance of El’s knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel;
  • any “sovereign citizen” claim that federal jurisdiction did not apply to him;
  • the sufficiency of evidence supporting the fraud and monetary-transaction convictions;
  • a Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) claim, because the incriminating portions were not admitted or played; or
  • the sentence, including use of intended loss for the Guidelines enhancement and the sentence’s substantive reasonableness.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)

Anders supplies the procedural vehicle: when appointed counsel concludes an appeal is frivolous, counsel may seek to withdraw while filing a brief identifying any arguably appealable issues. The appellate court then independently examines the case (often guided by the Anders brief) to confirm no nonfrivolous issues exist.

United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)

The court used Bey for two linked propositions in Anders practice: (i) counsel’s brief must adequately explain the case and likely issues, and (ii) when the Anders analysis is thorough, the court may limit review to the subjects counsel discusses.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) and United States v. Thomas, 833 F.3d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 2016)

These cases frame the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and the requirement that waiver of counsel be knowing and intelligent. The opinion treats the district court’s repeated warnings and colloquies as satisfying the constitutional threshold even though El initially resisted engagement by asserting “sovereign-citizen” rhetoric and refusing to “consent” to the colloquy.

Bey v. State, 847 F.3d 559, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2017)

The court relied on this authority to characterize “sovereign citizen” jurisdictional arguments as frivolous, noting that the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly rejected such nonsensical arguments.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) and United States v. Scott, 150 F.4th 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2025)

These cases supply the sufficiency-of-evidence framework: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a conviction stands if a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court used this lens to deem the extensive testimonial, documentary, communications, and banking evidence more than sufficient.

United States v. Pacilio, 85 F.4th 450, 462 (7th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Agbi, 84 F.4th 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2023)

The panel cited Pacilio to support the wire-fraud and conspiracy convictions where falsified loan applications and the financial trail showed knowing participation and benefit from the scheme. It cited Agbi as support for the mail-fraud conviction based on evidence of a scheme, use of the mails, and El’s participation—here, counterfeit lien releases and the monetization of “clean” titles.

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1968)

Bruton concerns the admission, at a joint trial, of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that incriminates the defendant, raising Confrontation Clause concerns. Here, counsel explored the issue, but the factual predicate failed because the incriminating portions naming El were not admitted into evidence or played for the jury—making a Bruton claim frivolous on this record.

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022)

Boyle provided the standard of review point: because El agreed with the Guidelines calculation, any later challenge would face (at best) plain-error review—an additional barrier in an Anders posture.

United States v. Ponle, 110 F.4th 958, 963 (7th Cir. 2024)

The opinion invoked Ponle while addressing the loss calculation. It emphasized that the Guidelines use “the greater of the actual loss or intended loss,” and thus using intended loss (here, $9.9 million) rather than actual loss (about $1.2 million) did not present a viable appellate issue.

United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2022)

Major supplied the framework for substantive reasonableness review: a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and the sentence will be upheld if the district court adequately explains it with reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The panel found the district court’s explanation sufficient, highlighting El’s leading role, prior similar fraud conviction, and demonstrated contempt for the law.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Self-representation and waiver of counsel

The court’s reasoning is practical and record-driven: it focuses on whether the district judge meaningfully warned El of the risks of self-representation, ensured he understood the charges and potential penalties, and assessed whether any impairments undermined comprehension. Despite El’s initial refusal to “consent” to the colloquy and his “sovereign-citizen” assertions, the district court held a later hearing that “managed” to provide the required warnings and confirmations. The district court also repeatedly reiterated the risks throughout the proceedings and even appointed standby counsel (over El’s objection), further reinforcing the conclusion that the waiver was knowing and intelligent under Faretta and Thomas.

Frivolous jurisdictional theories

The panel treated the “sovereign citizen” jurisdiction argument as categorically foreclosed by circuit authority (Bey v. State). This portion of the order reflects an institutional interest in conserving judicial resources by discouraging recycled, legally baseless challenges to federal jurisdiction.

Sufficiency of the evidence

Applying Jackson and Scott, the court highlighted multiple independent strands of proof: (i) fabricated PPP/EIDL applications and tax forms, (ii) phone records and WhatsApp messages connecting El to the conspiracy, (iii) bank records documenting receipt and movement of proceeds (including deposits into El’s personal account), and (iv) evidence of the title-washing scheme through counterfeit lien releases and testimony from PNC Bank and Carvana. The fact that El did not cross-examine witnesses or present evidence did not alter the sufficiency analysis; it underscored that the government’s case went essentially unrebutted.

Bruton and the missing factual predicate

The opinion’s treatment of Bruton is an example of Anders triage: even potentially serious constitutional claims become frivolous if the record does not support them. Because the jury did not hear the incriminating references to El, there was no Confrontation Clause harm to litigate.

Sentencing: loss amount and reasonableness

Procedurally, the court emphasized that El agreed with the Guidelines calculation, pushing any attack into plain-error territory under Boyle. Substantively, it rejected the notion that actual loss must control where intended loss is greater, relying on the Guidelines’ “greater of” formulation and Ponle. On the overall sentence, the panel applied the presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence from Major and credited the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation, including El’s leadership, recidivism in similar fraud, and pronounced disdain for the law.

3.3. Impact

Although designated a nonprecedential disposition, the order is still informative in several ways:

  • Anders practice in the Seventh Circuit: it exemplifies the court’s approach of limiting review to issues counsel addresses when the Anders submission is thorough (United States v. Bey), thereby incentivizing comprehensive screening by counsel.
  • Self-representation disputes: it underscores that persistent “sovereign citizen” rhetoric and refusal to cooperate do not, by themselves, invalidate a waiver of counsel where the judge successfully delivers warnings and confirms comprehension over time.
  • Fraud sentencing: it reinforces that intended loss may drive substantial enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 when it exceeds actual loss, limiting the viability of “actual-loss-only” reframing on appeal—especially where the defendant accepted the Guidelines calculation below.
  • Confrontation claims: it illustrates the record-sensitive nature of Bruton issues: the presence of a recording is not enough; what matters is what the jury actually heard.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anders brief: a filing by appointed appellate counsel stating the appeal has no nonfrivolous issues, while still identifying potential issues so the court can independently confirm.
  • Knowing and intelligent waiver (Faretta): a defendant can represent himself only if he understands what he is giving up (trained counsel) and the risks of proceeding alone.
  • “Sovereign citizen” arguments: claims that a person is not subject to federal law or courts. The Seventh Circuit treats these as legally baseless.
  • Sufficiency of the evidence (Jackson): appellate courts do not retry the case; they ask whether, viewing evidence favorably to the government, a rational jury could convict.
  • Bruton rule: in a joint trial, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that directly incriminates the defendant can violate confrontation rights if the jury hears it.
  • Actual loss vs. intended loss (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1): “actual” is what victims lost; “intended” is what the defendant sought to take. The Guidelines apply the greater of the two for the loss table.
  • Plain error: a difficult standard requiring an obvious error that affected substantial rights, typically applied when the defendant did not properly preserve an objection.
  • Within-Guidelines presumption: a sentence inside the advisory Guidelines range is usually upheld unless the judge’s reasoning is inadequate or the sentence is otherwise unreasonable.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Divine-Seven El reinforces several settled but practically important points: a properly conducted (and repeated) Faretta colloquy can sustain a waiver of counsel even when the defendant is obstructive; “sovereign citizen” jurisdictional theories remain frivolous; sufficiency challenges fail where the record contains extensive documentary and testimonial proof of coordinated fraud and financial benefit; Bruton claims require that the jury actually heard the incriminating statements; and intended loss may legitimately drive major fraud enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 when it exceeds actual loss. In an Anders posture, the decision also illustrates the Seventh Circuit’s efficient screening methodology: when counsel thoroughly canvasses the record, the court will not manufacture issues that the record and governing law do not support.