Reaffirming MDLEA’s Extraterritorial Reach (Including Foreign EEZs) and Denying Mitigating-Role Relief to Vessel Captains Despite the 2025 § 2D1.1(e) “Low-Level Function” Guidance

I. Introduction

United States v. Hector Caballero (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision affirming (1) convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and (2) a 210-month below-guidelines sentence.

The case arose from a 2022 Coast Guard interdiction of a boat carrying 708 kilograms of pure cocaine. Caballero proceeded to trial (unlike his codefendants) and was convicted on both counts. On appeal he raised three principal issues:

• Constitutionality of the MDLEA (Felonies Clause, due process, and application in a foreign nation’s EEZ).
• Guidelines calculation, especially the two-level “captain” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C).
• Substantive reasonableness of the 210-month sentence, including alleged disparity with codefendants.

Caballero also attempted—for the first time on appeal—to obtain a mitigating-role reduction under § 3B1.2 by invoking the Sentencing Commission’s 2025 “special instructions” for drug cases in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board:

• MDLEA constitutional challenges rejected as foreclosed by circuit precedent: United States v. Campbell and United States v. Alfonso, with reinforcement from United States v. Canario-Vilomar.
• Captain enhancement upheld: the district court did not clearly err in crediting a codefendant’s testimony that Caballero was the captain, controlled navigation via GPS, and acted as the crew’s spokesperson.
• No mitigating-role decrease: even assuming § 2D1.1(e) (2025) is a clarifying amendment, Caballero—found to be the vessel’s captain transporting massive quantities for significant payment—was not a “low-level trafficker.”
• Sentence substantively reasonable: the district court considered Caballero’s age and background, varied downward from the guidelines, and permissibly distinguished him from codefendants due to leadership role, trial posture, and prior similar conduct.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. MDLEA, extraterritoriality, and EEZ enforcement

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
  Role in Caballero: Campbell supplies the controlling holdings that (a) the MDLEA is constitutional under the Felonies Clause even without a U.S. nexus for drug trafficking on the high seas, and (b) prosecuting foreign nationals for such conduct does not violate due process because the MDLEA gives clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned. Caballero’s nexus and due process challenges were therefore foreclosed.
• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
  Role in Caballero: Alfonso is dispositive on Caballero’s argument that a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is not “high seas.” The panel relied on Alfonso’s conclusion that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ and thus within Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause,” and that international law does not limit the Felonies Clause for this purpose.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Role in Caballero: Cited to reinforce Alfonso’s continuing force and the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent rejection of similar EEZ-based constitutional challenges.
• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Role in Caballero: Archer provides the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, framing why Campbell and Alfonso bind subsequent panels.
• United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016)
  Role in Caballero: Iguaran is cited for de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction, even if raised for the first time on appeal (though Caballero’s principal constitutional claims were reviewed under plain-error standards where applicable).
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019)
  Role in Caballero: Valois is used twice: (a) as support for applying plain-error review to unpreserved constitutional challenges (via Alfonso’s citation), and (b) for the “two permissible views of the evidence” principle that makes clear-error reversal rare.
• United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005)
  Role in Caballero: Appears in the plain-error definition chain (via Alfonso) for the basic three-part test.

2. Guidelines factfinding and the “captain” enhancement

• United States v. Hill, 783 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Role in Caballero: Establishes that role determinations are factual findings reviewed for clear error.
• United States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005)
  Role in Caballero: Confirms clear-error review specifically for the captain/pilot enhancement context.
• United States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Role in Caballero: Supplies the “substantial deference” rule for district court credibility determinations.
• United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2002)
  Role in Caballero: Provides the “incredible as a matter of law” standard (contrary to laws of nature / facially impossible) limiting appellate disruption of credibility calls.
• United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017)
  Role in Caballero: Defines “captain” functionally as the vessel’s “ultimate decisionmaker” and clarifies that a captain may delegate operational tasks (critical to rejecting Caballero’s argument that alternating at the helm negated captain status).

3. Clarifying amendments, forfeiture, and plain-error review of guidelines issues

• United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011)
  Role in Caballero: Provides the framework distinguishing clarifying versus substantive guideline amendments on direct appeal and the default rule applying the guidelines in effect at sentencing.
• United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2020)
  Role in Caballero: Establishes plain-error review for unpreserved procedural sentencing claims (here, failure to seek § 3B1.2 at sentencing).
• United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2019)
  Role in Caballero: Cited through Johnson as part of the preserved/unpreserved procedural error framework.

4. Substantive reasonableness and disparities

• United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023)
  Role in Caballero: States the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness and the sufficiency of a record showing consideration of § 3553(a).
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Role in Caballero: Explains that courts must consider § 3553(a) factors but may weigh them unevenly; provides challenger’s burden framing.
• United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Role in Caballero: Notes the ordinary expectation that within-guidelines sentences are reasonable; used here to reinforce that a below-guidelines sentence is an even stronger indicator of reasonableness.
• United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Role in Caballero: Stand for the proposition that a sentence well below the statutory maximum indicates reasonableness (Caballero faced a life maximum).
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
  Role in Caballero: Provide the canonical substantive unreasonableness framework (failure to weigh proper factors, weighing improper ones, or clear error of judgment), plus the “definite and firm conviction” threshold for reversal.
• United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009)
  Role in Caballero: Supports the requirement to consider § 3553(a) factors without requiring a factor-by-factor recital.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)
  Role in Caballero: Clarifies that failure to discuss mitigating evidence expressly does not mean it was ignored; an acknowledgement of considering § 3553(a) may suffice.
• United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Role in Caballero: Reinforces district court discretion in the weight assigned to mitigating factors.
• United States v. Mullings, 166 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2026)
  Role in Caballero: Provides the comparator principle for disparity arguments: courts need not equalize sentences with defendants who have materially different circumstances.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional challenges: foreclosed, not re-litigated

The panel treated Caballero’s constitutional arguments as preservation claims for further review rather than live doctrinal questions within the circuit. By invoking Archer, the court emphasized that it could not depart from Campbell (no nexus required; due process satisfied) and Alfonso (EEZ is “high seas” for Felonies Clause/MDLEA purposes). Thus, the opinion’s reasoning is principally institutional: it demonstrates how prior-panel precedent functions as a constraint, especially in recurring MDLEA litigation.

2. Captain enhancement: functional leadership plus credibility deference

The core sentencing dispute preserved below was the § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) enhancement. The panel’s analysis follows a familiar two-step path:

1. Define the legal meaning of “captain” using United States v. Hernandez—the “ultimate decisionmaker” concept, with the important corollary that delegation does not defeat captain status.
2. Apply clear-error review and deference to credibility findings using Hill, Cartwright, Valois, Maddox, and Ramirez-Chilel. Because the district judge expressly credited Silvino’s testimony, the panel framed reversal as permissible only if the testimony were impossible or facially unbelievable—an exceptionally high bar.

Factually, the panel highlighted indicia of command and navigation control: higher promised compensation due to captaincy, possession and control of the GPS, directing the other driver, and speaking as captain to the Coast Guard. Those facts fit Hernandez’s “ultimate decisionmaker” definition even if the helm was shared.

3. The attempted § 3B1.2 reduction via 2025 § 2D1.1(e): two independent barriers

Caballero’s mitigating-role claim encountered two hurdles:

• Procedural forfeiture: Because Caballero did not seek § 3B1.2 in the district court, the panel applied plain-error review under United States v. Johnson.
• Merits mismatch: The panel assumed (without deciding) under United States v. Jerchower that § 2D1.1(e) (2025) could be treated as a “clarifying” amendment. Even then, the court held Caballero’s role was not “low-level” within § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B): he was found to be the captain of a vessel transporting extraordinarily large quantities for significant payment.

The “assume but deny anyway” approach is significant: it allows the court to avoid deciding the retroactivity/clarifying question while making clear that § 2D1.1(e)’s low-level-function guidance is not designed to benefit defendants exercising command-and-navigation authority in major maritime shipments.

4. Substantive reasonableness: downward variance and individualized assessment

The panel upheld the 210-month sentence under Oudomsine and Irey, emphasizing:

• The district court varied downward from 235–293 months, a strong indicator against unreasonableness under Hunt.
• The sentence was far below the statutory maximum of life, supporting reasonableness under Stanley and Gonzalez.
• The judge expressly cited mitigating considerations (age, history/characteristics, impoverished upbringing) and referenced § 3553(a)’s parsimony principle. Under Butler, the absence of explicit discussion of every mitigating fact (such as detailed health considerations) does not imply neglect.
• The disparity claim failed because comparators were not similarly situated: Caballero was the captain, went to trial, and had a prior large-scale maritime cocaine-smuggling conviction. The panel relied on Mullings to confirm that material differences defeat unwarranted-disparity arguments.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision has practical, litigation-facing effects in the Eleventh Circuit:

• MDLEA constitutional challenges: Caballero underscores that nexus, due process, and EEZ-based attacks remain effectively nonstarters in this circuit given Campbell and Alfonso. Defendants may continue to raise them for preservation, but district courts can expect routine affirmance.
• Captain enhancement fact patterns: The opinion illustrates the evidentiary package that supports § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) (crew perception, pay differential, navigation control, communications with authorities). It also signals that “taking turns driving” will rarely defeat the enhancement when command and navigational decision-making remain centralized.
• 2025 § 2D1.1(e) and mitigating role: The panel’s reasoning suggests that § 2D1.1(e)’s “low-level trafficking function” language will likely benefit true couriers/lookouts/errand-runners, not operational officers (captains/navigators), particularly in high-quantity shipments with significant compensation. The court also modeled a cautious appellate method: assume clarifying status and resolve on role facts—avoiding premature rulings on retroactivity.
• Disparity arguments among codefendants: Caballero reinforces the idea that disparity comparisons require truly similar posture and culpability (plea/acceptance, leadership function, criminal history), limiting the force of “my codefendants got less” arguments in maritime cases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA: A federal statute criminalizing drug trafficking on certain vessels, including conduct occurring outside U.S. territory, when the vessel is subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Gives Congress power to “define and punish” felonies on the “high Seas.” Eleventh Circuit precedent reads this power broadly for maritime drug trafficking.
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone adjacent to a coastal nation where it has certain resource rights. In United States v. Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit treated EEZ waters as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause/MDLEA enforcement.
• Clear error: A highly deferential appellate standard for factual findings; if the district court’s view of the evidence is plausible, it stands.
• Plain error: An even harder standard applied when a party failed to raise an issue below; the appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously harmed the integrity of proceedings.
• Captain enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(3)(C)): Adds two offense levels if the defendant functioned as an operational officer (captain/navigator/pilot) during drug import/export by vessel.
• Mitigating role (§ 3B1.2): Reduces offense level for defendants who are substantially less culpable than average participants (minimal or minor participants). The 2025 § 2D1.1(e) guidance explains that low-level functions (like courier or lookout) generally warrant the adjustment, but it does not convert leaders/operational officers into “minor participants.”
• Substantive reasonableness: Whether the sentence length is reasonable in light of § 3553(a), not whether every judge would pick the same number.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Hector Caballero reaffirms three practical propositions in Eleventh Circuit maritime drug cases: (1) MDLEA constitutional challenges based on lack of U.S. nexus, due process, or foreign EEZ location remain foreclosed by Campbell and Alfonso; (2) the § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) captain enhancement is readily supported where testimony and circumstances show operational command and navigation control, with strong deference to trial-court credibility findings; and (3) even under the Sentencing Commission’s 2025 “low-level trafficking function” guidance in § 2D1.1(e), a defendant found to be a vessel captain in a massive cocaine shipment is not positioned to claim a mitigating-role reduction—particularly on plain-error review.

The decision also illustrates the appellate court’s broader sentencing posture: a below-guidelines, individualized sentence that accounts for age and background while emphasizing deterrence and recidivism concerns will typically survive substantive reasonableness review, especially where codefendant comparisons are not “like for like.”