Date: Apr 3, 2026

Reaffirming Limits on COVID-Mandate Litigation Against New York Courts: Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Mootness, and Title VII’s “Policymaking Appointee” Exclusion for City Judges

Introduction

In Mora v. NY State Unified Ct. Sys. (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2026) (summary order), plaintiff-appellant Frank Mora, a city judge in Poughkeepsie, New York, challenged actions taken by the New York State Unified Court System (“UCS”), the Office of Court Administration (“OCA”), and multiple individual officials after UCS denied his request for a religious exemption from UCS’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Mora alleged that the denial and resulting restriction from entering the courthouse violated his constitutional rights and federal employment law, and that subsequent discipline-related steps were retaliatory.

The central issues on appeal were whether Mora’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and mootness, whether he qualified as an “employee” protected by Title VII, and whether his pleadings plausibly stated claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the First Amendment retaliation doctrine.

Important procedural note: The court resolved the appeal via a summary order, which the Second Circuit states “do not have precedential effect.” The order nonetheless provides a clear illustration of how established doctrines—sovereign immunity, mootness, statutory exclusions from Title VII, and modern pleading standards— can be dispositive in COVID-mandate litigation against state court systems and officials.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mora’s second amended complaint.

Section 1983 claims against UCS/OCA: Dismissed because UCS and OCA are arms of the State entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; requests for prospective injunctive relief were also moot because the mandate had been rescinded and Mora had been reinstated to full in-person duties.
Title VII claim against UCS/OCA: Although Title VII abrogates state sovereign immunity, Mora—as a city judge appointed by an elected mayor—fell within Title VII’s exclusion for “an appointee on the policy making level,” and thus was not covered as an “employee” for Title VII purposes.
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim (selective enforcement) against individual committee members: Dismissed for failure to plausibly allege similarly situated comparators or discriminatory motive.
Free Exercise claim (as-applied) against individual defendants: Dismissed; Mora’s own allegations that many Catholics and others received exemptions undermined an inference of religious hostility, and the pleadings indicated denial due to failure to follow exemption procedures.
First Amendment retaliation claim against Chief Administrative Judge Marks: Dismissed; the pleadings did not plausibly allege a causal connection between protected activity (seeking a religious exemption) and the adverse action (disciplinary referral), where the referral followed noncompliance with procedures and the mandate after the exemption denial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pleading standards and Rule 12(b)(6)

Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc.: The panel applied de novo review and the obligation to accept well-pleaded allegations as true while drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff—framing how plausibility would be assessed.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The court relied on the “plausible on its face” requirement and the need for facts permitting a reasonable inference of liability. These standards materially drove the dismissal of Mora’s Equal Protection, Free Exercise, and retaliation theories, where the court found key inferences (discriminatory motive; causation) not plausibly supported by factual detail.

2) Sovereign immunity and “arm of the state” status

Tennessee v. Lane: Cited for the baseline rule: the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits by private parties against a state absent consent or congressional waiver.
Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.: Used to define that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agents/instrumentalities functioning as “arms of a state.”
Gollomp v. Spitzer: Central authority that “New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State’” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The panel also echoed Gollomp’s observations that New York has not consented to suits against UCS in this context and that § 1983 does not include a congressional override of state immunity.
Posr v. Ct. Officer Shield No. 207: Reinforced that “The State Office of Court Administration is an arm of the state and therefore immune,” treating OCA as part of the immune state apparatus.
Morell v. Balasubramanian: Cited (through Gollomp) for the proposition that New York’s waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to suits in the Court of Claims, not federal court suits of this type.
Ward v. Thomas and Ex Parte Young: The panel invoked the familiar boundary that Ex Parte Young-style prospective relief does not extend to retrospective relief. The court’s point was that Mora did not allege an ongoing violation requiring prospective relief, and in any event his forward-looking requests were mooted by changed circumstances.

3) Mootness and the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey: Supplied two important propositions: (i) courts “cannot enjoin what no longer exists,” and (ii) the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception is “only in exceptional situations” requiring a reasonable expectation of recurrence plus inherently short duration preventing full litigation.
County of Suffolk v. Sebelius: Cited in a footnote for the general rule that if intervening events make effective relief impossible, claims for injunctive relief become moot.

4) Title VII sovereign immunity abrogation and the “policymaking appointee” exclusion

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer: Established the key threshold: Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity under Title VII, so immunity alone does not defeat a Title VII claim against a state entity.
Felder v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n: Cited for the proposition that an employer-employee relationship is a primary element of Title VII claims—setting up the decisive statutory “employee” exclusion analysis.
Gregory v. Ashcroft: The substantive driver of the panel’s Title VII holding. The Supreme Court concluded that a state judge appointed by an elected official was “an appointee on the policymaking level” under the ADEA’s definition of “employee,” and thus outside statutory coverage. The Second Circuit treated Gregory as controlling by analogy because Title VII and the ADEA use identical “employee” definitions.
Butler v. N.Y. State Dep't of L.: Provided the interpretive bridge: the Second Circuit has relied on ADEA caselaw to analyze Title VII’s “employee” definition because Congress adopted the definition “verbatim” across the statutes. This supported importing Gregory into the Title VII context here.

5) Equal Protection selective enforcement and comparator pleading

Crowley v. Courville: Supplied the two-prong selective enforcement framework: selective treatment compared to similarly situated others, plus an impermissible basis (including religion) or malicious intent.
Hu v. City of New York: Defined similarly situated comparators as having circumstances bearing a “reasonably close resemblance,” a comparator standard that the panel found Mora did not meet with factual specificity.
Burgis v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation: Supported dismissal where comparator allegations lack “meaningful specifics” of relevant similarity; the panel used it to characterize Mora’s comparator references as too conclusory (no details about others’ exemption applications).
Phillips v. City of New York: Reinforced the inference problem: where a plaintiff acknowledges that other members of the same faith were granted exemptions, it is not plausible to infer denial was based on hostility to that faith.

6) Free Exercise as-applied claims in the vaccine exemption setting

New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York: The panel distinguished this then-recent Second Circuit decision. In that case, plaintiffs plausibly alleged their exemptions were denied because officials treated their beliefs as “too personal” or “idiosyncratic,” crossing the line from assessing sincerity to judging “the verity” of beliefs. In Mora’s case, however, allegations that hundreds—including Catholics with identical beliefs—received exemptions undermined an inference of religious hostility, and the pleadings pointed to procedural noncompliance as the reason for denial.

7) First Amendment retaliation in public employment

Specht v. City of New York and Smith v. County of Suffolk: Supplied the three-element retaliation test (protected activity; adverse action; causal connection). The causation element was fatal because the pleaded sequence suggested discipline followed refusal to comply with procedures and the mandate after denial, not the protected act of requesting an exemption.

Legal Reasoning

1) UCS and OCA: sovereign immunity plus mootness foreclosed § 1983 relief

The court’s analysis proceeded in two reinforcing steps.

First, sovereign immunity: By invoking Gollomp v. Spitzer and Posr v. Ct. Officer Shield No. 207, the panel treated UCS and OCA as arms of the State, which generally defeats § 1983 damages and injunctive suits in federal court absent consent or congressional override. The order emphasized the settled nature of UCS’s “arm of the state” status in this Circuit.

Second, mootness of prospective relief: Even if prospective relief were conceptually available, it was no longer practically available. The vaccine mandate was vacated (February 2023) and Mora was restored to full in-person duties. Applying Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, the court held it could not enjoin a rescinded policy. The panel also rejected the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception for lack of a non-speculative likelihood that Mora would again face the same challenged mandate under similar conditions.

2) Title VII: abrogation did not matter because Mora was not a covered “employee”

The court accepted that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer removes the sovereign immunity barrier for Title VII claims, but then turned to Title VII’s definitional exclusion in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f): an “appointee on the policy making level” is not an “employee” for Title VII purposes.

The decisive move was characterizing Mora—a city judge appointed by an elected mayor—as within the Gregory v. Ashcroft rationale. Because Title VII’s and the ADEA’s employee definitions are identical, and because Butler v. N.Y. State Dep't of L. endorses cross-reliance on ADEA caselaw for Title VII’s definition, the panel treated Gregory as controlling in effect. Thus, even though Title VII can reach state employers, it does not reach this particular plaintiff’s role.

3) Equal Protection selective enforcement: insufficient comparator detail and no plausible discriminatory motive

Mora’s selective enforcement theory required factual allegations showing (i) similarly situated individuals received different treatment and (ii) the difference was based on an impermissible consideration such as religion (Crowley v. Courville). The court held he plausibly alleged neither.

On similarity, Mora named other Catholic employees who received exemptions, and referenced “500” exempted employees, but alleged no specifics about their applications. Under Hu v. City of New York and Burgis v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation, the lack of “meaningful specifics” prevented an inference that these were true comparators.

On motive, Mora’s own pleading concession that the committee granted exemptions to other Catholics and other faiths undercut the claim that his denial reflected anti-Catholic discrimination (Phillips v. City of New York).

4) Free Exercise: allegations fit procedural denial, not religious hostility

The panel used New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York as the comparator decision but distinguished it on the pleadings. In New Yorkers, the alleged wrongdoing was theological gatekeeping—treating beliefs as too “personal” to be religious—an impermissible inquiry into “verity” rather than sincerity.

Here, by contrast, Mora pleaded facts suggesting the opposite of systemic hostility: hundreds of exemptions were granted, including to Catholics with identical beliefs. That pattern made it less plausible that the denial reflected anti-religious animus. The court instead pointed to the UCS policy requiring applicants to provide requested information and Mora’s “incomplete response” to an information request as a non-hostile explanation for the denial.

5) Retaliation: missing causation between protected activity and adverse action

Applying Specht v. City of New York (citing Smith v. County of Suffolk), the court focused on causation. Even assuming the exemption request was protected activity, the pleadings indicated the disciplinary referral occurred after Mora failed to follow exemption procedures and then refused to comply with the mandate after denial. Without allegations that exemption-requesters as such were disciplined—or that Mora was treated worse than similarly situated nonreligious objectors—causation remained speculative.

Impact

Institutional defendants (UCS/OCA): The order underscores that § 1983 challenges to state court-system policies will frequently be blocked at the threshold by Eleventh Amendment immunity and, for rescinded COVID-era policies, by mootness. Plaintiffs seeking forward-looking relief must plead a live controversy and overcome stringent limits on “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Judicial officers and Title VII coverage: The decision reinforces the practical consequence of the “policymaking appointee” exclusion: even when Congress has abrogated immunity (Title VII), certain public roles—especially appointed judges—may be outside the statute’s protection entirely, routing disputes into other legal avenues (state law remedies, constitutional claims against individuals where viable, or administrative frameworks), rather than Title VII.
Pleading discipline in exemption litigation: The court’s comparator and motive analyses highlight that broad references (e.g., “others got exemptions”) are not enough. Plaintiffs must plead concrete details about comparators and a nonconclusory basis for discriminatory intent—particularly when their own allegations suggest many co-religionists were accommodated.
Free Exercise claims post-exemption-review: By distinguishing New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York, the order suggests a practical dividing line: allegations of theological gatekeeping or hostility may survive, but allegations consistent with neutral procedural enforcement (in a system that granted many religious exemptions) may not.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: A constitutional doctrine that generally prevents private individuals from suing a state (or state “arms,” like UCS/OCA) in federal court unless the state consents or Congress unmistakably removes immunity for a specific statute.
Section 1983: A federal statute allowing suits against persons who, under color of state law, violate federal rights. It does not itself override state sovereign immunity for suits against the state or its arms.
Mootness: A case becomes moot when events make it impossible for a court to grant effective relief. If the mandate is rescinded and the plaintiff is reinstated, an injunction against the old mandate typically cannot be granted.
“Capable of repetition, yet evading review”: A narrow exception to mootness where the plaintiff is reasonably likely to face the same action again and the action is so short-lived that it will always end before courts can fully litigate it. Speculation about recurrence is insufficient.
Title VII “policymaking appointee” exclusion: Title VII excludes certain public officials from the definition of “employee,” including “an appointee on the policy making level.” Relying on Gregory v. Ashcroft, the court treated an appointed city judge as within this exclusion.
Selectively treated “similarly situated” comparators: For selective-enforcement Equal Protection claims, plaintiffs must identify others who are alike in relevant ways (“reasonably close resemblance”) but were treated better. Vague references to other beneficiaries without details about why they are comparable generally will not suffice.
Sincerity vs. “verity” of religious belief: Decisionmakers may inquire whether a belief is sincerely held (genuineness), but they may not judge whether the belief is “true,” orthodox, or sufficiently religious in substance—an impermissible theological assessment highlighted in New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York.

Conclusion

Mora v. NY State Unified Ct. Sys. affirms dismissal of wide-ranging challenges to UCS’s former COVID-19 vaccination mandate by applying several dispositive gatekeeping rules: Eleventh Amendment immunity for UCS/OCA in § 1983 suits; mootness once the mandate is rescinded and the plaintiff is restored; and Title VII’s statutory exclusion for “appointee[s] on the policy making level,” which the court applied to an appointed city judge via Gregory v. Ashcroft.

On the merits-oriented constitutional theories against individual defendants, the order emphasizes modern plausibility pleading: without concrete comparator facts, plausible discriminatory motive, or a non-speculative causal chain, Equal Protection, Free Exercise, and retaliation claims will not proceed past Rule 12(b)(6)—especially where the complaint itself suggests a pattern of religious accommodations and a procedurally grounded reason for denial.