Reaffirming Keene Harmless-Error Review: Disputed Guideline Enhancements Need Not Be Resolved When the District Court Would Impose the Same Sentence and the Result Is Substantively Reasonable

I. Introduction

In United States v. Malik McKenzie (11th Cir. May 20, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Malik Javier McKenzie’s convictions and 595-month aggregate sentence arising from a traffic stop that escalated into a crash and foot pursuit, culminating in the discovery of drugs and a loaded Glock 9mm on McKenzie. The case later broadened when, during trial, McKenzie attempted to bribe a juror—leading to a separate obstruction-of-justice conviction and a consolidated sentencing.

The appeal presented four recurring federal criminal issues: (1) Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop; (2) admission of prior drug-sales evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) procedural reasonableness of a sentence where the defendant disputed two Guidelines enhancements. The opinion’s most practically significant feature is its application of the Eleventh Circuit’s Keene doctrine: the court declined to decide the disputed Guideline issues because the district judge stated an alternative identical sentence and the sentence remained substantively reasonable even under the defendant’s preferred Guideline calculation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Suppression: The court affirmed denial of the motion to suppress, holding that Officer Myers’s credited testimony that he observed a stop-sign violation supplied reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
  • Rule 404(b): The court affirmed admission of a redacted plea agreement reflecting prior drug sales, finding it admissible to prove intent to distribute and not unfairly prejudicial, particularly given a limiting instruction.
  • Sufficiency: The court affirmed denial of judgment of acquittal; the evidence (including testimony of multiple officers and a DEA agent plus a felon-status stipulation) permitted a rational jury to convict.
  • Sentencing: The court rejected the claim of procedural unreasonableness. Applying United States v. Keene, it declined to resolve disputes over U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1) and § 3C1.2 because the district court said it would impose the same 595-month sentence regardless, and the sentence was substantively reasonable even assuming the enhancements were erroneous.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Fourth Amendment traffic-stop and credibility review

  • United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020): Provided the governing framework that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “seizure” and must be supported by reasonable suspicion, which can be based on a minor traffic violation. The panel used Wilson to treat the stop-sign violation as sufficient suspicion if the officer’s observation was credited.
  • United States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2015): Supplied the deference standard for credibility findings at suppression hearings: appellate courts accept credibility determinations unless testimony is contrary to the laws of nature or so improbable that no reasonable factfinder could accept it. The opinion leaned on Maddox to reject McKenzie’s effort to relitigate Officer Myers’s credibility.

2. Rule 404(b) “other acts” evidence

  • United States v. Booker, 136 F.4th 1005 (11th Cir. 2025): The central authority for the court’s Rule 404(b) analysis. The panel imported Booker’s three-part admissibility test (non-character relevance, sufficient proof, and Rule 403 balancing) and its practical premise that Rule 404(b) is a “rule of inclusion,” especially where intent is contested by a not-guilty plea. The opinion also echoed Booker’s repeated holding that prior drug dealing is highly probative of intent and typically not overly prejudicial—particularly when paired with a limiting instruction.

3. Sufficiency of evidence and jury credibility

  • United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021): Anchored the standard that the verdict stands if any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, with all inferences drawn in the government’s favor.
  • United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025): Supplied the principle that witness credibility is for the jury; appellate review does not revisit credibility unless testimony is “unbelievable as a matter of law.” The panel used Gregory to reject McKenzie’s attempt to invalidate the convictions by attacking Officer Myers’s reliability.
  • United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2025): Provided elements of § 841(a)(1) possession with intent to distribute and definitions of actual/constructive possession, plus the inference of intent from drug quantity. The panel used these principles to frame why the trial evidence supported the drug-trafficking conviction.
  • Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021): Provided the knowledge-of-status requirement for § 922(g)(1) (knowing felon status at time of possession). The court noted McKenzie’s stipulation on this point.

4. Sentencing procedure, substantive reasonableness, and harmless error

  • United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Provided the procedural reasonableness checklist (proper Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a) factors, explanation, avoidance of clearly erroneous facts, etc.). The panel cited these to situate McKenzie’s “procedural” challenge.
  • United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Supplied deference language for substantive reasonableness (“range of choice” and “clear error of judgment” boundaries). The panel relied on these to uphold the 595-month sentence as within a reasonable range given the facts.
  • United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): Reinforced that district courts may weigh § 3553(a) factors unevenly and explained Keene as “a species of the harmless error doctrine.” The panel used Olson both to justify the sentencing court’s weighting and to describe the controlling harmless-error framework.
  • United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Supported the proposition that a district court need not explicitly discuss each § 3553(a) factor or every piece of mitigating evidence to show it considered them.
  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): The key sentencing precedent. Under Keene, the appellate court will not resolve a disputed Guideline issue if the district judge states the same sentence would be imposed regardless and the sentence is substantively reasonable even under the defendant’s proposed Guideline range.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Motion to suppress: reasonable suspicion plus deference to credibility

The court treated the case as turning not on a nuanced Fourth Amendment doctrine but on a factual predicate: whether Officer Myers in fact observed a stop-sign violation. Once the magistrate judge found Myers “wholly credible,” appellate review became highly constrained under United States v. Maddox. The panel concluded Myers’s testimony was not physically impossible or facially absurd, and therefore it established reasonable suspicion under United States v. Wilson.

2. Rule 404(b): intent as a live issue and prior drug sales as probative

Applying United States v. Booker’s three-part test, the panel held the redacted plea agreement was admissible because: (i) it was offered to prove intent to distribute (a non-propensity purpose); (ii) the plea agreement provided sufficient proof for a jury to find the prior acts by a preponderance; and (iii) the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value, especially given a limiting instruction. The reasoning reflects the Eleventh Circuit’s pragmatic approach in drug cases: when a defendant pleads not guilty, intent becomes contested, and prior distribution conduct often becomes powerful circumstantial proof of intent in the charged episode.

3. Sufficiency: credibility belongs to the jury and corroboration matters

The panel rejected McKenzie’s sufficiency challenge largely because it was framed as a credibility attack. Under United States v. Gregory, credibility determinations are insulated absent testimony that is “unbelievable as a matter of law.” The opinion also emphasized that the government’s proof did not rest on a single officer: other officers testified to recovering drugs and the firearm from McKenzie, a DEA agent opined the evidence was consistent with distribution, and McKenzie stipulated he knew his felon status—collectively satisfying the elements described in United States v. Cremades and Greer v. United States.

4. Sentencing: using Keene to bypass disputed enhancements

The sentencing dispute concerned application of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1) (Official Victim) and § 3C1.2 (Reckless Endangerment During Flight). Rather than decide whether applying both was correct, the panel invoked United States v. Keene. Because the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same 595-month sentence regardless of the enhancements, the appellate task shifted to a counterfactual: assume McKenzie is correct, recompute the advisory range, and then ask whether the same sentence is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a).

The panel accepted that removing the enhancements would reduce the total offense level from 34 to 26, producing an advisory range of 110–137 months (before accounting for the mandatory 30-year component referenced by the court), and an effective range stated by the panel as 470–497 months. It then upheld the 595-month sentence as substantively reasonable in light of the district court’s stated concerns: dangerous drugs (fentanyl/carfentanil), possession of a loaded machinegun, alarming flight and struggle with police, attempted juror bribery as an attack on the justice system, and a lengthy and violent criminal history. Citing United States v. Olson, United States v. Riley, and United States v. Irey, the panel concluded the variance did not fall outside the range of reasonable sentences.

C. Impact

  • Increased importance of “alternative identical sentence” findings: The decision reinforces that a clear statement by the district court—“I would impose the same sentence regardless of the disputed Guideline issue”—can substantially narrow appellate review and effectively convert many Guideline disputes into a single question of substantive reasonableness under § 3553(a). This incentivizes litigants to focus on building (or attacking) the sentencing record, not just the Guideline math.
  • Practical lesson for defense appeals: When Keene is triggered, a defendant must do more than show a plausible Guidelines error; the defendant must also show that the sentence is unreasonable even under the reduced range. This raises the bar for relief where the district court gives a robust § 3553(a) explanation tied to danger, recidivism, obstruction, and public protection.
  • Continued permissiveness toward prior drug-dealing evidence: By leaning on United States v. Booker, the opinion signals that in narcotics prosecutions, prior distribution conduct admitted to prove intent will often survive Rule 403, particularly if presented in a limited form (here, a redacted plea agreement) and paired with a limiting instruction.
  • Suppression litigation remains credibility-driven: The opinion underscores that appellate courts rarely overturn suppression denials premised on credited officer testimony unless the testimony is inherently impossible; ordinary impeachment points (discipline history, missing camera footage) typically will not suffice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable suspicion (traffic stop): A lower threshold than probable cause; an officer needs specific, articulable facts suggesting a violation (even a minor traffic infraction). If the judge credits testimony that a stop-sign violation occurred, that alone generally justifies the stop.
  • Rule 404(b) evidence: Evidence of past acts cannot be used to prove “he’s the kind of person who does this,” but it can be used for other reasons—most commonly in drug cases, to prove intent to distribute rather than mere possession.
  • Rule 403 balancing: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial in a way that substantially outweighs its probative value. Limiting instructions often reduce the risk of unfair prejudice.
  • Constructive possession: Possession does not always require the item to be in a person’s hand or pocket; it can be shown by dominion or control over the place where the item is kept (though this case also included evidence of drugs and a firearm found directly on McKenzie).
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed the correct process (including correct Guideline calculation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is reasonable under § 3553(a). Under Keene, even a possible procedural error may not matter if the judge would impose the same sentence and that sentence is substantively reasonable.
  • The Keene harmless-error doctrine: If (1) the district court explicitly states it would impose the same sentence regardless of the disputed Guideline issue, and (2) the resulting sentence is reasonable even under the defendant’s lower range, then the appellate court will affirm without deciding the Guideline dispute.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Malik McKenzie is a compact but instructive Eleventh Circuit decision that reaffirms several entrenched doctrines: heavy deference to credibility findings on suppression, the admissibility of prior drug dealing to prove intent under Rule 404(b) when properly limited, and the high bar for overturning convictions on sufficiency review. Its most consequential contribution is its reaffirmation of United States v. Keene: when a district court announces an alternative identical sentence and anchors that sentence in a detailed § 3553(a) analysis, disputed Guideline enhancements may become functionally immaterial on appeal—shifting the fight from Guidelines arithmetic to the overall reasonableness of the sentence.