RCW 35.22.120: “Next Regular Municipal Election” Includes Special Elections; Mandamus Requires a Clear Ministerial Duty

Introduction

A Better Richland v. Chilton is a Washington Supreme Court en banc decision arising from a citizen-driven attempt to amend the City of Richland’s home-rule charter. The petitioner, A Better Richland (ABR) (a political action committee), filed a charter-amendment petition in October 2024, proposing a shift from at-large city council elections to a mixed district/at-large system. The respondent, Brenda Chilton, Benton County Auditor, determined the measure would be placed on the November 2025 election ballot. ABR sought a writ of mandamus compelling placement on an earlier February or April 2025 special-election ballot.

The case presented two interrelated legal issues: (1) the meaning of “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 (charter amendments by petition), and (2) whether mandamus could compel the county auditor to call or use a special election absent further municipal action.

Summary of the Opinion

The court unanimously held the requested relief was moot because the February and April 2025 special-election dates had passed. It unanimously concluded, however, that an exception to mootness applied because the statutory question is of continuing and substantial public interest.

On the merits, a majority of justices agreed that “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 can include both special and general elections. Separately, a different majority concluded that mandamus would not lie on these facts because ABR did not identify a sufficiently ministerial, nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to place the measure on a special-election ballot absent a city resolution or clarifying charter rule. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the mandamus action.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Statutory interpretation framework

  • City of Pasco v. Pub. Emp't Rels. Comm'n: Applied for the de novo standard of review in statutory interpretation.
  • Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC: Central to the opinion’s method—ascertaining legislative intent through plain meaning, reading statutes as a whole, and consulting related statutes to resolve meaning.
  • Wash. State Ass'n of Counties v. State (quoting State v. J.P.): Reinforced the canon against interpreting statutory language in a way that renders words meaningless or superfluous.
  • State v. Gonzalez: Used for the rule that undefined statutory terms receive their ordinary meaning.
  • Five Corners Fam. Farmers v. State: Cited for the proposition that ambiguity permits use of legislative history and enactment circumstances.
  • Bearden v. City of Ocean Shores (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham): Supported the avoidance of literal readings that yield strained or absurd results.

2) Mootness and the “continuing and substantial public interest” exception

  • State v. Beaver: Provided the governing test—moot cases are generally dismissed, but the court may decide issues of continuing and substantial public interest.
  • AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC: Used to define mootness as the inability of the court to provide effective relief.
  • In re Marriage of Horner: Cited in support of exercising discretion to reach moot issues that are likely to recur.

3) Mandamus standards

  • Colvin v. Inslee: Emphasized mandamus as a rare and extraordinary remedy and framed petitioners’ demanding burden.
  • City of Seattle v. McKenna: Anchored the requirement that mandamus compels only ministerial (nondiscretionary) acts.
  • Freeman v. Gregoire (citing Walker v. Munro): Required that the writ specify the precise act to be done.
  • SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. City of Seattle): Insisted the duty be defined with such particularity that it leaves nothing to discretion.
  • Eugster v. City of Spokane (quoting Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct.): Quoted for the petitioners’ demanding burden to prove the elements justifying mandamus.

4) Home rule and charter authority

  • State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Ct.: Used to describe broad home-rule power for first-class cities, including election rules consistent with state law.

5) Additional interpretive/context authorities (dissent)

  • State v. Watson: Cited for focusing first on statutory text and ordinary meaning.
  • State v. Roggenkamp: Cited for the rule against rendering statutory words meaningless.
  • Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412: Cited for the principle that a word used in related provisions on the same subject generally carries the same meaning.
  • State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Ct., City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild (citing Seattle v. Reed and Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover): Used in the concurrence in part to support the conclusion that “shall” and timing language do not necessarily eliminate discretion for mandamus purposes.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why the court reached the merits despite mootness

Although the requested special-election dates had passed (no effective relief remained), the court exercised discretion under State v. Beaver because county auditors and municipalities regularly confront ballot-timing questions for charter amendments, and the issue is likely to recur yet evade review due to election calendars.

2) Interpreting “next regular municipal election” (majority view on meaning)

The lead opinion’s central move was contextual plain-meaning interpretation: RCW 35.22.120 does not define “regular municipal election,” so the court examined related election statutes in Title 29A. Under RCW 29A.04.330, “municipal elections” include both general elections (fixed, recurring) and special elections (held on specified special-election dates when called). The lead opinion also relied on how the legislature uses “regular,” “general,” and “municipal general” across Title 35—concluding that when the legislature intends to restrict to general elections, it tends to say so expressly (e.g., “municipal general election”), which RCW 35.22.120 does not.

The concurrence in part agreed that, as a matter of state law, the phrase can encompass both general and special elections—even where a charter is silent—consistent with WASH. CONST. art. XI and the home-rule principle described in State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Ct.

The dissent rejected this reading as linguistically and structurally unsound, emphasizing ordinary meaning: “regular” implies fixed recurrence, while “special” implies irregularity, and reading “regular” to include “special” risks making “regular” superfluous.

3) Why mandamus failed (majority outcome on remedy)

Even accepting that RCW 35.22.120 allows submission at a special election, a separate question is whether an auditor has a nondiscretionary duty to select (or to cause) a special election on demand. The concurrence in part reasoned that calling a special election typically requires a municipal governing-body request/resolution under RCW 29A.04.330(2). Because Richland’s council did not pass such a resolution and the charter did not define “next regular municipal election” to mandate a special election, ABR could not identify a ministerial duty “with such particularity as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment” (tracking the standards in City of Seattle v. McKenna and SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire).

As a result, the controlling disposition affirms denial of mandamus: the law may permit special-election submission, but it does not, on these facts, command the auditor to do so.

Impact

  • Substantive rule on timing: The decision establishes (by a majority on that issue) that RCW 35.22.120’s “next regular municipal election” is not limited to November odd-year general elections; it can include special elections.
  • Practical constraint on enforcement: The mandamus holding signals that petitioners may be unable to force a special election absent a clear statutory/charter command or required municipal action (such as a council resolution under RCW 29A.04.330(2)).
  • Institutional incentive for charter drafting: First-class cities may respond by defining “regular municipal election” in their charters to allocate decision-making authority and timing rules, reducing disputes with auditors.
  • Election administration guidance: County auditors gain interpretive direction: special elections are not categorically excluded, but the pathway to a special election may depend on municipal triggers and the scope of their ministerial duties.
  • Future litigation posture: Plaintiffs may shift from mandamus to other forms of relief (or target municipalities rather than auditors) where the dispute is about whether a council must call a special election.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mootness: A case is moot when the court can no longer give meaningful relief (e.g., the election date has already passed). Courts sometimes still decide moot cases if the issue will keep coming up and matters to the public.
  • Home rule / first-class city charter authority: First-class cities in Washington can adopt charters to structure local government, but they must remain consistent with the state constitution and general laws.
  • General vs. special elections: A “general election” is held on a fixed, recurring schedule; a “special election” is any election that is not a general election and occurs when properly called.
  • Mandamus: A court order compelling a public official to perform a legally required, purely ministerial act—something the law clearly commands with no room for judgment. If the official has discretion, mandamus usually fails.
  • Plurality decision: Different groups of justices may form different majorities on different issues (here, one majority on statutory meaning and another on mandamus), with a per curiam opinion summarizing the court’s bottom-line result.

Conclusion

A Better Richland v. Chilton clarifies a key election-timing provision for charter-amendment petitions: “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 may include special elections as well as general elections. But it simultaneously underscores a remedial limit: mandamus will not compel a special election absent a clearly defined, ministerial duty. The combined effect is to broaden what the statute allows, while narrowing what petitioners can force through extraordinary writ practice—leaving substantial importance to charter drafting choices and municipal procedures for calling special elections.