Raspberry Pi “Scanning Receiver” as U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) Device-Making Equipment; PSI Notice Satisfied by Application Note 10(A) Cross-References

1. Introduction

United States v. Karol Tellez Duarte (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2026) addresses two recurring federal-sentencing disputes in fraud cases: (1) what constitutes adequate notice for a Guidelines enhancement when the district court relies on a particular definitional pathway; and (2) whether a within-Guidelines (or Guidelines-based) sentence becomes substantively unreasonable when the court discusses internationally routed proceeds and related circumstances.

Duarte pleaded guilty to (and was sentenced for) conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The district court imposed a 57-month sentence. On appeal, Duarte argued: (a) a due process violation from lack of notice and misapplication of a “device-making equipment” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11); and (b) procedural and substantive unreasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including that the court gave undue weight to comments involving Venezuela, the loss amount, and the victims’ identities.

The Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-published) affirmed, holding the enhancement was properly applied under the “scanning receiver” definition incorporated into Application Note 10(A), and that the district court’s sentencing explanations did not rely on impermissible factors.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • No due process violation / adequate notice: The PSI’s reference to Application Note 10(A) provided sufficient notice that “device-making equipment” could be established through any of the incorporated statutory definitions, including a “scanning receiver.”
  • Enhancement correctly applied: The district court applied § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) (not § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)), finding a Raspberry Pi device was used to intercept communications between a bank server and an ATM, fitting the “scanning receiver” definition.
  • Argument abandonment: Duarte’s notice challenge to the “scanning receiver” theory was raised for the first time in her reply brief and therefore treated as abandoned.
  • Sentence substantively reasonable: The district court permissibly considered where proceeds went, the scale of losses, and the community nature of affected institutions, and it was not required to address each mitigation claim point-by-point.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review; preservation; abandonment

  • United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2009): Cited for de novo review of Guidelines application and clear-error review of factual findings. This framed the panel’s approach: legal interpretation of § 2B1.1 and Application Note 10(A) was reviewed de novo, while acceptance of Agent Winn’s testimony about the device’s function was reviewed for clear error.
  • United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2010): Provided the clear-error definition (“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”). This heightened Duarte’s burden on appeal regarding the district court’s factfinding about the Raspberry Pi intercepting communications.
  • United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007): Used for the requirement that objections must sufficiently apprise the district court of the grounds for relief. This undergirds the panel’s emphasis that sentencing objections must be properly framed to preserve specific legal theories.
  • United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2005): Key to the holding that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are abandoned. The panel used Magluta to dispose of Duarte’s late-emerging “scanning receiver notice” argument.

B. Due process at sentencing; PSI notice; court’s latitude

  • United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for the principle that due process requires notice and an opportunity to contest facts used to support the penalty. Jules supplies the constitutional baseline for sentencing procedures.
  • United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2018): The central notice precedent. Plasencia supports two propositions the panel relied on: (i) the PSI must identify applicable Guidelines, but the court is not bound by the PSI’s recommendations; and (ii) the court may apply an enhancement not identified in the PSI if the defendant has “proper notice,” which can exist where circumstances indicate the conduct could trigger the enhancement. Here, the panel used Plasencia to validate using Application Note 10(A)’s definitional cross-references as a sufficient notice mechanism.

C. Reasonableness review; impermissible factors

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion framework and the two-step sentencing review—procedural error first, then substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784 (11th Cir. 2005)): Used for the burden on the appellant to show unreasonableness, and the rule that the court need not expressly discuss each § 3553(a) factor so long as the record shows consideration.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008)): Provided the “clear error of judgment” substantive-unreasonableness test and the high threshold for reversal.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Reinforced deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors. This supported rejecting Duarte’s claim that the court “overweighted” loss, victims, and where proceeds were sent.
  • United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015): Used for the proposition that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness. The panel pointed to the 30-year maximum vs. Duarte’s 57-month sentence.
  • United States v. Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for de novo review of whether a factor is impermissible at sentencing.
  • United States v. Davis, 204 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 1999): Cited for the principle that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status cannot be used to depart from the Guidelines. Davis anchored Duarte’s argument that references to Venezuela/nationality risked being impermissible—but the panel distinguished the district court’s remarks as offense-circumstance commentary rather than nationality-based punishment.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. What the district court actually applied: § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i), not (B)

Duarte asserted the district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) (which the government had alternatively proposed). The Eleventh Circuit rejected that factual premise: the district court expressly applied the “device-making equipment” enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) by finding the device qualified as a “scanning receiver” under Application Note 10(A).

B. Notice and due process: PSI reference to Application Note 10(A) sufficed

The opinion treats “notice” as satisfied not only by naming the enhancement subsection but by identifying the definitional material the enhancement incorporates. The PSI referenced Application Note 10(A), which in turn incorporates statutory definitions from 18 U.S.C. § 1029. Because the note expressly includes “scanning receiver” (via 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(8)), Duarte was on notice that “device-making equipment” could be proved through that route.

Two procedural doctrines reinforced this outcome:

  • Abandonment: Duarte first raised a targeted “scanning receiver notice” argument in her reply brief, triggering abandonment under United States v. Magluta.
  • Non-binding PSI recommendations: Even if the PSI’s discussion seemed to emphasize other definitional paths, the district court is not bound by PSI recommendations (supported by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(1)(A) and United States v. Plasencia), so long as the defendant has notice and an opportunity to contest.

C. Why the Raspberry Pi fit the “scanning receiver” definition

The court’s application turned on a chain of incorporated definitions:

  • U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) applies if the offense involved possession or use of “device-making equipment.”
  • Application Note 10(A) states “device-making equipment” includes items meeting 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(6) and also includes a “scanning receiver” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(8).
  • Section 1029(e)(8) includes a device used “to intercept a wire or electronic communication in violation of chapter 119,” linking to the wiretap statute framework at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523.

On the facts, the district court credited Agent Winn’s testimony that the Raspberry Pi device intercepted communications between the bank’s server and the ATM through the network cable and interfered with denial messages. The Eleventh Circuit held that using the device “to acquire and interfere” with those messages satisfied “intercepting wire communications” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (4), and thus met the “scanning receiver” definition under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(8).

A notable doctrinal point is that the panel rejected Duarte’s attempt to confine the enhancement to the separate § 1029(a)(9) concept of modifying telecommunication identifying information to obtain unauthorized telecommunications service. The opinion emphasizes that Application Note 10(A) is broader: it includes “scanning receiver,” which is not limited to the “telecommunications service” acquisition theory.

D. Substantive reasonableness: Venezuela-related remarks as offense circumstances, not national-origin punishment

Duarte argued the court gave undue weight to the Venezuelan nationality of a co-conspirator and the routing of proceeds. The Eleventh Circuit treated the district court’s remarks as tied to legitimate § 3553(a) considerations: nature and circumstances of the offense, loss amount, community harm, and Duarte’s history and characteristics (including that she overstayed her visa while committing the offense).

The panel’s analysis is careful on the impermissible-factor boundary: it noted it “presumably would be impermissible” to consider Duarte’s nationality “in and of itself” (invoking United States v. Davis), but concluded the district court did not do that. Instead, it permissibly considered where stolen funds went and what their effects might be—offense conduct and offense impact—rather than punishing national origin.

The court also relied on deference principles (United States v. Shabazz) and reasonableness indicators (United States v. Holt), plus the rule that the court need not address every mitigation point individually (United States v. Gonzalez), to affirm the 57-month sentence.

3.3. Impact

  • Broader reach of § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) in cyber-enabled fraud: The decision signals that “device-making equipment” can be satisfied by modern, inexpensive computing hardware (here, a Raspberry Pi) when configured to intercept communications in a manner fitting the “scanning receiver” definition incorporated into Application Note 10(A). This matters for ATM/network interception schemes that are not classic card-encoder “skimmer” cases.
  • Notice via incorporated definitions: The opinion supports the idea that a PSI’s citation to the relevant commentary (Application Note 10(A)) can provide constitutionally adequate notice of multiple definitional avenues, even if the defendant expected a narrower theory.
  • Sentencing remarks touching foreign destinations of proceeds: The decision suggests district courts may discuss international routing of criminal proceeds when tied to offense circumstances and harm, while still needing to avoid reliance on national origin as a sentencing reason.
  • Practical caution (non-publication): Because the opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is not binding precedent in the same way as published Eleventh Circuit decisions, but it may still be cited as persuasive authority subject to applicable circuit rules and offers a roadmap for litigating Application Note 10(A) in ATM-intrusion cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Device-making equipment” (Guidelines)
Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i), the term is broader than it sounds. Through Application Note 10(A), it includes not only machines that literally make counterfeit cards, but also devices that fit certain federal statutory definitions—here, a “scanning receiver” used to intercept communications.
“Scanning receiver” (18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(8))
A device that can be used to intercept wire or electronic communications unlawfully (by reference to federal wiretap law). The court treated interception of messages between a bank server and an ATM over a network cable as fitting this concept.
“Intercept” (18 U.S.C. § 2510)
In simplified terms, capturing or acquiring communications while they are being transmitted. The opinion accepted that interfering with and acquiring denial messages between server and ATM constituted interception of wire communications.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness concerns whether the court correctly calculated the Guidelines and followed proper steps. Substantive reasonableness asks whether the final sentence is within the range of reasonable outcomes given the § 3553(a) factors.
“Impermissible factors” at sentencing
Certain characteristics (e.g., national origin) cannot be used as reasons to increase punishment. But facts about where money went or what harm occurred may be permissible if they describe the offense’s circumstances rather than the defendant’s identity.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Karol Tellez Duarte affirms that the U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) “device-making equipment” enhancement may be established through Application Note 10(A)’s “scanning receiver” definition when a device (here, a Raspberry Pi) is used to intercept communications between a bank server and an ATM. It also reinforces two sentencing principles: (1) PSI notice can be adequate when it points the defendant to the relevant commentary and incorporated definitions, and (2) district courts may discuss internationally routed proceeds and community harm as offense circumstances, so long as they do not punish protected traits such as national origin.